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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to elevate the understanding of corporate social and 
environmental disclosure (CSED) by examining the nature and level of CSED by the 
listed companies in Saudi Arabia. It analyses CSED determinant’s which includes: 
firm characteristics and corporate governance aspects. Four theoretical perspectives, 
namely stakeholder, legitimacy, institutional, and Agency theory, used to assist in 
better understanding and analysing the findings on the CSED in Saudi Arabia.  
This study adopts a quantitative approach; the selected sample consists of 164 
corporate reports of Saudi companies listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange, in 2012. 
Content analysis is used to measure the extent of social and environmental 
information that are reported. An information index was devised. The data were 
examined using descriptive and statistical tests multivariate analyses and negative 
binomial regression.   
The results show more than 70% of the companies report social and environmental 
information, most of the disclosures are related to human recourses, community 
involvement and economics. Human recourses category rate is 41.5 %, community 
involvement at 24.5%, and economic disclosure is 20%.  Less attention is given to 
environmental, customers and products reporting. The Saudi government encourages 
companies to follow the Saudisation regulations and the Ministry of Labour 
regulations. Hence companies tend to report considerably more on information issues 
addressed by the government.  
This study examines the factors affecting the level of CSED which are firm 
characteristics and corporate governance. CSED level is positively associated with 
firm characteristics (firm size, age, profitability, and leverage), and corporate 
governance mechanism (government ownership and audit firm size). There were no 
significant results for managerial ownership, foreign ownership, CEO duality, board 
size and independency. The determinants of CSED categories indicate that firm age 
is the most influential factor affecting the five categories and human resource is the 
category that is related with most of the factors. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSED) is a growing phenomenon that 
has been a focus for businesses and researchers, as corporate social responsibility is 
one of the voluntary activities that firms are paying more attention to, especially when 
planning or developing their strategies (Preciado, 2009; Saudiembassy, 2017). As 
McGuire (1963, p.144) states, “The idea of social responsibilities supposes that the 
corporation has not only economic and legal obligations, but also certain 
responsibilities to society which extend beyond these obligations”. In addition 
According to the European Commission (2001, p.5), corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) is “a concept whereby companies decide voluntarily to contribute to a better society 
and a cleaner environment”. From the above definitions, it can be shown that socially 
responsible companies play a role in improving the society in which they operate in 
and report on their CSR activities voluntarily. Companies report their social and 
environmental activities as a form of communication with their stakeholders, as well 
as the whole of society. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting can be defined 
as “the process of communicating the social and environmental effects of organisations’ 
economic actions to particular interest groups within society and to society at large” (Gray 
et al., 1996b: p.3). CSR reporting is done to inform them about their interactions and 
responses to the society in which they operate and as a means of discharging their 
accountability to these groups. Companies also choose to report their social and 
environmental practices in order to gain, maintain or repair their legitimacy to society 
(Gray et al., 1996b), and in the Western context, this is regarded as essential if 
companies are to continue surviving.  
This thesis aims to analyse CSED in Saudi Arabia (SA), which is one of the leading 
countries in the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC), Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA), by using the annual reports of the Saudi-listed companies (in 2012).  
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Saudi Arabia  
Little is known about CSED in Saudi Arabia. The limited number of studies that have 
investigated aspects of CSED in the country indicate it is at an early stage of 
development and CSED is a growing phenomenon in the country (Alsaeed, 2006; 
Naser et al, 2006). For these reasons, this research has been conducted to fill this gap 
in the literature and to contribute to the scholarly field, as well as to CSR practitioners 
in Saudi Arabia. This research also aims to investigate the determinants of CSED in 
general and specific CSED categories in Saudi Arabia by examining the effect of the 
firm characteristics and corporate governance (CG) mechanisms.    
This chapter will be organised as follows. Section 1.2 presents an overview of the 
research background and motivations, followed by section 1.3, where the motivations 
underlying the research are presented. Section 1.4 discussed the research aims, 
objectives and questions. The methodology and methods used in this research are 
briefly outlined in section 1.5, while section 1.6 sheds light on the contribution and 
the added value of this study. Finally, section 1.7 presents the structure of the thesis. 
1.2 Background and justifications for this study 
The main aim of this research is to understand the practice of CSED and its categories: 
environment, human resource, products and consumer, community involvement, 
economic, general social disclosure and the factors (both firm characteristics and 
corporate governance mechanisms) that affect CSED in Saudi Arabia. This research 
is based on the annual reports by Saudi companies listed on the Saudi stock exchange 
(Tadawul). Corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSED) is a rising 
phenomenon, especially in developing countries where they have started reporting 
later than in developed countries. In line with this, the research into CSED in 
developing countries is less extensive than in developed countries and hence, there is 
a considerably smaller bank of literature to refer to. Significant numbers of studies 
have been conducted on developed countries (e.g., Adams and Kuasirikun, 2000; 
Giannarakis et al., 2014; Gray et al., 2001; Jennifer Ho and Taylor, 2007; Michelon 
And Parbonetti, 2014; Milne and Patten, 2002; O'Dwyer, 2002). However, a fewer 
numbers of studies have been conducted on CSED in developing countries (Alsaeed, 
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2006; Branco and Rodrigues, 2007; Esa and Ghazali, 2012; Gallhofer et al., 2011; 
Kansal, and Batra, 2014; Li et al., 2013; Muttakin and Khan, 2014; K. Naser et al., 
2006; Said et al., 2009). Only a few studies have been conducted in Saudi Arabia (Al-
Janadi, Rahman, and Omar, 2013; Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004; Alsaeed, 2006; 
Habbash, 2015; Mandurah et al., 2012).  
CSED is considered to be the voluntary disclosure of information on the contributions 
of corporations and their interaction with both the environment and the community 
(Gray et al., 1996b; Guthrie and English, 1997; Hackston and Milne, 1996). It is 
considered to be a proxy of a company’s social and environmental performance where 
interested groups, such as the government, NGOs, investors, customers, can assess 
the company’s interactions with society (Blowfield and Murray, 2008). The term 
CSED is similar to social and environmental disclosure (Hackston and Milne, 1996; 
Gray et al., 1996) and corporate social reporting (Gray et al., 1996). Based on the 
previous studies that have been carried out, CSED has four main categories: 
environment, human resources, products and consumer, and community involvement 
(see Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Hackston and Milne, 1996). Each category 
concerns their interaction with different issues or groups. For example, environmental 
disclosure concerns the environment, human resources concern employees, product 
and consumer concerns customers, and community involvement concerns the local 
community.  
To understand more about CSED, the start of CSR needs to be presented. The classical 
point of view argues that companies should only pay attention to shareholders and 
invest in things that increase the company’s value, which implies that managers are 
not allowed to spend on CSR (Friedman, 1962). Making a similar argument, Arrow 
(1973) stated that a company contributes to the society it is operating in by generating 
profits, and by doing so, it is considered to be socially responsible. This idea has been 
presented by the classical economy theory: the only social concern that a company 
should take into account is maximising shareholders’ wealth in an ethical way by 
following the rules and regulations (Carroll, 1999). However, companies have been 
criticised in the past for creating various social and environmental problems 
throughout the time of their economic operation (e.g., child labour, quality and safety 
issues of products, employees’ health and safety issues, environmental pollution and 
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waste of resources) (Gray et al., 1987b; Islam and Deegan, 2008; Reverte, 2009). 
Because of these problems, companies have been pressurised into considering social 
and environmental issues while they operate, as public awareness of CSR has 
increased. It has become a valid issue to take into account social and environmental 
aspects, as well as different stakeholder groups in companies’ operations, and this is 
what concerns CSR.  
Companies are under pressure to be socially responsible (McWilliams et al, 2006) and 
this pressure has been addressed by (Waddock et al., 2002). He mentioned three 
sources of the pressure that companies face from stakeholders to engage in CSR: 
primary stakeholders (e.g., owners, employees, customers, and suppliers), secondary 
stakeholders (e.g., non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and activists) and 
governments, institutional forces and general societal trends. This idea has been 
supported by the argument of Paul and Siegel (2006) that customers, the media, 
NGOs, institutional and governments are placing increasing pressure on companies to 
invest more in CSR. As a result, companies are taking not only shareholders into 
account, but also various stakeholder groups and the society they operate in by being 
socially responsible. CSR assists companies in keeping good relations with 
stakeholders by reporting social and environmental information which is considered 
to be part of CSR (this will be discussed more in Chapter 3) (Gray et al., 1987a).  
Although corporate social responsibility is a new issue, along with voluntary 
responsibility, companies are now giving it more attention compared to other 
accounting topics. Moreover, awareness of this phenomenon (CSR) has both 
increased and developed over the last few decades (Karim et al., 2015). This could be 
due to the role that CSR plays in building a company’s trust and reputation, as argued 
by Carroll and Shabana (2010). Companies report their social and environmental 
activities through different channels (Porter and Kramer, 2006). For example, their 
annual reports are one of the channels used. The information or accounts that 
companies provide could be either mandatory financial accounts or voluntary non-
financial accounts. Companies choose to disclose voluntary non-financial information 
in order to illustrate that they are socially responsible. Corporate social and 
environmental disclosure, which will be discussed Chapter 3, is an example of the 
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non-financial accounts that enable companies to demonstrate both their accountability 
and social responsibility (Gray et al., 1996a).  
As mentioned previously, the context of this study is Saudi Arabia, where only a 
limited number of studies have been carried out. For this reason, it is desirable that 
more studies in CSED in Saudi Arabia are done and this was one of the motives behind 
this study, which will be discussed in the next section.       
1.3 Motivations Underlying this Research 
Saudi Arabia is a developing country that has institutional, regulatory and contextual 
characteristics similar to Islamic and Arab countries. It is ruled by Shari’ah1  (Islamic 
law); the constitution and formal rules and regulations that are based on Islamic law 
(Al-Matari et al., 2012; Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008). The Saudi Arabian economy 
is the largest economy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and one of the 
largest in the world (Al-Filali and Gallarotti, 2012; Al-Matari et al., 2012, Piesse et 
al., 2012). Additionally, Saudi Arabia performed 25% of the total Arab Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in 2010 and 44% of the total Arab market capitalisation 
(Alshehri and Solomon, 2012; Albassam, 2014, Hearn et al., 2011). It is one of the 
largest oil-producing countries in OPEC and was accountable for 31% of the total oil 
production of OPEC in 2010 (Albassam, 2014; Habbash et al., 2015). Saudi Arabia is 
one of the most competitive economies and the world’s fastest reforming business 
environment. This makes it an ideal investment opportunity. Its tax system is the third 
most rewarding system in the world. Another factor that gives Saudi a significant 
status is its growing economy: it is one of the world’s fastest growing economies with 
6.8 % in 2012 (SAGIA, 2013). Moreover, it is the largest free market in the (MENA) 
region (SAGIA, 2013). The Saudi government offers incentives, such as tax discounts, 
and allows foreign owners to take loans from Saudi banks that belong to the 
government to encourage foreign companies to invest in Saudi Arabia. By 2005, it 
had 642 foreign companies, of which 174 were industrial enterprises (SAMA, 2006). 
                                                 
1 Shari’ah is the “Islamic law about human conduct and regulates everything referring to the life of the 
Muslim”. It is based on the Quraan (God’s Holy Words), “the deeds and expressions of the Prophet 
(the Sunna) and the consensus of Islamic scholars” (Macarulla and Talalweh, 2012, P. 816). 
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As a result of the factors mentioned in the previous paragraph, some of the Saudi 
regulations have been changed, such as the accounting profession (Al-Rehaily, 1992), 
the corporate governance code (Albassam, 2014), investment policies and stock 
market regimes (Tadawul, 2015). Some of these regulations and codes mean that 
companies now have to pay more attention to accountability and transparency. For 
example, the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) (2006, Article 10) includes 
stakeholder rights in sub-section (e) “outlining a written policy that regulate the 
relationship with stakeholders with a view to protecting their respective rights; in particular” 
(Authority, 2006). Additionally, Part Three of the SCGC focuses specifically on 
enhancing both corporate transparency and voluntary disclosure (Authority, 2006). 
There is a shortage of CSR and CSED research in Saudi Arabia (e.g., Maghrabi, 2008; 
Abbas et. al. 2012; Mandurah et.al. 2012; Nalband and Al-Amri, 2013). This situation 
is further worsened by the lack of CSR adoption in its corporations’ strategies. This 
is against a background of the growth of the Saudi economy; hence, the need for the 
government to encourage companies to comply with CSR standards, as stipulated by 
the governance code. 
This study is considered significant for several reasons: 
The first motivation is the relatively low level of CSED that was found in the results 
of previous CSED studies (Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Albassam, 2014; Alsaeed, 2006; 
Habbash, 2015). Based on the status of Saudi Arabia, the level of CSED should be 
higher. Saudi Arabia, as mentioned previously, is a leading country in the Middle East 
with the largest economy and is one of the largest economies in the world (Al-Filali 
and Gallarotti, 2012; Al-Matari et al., 2012, Piesse et al., 2012). It is also one of the 
most competitive economies and the world’s fastest reforming business environments, 
which makes Saudi Arabia an ideal investment opportunity. In addition, it is an 
Islamic Arab country where  Shari’ah2  (Islamic law) is the main regulatory source, 
and the constitution and both formal rules and regulations are based on Islamic law 
(Al-Matari et al., 2012; Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008). CSR is one of the Islamic 
                                                 
2 Shari’ah is the “Islamic law about human conduct and regulates everything referring to the life of the 
Muslim”. It is based on the Quraan (God’s Holy Words), “the deeds and expressions of the Prophet 
(the Sunna) and the consensus of Islamic scholars” (Macarulla and Talalweh, 2012, P. 816). 
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and cultural values that companies who operate in Saudi Arabia should consider 
performing and reporting on.     
The second motivation is that CSED in the Saudi corporate governance code is 
considered to be part of a company’s annual reports voluntary disclosure, which aims 
to ensure the protection of the rights of both shareholders and stakeholders, and could 
affect the level of CSED in Saudi-listed companies. This can create pressure on 
companies to disclose social and environmental disclosure, as the corporate 
governance code is issued by the Capital Market Authority (CMA) (Al Matari et al., 
2012). Therefore, further examination of CSED practice in Saudi Arabia is needed in 
order to analyse the extent and nature of CSED and whether companies respond to the 
pressure from regulatory bodies.   
The third motivation is that companies are engaging in CSR and reporting their CSR 
activities, even though the level of CSED is low, as mentioned previously, as it is still 
a voluntary practice to a certain extent. Moreover, they are reporting on its various 
categories in their annual reports, standalone reports or websites. This study will 
closely examine the nature of the CSR information that companies are reporting on 
and look at what information items they have paid the most attention to. This study 
also provides an analysis of the reasons why companies report their social and 
environmental practices by assessing the legal enforcement and government laws and 
regulations that are related to CSED and examines the extent to which companies have 
reported on them.  
The fourth motivation results from the dearth of empirical research that examines the 
extent and nature of CSED and the determinants of CSED and its categories in Saudi 
Arabia. Furthermore, corporate governance is considered to be a new phenomenon in 
Saudi Arabia. It is a growing issue that companies are now giving more attention to 
(Albassam, 2014). Corporate governance aims to satisfy the demands of stakeholders 
and shareholders, as well as social responsibility. Moreover, corporate governance 
enhances voluntary disclosure, including CSED. Alsaeed (2006), Macarulla and 
Talalweh (2012), Al-Janadi (2013) and Habbash (2015) are the only studies that have 
examined the effect of some corporate governance mechanisms on the level of CSED 
in Saudi Arabia.  
  
21 
This study will contribute to the literature by examining the effects of firm 
characteristics and corporate governance characteristics on CSED, and it will be the 
first study on Saudi Arabia to examine the effect on CSED categories. In addition, 
this PhD research is sponsored by the Saudi government. It is an ethical responsibility 
to focus the research on Saudi Arabia, as this could be beneficial to the country and 
contribute towards improving both the quantity and quality of disclosure. It might also 
have some policy implications, and this is considered a primary motivation for 
conducting the research in Saudi Arabia. 
After presenting the background and justification for this study, it is essential to 
highlight the research’s aim and questions in the next section.      
1.4 Research aim, objectives and questions 
The overall aim of this research is to analyse the extent and nature of corporate social 
and environmental disclosure (CSED) in Saudi Arabia with respect to the factors that 
affect the extent and the nature of disclosure.   
The objectives to achieve this aim are:  
First objective:  
To examine the extent and the determinants of CSED using content analysis to 
analyse the Saudi-listed companies’ annual reports. 
Second objective:  
To analyse the nature and the determinants of CSED in terms of the type of categories 
that have been reported by Saudi Arabian-listed companies. 
These two objectives will be addressed by answering the following research 
questions:  
RQ1: What is the extent and nature of the social and environmental information that 
is reported by Saudi-listed companies?    
This research question is addressed in Chapter 5.  
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RQ2: What are the determinants of the level of CSED reported by Saudi-listed 
companies?  
This research question is addressed in Chapter 6.  
Two sub-questions fall under RQ2: one is related to the firm characteristics that aim 
to examine the effect of specific characteristics (e.g., firm size, firm age, profitability 
(ROA and leverage) on the level of CSED in Saudi Arabia. 
RQ2.a: Do the corporate characteristics of Saudi Arabian-listed companies affect the 
level of CSED?  
The other sub-question is related to the corporate governance mechanisms to examine 
the effect of specific corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., ownership, board size, 
board independence, CEO duality and audit firm size) on the level of CSED in Saudi 
Arabia 
RQ2.b: Do corporate governance mechanisms of Saudi Arabian listed companies 
affect the level of CSED?  
RQ3: What are the determinants of the level of CSED in terms of the categories that 
are reported by Saudi Arabian-listed companies?  
This research question is addressed in Chapter 7. 
There are two sub-questions under the RQ3; one aims to examine the effect of specific 
firm characteristics (e.g., firm size, firm age, profitability (ROA) and leverage) on the 
level of CSED categories in Saudi Arabia 
RQ3.a: Do the corporate characteristics of Saudi Arabian-listed companies affect the 
level of each category of CSED?  
The other sub-question is related to the corporate governance mechanism to examine 
the effect of specific corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., ownership, board size, 
board independence, CEO duality and audit firm size) on the level of CSED categories 
in Saudi Arabia. 
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RQ3.b: Do the corporate governance characteristics of Saudi Arabian-listed 
companies affect the level of each category of the CSED?  
The above research questions will be addressed in this research by using a specific 
methodology and that method will be discussed in the next section. A detailed 
discussion of how each research question and its supporting research questions are 
linked with and supported by the relevant literature is presented in Chapter 3. 
1.5 Summary of the Research Methodology and method 
The aim of this research is to analyse corporate social and environmental disclosure 
(CSED) in Saudi Arabia by using Saudi-listed companies’ annual reports. This study 
is a deductive study that starts by reviewing the related literature and appropriate 
theories as guidance to the research (Adams, 2007). Four key theories are used as the 
basis of the arguments when the main research questions are discussed, analysed and 
posed. These are stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, institutional theory and 
agency theory. A quantitative method is used, which is in line with choosing a 
deductive approach (Alsaeed, 2006; Hackston and Milne, 1996). This research uses 
secondary data, such as the financial reports, corporate social responsibility stand-
alone reports and corporate websites of the sample. The data is required to develop a 
balanced understanding of CSED practice in Saudi Arabia; therefore, all the Saudi-
listed companies in the data collection year are included in the study sample to give 
an extensive view of CSED in Saudi Arabia. Content analysis of the annual reports 
and other reports, documents and information is the technique that is used to collect 
data at this stage. As part of the content analysis, a CSED index was devised, which 
mainly used the Global Reporting Information Guidelines and existing literature, such 
as Hackston and Milne (1996), who used content classifications of CSED based on 
the earlier schemes developed by Ernst and Ernst (1978), Guthrie (1982) and Gray et 
al. (1995). The main categories in the previous research were four categories of 
disclosure: environment, energy, human resources, product and safety, community 
involvement and others. In addition, sub-categories of disclosure were classified 
under each category. In this study, energy is considered as a sub-category under 
environment. Two more categories have been added to the previous categories, 
economic and general social disclosure (see appendix 2 for CSED Index). These two 
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categories have been added based on GRI reports and the annual reports of the selected 
sample of Saudi listed companies in the pilot study3. Some of the data has been 
collected manually from reports and other types of data, such as financial data 
collected by using the Bloomberg online database.   
The sample selected for this study consisted of 163 Saudi-listed companies operating 
in 15 different sectors in 2011 and 2012. These are all Saudi companies listed on the 
Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul). A total of 244 reports were used to collect the data 
(i.e., 163 reports in 2012 and 80 reports in 2011, which were available at the time of 
data collection).  
The quantitative method has been used to analyse the collected data to explore the 
extent of CSED practice in Saudi Arabia, in addition to investigating the motivation 
behind companies that disclose their social and environmental practices. Statistical 
descriptive analysis is used in order to discover the companies’ approach toward 
corporate social and environmental practices, which are represented in their annual 
reports. Moreover, statistical tests, such as correlations and regressions, are used to 
test the hypotheses by investigating the associations between CSED with the firm 
characteristics and corporate governance aspects in order to answer the research 
questions. This will be from the research contributions discussed in the next section.   
1.6 Contributions of this study 
After addressing the motivation behind the study, as well as the research aim, 
objectives and questions, this research contributes to CSED literature in the following 
ways.  
Firstly, this study contributes to the literature about developing countries in general 
and Saudi Arabia in particular. Although significant numbers of studies have 
addressed the issues of corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSED) in the 
past, few of them have been carried out in developing countries in general and Saudi 
                                                 
3 A pilot study was conducted on a sample of 30 companies (see section 4.6.1).  
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Arabia in particular (Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Alsaeed, 2006; Habbash, 2015). In 
addition, the findings of this study provide scope for future research. 
Secondly, this is the first study in Saudi Arabia to analyse in detail CSED information 
reported by listed companies, including the categories, sub-categories and items. This 
insight analysis contributes to Saudi literature by providing an overview of what 
Saudi-listed companies both perform and report on about their corporate social and 
environmental activities and information.  
Thirdly, this study contributes to the extent of the literature there is about the 
determinants of CSED by providing empirical evidence on the factors that determine 
the level of CSED. There are still debates about the effect of some of the firm 
characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms on the level of CSED and 
previous studies found mixed results. The factors investigated in this study include 
firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, profitability, leverage) and corporate 
governance (firm ownership structure, board size and independence, CEO duality and 
audit firm size). 
Fourthly, the study contributes to CSED literature by examining the determinants of 
CSED and its categories due to the scarcity of literature that examines the 
determinants of CSED categories, particularly economic disclosure. To the best of 
this researcher’s knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the factors that 
affect the choice and level of CSED categories in Saudi Arabia. The types of CSED 
(categories) differ between the Saudi-listed companies. Six different categories 
construct the index of this study, which contribute to the literature by providing 
empirical evidence of the determinants of the level of each CSED category. The 
factors used to investigate the determinants of the choice and level of CSED categories 
are firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, profitability, leverage) and corporate 
governance (firm ownership structure, board of directors’ size and independence, 
CEO duality and audit firm size). 
Fifthly, this study also contributes by analysing corporate social and environmental 
disclosure in the Saudi context, which may have particular importance for 
organisations, policy-makers and regulatory bodies, such as the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry, Ministry of Labour, the Capital Market Authority and the 
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Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul). The findings of this study assist in an understanding 
of whether the empirical evidence supports and justifies the need for a change in the 
decisions of organisations and policy-makers or regulatory authorities’ rules and 
regulations in order to enhance the ability of companies to engage in social and 
environmental activities by reporting these activities and information in Saudi Arabia.  
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of eight chapters (as shown in Figure 1.1) that analyse corporate 
social and environmental disclosure (CSED) and the determinants of the level of 
CSED. This chapter one an introduction to the thesis that discusses the background 
and motivations of the research, articulate the main research aim, objectives and 
questions, as well as presenting a summary of the methodology and elaborating on the 
research contribution. It concludes with a brief outline of the thesis structure.   
Since Saudi Arabia is the focus of this study, Chapter two presents an overview of 
Saudi Arabia, including the political, legal and economic culture systems in Saudi 
Arabia. It addition, it aims to explore the accounting and reporting system, corporate 
social and environmental disclosure and the corporate governance framework in Saudi 
Arabia, which will assist in understanding the practice of CSED in Saudi Arabia.  
Chapter three contains the literature review and discusses the development of 
corporate social responsibility and corporate social and environmental disclosure. 
Furthermore, there is a discussion of related theoretical and empirical literature on 
corporate social and environmental disclosure. This chapter consists of three main 
sections: firstly, it presents a discussion of the key concepts of this research, which 
are corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate social and environmental 
disclosure (CSED). Secondly, it reviews three key theories that are associated with 
CSED, which are the stakeholder, legitimacy, institutional and agency theories, by 
emphasising their implications within the Saudi context. A discussion of the theories 
provides a better understanding of CSED behaviour and explains the relationship between 
the firm characteristics, corporate governance mechanisms and CSED. In addition, it 
helps in the process of interpreting and justifying the empirical results. Thirdly, a critical 
analysis of the existing empirical literature of CSED in general and of the specific 
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determinants of CSED, from both developed and developing countries, is covered in 
this section. The research questions and hypotheses are developed in Chapter 2.   
Chapter four provides the research methodology, including the research paradigm and 
philosophical assumptions of choosing the research paradigm. It also provides the 
research method, the data collection techniques and variables measurements, 
including the constructed CSED index. The final part of Chapter Four explains the 
statistical analysis techniques.      
Chapter five presents an analysis of CSED practice in Saudi Arabia by using a content 
analysis technique of the annual reports of Saudi Arabian-listed companies. The data 
is analysed to explain the extent and nature of CSED practice in Saudi Arabia. In 
addition, more analysis is done to analyse the nature of the information that is 
disclosed by Saudi-listed companies in terms of the CSED categories and sub-
categories.  
Chapter six is an empirical analysis of the determinants of the level of CSED and 
investigates the association between firm characteristics, corporate governance 
mechanisms and the level of CSED in Saudi Arabian-listed companies, using a 
multivariate regression analysis for testing the effects of the characteristics and 
aspects on the level of CSED.     
Chapter seven provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of the CSED 
categories, analysing the determinants of the CSED categories (the firm 
characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms). Negative binomial regression 
is the statistical test that is used to test the related hypotheses.     
Chapter Eight is the final chapter and presents the findings of the research and their 
theoretical justification. Furthermore, it presents the research contribution, limitations 
and future research suggestions. 
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Figure 1.1: Thesis structure 
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Chapter 2: Chapter Two: The context of Saudi 
Arabia 
2.1 Introduction 
Following the introduction to the phenomenon of CSED, this chapter will discuss 
some of the factors which influence the development of CSED in Saudi Arabia. These 
include the influence of politics, religion, culture, economics and foreign investment, 
as well as other factors. This chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 provides the 
context of Saudi Arabia, followed by section 2.3 which provides an overview of the 
Saudi political and legal system. Section 2.4 sheds light on the Saudi economic system 
which includes business, foreign investment and the Saudi Stock Exchange. Section 
2.5 focuses on the Saudi Arabian culture, followed by the system of accounting and 
financial reporting in section 2.6. Section 2.7 explores the corporate social and 
environmental disclosure in Saudi Arabia. Section 2.8 discusses the corporate 
governance framework in Saudi Arabia. Finally, a summary of the chapter is provided 
in section 2.9.  
2.2 Context of Saudi Arabia 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is one of the Middle Eastern Countries and one of the 
Gulf Co-operation Council Countries. It is located in the south-west corner of Asia in 
the Arabian Peninsula and it occupies around 80% of it (Saudiembassy, 2017). Saudi 
Arabia has borders with Iraq, Jordan and Kuwait to the north, Yemen and Oman to 
the south, and Qatar, Bahrain and the U.A.E to the east (Saudiembassy, 2017). Also 
to the east is the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea lies to the west (Saudiembassy, 2017; 
Shoult, 2006). The capital of Saudi Arabia is Riyadh. Saudi Arabia has two holy 
Islamic cities: Mecca (the direction of all Muslim prayer in the world) and Medina 
(city of Prophet Mohammed). Every year significant numbers of Muslims come to 
these cities from all over the world to make pilgrimages (either Omrih or Hajj). The 
population of Saudi Arabia (2016 estimate) is nearly 31.7 million people, 11.5 million 
of them non-Saudi (Saudiembassy, 2017). Saudi Arabia consists of thirteen provinces, 
each of which has its own provincial capital. Arabic is the official language, and the 
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Arabic calendar (Hegira) is used (Shoult, 2006). The official religion of Saudi Arabia 
is Islam, and its influence pervades all aspects of life in the country, including 
accounting practices, banking and the Stock Exchange. 
2.3  Political and legal System 
Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy the laws of which, are based on the Quran and 
the Sunnah, and some elements of Egyptian, French and customary law (CIA: World 
Factbook 2014) are issued by Royal Decree. The main legislative bodies are the Majlis 
al-Shura (Council of Consultation) and the Council of Ministers, which has the King 
as its head and the Crown Prince and Prime Minister as members. 
 Consultative Council (Majlis Al-Shura) has one hundred and fifty members, chosen 
by the King, and based in Riyadh (Saudiembassy, 2017). In 2003 the Council of 
Ministers announced its intention to introduce elections for a third of the Majlis 
incrementally over a period of four to five years. This process indicates the 
government plan to engage Saudi citizens in decision making (CIA: World Factbook, 
2014). The council of Ministers helps the King carry out his duties; all the members 
are appointed by the monarch every four years. These two bodies have the power to 
take initiatives or approve public policy (Basheikh, 2002). Recently women began to 
play a role in the Saudi Government as they have been appointed in Majlis Al-Shura 
and the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry (JCCI). Moreover, the deputy 
Minister of Education is a woman for the first time. Another significant change in 
government policies can be shown in the recent elections to the board of directors of 
Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry (JCCI) for the year 2015, in which 
elections women were allowed to hold positions and to vote.  
Saudi Arabia has never been colonised by any Western country, but some of these 
countries have exerted an influence on accounting in the Kingdom through accounting 
education or the development of the capital market and this western effect is 
considered to influence corporate social and environmental practices and disclosure.  
As mentioned previously, Islam is the official religion of Saudi Arabia, and all aspects 
of life are based on Shari‘a law which refers to the body of Islamic law 
(www.Saudiembassy.net). The legal system in Saudi Arabia is based on the Quran as 
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the main source, which provides the guidelines, not only for individual behaviour and 
actions, but also for social and community life. The Sunnah, containing Mohammed’s 
peace be upon him (PBUH) directives as to how the ideals of the Quran can be applied 
in practical terms, is the second source. Ijma and Qiyas are other sources; Ijma is the 
interpretation of certain Islamic traditions as decided by theologians in the first few 
hundred years of Islam, while the Qiyas serves to resolve new problems emerging 
from scientific and cultural developments through the application of principles from 
the Quran and Sunnah (Basheikh, 2002).  
2.4 Economic system 
In the past, Western Asia was ruled by different Arab tribes and had very few sources 
of income; basic agriculture was the main economic activity in addition to some 
revenue earned from helping pilgrimages to visit the Holy Places, such as Mecca. The 
need for accountancy was not necessary in such an environment (Elkharouf, 1985). 
However, this changed with the discovery of oil in the late 1930s, where oil became 
the principal source of income for the government. A rise in oil prices then boosted 
the economy and allowed for industrial diversification, followed by a global recession 
which, in turn, resulted in a drop in oil prices leading to economic instability. In the 
light of this, the Saudi government realized the benefit of varying the economic 
sources rather than depending on a single commodity (Al-Rehaily, 1992). In the last 
two decades, Saudi Arabia has encouraged political economic and social developments 
which result in an improved economic position.  Saudi Arabia has become one of the 
largest economies in the world with the largest stock market in the Middle East (Al-
Filali and Gallarotti, 2012; Al-Matari et al., 2012, Piesse et al., 2012). 
Basheikh (2002) reports that the Saudi government has begun a number of 
development programmes, such as five-year development plans. The first 
development plan was carried out between 1970 and 1975, and still continues. The 
basic concepts behind these plans are: firstly, to restate the government’s commitment 
to the dissemination of Islam and its social and cultural values; secondly, to support 
free enterprise to provide benefits the entire community; thirdly, to create a wide range 
of facilities and institutions that will enhance the social and personal lives of all 
Saudis; fourthly, to decrease dependence on petroleum as the only source of the 
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country’s revenues and, finally, to complete the solid infrastructure which is necessary 
to achieve the other aims. In line with the development programs that Saudi Arabia 
has implemented in its plans, the government has announced a new vision (Saudi 
Arabia’s vision for 2030) in 2016 encompassing long-term goals and expectations 
which reflect the countries strengths and capabilities4 . One of the goals is to use other 
rich natural resources and not to depend solely on oil. In addition, the vision is to 
transform its unique strategic location into a global hub connecting the three 
continents (Asia, Europe and Africa). Moreover, one of the vision’s goals is to 
introduce transparency and accountability reform by setting up performance criteria 
for government agencies.   
Companies are required to use the government plans and vision as a guide for 
corporate social responsibility: for example, where the government’s priority is 
education a company could choose to contribute to this in order to enhance the 
legitimacy of educational reform. Based on the new vision, companies are expected 
to be more accountable and transparent in adhering to government plans.  
2.4.1 Business in Saudi Arabia 
According to the latest report of the official central department of statistics and 
information of Saudi Arabia (2010), there are 910,000 companies operating in Saudi 
Arabia, most of which are small and family-owned (84%), followed by 13% medium 
size companies and only 3% large. Around 87% of the companies are operating in the 
private sector, while 12% are in the public sector and 1% are non-profit organizations 
and foreign companies. In 2000, foreign investment was permitted in Saudi Arabia. 
The Saudi government at that time encouraged foreign companies by offering 
incentives such as tax discounts and allowing foreign owners to take loans from Saudi 
banks belonging to the government. By 2005 there were a total of 642 foreign 
companies, of which 174 were industrial enterprises (SAMA, 2006). 
According to Al-Rehaily (1992), the rapid growth of the Saudi Arabian economy has 
greatly affected the accounting profession. There has been a rise in per capita income 
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from oil revenues, which has led to increased consumption. Imports and exports have 
both increased. All sectors have been involved in development plans in which huge 
sums of money have been invested. Great changes have taken place over the past thirty 
years in the form of business enterprises active in KSA, with the trend moving away 
from traditional individual or family-owned businesses towards partnerships and 
corporations (CMA, 2009). Since the early 1970s the considerable rise in the number 
of corporations has led to a demand for a broad range of accounting services, and 
therefore to an increase in the number of firms offering such services (Al-Rehaily, 
1992).  
Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s top 20 most competitive economies and has 
significant number of factors that make it the ideal investment opportunity. One of 
these factors is that Saudi is the world’s fastest reforming business environment. It is 
also one of the world’s largest economies and the largest economy in Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA). Its tax system as it is the third most rewarding system in the 
world. Another factor is its growing economy: Saudi is one of the world fastest 
growing economies with 6.8 % in 2012. Moreover, it is the largest free market in 
(MENA) region. 
2.4.2 The Saudi Stock Market and corporate governance 
The first joint stock company, the Arab Automobile Company, was established in 
Saudi Arabia in 1943. By 1975 there were 17 public companies, but at this time there 
were no regulations (Basheikh, 2002). This number increased rapidly during the 
economic boom of the 1970s when many large corporations and joint venture banks 
were set up, but the market remained informal until the early 1980s, when the 
government began a rapid development programme. As part of the Saudi government 
intention to create a free market economy, an official stock exchange was formed 
(Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Tadawul, 2012). The responsibility of operating, 
regulating and controlling was given to the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA). In 
order to improve the regulatory framework, share-trading intermediation was 
restricted to commercial banks (Al-Rumaihi, 1997). In 1989 automated clearing and 
settlement were introduced, and the following year the introduction of the Electronic 
Securities Information System (ESIS), was developed and operated by SAMA. The 
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number of the listed firms gradually increased from 14 in 1975 to 72 in 1995. In 
October 2001, the Tadawul system for securities trading, clearing and settlements was 
initiated. Two years later the Capital Market Authority (CMA) was established (16th 
June, 2003), under the aegis of the Capital Market Law, with the purpose of operating, 
regulating, controlling and developing the capital market in Saudi Arabia (Basheikh, 
2002; Tadawul, 2012). Foreigners are now permitted to invest in the Saudi stock 
market, even if they are not resident in the Saudi Arabia. The Saudi stock market is 
now the largest in the Arab world, based on the capital, and Saudi Capital Market 
growth between 1996 and 2005 was high, with a huge increase in the number of 
transactions, volume and value-trading. However, at the beginning of 2006 the stock 
market crashed, which gave a warning to the Saudi stock market authority who, in 
July of that year, formulated regulations and requirements for greater disclosure and 
compliance with corporate governance. In addition, the CMA began to attract foreign 
direct investment (FDI) by promoting and developing the financial reporting of 
companies in order to be clearer and more informative for investors (CMA, 2007). 
However corporate social and environmental disclosure is not included yet in the 
reporting regulations. In 2007 the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) separated from 
the CMA after the Saudi Council of Ministers approval to make it an independent 
entity (Tadawul, 2012). To date (2016), there are 176 listed companies in the Saudi 
stock market. The Saudi stock market comprises fifteen sectors (see appendix 3).  
2.5  Saudi Arabian Culture 
Saudi Arabia is one of the Islamic and Arab countries and is a member of the Gulf 
Co-operation Council Countries, which has strong religious ties. Arab traditions, such 
as generosity and hospitality towards strangers, family and friends have also 
influenced Saudi culture (www.Saudiembassy.net). In Islam, the benefit of the whole 
society is more important than the individual, so harming or wasting resources is 
forbidden (Yaseen Al-Janadi et al., 2013). These Islamic and cultural attributes make 
social and environmental activities common and familiar to company managers and 
decision makers as well as to stakeholders and other groups in the expectation that 
they will positively contribute to the region where they operate.   
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Hofstede (1980) has described the culture of Arab countries as homogeneous and 
united by a common language (Arabic). He argues that Saudi Arabia exemplifies a 
high-power distance society where, for example, children usually have a great respect 
toward their parents. In Saudi Arabia, managers make decisions dictatorially (Bhuian, 
1998). In his view, Saudi Arabia is a high uncertainty avoidance society; as a result, 
people usually depend on Islamic religion as a protection from unknown situations 
(Al- Rumaihi, 1997; Basheikh, 2002). Moreover, Saudi society is highly traditional 
and emphasises relationships with family and friends. As mentioned previously, Islam 
influences Saudi culture, such that Saudi children are expected to look after their 
parents and remain close to them, as well as remaining together in groups and 
contributing to these groups. The leader of the group plays a role in organizing it.  
These features in Saudi society demonstrate the importance of collectivism. A high 
degree of masculinity is another prominent cultural feature of the Saudi society, 
despite Islam does not distinguishing between men and women (Al-Rumaihi, 1997; 
Basheikh, 2002).  Although men and women have the same rights in the work place, 
the majority of the workforce is formed by males; the opportunities open to women 
are limited, and women are not represented in high-ranking positions. However, this 
has begun to change: as recently as 2014 a woman was appointed as a CEO of the 
largest bank in the Saudi, National Commercial Bank (NCB) and women now have 
more presence in official councils.  
Nowadays, Saudi is influenced by Western culture. This effect can be seen especially 
in the younger generation. The influence of developed countries on Saudi culture 
extends to accounting and reporting. A large number of managers and employees 
completed their higher education at universities in the USA, the UK or other Western 
countries. The increase in adopting CSED practices by Saudi companies recently 
could be due to many factors; such as the influence of multinational companies 
operating in Saudi, as well as Saudi companies aiming to gain a competitive advantage 
by being socially responsible by competing globally. The next sub-section (1.6) aims 
to explore the accounting and financial system in Saudi Arabia.  
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2.6  The accounting and financial reporting system in 
Saudi Arabia 
Given that Saudi Arabia is an Islamic Arabic developing country, it has institutional, 
regulatory and contextual characteristics similar to some other developing Islamic and 
Arab countries (Piesse et al., 2012). The western accounting system influenced that 
of Saudi: according to Basheikh (2002), in the 1930s the Aramco company was the 
first foreign oil production company in Saudi Arabia. At that time, there were no laws 
or regulations for Saudi companies, which meant that other countries’ rules and 
regulation were used. In 1965, the Saudi Ministry of Commerce issued the first legal 
guidelines for the accounting profession - the Companies Law - which was revised in 
1982, and 1992 (Al-Rumaihi, 1997; Al-Mogbel, 2003).  The Company Law consists 
of 234 articles which assist in building Saudi accounting ordinances. Even so, only a 
few of these concern accounting and auditing regulations and none of the articles refer 
to accountancy or accounting standards (Alkahtani, 2010; Al-Mogbel, 2003). To 
resolve this issue, another law was introduced in 1974, the Accountants Law, which 
addressed accountancy specifications (SOCPA, 2007).  
The third law that underpins accounting regulations in Saudi Arabia is the Income Tax 
and Al-Zakat Law. In Saudi Arabia, Saudi citizens are not required to pay tax. 
However, they are, as Muslims with a certain level of income, obliged to pay Zakat5.  
The Income Tax and Zakat Law was introduced in 1950 and revised several times 
after that (Al-Mogbel, 2003). Starting in 1979 the Saudi government worked to 
established accounting standards to improve and develop the accounting system. As 
a result of this, the Saudi Accounting Association (SAA) has been established and the 
‘General Presentation and Disclosure Standards’ which are the first accounting 
standards in Saudi Arabia, were issued in 1986 with the name (SOCPA, 2007).  To 
continue developing accounting standards, in 1992 the Saudi Organization for Public 
                                                 
5 ‘Zakat’ is Islamic social tax: every Muslim individual and company must pay 2.5% of their wealth 
towards a charitable cause, such as making donations to the poor and needy (Kamla et al., 2006). 
Companies are also required to pay Zakat to the government as a type of tax.  
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Certified Accountants (SOCPA) was established to take over SAA (Alkahtani, 2010). 
Recently (2016), the SOCPA approved the change from the Saudi Accounting 
Standards (SASs), which were based on the International Accounting Standards IASs, 
the USA Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAO) and UK practice. This 
transition was designed to improve the Saudi accounting system. The new application 
of the IFRSs in Saudi listed companies will be on 2017 annual reports and 2018 for 
the non-listed (SOCPA, 2016).  
2.7 Ministry of Labour regulation  
The Saudi Labour Law issued by the Saudi Labour Ministry in 2005 (amended in 
2015) includes regulations aim to organize the relationship between companies and 
employees to maximize the benefits and reduce problems. Different issues are 
included in the labour law for example: the employment system, working hours, 
health and safety, the employment of disabled people, the retirement system, 
employment contracts and training systems. Companies are expected to follow these 
laws and regulation thus, they report doing so to show that they are legitimate. 
Recently, the Saudi Labour Ministry has introduced a law to reduce the 
unemployment rate and ensure that there will be ample skills among the locals. This 
law encourages companies to nationalise jobs (Saudisation) by either recruiting new 
Saudi staff or replacing foreign employees with local employees in occupied jobs. 
Moreover, the Saudi Labour Ministry imposes fines on companies that do not comply 
with this requirement and may be prohibited from receiving any governmental 
benefits to ensure companies pay more attention to this issue. In the other hand, 
companies following Saudisation requirements are rewarded by the Saudi 
government. In 2011, the Ministry of Labour has implemented a system to control 
companies Saudisation it calls (Netaqat) which is a point system to enforce companies 
to increase the number of Saudi employees. The higher the rate of Saudi employees 
the more the points the company got thus, the reward increases (Department of Labour 
and Employment, Ministry of Labour). Moreover, Saudisation certificate6 is given to 
                                                 
6 A Saudisation certificate is given by the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Labour to firms that achieved the 
Saudisation target.  
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the companies that follow the saudisation law, without this certificate, the company 
cannot apply for governmental tenders and projects.   
2.8  Corporate social and environmental disclosure in 
Saudi Arabia 
As discussed, Saudi Arabia is an Islamic country and all the Saudi citizens are 
Muslims which affects the concept and practice of corporate social and environmental 
disclosure. This concept derives from the Islamic provisions in Quran or Sunnah. 
Although corporate social and environmental disclosure is voluntary, none of the 
current laws or accounting standard includes it. However, accountability, 
sustainability and transparency, which are part of corporate social responsibility, are 
included in the legal accounting regulations. This might change after the change in 
accounting standards from the Saudi Accounting Standards (SAAs) to the 
International Financial Reports Standards (IFRSs). Applying the (IFRSs) is intended 
to enhance the accountability and transparency, including the practice of corporate 
social and environmental disclosure. It can also be argued that the legal system affects 
the form of corporate social responsibility that companies choose to engage in and 
report. As the offshoot of an absolute monarchy the legal system in Saudi Arabia gives 
the government regulation and legislation priority in terms of corporate social and 
environmental disclosure. There is no evidence to suggest that there are legal 
requirements to enforce companies to disclose their social and environmental 
activities7. However, companies follow the government regulation and plans when 
choosing the type of social and environmental responsibilities they report: such as job 
nationalisation, minimum wage and the retirement system. These types of activities 
that companies undertake become a priority for them rather than other social and 
environmental activities. Moreover, when the government puts pressure on companies 
to follow a specific regulation by means of fines for not implementing it or by 
withdrawing government benefits, such activities will become more commonplace. 
For example, the Ministry of Labour has its own system, the nationalisation 
                                                 
7 After searching in Saudi government (official website), SAGIA (investment ministry), Ministry of commerce and industry 
(SACA) and Ministry of labour and other Saudi regulator (2016) 
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employing system (Netaqat) to enforce companies to increase the number of Saudi 
employees. In the case of CSED, in order to enforce compliance, the Saudi 
government decided to exclude companies’ contributions to charities from the 
“Zakat”. As a result of this decision companies could choose to pay the amount 
specified for corporate social responsibility to charities and to disclose this action in 
their reports. Corporate social responsibility includes protecting stakeholders’ rights 
as declared in the Saudi Corporate Governance Cods (SCGC) (article 10) which states 
that “companies should consider all stakeholders not only company owners, also 
government, employees, customers and local community”.  
2.9 Corporate governance framework in Saudi Arabia 
Corporate governance is a relatively new issue in Saudi Arabia; however, it is 
considered an important part of the Saudi economic reforms. At the beginning, the 
only regulations related to corporate governance behaviour was included in the 
Company Law issued in 1965 (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 
2008). Nevertheless, this regulation addresses only a few corporate governance 
provisions. International organisations (the World Bank, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recommended giving more 
attention to corporate governance in developing countries in general and in Saudi 
Arabia in particular (Rwegasira, 2000; Clarke, 2004; ROSC, 2009, Albassam, 2014). 
Corporate governance has, in effect, been given more attention following the 
economic crises in the year 1997/1998 which hit developed and developing countries 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) was the 
responsible authority for regulating corporate governance as it was responsible for the 
stock market in the period between 1984 until 2003 when the Saudi government 
established the CMA (Al-Nodel and Hussainey, 2010). Since its establishment the 
CMA has become responsible for corporate governance regulation and reform 
(Alshehri and Solomon, 2012). The latest corporate governance reform, the Saudi 
Corporate Governance Codes (SCGC), was issued in the year 2006 (Maacarulla and 
Talalweh, 2012). The reform in corporate governance codes took place after the 
dramatic decline of the Saudi stock market in 2006, which caused about 25% market 
value lose in just 2 months (February and march) and by December 53%, after a raped 
growth in market capitalization since 2004. This growth grasped the attention of the 
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CMA from forming corporate governance code (SFG, 2009; Alshehri and Solomon, 
2012). However, due to the dramatic drop in the Saudi stock market, a question has 
been raised whether the existence of the governance legislation could effectively 
protect investors (Al-Abbas, 2009). At that time, the CMA identifies the urgent need 
to improve corporate governance legislation and develop external corporate 
governance mechanisms (SFG, 2009; Tadawul, 2012, Alshehri and Solomon, 2012). 
In November 2006, the CMA introduced the SCGC aiming to rebuild the invertors 
confidence in the market and to protect investors (Al-Abbas, 2009). The SCGC, 2006 
addresses a various number of corporate governance issues including the rights of 
shareholders and the general assembly, disclosure and transparency, board of directors 
and internal controls and risk management (CMA, 2010). According to Alshehri and 
Solomon, 2012, the corporate governance regime in Saudi Arabia is based on the 
Anglo-American model of corporate governance giving a great attention to protecting 
shareholders’ interests. The SCGC is mostly derived from the 1992 UK Cadbury 
Report (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Al-Abbas, 2009; Seidl et al., 2013).  For 
example, as recommended by the SCGC, the board of directors is a unitary board of 
directors which consists of executive and non-executive directors, who are 
accountable to shareholders. On the other hand, there are differences in ownership 
structure, social norms and highly hierarchical social structure which may delay the 
effectiveness of formal corporate governance mechanisms in Saudi Arabia (Al-
Twaijry et al., 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; 
ROSC, 2009; Baydoun et al., 2013). 
The Saudi corporate governance structure includes external and internal frameworks. 
First, the external framework which consists of: The Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry (MCI), the Capital Market Authority (CMA) the Saudi Stock Exchange 
(Tadawul) and the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA). 
MCI was established in 1953 and until 2003 it was the only authority responsible of 
regulating listed companies. In 2003, the Companies Act has been established by the 
CMA, which includes a few number of corporate governance provisions in the benefit 
of protecting shareholders. For example, Article 10 subsection e in the 2006 Saudi 
Corporate Governance Codes includes provisions related to the stakeholders’ rights 
and social responsibility “Outlining a written policy that regulate the relationship with 
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stakeholders with a view to protecting their respective rights; in particular” 
(Authority, 2006). Various responsibilities of the MCI were given to the CMA after 
the 2006 corporate governance reforms (CMA, 2010). Establishing the CMA in 2003 
helped in the external corporate governance reform in Saudi Arabia (Hussainey and 
Al-Nodel, 2008; Al-Matari et al., 2012). The CMA is mainly responsible of 
developing and regulating the Saudi stock market, increasing investors’ confidence 
and encouraging transparency and disclosure in listed companies (CMA, 2010). In 
order to do this, they issued seven corporate governance rules including the 2004 
Market Law, the 2004 Listing Rules, the 2005 Investment Funds Regulations, the 
2005 Merger and Acquisition Regulations and the 2006 Saudi Corporate Governance 
Code. The operations of the Saudi stock market Tadawul established in 1985 by Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Tadawul, 
2012). Before that time, the market continued to be informal. The Tadawul is a 
regulatory body which responsible for organising the financial market.  
Saudi Arabia where corporate governance system concerns more about shareholders’ 
interests (as discussed in 2.9). Although companies are accountable to stakeholders, 
accountability to shareholders usually taking more of companies attention than other 
stakeholders (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004), especially in a country like Saudi Arabia 
where corporate governance system concerns more about shareholders’ interests.  
2.10 Chapter summary 
This chapter presents an introduction of the Saudi Arabian context as one of the 
Middle Eastern Countries and Gulf Co-operation Countries (GCC) with an absolute 
monarchical system. Saudi Arabia is an Islamic country; the Saudi legal system and 
laws are all based on Islamic aspects and Shari’a Law is implemented in all the legal 
interactions including banking and accounting systems. Saudi Arabia depends 
economically on the oil industry; however, there is a tendency toward widening the 
economic resources. This chapter presents a background of business in Saudi Arabia 
as one of the world’s top 20 most competitive economies and one the world’s fastest 
reforming business environment. These previous factors encourage foreign investors 
to invest in Saudi. Foreign investments have influenced the local companies in many 
aspects such as companies’ policies, accounting system, corporate social and 
  
42 
environmental activities and disclosure and corporate governance. Although there is 
no legal regulation to enforce companies to disclose social and environmental 
activities, the government (i.e., Ministry of Labour) is putting pressure on companies 
to be socially responsible. To justify this issue, CSED in Saudi Arabia, the following 
chapter will discuss the theories and the previous empirical literature.    
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore more about corporate social and 
environmental disclosure (CSED) by identifying the key concepts, addressing the 
related theoretical perspective and reviewing the relevant literature of CSED in order 
to formulate the research questions after identifying the gap in the literature. The 
predominant literature in the CSED field relates to the Western and developed 
countries with a relatively small but growing bank of literature on CSED in 
developing countries. Reviewing the existing literature in CSED will lead to an 
increased understanding of CSED which serve to identify gaps within the existing 
literature to which a study on the Saudi context contributes.  
This chapter is structured into 8 sections. It will commence by identifying the key 
research concepts in two sections: Section 3.2 discusses the corporate social 
responsibilities then Section 3.3 discussed the corporate social and environmental 
disclosure. Followed by Section 3.4 where relevant well-known theories, Stakeholder, 
legitimacy, institutional and agency theories are addressed for greater understanding 
of the phenomena CSED. In Section 3.5 the theoretical approach of this research is 
introduced in order to present the implemented theories. Section 3.6 reviews the 
existing CSED literature in developed and developing countries including Gulf 
Cooperation Council countries in general and Saudi Arabia in specific which is the 
centre of this research. Section 3.7 reviews the literature on the determinants of CSED 
which are firm characteristics and corporate governance aspects. Section 3.8 provides 
an overview of the literature on the determinants of CSED categories. Section 3.9 
presents the rationale for research questions and formulates aims, questions and 
objectives for this research. Section 3.10 concludes and summarizes the discussions 
in this chapter. 
3.2 Development of corporate social responsibility 
This research aims to investigate corporate social and environmental disclosure 
(CSED) in Saudi listed companies with respect to corporate characteristics and 
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corporate governance mechanisms as determinacies of CSED. In order to carry out 
this investigation corporate social responsibility (CSR), and CSED needs to be 
explored. To do so a look back in the history of corporation is needed. From a classical 
point of view, Friedman (1962) argues that companies should only pay attention to 
shareholders and invests in increasing company’s value which implies that managers 
are not allowed to spend on CSR. In a similar point of view, Arrow (1973) stated that 
by generating profits witch is considered as contribution to the society its operating 
in, company is considered to be socially responsible. This idea has been presented by 
the classical economy theory; the only social concern that company should take into 
account is maximising shareholders’ wealth in an ethical way by following rules and 
regulations(Carroll, 1999). However, Companies have been criticised in the past for 
creating various social and environmental problems throughout their economic 
operation (e.g. child labour, quality and safety issues of products, employees’ health 
and safety issues, environmental pollution, waste of resources) (Gray et al., 1987b; 
Islam and Deegan, 2008; Reverte, 2009). As a result of these problems, companies 
have been put under pressure to consider social and environmental issues while they 
are operating as the public awareness of CSR has increased. Considering social and 
environmental aspects as well as different stakeholder groups in companies’ 
operations have become a vital issue, and this is what CSR concerns.  
CSR is the social and environmental effects of business entities to various interest 
groups and society throughout their economic operations (Rob Gray et al., 1987a). By 
being socially responsible companies are considering not only shareholders but also 
various stakeholder groups and the society. Companies are facing pressure to be 
socially responsible (McWilliams et al., 2006), this pressure has been addressed by 
Waddock et al. (2002). He mentioned three sources of stakeholders’ pressure on 
companies to engage in CSR; primary stakeholders (e.g. owners, employees, 
customers, and suppliers), secondary stakeholders (e.g. non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and activists) and governments, institutional forces and general 
societal trends. This idea has been supported also by the argument of Paul and Siegel 
(2006) that  the customers,  media, NGOs, institutional and governments are forming 
an increasing pressure on companies to invest more in CSR. Companies are expected 
to respond to the pressure from stakeholders in order to keep good relations with them 
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through reporting social and environmental information which considered part of CSR 
(will be discussed in the next section (3.3) (Gray et al., 1987a). 
Although corporate social responsibility is a new issue, compared to other accounting 
topics, as well as a voluntary responsibility, companies are now giving it more 
attention. Moreover the awareness of this phenomenon (CSR) has increased and 
developed in the last few decades (Karim et al., 2015). This could be due to the role 
that CSR play in building  company’s trust and reputation as argued by Carroll and 
Shabana (2010). Furthermore, it is concerned with satisfying the legitimate and ever-
expanding expectations of society. Companies are aiming to prove their legitimacy by 
being socially responsible and this is one of the practices that companies do to 
discharge their accountability to stakeholders and the society. Accountability involves 
two main responsibilities or duties: 1) to undertake actions or decisions, or not to, 2) 
to present an account for these actions (Gray et al., 1996c). Increasing accountability 
is in the best interest of companies (Gray et al., 1996; Power, 1994) and in order to 
achieve this there is a tendency towards increasing the degree of organisational 
transparency by increasing the level of disclosure including social and environmental. 
Transparency is a mechanism of accountability which concerns the visibility and 
openness of the company when reporting information (Gray, 1992; Gray and 
Morrison, 1992; Roberts, 2009). Transparency is the provided information by the 
company about their activities including social and environmental activities, it is how 
organizations display their accountability and responsibility to society through 
different channels (Porter and Kramer, 2006). For example, companies’ annual reports 
are one of the channels that are used to reveal their accountability toward stakeholders. 
However, “a complete transparency is an impossible fantasy” (Roberts, 2009, p. 958). 
The information or accounts that companies provide could be mandatory, financial 
accounts or voluntary, non-financial accounts. Companies choose to disclose 
voluntary non-financial information to illustrate that they are socially responsible. 
Corporate social and environmental disclosure, which will be discussed in the next 
section (3.3), is an example of the non-financial accounts that have become one of the 
companies’ concerns in order to demonstrate accountability and social responsibility 
(Gray et al., 1996a).  
  
46 
Saudi Arabia, as mentioned in Chapter 2, is a developing country and one of the 
leading economies in the Middle East which is aiming to improve its economy and 
investment, with a focus on its foreign investment. Previous factors have encouraged 
the government to follow international standards in business.  CSR is one of the issues 
that is growing on a global scale to become more of a necessary issue than a voluntary 
one, although it is still voluntary.  The Saudi government’s intention can be seen in 
the new 2030 vision which it announced in 2016.  Increasing transparency is one of 
the key aims of this vision. Moreover, awarding greater attention to the third sector8 
is another aim of the Saudi 2030 vision.  Enhancing transparency, as well as paying 
more attention to the third sector positively affects social responsibility.  This new 
vision and intention of the government will reflect on companies operating in Saudi 
Arabia.  
 Saudi Arabia is an Islamic, traditional country which depends on Shariah9 in all 
aspects.  In Islam, CSR is implemented in all trades such as accountability, 
environmental, resources conservation and Zakat10. As a way of implementing CSR 
in Saudi business, the Saudi Arabian Responsible Competitiveness Index (SARCI) 
was launched in 2008 by 2 Saudi companies (one state and one semi private), and one 
International non-governmental organization.  In the first year 40 companies 
participated and this number continued to increase every year. An award (King Khaled 
Responsible Competitiveness Award) for the three strongest performances in 
responsible competitiveness was also presented every 2 years. This index indicates 
how important CSR has become in Saudi Arabia. 
                                                 
8 Third sector is the type of organizations or societies that are not governmental (public) or private it 
includes charities, voluntary or society groups which are non-profit organizations.    
9 The Shari’ah is the “Islamic law about human conduct and regulates everything referring to the life 
of the Muslim”. It is based on Quraan (God’s Holy Words), “the deeds and expressions of the Prophet 
(the Sunna) and the consensus of Islamic scholars”(Macarulla and Talalweh, 2012, P. 816). 
10 ‘Zakat’ is Islamic social tax: every Muslim individual and company must pay 2.5% of their wealth 
towards a charitable cause, such as making donations to the poor and needy (Kamla et al., 2006). 
Companies are also required to pay Zakat to the government as a type of tax.  
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As a result of the increased consideration companies and researchers have given to 
CSR, and as companies’ transparency depend on the accessibility of information when 
communicating with stake holders via different media such as company reports, 
corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSED) has become a major area of 
interest for companies and researchers. This method of reporting as a way of 
communicating with society is the main focus of this study since it’s an essential way 
of showing the stakeholder group how responsible and accountable the company is to 
society. The next section will address the concept of CSED; will explain in more detail 
what it is, why it’s important for companies to implement it and what the benefits are 
from reporting CSR activities. 
3.3 Development of corporate social and environmental 
disclosure 
As outlined in the above section (3.2) corporate social responsibility (CSR) has 
become an essential issue companies considering throughout their operations.  Since 
social and environmental disclosure considered as a demonstration of CSR, CSED has 
become also a significant practice that companies pay more attention to. This section 
will explore the development of corporate social and environmental disclosure 
(CSED). Organisations, in the majority of countries, are required to meet regulations 
(e.g., International Accounting Standards, IAS’s) and to report their financial 
outcomes of their activities to stakeholders in order to evidence their profit and loss. 
Conventionally, this is the information that financial reports contain. Another type of 
reporting, which is as important as financial data, is to disclose the non-financial 
aspects such as social and environmental activities. Albeit it is voluntary to disclose 
social and environmental activities, it is still important to satisfy stakeholders and to 
demonstrate the company’s legitimacy to operate. Both types of reports are 
fundamental for the company because they assist in communicating with stakeholder 
groups and informing them about the economic and societal effects of the company 
(Murray, 2010).  
Corporate social reporting is the technique that companies use to communicate with 
stakeholders and society to inform them of the companies’ economic actions, social 
and environmental contribution. As defined by Gray et al.  (1996b, p. 3) corporate 
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social and environmental disclosure is “the process of communicating the social and 
environmental effects of organisations’ economic actions to particular interest groups within 
society and to society at large”. Based on this definition, it can be argued that this 
communication aims to broaden companies’ accountability and responsibility to move 
beyond satisfying only shareholders by providing financial accounts to all 
stakeholders and society (Gray et al., 1995; Owen et al., 2001; Turner et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, CSED considers a type of organisational social accounting to introduce 
accountability (Gray et al., 2001). As companies are paying more attention to society 
with regards to how they operate and how they try to avoid harming the environment 
(e.g. pollution and waste) as well as positively contributing to society by improving 
the quality and safety of their products, saving resources and caring about their 
workers’ rights (Reverte, 2009). By considering different stakeholders’ non-financial 
anticipations companies could discharge their accountability by disclosing social and 
environmental issues (Gray et al., 1996; Haniffa, 2002). In addition, CSED is evidence 
that companies use to as a means to improve their transparency, build good 
relationship with stakeholders as well as good image and reputation, see for example 
(Friedman and Miles, 2001; Gray et al., 1988; O'Dwyer, 2005b). Although companies 
are accountable to stakeholders, accountability to shareholders usually taking more of 
companies attention than other stakeholders (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004), especially in 
a country like Saudi Arabia where corporate governance system concerns more about 
shareholders’ interests (as discussed in 2.9) .  
CSED has developed throughout the years and its argued that social reporting started 
before the first world war in the US and Australia and some of the European countries 
(Hogner, 1982; Murray, 2010). In the mid to late 1960s companies’ awareness of CSR 
practice increased and continued to be a fundamental issue in the 1970s. Companies 
are concerned about their behaviour towards the environment and society, therefore, 
they started to include more non-financial aspects in their annual reports (Murray, 
2010). Moreover, some countries have created laws requiring non-financial reporting 
for some social and environmental activities. As a result, managers and researchers 
are paying more attention to non-financial reporting by carrying out more research 
related to this issue. New terminology to describe social reporting have been created 
such as social disclosure and accountability as well as new social performance 
measures (Gray and Bebington, 2000; Murray, 2010). The 1970s can be described as 
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the foundation stage in CSED (Gray et al., 1995). According to Murray (2010), due 
to political reasons corporate social reporting decreased and no significant changes 
took place during the 1980s, but it increased again in the 1990s. Globalisation and 
economic growth  are two significant reasons for the increase in CSD (Perrin, 2008). 
Companies also started to differentiate between ‘environmental’ and ‘social’ 
disclosure, moreover the aspects affecting the level of voluntary disclosure had been 
under investigation. As the awareness of CSED increased, in this period companies 
that failed to report social responsibility activities were criticised (Murray, 2010). 
Social voluntary activities were at first reported as non-financial information in the 
annual reports, however recently it has developed into having separate reports. 
Moreover the internet is used by organisations to communicate  their stakeholder 
groups through disclosing social practices (Adams and Frost, 2004). As evidence of 
companies increasingly reporting their social and environmental activates, the 
increasing number of non-financial reports that has been published around the world. 
According to the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) 2004 
report, in 1993 less than 100 non-financial reports were published, while more than 
1500 non-financial reports were published in 2003. Moreover, as shown by Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) (2010), sustainability reports around the world has 
increased by 22% in 2010 in comparison to the 2009 (Ali, 2014). Different 
terminologies have been used in research for corporate social reporting which have 
almost the same meaning, corporate social disclosure (Bella, 2001), social 
responsibility accounting (Mathews, 1984) and social accounting. (Gray, 2000) In this 
research corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSED) will be the used 
terminology. 
In Saudi Arabia, CSED has developed as companies today pay more attention to CSR 
related issue than before. The increased level of Saudi companies CSED in the studies 
conducted in Saudi Arabia illustrates this development. According to Alsaeed (2006), 
the mean of the companies voluntary disclosure in forty companies in 2003 was lower 
than the average while a study by Al-Janadi et al. (2013) includes 87 Saudi listed 
companies in 2006 and 2007 and states that the average voluntary disclosure level  is 
14%. The average voluntary disclosure level including social and environmental 
disclosure has increased to 16% in 2008 according to a study conducted by Macarulla 
and Talalweh (2012) which includes 132 listed firms. According to Khasharmeh and 
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Desoky (2013) the level of disclosure (online disclosure) has increased to 21.86%, 
their study has been conducted in Gulf cooperative countries including 44 Saudi 
companies. Finally, Habbash (2015), the most recent study, shows that the average 
level of CSED of Saudi non-financial listed companies is 24% and the study includes 
267 annual reports from 2007 to 2011. This proves that the level of CSED has 
increased and developed accordingly; and that this development could be the result of 
the significant attention given to CSR in the media, especially after globalisation 
(Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Gray et al., 1995; Hooghiemstra, 2000; Kolk, 2003). 
Companies are facing stronger challenges to operate and remain legitimate 
specifically after globalisation which increased awareness of the significance and 
benefits of CSED as well as demanding a higher degree of accountability and 
transparency. One of the ways in which to deal with the above challenges is for 
companies to report their social and environmental activities in order to gain or 
maintain legitimacy by responding to stakeholders, society and environment demands 
(Craig Deegan, 2002b). By contributing positively to society and satisfying 
stakeholders companies will earn a higher level of trust and enhance their reputation, 
consequently they will lower their risks and in the long this will lead to better financial 
performance. In order to understand CSED more, and to justify an organizations 
intention to be socially responsible in addition to disclosing their social and 
environmental practices, theories related to CSED will be further explored in the next 
section. 
3.4 Theoretical perspectives and CSED 
This section will present four well-known theories which are the most commonly used 
theories by researchers to explain the issue of  CSED (C. Deegan and J. Unerman, 
2006). Stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, institutional theory and agency theory 
are the applied theories in this research. These theories are overlapping in interpreting 
the phenomena of CSED. According to Gray et al (1996b), stakeholder theory, 
legitimacy theory and institutional theory are known as “system oriented theories” 
they focus on the association between the organisation and society, while agency 
theory concerns the relation between corporate shareholders and  managers. Agency 
theory also focuses on how companies use information in annual reports and 
disclosure to communicate with their stakeholders. Analysis of some of the major 
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studies in this field that applied those theories (stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, 
institutional theory and agency theory) in explaining CSED will also be presented in 
this section. This segment will be organised as follows: 3.2.1 Stakeholders theory, 
3.2.2 Legitimacy theory, 3.3.3 Institutional theory and finally 3.3.4 agency theory.  
3.4.1 Stakeholder theory 
Stakeholder theory is one of the main theories in explaining CSED.  The theory 
suggests that companies should take into account all stakeholders, including 
customers, government, employees, suppliers and society when operating and when 
making decisions (Abdullah, 2007; Andriof, 2002; Lamberg et al, 2003; Sweeney, 
2009). Stakeholder theory is concerned with a new way of post-globalisation thinking. 
Globalisation had a significant effect on firms management since it encouraged them 
to take into consideration new aspects of business such as ethics, transparency, 
sustainability and social responsibility (Re and Reed, 1983).  Stakeholder theory 
places emphasis on satisfying all stakeholder groups, not only shareholders, in 
addition to explaining the reason behind companies responses to stakeholders’ 
demands that are in alignment with company aims (Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et al., 
1997). Stakeholder theory assumes that companies are responsible for fulfilling 
Stakeholders needs, and part of a company’s voluntary obligations are toward 
different groups such as employees, customers, shareholders, government, creditors, 
suppliers, community and society as a whole. (Gray et al., 1996b). Stakeholder theory 
proposes that profitability is not the only reason why companies operate, because they 
operate for the benefits of the wider society (Albassam, 2014; Cho and Roberts, 2010; 
Mitchell et al., 1997).  Moreover, companies tend to inform stakeholders of their 
actions toward them as well as their positive contribution to society via different 
channels such as annual reports and companies’ websites.  
From what has been discussed previously it can be argued that social and 
environmental disclosure is a tool that companies’ use to illustrate their 
responsibilities and obligations towards stakeholder groups demands (Brown and 
Deegan, 1998). Furthermore, companies actions and responses to their stakeholders 
are the elements that have been used by stakeholder theorists in expressing appropriate 
and inappropriate corporate behaviour (Driver and Thompson, 2002). According to 
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Ullmann (1985), the extent to which the stakeholder group demands affect the level 
of social disclosure depends on how companies respond to stakeholders. 
Stakeholders’ demands consider key aspects that firms should take into account in 
making decisions or developing their strategies according to stakeholder theory. 
Moreover, stakeholder theory helps to explain CSED and the factors affecting 
companies’ disclosure. Stakeholder theory suggests that CSED is a concern of 
managers; and that managers are accountable to all company stakeholders, not only 
to shareholders and creditors (Albassam, 2014). Accordingly, in this study stakeholder 
theory will be one of the theories that will be used when analysing CSED practices in 
Saudi listed companies.  
Stakeholder theory has two branches, managerial and normative, the managerial 
branch is concerned with the power of the stakeholder. When planning and disclosing, 
companies consider how important it is to bring the companies achievements to the 
Stakeholders attention. In this case companies group their stakeholders according to 
their power to satisfy their demands, taking into account the scarcity of the recourses 
that they have available (Deegan and Unerman, 2006). The other branch is ethical 
(normative), and is concerned with informing stakeholders about the companies’ 
actions regardless of their authority. Disclosure is motivated by the companies 
responsibility as a base (Deegan  and Unerman, 2006). Accordingly, in this study 
stakeholder theory will be one of the research theories in investigating CSED practices 
in Saudi listed companies, specifically ethical (normative) branch of stakeholder 
theory where CSED can be investigated in Saudi listed companies regardless of their 
power. 
 In Saudi Arabia, the 2006 Saudi Corporate Governance Codes includes provisions 
related to the stakeholders’ rights and social responsibility (see Article 10)11. Saudi 
companies are required to take into consideration the needs of stakeholders such as 
government, employees and the local society as well as shareholders. In addition to 
                                                 
11Article 10 in Saudi Corporate Governance Codes includes stakeholder rights in sub-section “ e) 
Outlining a written policy that regulate the relationship with stakeholders with a view to protecting 
their respective rights; in particular” (Authority, 2006) 
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the Islamic concept of ‘Zakat’12 which encourages companies to be socially 
responsible and contribute positively to society.  
Stakeholder theory has been widely used in CSED literature by numerous studies   
(Belal and Owen, 2007; Branco and Rodrigues, 2007; Chan et al., 2014; Garriga and 
Mele, 2004; Menassa, 2010; Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012; Ruf et al., 2001). Belal 
and Owen (2007) based their research on stakeholder theory,  legitimacy theory and 
political economy theory in investigating corporate social disclosure. According to 
Menassa (2010), disclosing corporate responsibility to their stakeholder group is a 
significant strategy that companies consider in managing the relation with 
stakeholders. Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) have also used stakeholder theory in 
examining the relationship of corporate governance mechanisms and corporate social 
responsibility disclosure. In a recent study Chan et al.,  (2014) also used stakeholder 
theory in addition to legitimacy theory to investigate the association between 
corporate social responsibility and corporate governance and how companies use both 
mechanisms to enhance relations with stakeholders.  
Stakeholder theory is one of the theories that are used in explaining CSED in this 
research, as well as in previous research; it focuses on stakeholders’ expectations and 
needs.  Legitimacy theory is another theory used to explain why companies may 
decide to report social and environmental information which is discussed in the 
following sub section.   
3.4.2 Legitimacy theory 
Legitimacy theory is one of the theories that is widely used in corporate social and 
environmental disclosure. This theory considers the company as a part of a broader 
social system, which is influenced by and has influence on other parties (Islam and 
Deegan, 2008). According to Suchman (1995, p. 574) legitimacy is: “a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
                                                 
12‘Zakat’ is the second pillar in Islam where Muslim people who are financially capable pay 2.5% to 
specific groups of people; it is an Islamic social tax (Kamla et al., 2006). Companies are also required 
to pay Zakat to the government as a type of tax.  
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within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. Similar 
explanation by Lindblom (1993, p. 2, cited in Gray et al., 1996) states that legitimacy 
is “ ..a condition or status which exists when an entity’s value system is congruent  with  the  
value system  of  the  larger social system  of  which  the  entity  is  a  part of”. Both definitions 
assert that companies are part of a larger social system in which they ensure they are 
perceived as operating within the society expectations. When a disparity, actual or 
potential, exists between the two value systems (company and society), a threat to the 
entity’s legitimacy occurs. In other words, legitimacy is the reason behind companies 
engaging in social and environmental disclosure to comply with society’s 
expectations. Norms, values and beliefs represent the expectations of the society and 
they are changing through time due to changes in some factors (Islam and Deegan, 
2008). These factors include regulatory institutions, the increase in the social 
awareness, pressure from interest groups, the influence of the media, the pressures 
form educational institutions and NGOs (Campbell, 2007; Elsbach and Sutton, 1992; 
O'Donovan, 2002; Tilt, 1994). The changes in norms and values throughout the time 
will lead to change in the social contracts between the company and the society, as a 
result, companies change consequently to maintain legitimacy.     
Legitimacy theory is a system-oriented theory which considers organisations as part 
of a larger social system in which they operate in (Cho, 2009; Gray et al., 1995). 
Therefore this theory focuses predominantly on the concept of company and society 
contract; companies are operating in society through a social contract to organize the 
activities of the companies and relate them to the society’s values, norms and beliefs 
(Reverte, 2009). The social contract organises the relation between the company and 
society, what the society expect from the company as well as what companies are 
expecting from the society (Cho and  Roberts, 2010; James Guthrie and Parker, 1989; 
M. Reg Mathews, 1993; Patten, 2002b). In this case, companies have to show society 
that they are operating in accordance with the terms of the social contracts by 
disclosing information about their activities and actions,  such as social and 
environmental information, as often as possible in order to prove their legitimacy 
(Abbott and Monsen, 1979; Brown and Deegan, 1998; Deegan et al., 2000; Deegan 
and Unerman, 2006; Gray et al., 2001; R. Gray et al., 1995; James Guthrie and Parker, 
1989; Hooghiemstra, 2000; Menassa, 2010; Roberts, 1992). The social contract 
incorporates two types of norms, values and beliefs; explicit norms, values and beliefs 
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which are clearly codified and implicit norms, values and beliefs which are non-
codified (Shocker and Sethi, 1973). Incorporating explicit and implicit norms and 
values, which are society expectations, while companies operating aiming to satisfy 
these expectations is what legitimacy is about. The diagram presented below (Figure 
3.1) by O’Donovan (2002) explains organisational legitimacy.   
 
Figure 3.1: Organisational Legitimacy. [Source: O'Donovan (2002)] 
The diagram above shows the relation between company’s activities to a specific issue 
or event which is presented as circle Z, and the society’s expectations and perceptions 
of companies’ activities related to the same issue or event presented in circle Y. If the 
company satisfies society demands then the area X arises and this is organisational 
legitimacy. On the other hand, if the company’s activities and actions didn’t match 
the expectations of the society, a legitimacy gap or illegitimacy occurs (Ali, 2014; 
O'Donovan, 2002). Since society expectations about company change and also 
company’s activities related to social issues or events change, legitimacy gap (or 
illegitimacy) changes as well because both are related. Legitimacy gap could be a 
result of the change in societal expectation, the change in companies’ activities is not 
aligned with the change in the societal expectations (Deegan, and Unerman, 2011 ). 
Additionally, companies are not informing the society with activities that they did to 
satisfy societal expectations and societal awareness of hidden negative information 
about the company which dissatisfy the society ( Deegan and Unerman, 2011 ).  
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Companies may choose to disclose social and environmental information as a 
response to the society expectation which is part of a legitimation process (Gray et al., 
1995; Roszaini M. Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). Lindblom (1993, cited in Gray et al., 
1996) has presented four legitimation strategies which could explain how companies 
actions can aim to gain, maintain or repair legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). The four 
legitimacy strategies are as follow: first strategy is to notify stakeholders about the 
companies’ changes and improvements in activities and actions aiming to satisfy 
public expectations. Second, company try to change stakeholders’ perception about 
its performance related to specific event. Third, company seeks to distract 
stakeholders’ attention from an event or issue of worry to another event or issue. 
Fourth, company aim to change societal expectations about its activity by representing 
that this specific expectation is not applicable. It can be argued based on Lindblom 
(1993, cited in Gray et al., 1996) strategies that corporate social and environmental 
disclosure could be used to inform and educate stakeholders and also to change 
stakeholders’ perceptions and hide the reality.  
In addition to the legitimation strategies provided by Lindblom (1993, cited in Gray 
et al., 1996), Organisational legitimacy model of legitimacy had been identified by 
Tilling and Tilt (2010)  based on the works of Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) and 
Suchman (1995). They introduced six different phases of legitimacy which are; 
establishment, maintenance, extension, defence, loss and disestablishment. According 
to both Tilling and Tilt (2010) and Belal and Owen (2015), over time and based on 
the changes in company actions and activities as well as society expectations, firm’s 
legitimation strategies might move from one phase to another. The stages are 
discussed as follow: establishment, it is the stage where companies aim to gain or 
build legitimacy from stakeholders when the company is still in its early starting 
stages. At this stage, company intention to ensure that its actions and activities are 
aligned with the society’s expectations, otherwise the company will lose its 
legitimacy. Maintenance is another phase which is less complicated than the 
establishment stage, since it is easier to maintain legitimacy after gaining society 
acceptance it. At this stage, less social and environmental disclosure is required than 
the establishment stage. 
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 Extension is the phase that company goes through when starting a new activity as a 
result of changes in stakeholders’ expectation. Companies need to report more in this 
phase to enhance legitimacy. Repair or defence phase has taken the vast attention of 
social and environmental accounting researchers (Belal and Owen, 2015). This stage 
is a result of legitimacy gap, when company’s legitimacy is threatened, thus a 
legitimacy repair is needed and this will lead to an increase in social and 
environmental disclosure (Patten, 1992). Loss phase occurs due to powerful pressures 
from the media or new regulatory control (Tilling, 2004). This stage indicates that the 
company has low level of legitimacy and that it needs to change in its strategy of 
social and environmental disclosure.  Abandonment phase, in this phase companies 
are rebuilding their legitimacy. This stage usually comes after the loss stage where 
companies decide to start all over again aiming to regain their stakeholders’ 
acceptance (Craig Deegan, 2014; Tilling and Tilt, 2010). Companies at this stage are 
more cautious aiming to proceed successfully this time in establishing their legitimacy 
by learning from the previous experience.  
Based on the above discussion, the company is required to communicate with 
stakeholders in each of the legitimation strategies and in each legitimacy phases (Gray 
et al., 1995; Lindblom, 1993, cited in Gray et al., 1996; Suchman, 1995). One way of 
communicating with stakeholders is corporate social and environmental disclosure 
which is considered to be a tool to show company’s legitimacy strategies (Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2007). Companies disclose social and environmental information aiming 
to establish, maintain or repair legitimacy (Cho and Roberts, 2010; Cho et al., 2010; 
Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). This is done by influencing stakeholders’ views and 
persuading them that the company meets their expectations, even if it didn’t 
essentially meet all the expectations, and this is suggested by legitimacy theory 
(Branco and Rodrigues, 2007; Deegan, 2002a; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Mathews, 
1995).  
Legitimacy theory also comprises  the idea that there is a social pressure on companies 
to report their social and environmental information, for example companies will 
disclose more social information under more social pressure (Cho and Roberts, 2010). 
According to Deegan (2002a) and O’Donovan (2002), managers use information in 
annual reports to send messages to society for example they use corporate social and 
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environmental disclosure as a tool to improve  corporate image. Therefore, corporate 
social and environmental reporting is a reflection of companies response to economic, 
social, political and environmental aspects as it shows how companies are legitimate 
to exist and operate (Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Hogner, 1982). Social and 
environmental disclosure plays a vital role in justifying companies’ legitimacy (Cho, 
2009; Deegan and Rankin, 1996)  
Legitimacy theory has been widely used to explain corporate social and environmental 
disclosure practice in a vast amount of literature, see for example (Chan et al., 2014; 
Deegan, 2002a; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Neu et al., 
1998; O'Donovan, 1999, 2002; Patten, 1992). Hogner (1982) found evidence that 
society’s expectations of the companies behaviour affect social disclosure. Another 
study by Deegan and Gordon (1996) found that there is a relationship between the 
level of corporate environmental disclosure and the legitimating procedures that 
companies go through to be legitimate. In their study, they used annual reports in 
investigating CSED. Additionally, Brown and Deegan (1998) examines how annual 
reports can be used as an instrument by the organisation’s management to legitimise 
its existence and business. Gray and Bebbington (2000) argue that companies disclose 
social and environmental information that will add to their legitimacy and that it is a 
voluntary practice “accountability mechanism”.   
Four studies had been analysed by Gray (2002), including O’Donovan (2002), Milne 
and Patten (2002) , O'Dwyer (2002) and Deegan et al. (2002).  He stated that the 
findings of the four papers are consistent with legitimacy theory. He discovered that 
managers decide to report information about their social and environmental practices 
for legitimacy purposes.  In addition, Hopwood (2009) stated that organisations use 
social and environmental reporting in building their image, which helps in 
constructing legitimacy. Another research by Cho et al. (2012) examines companies 
choices in the amount of capital spent in environmental disclosure using legitimacy 
theory as one of the theories to explain social and environmental disclosure. 
Moreover, Belal and Owen (2007) based their research on legitimacy theory as well 
as stakeholder and political economy, in order to investigate corporate social 
disclosure. In a more recent study Belal and Owen (2015) examine the motivations 
for the development of stand-alone corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting  in 
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Bangladesh. Legitimacy theory is the base of this study as they use the lens of it in 
explaining the stand-alone CSR reporting process and how it gives the subsidiary a 
formal space and legitimise its activities in Bangladesh.  
Cho and Patten (2007) have implemented legitimacy theory in their research when 
analysing environmental disclosures. Legitimacy theory has also been used by Samkin 
and Schneider (2010) in a study in New Zealand. The study aims to explain the benefit 
of accountability and reporting such as gaining credibility. Khan et al.(2013) have also 
adopted legitimacy theory as a framework to examine the relationship between 
corporate governance and the extent of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
disclosures using Bangladeshi companies’ annual reports. The results suggest 
corporate governance mechanisms in addition to the stakeholder groups’ pressure 
influence CSR disclosure practices to ensure companies’ legitimacy. In their study 
Kamal and Deegan (2013) make a significant contribution to the empirical literature 
since they focus on a new area which combines corporate governance with corporate 
social and environmental responsibility when investigating the companies’ disclosure. 
Their study is based on legitimacy theory in explaining corporate governance-related 
social and environment disclosure, the results of the study have proven that companies 
disclose social and environmental practices because of societal pressure and in order 
to gain legitimacy.  
In Saudi Arabia, as traditional Islamic country, stakeholders and the society expect 
companies to operate within the traditional Islamic framework.  Companies are 
expected to take into account Saudi Islamic norms and values operating in order to 
gain or maintain societal legitimacy. Contributing positively to society in the form of 
`Zakat`13 or ` Sadaqah`14, group privileges is more important than individual rights and 
saving the environment are all Islamic values that companies should not neglect when 
operating. There is an increased pressure on companies from media and social groups 
                                                 
13  ‘Zakat’ is Islamic social tax: every Muslim individual and company must pay 2.5% of their wealth 
towards a charitable cause, such as making donations to the poor and needy (Kamla et al., 2006). 
Companies are also required to pay Zakat to the government as a type of tax.  
14 `Sadaqah` as described in Qura`an is any voluntary contribution good works, alms, charity 
(Sadeghzadeh, 1995) 
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to be socially responsible, particularly after globalization. As a result, companies 
report more information about their social activities to meet society expectations to 
secure this legitimacy.  
Since this study is investigating CSED in Saudi listed companies, legitimacy theory 
is the main theory that will be used as it is concerned with society in general and the 
relationships between companies and their relevant stakeholders and society. This 
study uses legitimacy theory in examining corporate social and environmental 
disclosure similar to Macarulla and Talalweh (2012) study. Their study examines the 
level of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure in Saudi listed companies. 
The theory will enable the study to later examine the findings on CSED in Saudi 
Arabia. Despite the strength of stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory in explaining 
the companies’ response to external pressure and expectations of relevant 
stakeholders and the society, they fail to embrace institutional contexts where the firm 
is operating. These institutional contexts are said to influence companies CSR 
disclosure decisions. For this reason, institutional theory is used in this study to cover 
all other elements, including economic and political aspects, and will be discussed in 
the next sub section.  
3.4.3 Institutional theory 
Institutional theory takes into account economics and political aspects, in addition to 
social aspects, which affect organisations actions and activities (Campbell, 2007; 
Walsh et al., 2003). Institutions are common social structures that perform pressure on 
companies to take actions or to do particular activity. These social structures are known 
as regulatory and competitive norms and rules, social values, cultural, and routine 
practices. According to Scott (1995), institutional theory is concerned with these social 
structures and how it can affect the companies’ behaviour and actions. Companies 
should follow environmental and societal rules and regulations and include them in 
their activities and accounting practices such as corporate social and environmental 
disclosure (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995).  
According to Deegan and Unerman (2006) institutional theory combines stakeholder 
and legitimacy theories when explaining the reason behind companies engaging in 
corporate social responsibility as a response to social, environmental and institutional 
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pressures. As well as understanding companies accounting and reporting practices 
such as corporate social and environmental disclosure and how companies use them 
as a tool of organisational legitimacy (Deegan and Unerman, 2006). Dillard et al. 
(2004) discussed institutional theory from an accounting based study point of view, 
stating that social culture and environment are affecting the practice of accounting. 
Institutional theory considers the organization as a part of larger social system (see  
Amran and Devi, 2008; Amran and Haniffa, 2011; Campbell, 2007;  Jamali and eville, 
2011), It also explains why companies which are operating in the same industry tend 
to disclose similar social and environmental issues, which will be discussed below 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
Institutional theory has three different approaches, Old Institutional Economics (OIE), 
which differs from New Institutional Economics (NIE) and New Institutional 
Sociology (NIS). While (OIE) is concerned with “the institutions that shape the actions 
and thoughts of individual human agents” within an organisation, both (NIE) and (NIS) 
are concerned with the organisations environmental influence (Scapens, 2006, p. 11). 
NIE is regarding “the structures used to govern economic transactions” (Scapens, 2006: 
p.11), NIE takes into account external factors to observe the organisations’ 
governance (Zhao, 2011). NIS is the branch of institutional theory that is concerned 
with social and cultural factors affecting organisational actions. In this research 
Institutional theory, NIS branch will be adopted in order to investigate CSED and the 
factors affecting it in Saudi Arabia.  
To understand more how institutional theory can describe CSED institutional theory 
alternative dimensions will be explored. Institutions produce the reason for a 
particular behaviour or isomorphic of a firm, institutions can be of three types: 
regulatory, normative, and cognitive (Scott, 2001). Regulatory institutions include 
rules and regulations, these rules and regulations include two types. Hard rules which 
are set by the state and can apply coercive pressure on companies to perform specific 
action or activity, and soft rules which are set by industry associations and these are 
voluntary to adopt (Campbell, 2007; Marquis et al., 2007). As a result, companies 
which are operating in an environment with strict regulatory system are more likely 
to be socially responsible and may disclose more social and environmental 
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information. Companies may disclose social and environmental information aiming 
to comply with institutional rules and regulation (government and industry). 
The second type of institutions is normative institutions which provide the norms: 
“desirable ways of acting and being” and values: “what is desirable/socially acceptable to 
pursue” (Bebbington, Higgins, and Frame, 2009, p. 5). Society norms and values are 
the standards for appropriate corporate behaviour set by different institutions such as 
media, professional associations, NGOs, educational institutions, and other social 
institutions (Muthuri and Gilbert, 2011). These standards set the socially responsible 
behaviour as part of corporate behaviour (what is appropriate to do related to social 
and environmental responsibility) to gain legitimacy. Companies tend to disclose 
more social and environmental information if they operate in an environment where 
normative institutions are active. They do so to meet normative institutions 
expectations and to gain normative position.     
Cognitive is the third type of institutions, they include cultural values, ideologies, and 
identities as well as common aspects to companies’ socially responsible behaviour 
(Muthuri and Gilbert, 2011). According to Bebbington (2009) these aspects are not 
easy to perceive. Additionally, understanding these aspects depends on managers’ 
perception.  The three previous institutions, regulatory, normative, and cognitive, can 
create isomorphic pressure on companies to disclose social and environmental 
information as shown in Figure 3.2 and will be discussed in the next sub-section.  
  
63 
 
Figure 3.2: Institutional Theory dimensions  
Isomorphism  
This aspect illustrates the implementation of institutional practices by companies such 
as the social and environmental disclosure process and the change in the organisations 
actions related to these institutions (Dillard et al., 2004). According to DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983), isomorphism is the action that an entity of the society take in order to 
be similar to others that are operating in the same environment. Three types of 
isomorphic pressure can be created by institutions: coercive, mimetic and normative 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
Coercive isomorphism demonstrates the effect of powerful stakeholders such as 
government, media and institutional investors on changes in institutional practices by 
Organisations. Since formal and informal pressure by stakeholders is the reason for 
companies changes in institutional practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Organisations take into account stakeholders especially those who have a significant 
effect on their social responsibility practices and disclosure. They will disclose what 
concerns their stakeholders, for example economic, social, environmental and ethical 
values. This process is associated with the stakeholders theory which concerns  
fulfilling stakeholders demands by CSED (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
Mimetic isomorphism is related to a competitive advantage in relation to legitimacy 
as companies try to improve their institutional practices to be similar to their 
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competitors or to adopt a superior policy (Jeffrey Unerman and Bennett, 2004). 
Similar companies operating in the same industries usually have similar policies and 
processes created by top companies in the industry. Therefore, the industry itself can 
be an aspect of mimetic isomorphism. Each company is going through this process 
called “mimetic isomorphism” to prove their legitimacy in operating in the society 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Normative isomorphism is associated with professionalization and socialization 
pressure to gain normative position (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) for example, 
accounting standards in corporate reporting.  In this case the company is expected to 
produce accounting reports, as an institutional practice, which  follows accounting 
standards (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Normative isomorphism can be resulted 
from three sources which shape the behaviour of professional managers and staff: 
educational institutions, professional networks, and trade associations (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). As an example, companies choose to perform some practices such as 
educating and training employees, sponsoring social and sports events, establishing 
schools and colleges, donations to meet normative standards and gain normative 
position. In addition to isomorphic pressures, institutional theory also includes a 
decoupling aspect which will be discussed in the next sub-section. 
Decoupling 
This perception of institutional theory explains the conflict which may arise between 
the image that the companies’ managers are trying to exhibit by particular institutional 
practices or processes and the actual practices and processes of these companies 
(Dillard et al., 2004). This could be identified when companies try to report social and 
environmental activities in their report without any change in the actual practices to 
enhance the companies’ image, and show their legitimacy. This is related to 
legitimacy theory as well and it can be detected by investigating the actual corporate 
social and environment responsibility practices and compares it to what had been 
disclosed by the companies.  
Institutional theory has been used as the foundation for a significant number of 
studies. One of these studies is Islam and Deegan (2008) who claim that they base 
their study on institutional theory in order to examine in detail the external pressures 
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and their relation to disclosure polices in developing countries and applied it in 
Bangladesh. They state that institutional theory explains the external pressure from 
different stakeholders on organisations to disclose social and environmental activities 
to gain societies legitimacy. Institutional theory supports their findings, indicating that 
the pressure from specific stakeholder groups as well as the industry’s social 
disclosure polices on the Bangladeshi clothing industry have a reflection on social 
reporting in their annual reports. Another study that uses institutional theory as a 
framework is Bebbington et al  (2009), they run semi-structured in-depth interviews 
with organisations reporting social information. The findings of this study indicate 
that organisations decide to disclose social information to improve their reputation, 
image and value. 
Amran and Haniffa (2011) have also used institutional theory to interpret their study 
results after conducting interviews aiming to investigate determinants of companies’ 
sustainability reporting in Malaysia. The study results show that isomorphism’s three 
mechanisms, the coercive, the normative and the mimetic apply to organisations 
sustainability reporting in Malaysia. Both studies, Chen and Bouvain, (2009) and 
Muthuri and Gilbert (2011) have implemented institutional theory while analysing 
corporate social responsibility reporting and the effect of global CSR standards on 
firms reporting. They found that global membership has an effect on some areas of 
CSR reporting whilst different institutional arrangements in each country have a 
significant effect. Another study by Caprar and Neville (2012) proposes that 
institutional and cultural perspectives can address companies’ adoption of 
sustainability in a better way. In a recent study by Campopiano and De Massis (2014) 
institutional theory is used to compare CSR reports of 98 large Italian firms owned by 
families and firms not owned by families. The grounded theory analysis informs and 
contextualizes several differences in the type and content of corporate social 
responsibility reports of family and nonfamily firms.  
In the context of institutions isomorphism, there are a number CSED studies that 
mentioned the types of isomorphism (Rahaman et al., 2004; Amran and Devi, 2008). 
The results from a study by Amran and Devi (2008) found that the reason behind 
Malaysian companies disclosing social responsibility information is the pressure from 
the government regulations. In a similar study, Rahaman et al. (2004) found that a 
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Ghanaian company (Volta River Authority) disclosed environmental information to 
comply with the requirements of The World Bank. Both studies show that both studies 
found that coercive isophorism is the type of pressure that companies are facing which 
lead to CSR disclosure.  
Regarding mimetic isomorphism, studies support the argument that country of 
resident and industry affect companies’ environmental disclosure  
(Gray and Bebbington, 2000; Vourvachis and Woodward, 2015). Additionally, 
companies might be disclosing social and environmental disclosure due to pressure 
from competitors that are operating in the same industry. Studies related to the third 
type of isomorphism which is normative isomorphism, Amran and Devi (2008) found 
that two factors of professionalism which are professional education and professional 
networks perform normative pressure on companies to do particular actions.  
In Saudi Arabia, CSED is generally voluntary practice. However, considering certain 
CSR activities could be considered as a form of obligatory by the Saudi government. 
For example, as mentioned previously in Error! Reference source not found., the 
minimum wage, working hours, job nationalisation and retirement scheme are several 
aspects that companies report as their social activities but there is a legal enforcement 
on companies to respond to these aspects. This study aims to investigate CSED in 
Saudi Arabia and its determinants which are firm characteristics and corporate 
governance mechanisms therefore, institutional theory is one of the theories used in 
explaining CSED. As this theory justifies the practice of CSED and how it is 
considered as a response to the external environmental pressure represented in 
different aspects which have been mentioned previously in this sub-section.  In 
addition to the previous discussed theories, stakeholders, legitimacy and institutional 
theories, agency theory is included as well in this study. This theory will be discussed 
in the next sub section, as this study investigates how firm characteristics and 
corporate governance mechanisms detriment the level of CSED.  
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3.4.4 Agency theory 
Agency theory primarily concerns the relation between shareholders and managers by 
aligning the interests of managers (agents) with shareholders (principles). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976, p. 308) referred to the agency relationship as “a contract under which 
one or more persons (the principals) engage another person (the agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf, which involves delegating some decision-making 
authority to the agent”. This relation provides separation of ownership and 
management (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theory 
concerns with reducing agency costs which arise from the problems of information 
asymmetries in markets (Morris, 1987). According to Fama and Jensen (1983) 
“agency costs include the costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of 
contracts among agents with conflicting interests, plus the residual loss incurred 
because the cost of full enforcement of contracts exceed the benefits” (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Therefore, companies use corporate governance mechanisms to reduce 
agency costs as well as mitigate managerial opportunism, which lead to improved 
voluntary disclosure and financial performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Khan et al., 2013; Leftwich et al., 1981; 
Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2012; Solomon, 2010).  
Agency theory suggests the same idea that companies could reduce agency costs by 
using a compensation plan or by providing voluntary disclosure such as social and 
environmental disclosure. Within this context, agency theory propose that companies 
with higher level of leverage tend to disclose more voluntary information aiming to 
reduce their agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). 
By reporting social and environmental information, the companies are considered to 
be more accountable to their stakeholders and to the society and this could enhance 
the value of the firm. Additionally, engaging in social and environmental activities 
enhance companies profitability and consequently reduce agency conflict between 
management and shareholders (Sun et al., 2010).  
Agency theory is one of the theories that is used in corporate social and environmental 
disclosure studies specifically when investigating the effect of corporate governance 
mechanisms on the level of CSED (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009). More specifically, 
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agency theory suggests that corporate governance set legal contracts between 
shareholders and managers to monitor managers. For example, one of the corporate 
governance mechanisms which plays a vital role in controlling and supervising the 
company’s management as well as providing strategic guidelines is the corporate 
board of directors. A reduction in the number of executive board members; could 
enhance the board’s independence (Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Solomon, 2010). 
Furthermore, reduces management opportunism (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  This 
occurs due to the separation of ownership and control by aligning the interests of 
managers (agents) in the firm with shareholders’ (Hoque, 2006). Motivating managers 
(agents) in order to work in alignment with shareholders’ interests is argued to reduce 
agency problems by reducing opportunistic managers’ behaviour.  This can be 
achieved in many ways such as introducing incentives and it is argued that outside 
independent directors may have more skills and knowledge which will be an 
advantage for the company (Craig Deegan, 2006).  
It is widely believed that the main concern of company’s shareholders is maximizing 
the value of the company and this is what they expect company’s managers to aim 
for. On the other hand, there are other stakeholders whom the company could not run 
its business without them such as employees, customers, creditors, suppliers and the 
government and they also have their expectations from the company. Additionally, 
managers have their own interests that to an extent could conflict with shareholders’ 
interests. The duty of the managers in that case is to satisfy as much stakeholders as 
they can include shareholders considering their interests. Corporate governance 
system, as mentioned in the previous paragraphs, is to align shareholders interest with 
managers’ interest as well as to reduce agency costs which might arise from the 
conflict of interests, additionally it reduces managers opportunistic. In this regards, 
Jensen (2002) has suggested a relation between value maximization and stakeholder 
theory, he called it “ enlightened value maximization”. He argued that enlightened 
value maximization reduces the conflict between value maximizing and stakeholder 
theory and it aims to improve management, organisational governance, and 
performance. He claims that value maximization is a long-run objective which will be 
achieved throw stakeholders. Since without success relation with company’s 
stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers and the government, the 
company will not be able to maximize its value or even survive (Jensen, 2002). 
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In the context of corporate social and environmental disclosure, according to Jamali 
et al. (2008) there are some Preliminary Links between corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility as shown in Table 3.1 below. In the broader corporate 
governance conception considers all key stakeholders which is the same objective as 
stakeholders’ approach of corporate social responsibility. Moreover, both corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility assume that companies hold 
stakeholders responsibilities as a form of accountability to gain trust and legitimacy 
(Page, 2005 as cited in , Jamali et al., 2008). As a result, companies report social and 
environmental information to show they are taking into account stakeholders. 
Additionally, CSED can be considered as a strategy to fill the legitimacy gap between 
shareholders and the management (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). And this is what agency 
theory suggests that CSED should reduce the gap between owners and management 
interests consequently, reduce agency costs. By reporting social and environmental 
information the board of directors will ensure that the management is performing in 
the best interest of not only shareholders but also other stakeholders. Additionally, the 
board of directors, particularly non-executive directors, will ensure that the company 
is responding to societal expectations.  
Agency theory has been used as a base of a significant number of studies investigating 
corporate governance (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009). Barako et al. (2006b) have used 
agency theory in examining the association of corporate governance practices with 
the voluntary disclosures in  Kenyan companies’ annual reports. Jo and Harjoto (2012) 
also based their study on agency theory in their examination of the association 
between corporate  governance and corporate social responsibility (CSR), using a 
large US sample. The results indicate a positive correlation between corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility. Similarly, Samaha et al. (2012) based 
their study on agency theory to investigate the determinants of corporate governance 
voluntary disclosure in Egypt. In Saudi Arabia, Albassam (2014) used a multi-
theoretical framework, including agency theory, to analyse corporate governance 
reforms in Saudi Arabia and their effect on the level of voluntary disclosure. In a 
similar study in Saudi Arabia, Habbash (2015) investigated the influence of corporate 
governance on corporate social responsibility disclosure using agency theory to justify 
the results of the study.     
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Table 3.1: Preliminary Links between Corporate Governance (CG) and Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR). 
Source: Jamali et al. (2008, p:446) 
Corporate governance CSR 
 Broader CG conception: Entails due 
regard to all stakeholders and ensuring 
that firms are answerable to all their key 
stakeholders (Dunlop, 1998; Kendall, 
1999) 
 Stakeholder approach to CSR: Corporations 
are the crux of a complex web of stakeholder 
relationships and have an obligation or 
responsibility to these different stakeholders 
(Freeman, 1984) 
 Narrow CG conception: Ensuring 
accountability, compliance, and 
transparency (Keasey and Wright, 1997; 
MacMillan et al., 2004) 
 Internal dimension of CSR: Corporations 
should accord due diligence to their 
responsibility to internal stakeholders 
addressing issues relating to skills and 
education, workplace safety, working 
conditions, human rights, equity/equal 
opportunity, and labour rights (Grosser and 
Moon, 2005; Jones et al., 2005) 
In Saudi Arabia, corporate governance regimes have developed over the years as the 
government has paid more attention to reforming the corporate governance codes.  In 
2006 the government issued the Saudi Corporate Governance Codes (SCGC) and this 
step is considered a foundation of the reforms (AlNodel and Hussainey, 2010; 
Robertson, Diyab, and Al-Kahtani, 2013). According to Albassam (2014), the aim of 
SCGC is to improve companies’ board of directors performance, responsibility, 
accountability and transparency in aligning the conflicts between mangers and 
shareholders. SCGC is considered significant in a country like Saudi Arabia where 
the ownership concentration in Saudi listed companies is relatively high (AlNodel and 
Hussainey, 2010) and could give power to the main shareholders as a consequence of 
the effect of the rights of small shareholders   (Baydoun et al., 2012). Ownership 
concentration could create a conflict of interest between shareholders, which would 
give greater power to large shareholders who wish to control the performance of 
management (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Moreover in a traditional community such 
as Saudi, assigning friends and relatives to management, regardless of their 
qualifications and abilities, used to be a common issue, and these practices could 
affect the company’s performance and disclosure (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
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Therefore, the application of agency theory is required in examining CSED in Saudi 
Arabia with regards to firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms.       
After discussing each theory and how it is related to this study, a theoretical approach 
of this research will be discussed in the following section.   
3.5 Research theoretical approach  
Corporate social and environmental disclosure is a complex multi-faceted issue which 
is challenging to be explained using a single theory and should depend on a multi-
theoretical framework (Cormier et al., 2005; Tagesson et al., 2009). Hence, a multi-
theoretical framework will be applied in conducting this study to help in 
understanding the issues related to CSED. These theories will include the four theories 
discussed in the previous sections. These are the most commonly used theories in key 
studies that investigate the motivations behind corporate social and environmental 
disclosure (C. Deegan and J. Unerman, 2006). According to Garriga and Mele (2004) 
theories related to corporate social and environmental disclosure are overlapping and 
while no certain theory can completely explain all the motives for CSED, system-
oriented theories indicate that organisations should take into consideration the social, 
political and economic factors such as norms, values, beliefs, regulations and 
standards when planning and disclosing. This explains that companies might disclose 
social and environmental information as a response to the previous factors (social, 
political and economic). Conjointly Agency theory is one of the most significant 
theories in explaining the reason why companies report social and environmental 
information with regards to agency costs that may arise from interests’ conflicts.     
Starting with stakeholder theory is one of the system-oriented theories that is used in 
this study to address the phenomena of CSED. The theory is concerned with satisfying 
powerful stakeholders’ demands and expectations to gain or maintain the support of 
stakeholders. This theory is associated with CSED as it aims to satisfy stakeholder 
groups and society at large. Legitimacy theory is the principal theory to be used when 
addressing the issue of CSED as it explains the reason behind the use of CSED by 
companies to signify legitimacy to their stakeholders.  
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Legitimacy theory emphases on society’s expectations, CSED shows the alignment 
between the corporate social and environmental disclosed information and the 
society’s expectations aiming to gain or maintain or repair legitimacy.  Additionally, 
CSED helps to improve organization’s image and can be used as a positive signifier 
to stakeholders and society at large. This theory is based on the notion of social 
contract that is formed between organisations, stakeholders and the public. Social 
contracts help to organise the expectations of all sides, namely organisations, 
stakeholders and society.  
Institutional theory is similar to stakeholder and legitimacy theories in the way it 
explains the effect of social values, norms and rules (i.e., social structures) on the 
actions taken by organisations. It focuses on organisational practices such as CSED 
in response to coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures from institutions such as 
regulatory, normative, or cognitive. Companies report social and environmental 
information aiming not to be different from other companies operating in the same 
environment. Accordingly, this theory will be included in this research theoretical 
approach to justify the practice of CSED in Saudi Arabia and to give explanation to 
the study results.  
On the other hand agency theory focuses on reducing agency costs which arise from 
the problems of information asymmetries in markets (Morris, 1987). Therefore, 
companies use corporate governance mechanisms to reduce agency costs as well as 
mitigate managerial opportunism, which lead to improved voluntary disclosure 
including social and environmental disclosure and financial performance (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Khan et al., 
2013; Leftwich et al., 1981; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2012; Solomon, 2010). Managers 
may choose to use CSED and publish more detailed information to reduce agency cost 
(Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Rozeff, 1982), particularly when 
they need to raise funds. Since this study aims to examine the determinants of the level 
of CSED and some of corporate governance mechanisms are included as CSED 
determinants, agency theory will be included in the study’s theoretical approach. 
Multi-theoretical approach is consistent with the suggestions of CSE disclosure 
previous researchers such as Gray et al. (1995), Islam and Deegan (2008) Deegan and 
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Unerman (2008), and Deegan and Unerman (2011). They argued that the three 
theories (stakeholder, legitimacy and institutional) are complementary in explaining 
corporate social and environmental disclosure. While stakeholder theory 
demonstrates organisations responses to stakeholder demands, legitimacy theory 
addresses how organisations disclose social and environmental information in order 
to gain, maintain or repair their legitimacy to their stakeholders and the wider society. 
In another study in Qatar, Naser et al. (2006)  have applied a multiple theoretical 
framework including agency theory, legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory to 
investigate the cause of the variation in the level of corporate social disclosure using 
the annual reports of 20 Qatari listed companies. In a recent study Gallego-Ã lvarez 
and Quina-Custodio (2016), have used the same theoretical framework that is used in 
this study, agency theory, stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory and institutional 
theory in analysing the voluntary disclosure of CSR in different countries (France, 
Portugal, Spain, UK and USA). This combined theoretical approach gives a deep 
understanding of CSED more than using one particular theory only. In Saudi Arabian 
context Macarulla and Talalweh (2012) also have used stakeholder theory and 
legitimacy theory to examine the level of CSR disclosure in the annual reports of the 
134 Saudi listed firms 2008 and investigating the variables affecting it. Albassam’s 
(2014) study has been conducted in Saudi Arabia also applies a multi-theoretical 
framework including stakeholder theory, agency theory and other theories to analyse 
the new reform of Saudi Corporate Governance codes and how this affect the level of 
voluntary disclosure.   
The previous discussion, dictates that a multi-theoretical approach is more appropriate 
to this research to gain a higher level of justification and explanations when examining 
and explaining CSED practice in Saudi Arabia. Thus, this study also follows the 
previous studies in applying multi-theoretical approach in analysing CSED in Saudi 
Arabia. It is argued that using joint consideration of more than one theory provides 
comprehensive perspective for explaining corporate social and environmental 
disclosure and its determinants in Saudi Arabia.  
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Table 3.2: Factors interrelation to each theory used in the study. 
Explanatory factor Stakeholder theory 
Legitimacy 
theory 
Institutional 
theory Agency theory 
Company size    - 
Company age    - 
Profitability (ROA)   -  
Leverage   -  
Government ownership  -   
Managers ownership     
Foreign ownership -    
Board of directors size - - -  
Board of directors 
independence 
  -  
Audit firm size -  -  
CEO role duality - - -  
After discussing the appropriate theories for this study, it is essential to review the 
existing relevant empirical literature in accordance with CSED in both developed and 
developing countries in general and in Saudi Arabia specifically. The next section will 
conduct a critical literature review of the empirical studies in the CSED field to 
identify any gaps in the literature where this study could contribute to the literature.  
3.6 Empirical literature on corporate social and 
environmental disclosure  
This section presents a review of the previous studies on corporate and environmental 
disclosure, while the next section will present how corporate characteristics and 
  
75 
corporate governance mechanisms could explain the extent to which companies report 
such information. This literature review covers empirical literature in both developed 
and developing countries aiming to understand more about social and environmental 
disclosure. The review will be followed by an analysis of empirical literature in 
countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), prompting reviewing of studies 
conducted on Saudi Arabia, the main focus of this study. After reviewing CSED 
literature, empirical literature detailing the determents of corporate social and 
environmental disclosure will be presented, and divided into two subsections. The 
first sub-section is comprised of the firm characteristics as a determinant of the level 
of CSED, followed by corporate governance mechanisms as an influential aspect 
affecting the level of CSED. This section will be analysed as follows: 3.6.1 will 
present an overview of CSED in developed countries, followed by 3.6.2., an overview 
of CSED in developing countries. And 3.6.3 will provides an overview of CSED in 
GCC countries including Saudi Arabia.  
3.6.1 Overview of CSED in developed countries:  
The majority of CSED studies that were conducted on developed countries were done 
so with different aims and methods (for example see: Gray et al., 1995; Guthrie, 1983; 
Hackston and Milne, 1996; Hassan and Kouhy, 2014; Kamal and Deegan, 2013; Ortas 
et al., 2014). It can be argued that developed countries have different CSED practices 
in comparison to those in developing countries (Imam, 2000).  This could be a result 
of the fact that, historically, developed countries have paid greater attention to social 
and environmental issues than developing countries. This issue of the difference 
between reporting practices in developing and developed countries,  has been 
highlighted by a significant number of studies (Imam, 2000; Pratten and Abdulhamid 
Mashat, 2009). The majority of studies related to corporate social and environmental 
responsibility (CSER) and corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSED) 
have been conducted in Europe, the USA, the UK, Japan, Singapore and Australia 
(Holder-Webb et al., 2009).  
In the UK, According to Idowu and Towler (2004), the main CSR information 
disclosed by UK companies is related to the environment and the community, in a 
study of UK companies across different industries. While in developing countries, 
  
76 
human resource information such as ‘the number of employees’ and ‘employee 
training’ are the categories that have been given considerably more attention rather 
than environmental contributions (Alsaeed, 2006; Belal, 2001; Gray et al., 2001; 
Guthrie and Parker, 1990; Ratanajongkol et al., 2006). A significant number of studies 
have compared corporate social and environmental practices, disclosure and reports 
types. Aguilera et al.(2006) conducted a study which compares corporate social 
responsibilities between the USA and the UK, and argue that the differences between 
the UK and the US corporate governance arrangements have resulted in company’s 
social responsibilities (CSR). In a similar study, Holland and Foo (2003) compare the 
environmental disclosure of companies in the USA and the UK, and the results 
indicate that each country’s environmental legal and regulatory framework influences 
the environmental performance and disclosure. In another comparison study, Ho and 
Taylor (2007) investigate the effect of firm characteristics on corporate social 
disclosure in the USA and Japan using a sample of 50 companies in 2003. They found 
that in Japan companies disclose more than USA companies, this could be because of 
the differences in cultures, the environmental regulations, and other institutional 
factors between the USA and Japan. In a USA study which explores the CSR 
disclosure practices of  50 publicly-traded U.S. firms, Holder-Webb et al. (2009) 
perform content analysis of the public information provided by these firms during 
2004. In a recent study conducted in the USA, (Giannarakis et al., 2014) examine the 
environmental disclosure in relation to corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
characteristics (CEO duality, Women in board, greenhouse gas emission, leverage, 
Industry) during the period 2009 -2012.  
In Singapore two similar studies  conducted by Eng and Mak (2003) and Cheng and 
Courtenay (2006) used 158 listed firms to investigate the association between 
corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. In a cross sectional study, Michelon 
and Parbonetti (2012) examine the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms (independent directors, leadership, structure and CEO duality) and 
sustainability disclosure using firm characteristics as control variables. The study 
sample consisting of US and European companies, use annual reports, stand-alone 
reports such as social, environmental and sustainability reports. In a similar study, 
Gallego-Ã and Quina-Custodio (2016) analyse the practice of social and 
environmental disclosure in  five different countries (UK, USA, France, Portugal and 
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Spain). The Sample of their study consists of 110 companies in 2014 using GRI, 2011 
as an index; and they found that firm size and leverage have a significant effect on 
CSED.  
In Europe, there are an extensive number of studies which analyse corporate social 
and environmental disclosure. Branco and Rodrigues (2008) conducted a study on 57 
listed Portuguese companies in 2003 to analyse  the relationship between total social 
responsibility disclosure reported in annual reports, the Internet and influencing 
factors. Leverage, firm size and media exposure are found to be the most significant 
factors influencing the level of social responsibility disclosure, while Industry, 
consumer proximity, environmental sensitivity and profitability are insignificant 
factors. In another European study, Reverte (2009) investigates the determinant of 
corporate social disclosure in Spanish non-financial firms in the years 2005 and 2006. 
Although it is a small sample study (46 Observations), it is considered significant, the 
results indicate that Firm size, media and Industries sensitivity are significant 
determinants of corporate social disclosure. In Greece, a study by Skouloudis et al, 
(2013) investigates corporate social disclosure determinants, and includes the 100 
largest companies based on annual revenues. They found that ownership identity, firm 
size, industry and profitability are significantly affecting the level of disclosure. In 
New Zealand, Hackston and Milne (1996) conducted one of the significant studies in 
corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSED) practice and determinants. 
They discovered that most social disclosure contains human resource information and 
activities in addition to environment and community issues. Firm size and industry 
have a significant influence on the level of CSED whilst profitability is an 
insignificant factor.  
3.6.2 Overview of CSED in developing countries:  
As mentioned in the previous sub-section, the corporate social and environmental 
disclosure phenomenon began to be a topic of interest in research in developing 
countries later than in developed countries. As a result, it is less established than in 
developed countries, making further research on it necessary. Malaysia is one of the 
developing countries to have a significant number of CSED studies. Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002) examine corporate governance and cultural characteristics, in addition 
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to firm characteristics as possible determinants of voluntary disclosures in the annual 
reports of 167 non-financial Malaysian companies during the year 1995. They found 
that firm size and governmental ownership has a positive significant effect on the level 
of voluntary disclosure, while CEO duality has a negative effect. This finding has 
implications for corporate governance policy formulation by the Malaysian Institute 
of Corporate Governance (MISG). Regarding the cultural factor, the proportion of 
Malay directors on the board is significantly associated with the level of voluntary 
disclosure.  In a similar study, Ghazali and Weetman (2006) examine the effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms on voluntary disclosure in Malaysia after the 1997 
financial crisis, to assess whether or not the regulatory reaction to the crisis increased 
the awareness of disclosure as a tool for corporate governance. They found that 
director ownership has a negative association with the level of voluntary disclosure, 
while board independent and CEO duality are insignificant determinants. 
 Another study conducted by Ghazali (2007) focuses on ownership structure in 
addition to firm characteristics as a determinant of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure. The study consists of 87 listed companies in 2001 using a checklist 
containing 22 items; the results indicate a negative effect of directors’ ownership on 
the level of corporate social responsibility disclosure while governmental ownership 
and firm size have a positive influence. Another Malaysian study which emphasises 
corporate governance and firm characteristics was conducted by Said et al. (2009), 
and includes  27 companies in the period between 2005 – 2007 using content analysis 
to collect the required data. They found that board size, independency and leverage 
are significant factors that affect the level of corporate social disclosure while, CEO 
duality firm size and profitability are insignificant. Esa and Ghazali (2012) also 
examine the effect of corporate governance and firm characteristics on the level of 
corporate social and environmental disclosure. 27 non-financial listed Malaysian 
companies are the sample of the study for two years (2005 and 2007), the CSR index 
that has been used in the study includes human resources, environmental, community, 
product and service categories. The results of the study show that Leverage Board size 
Independent directors are significant factors affecting CSED while Company size and 
Profitability are insignificant.  
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Further studies have been conducted in developing countries such as China, India, 
Indonesia, Kenya and Bangladesh to analyse the practice of corporate social and 
environmental disclosure. Two studies carried out in China by Huafang and Jianguo 
(2007) and Li et al.(2013) investigate voluntary disclosure, the former investigate the 
effect of performance and state ownership while the latter examine the influence of 
corporate governance. In Kenya Barako et al. (2006b) examines the association of 
corporate governance practices with the voluntary disclosures of selected information 
in the annual reports of Kenyan companies. The results indicate that the presence of 
an audit committee and proportion of non-executive directors on the board is a 
significant factor associated with the level of voluntary disclosure. On the other hand, 
board leadership structure has an insignificant influence on the level of voluntary 
disclosure. 
 Kansal et al. (2014) examined the effect of firm characteristics on corporate social 
responsibility disclosure, they chose the top 100 listed companies in India as a sample 
for their study. They found that industry, reputation and profitability are significant 
factors affecting the level of corporate social responsibility disclosure. While Kansal 
et al (2014) examine the effect of firm characteristics on corporate social 
responsibility disclosure, Siregar and Bachtiar (2010) examine the association 
between corporate governance in addition to firm characteristics and corporate social 
responsibility reporting. They found that firm and board of directors’ size have a 
positive effect on CSR reporting.  
Furthermore, studies from Bangladesh have contributed to developing countries 
literature.  Belal and Owen (2007) conducted a qualitative study to explore the view 
of managers about the current state of social reporting and the future prospects in 
Bangladesh. The study is based on 23 interviews with senior managers in Bangladeshi 
companies.  The dominant findings of the study show that the pressure on stakeholders 
is one of the motivations behind company engagement in CSR. Two similar studies 
in Bangladesh are  Khan et al. (2012) and Muttakin and Khan (2014), both of which 
examined the relationship between corporate governance and corporate social 
disclosure (CSD). Khan et al. (2012) found that Public, foreign ownership, board 
independence and audit committee are positively and significantly correlated with 
CSD, while main ownership is negatively significant and CEO duality is not a 
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significant factor. Muttakin and Khan (2014) conducted their study on 135 
manufacturing Bangladeshi companies listed from 2005 to 2009. The key findings of 
the study indicate that there is a positive association between firm size, and 
profitability (ROA) and the level of CSD; in contrast, there is a negative association 
between family ownership and the level of CSD. In a recent study Belal and Owen 
(2015) examine the determinants of stand-alone corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
reporting in a multinational subsidiary in Bangladesh. They found that stand-alone 
CSR disclosure is said to provide the subsidiary with the formal position in which to 
legitimise its activities in Bangladesh.  
Middle Eastern and North African countries have relatively few studies in corporate 
social and environmental disclosure.  Bayoud et al. (2012) examined the effect of  firm 
characteristics on the categories of corporate social and environmental disclosure. The 
study applies a mixed method (quantitative and qualitative) using a sample which 
includes 135 Libyan organisations across four sectors. In Egypt two studies are 
investigating the influence of corporate governance on voluntary disclosure, Samaha 
et al. (2012) and Hussainey et al. (2011). The former study, Samaha et al. (2012), aims 
to investigate the impact of corporate governance attributes on the level of voluntary 
disclosure (including corporate governance) using financial statements and websites 
of Egyptian listed companies as a source of data. They found a minimal level of 
voluntary disclosure compared to mandatory disclosure due to ineffectiveness and 
inadequacy in the regulatory framework in Egypt. The findings indicate a positive 
impact of the proportion of independent directors in the board as well as firm size on 
the voluntary disclosure, in contrast a negative impact of duality in position and higher 
ownership concentration. Hussainey et al. (2011) in a similar study examine the effect 
of corporate governance (CEO duality, board independent, directors ownership and 
board size) on the level of voluntary disclosure using firm characteristics as control 
variables (leverage, firm size, profitability and industry types). The study sample 
includes 100 Egyptian listed companies in 2009; the results show a significant 
association between board Independent, firm size and the level of voluntary 
disclosure, negative association with CEO duality while board size, leverage, industry 
and profitability are insignificant. 
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In Jordan Naser et al. (2002) provides an empirical analysis of the changes in the depth 
of corporate disclosure after introducing IASs (International Accounting Standards), 
in addition to examining the association with firm characteristics. The outcome of the 
analysis reveals a slight improvement in the depth of disclosure; this improvement is 
also related to corporate size, audit firm status, liquidity and profitability. Menassa 
(2010) aims to explore the nature and quality of social information reported by 24 
Lebanese commercial banks as well as the extent of these disclosures in relation to 
firm size, financial performance, and other chosen variables. He found that human 
resource, product and consumer information are the most commonly reported. He also 
found a significant association between the level of social disclosure, bank size and 
financial performance, yet a weak association with bank age and no association with 
listing status.  
After reviewing empirical literature in developed and developing countries, it is 
important, when conducting this study, to identify and review empirical literature on 
the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries which will be discussed in the next 
sub-section.  
3.6.3 Overview of CSED in GCC countries including Saudi Arabia:  
The countries that have been gathered to form the GCC are considered developing 
countries and have been given little considerations regarding social and environmental 
issues (Alsaeed, 2006; Ararat, 2006; Gallhofer et al., 2011; Hossain and Hammami, 
2009; Naser et al., 2006). The GCC countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (Davis and Hayashi, 2007). These countries 
are considered developing countries with the top rank in Middle East and North 
African countries in terms of an effective business environment (Sturm, Strasky, 
Adolf, and Peschel, 2008). The GCC countries have, to a large extent, similarities in 
some economics, social and characteristics such as oil revenue dependency, language, 
religion and culture (Al-Janadi et al., 2011).  In the context of corporate social 
responsibility and disclosure, this issue considered new, however it is growing. 
According to Khan (2008), CSR in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries lacks 
formal policies although those companies contribute in sustainable development in 
some sectors such as education, health, housing and the environment. Studies that 
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have been conducted on the GCC countries considered limited. These studies will be 
discussed in this section to illustrate the extent to which companies disclose social and 
environmental information.   
Qatar has the highest GDP per capita and the most concentrated economy in 
hydrocarbon with a miner change from oil to gas and Qatar is developing its tourism 
sector (Sturm et al., 2008). Hossain and Hammami (2009) conducted their empirical 
study on 25 listed companies in Qatar to look at the determinant of voluntary 
disclosure using companies’ annual reports. The affecting firm characteristics 
according to their results are age, size, complexity and assets and level of disclosure. 
On the other hand, profitability has an insignificant effect on the level of voluntary 
disclosure. Another study of CSED determinants in Qatar has been carried out by 
Naser, et al. (2006) who found an association between CSED and firm size, business 
risk and corporate growth as supported by the agency theory. 
The United Arab of Emirates (UAE) is the second largest country in the Council in 
terms of its nominal GDP and GDP per capita.  UAE is also the second country with 
less dependency on oil after Bahrain. Significant developments in tourism, transport 
and finance can be shown in the UAE (Sturm et al., 2008). Aljifri (2008) conducted 
research on 31 listed UAE companies, using their annual reports to examine the 
determinant of level of disclosure, such as sector, which has an association with the 
level of disclosure. In addition to size, other characteristics such as debt, equity ratio 
and profitability have found to have an insignificant association with the level of 
disclosure. Rettab et al. (2009) used survey data from 280 firms in Dubai to examine  
the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities and 
company’s performance using three measurement; financial performance, employee 
commitment, and corporate reputation. The findings demonstrate a positive 
association between CSR and company’s performance (for all three measures).    
According to Sturm et al. (2008), Kuwait depends mostly on Commodities with recent 
developments in finance. Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) conducted a study on 
170 Kuwaiti listed companies to measure the level of voluntary disclosure (including 
social and environmental disclosure) by listed companies in their annual reports. 
Moreover, they examined the association between voluntary disclosure and some of 
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the corporate governance characteristics. They compared the findings with those of a 
previous study which was conducted in 2009 and found an increase in voluntary 
disclosure of around 4% which indicated enhanced transparency by Kuwaiti 
companies. 
Bahrain has a significant financial hub which served the Gulf and the Arab region, 
focusing on Islamic finance. Bahrain is considered to be the country that least depends 
on oil with a major Aluminium production. This is in addition to diversity in tourism 
and transport (Sturm et al., 2008). Joshi and Al-Modhahki (2003) carried out a study 
on internet disclosure in Bahrain and Kuwait. The aim of the study was to examine 
the factors that clarify the use of the internet in voluntary non- financial reporting 
(including social and environmental disclosure); the study sample consists of 75 
companies. The results show 47.6 % companies from Kuwait and 48.5% companies 
from Bahrain had their own websites.  Six variables were considered in this study to 
examine their influence on internet financial reporting. From the six variables size and 
industry were found to have a significant influence on financial reporting practices, 
while risk, the usage of this technology was still limited and slow in the Gulf perhaps 
due to cultural constraints. Profitability, country effect, and auditor size were found 
to have an insignificant effect on financial reporting.  
Oman has the highest level of dependence on oil and gas and it needs to transfer to 
alternative sources of income; hence a significant infrastructure development is 
underway to boost tourism and enhance diversification in the manufacturing sector 
(Sturm et al., 2008).  Minnee et al. (2012) conducted a study that aimed to explore the 
expectations and practices of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Oman using 153 
respondents. The study compares the expectations of the respondents with CSR 
performance of large and medium-sized enterprises in Oman. The results indicate that 
respondents expect companies to provide “safe and reliable products and services”, 
“appropriately treat employees”, “behave ethically”, and be “committed to social 
responsibility”. Moreover, the results demonstrate a lack of awareness of CSR 
amongst Omanis, young people, and those with a lower level of education, since their 
expectations were lower.  
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Further studies were conducted to explore and investigate corporate social 
responsibility and disclosure amongst Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries.  
Khasharmeh and Desoky (2013) conducted a study which evaluates and compares the 
level of on-line CSR disclosure  in GCC countries. Conjointly the study aims to 
examine the effect of company characteristics on the level of CSR on-line disclosure. 
The study sample consists of 163 companies listed in the GCC stock market in six 
countries. The study discloses that Qatar and Saudi Arabia have the highest level of 
online disclosure and that profitability and company type are significantly correlated 
with the level of disclosure. 
In a similar study, Al-Janadi et al.(2011) compare the level of voluntary disclosure 
(including social and environmental disclosure) between two countries from the GCC 
including Saudi Arabia and United Arab of Emirates. They used the annual reports of 
companies listed in Saudi Arabia and the UAE from 2006 to 2007 to collect the 
voluntary disclosure information. The results of the study indicate a low level of 
voluntary disclosure as only 36% of the companies disclose voluntary disclosure out 
of the entire sample. The disclosed information lack social and environmental content. 
Moreover, the results divulge that the level of voluntary disclosure in UAE companies 
(42% on average) is significantly higher than that of Saudi companies (32% on 
average).  
Few studies based on voluntary disclosure in general and corporate social and 
environmental disclosure in particular have been conducted in Saudi Arabia. For 
example, Al-Razeen and  Karbhari (2004) investigated the correlation between the 
compulsory and voluntary disclosure (including social and environmental disclosure) 
in both listed and non-listed companies annual reports. Three disclosure indices have 
been constructed to analyse the disclosure in Saudi Arabia, including mandatory 
disclosure, voluntary disclosure closely related to mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
not closely related to mandatory disclosure. The results reveal a significant correlation 
between mandatory and voluntary disclosure in the mandatory index. Moreover, a 
weak correlation has been found between voluntary disclosure and the two other 
indices. The results point towards a low co-ordination between the board of directors 
and the management in writing parts of the annual report. The study analyses 
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voluntary disclosure in Saudi Arabia in general, but not corporate social and 
environmental disclosure.  
In a similar study Alsaeed (2006) analysed voluntary disclosure (including social and 
environmental disclosure) using the annual reports of 40 listed companies. His aim 
was to measure and analyse the extent of disclosures in addition to investigating the 
association between some firm characteristics and the level of disclosure. He 
constructed a disclosure index consisting of 20 items from previous studies, the results 
of which show that the average level of compliance and voluntary corporate disclosure 
is 30%. Interestingly, he discovered a positive interaction between the level of 
disclosure and firm size, and an insignificant association with debt, ownership 
dispersion, firm age, profitability, industry and audit firm size. Albeit this is the first 
study to examine the effect of a number of corporate characteristics and corporate 
governance mechanisms in Saudi Arabia, it is still considered small and relatively 
unobservant, since the index consists of only 20 items constructed in the index. Al-
Janadi et al, (2013) examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on 
voluntary disclosure (including social and environmental disclosure) in Saudi Arabia. 
The data was extracted from the annual reports of 87 companies listed in the Saudi 
Stock Market from 2006 – 2007. The findings of the study indicate a positive 
association between corporate governance mechanisms and reporting quality. 
Particularly, non-executive directors, board size, CEO duality, audit quality, and 
government ownership have a significant effect on the quality of voluntary disclosure. 
The previous studies analysed voluntary disclosure in Saudi Arabia in general, the 
subsequent paragraph will refer to studies which address corporate social and 
environmental disclosure in Saudi Arabia.     
 Mandurah et al. (2012) carried out an exploratory study to assess the Saudi selected 
firms’ managers’ awareness level of CSR and how companies integrate CSR in their 
strategies and policies. They concluded that the level of CSR awareness was 
reasonable and that there was a moderately positive attitude toward the CSR issue. In 
a another study, Macarulla and Talalweh (2012) examine the level of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) disclosure in Saudi Arabia. The data was collected from the 
annual reports of 134 Saudi listed companies using an index of labour, social and 
environmental categories. The study examines the determinants of the level of CSR 
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disclosure. The results reveal that the level of CSR disclosure is low in Saudi Arabia. 
Additionally, firm size, profitability and economic sectors are the main determinants 
of CSR disclosure level, while auditing firm type (national or international) and 
regulated sectors are not determinants of the level of CSR disclosure. Their study is 
similar to this study; however, the sample of this study is larger and the constructed 
index includes more categories which help in investigating more social and 
environmental information (that could be not investigated in previous studies). 
In a recent study, Habbash (2015) examines the influence of corporate characteristics 
and corporate governance on corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure in Saudi 
Arabia. The study is comprised of 267 annual reports of non-financial listed 
companies using a constructed index (17 items) based on ISO 26000. Although the 
identified level of CSR disclosure had increased since the previous studies, it is still 
considered low. This improvement could be a result of the application of the Saudi 
corporate governance code in 2007. Consequently, the results indicate a positive 
association between government and family ownership, firm size, firm age and CSR 
disclosure. To the contrary it highlights a negative association with firm leverage. No 
association has been found between board independence, role duality, institutional 
ownership, firm profitability, industry type and CSR disclosure. Agency theory was 
applied in the study to ascertain the influence of specific board characteristics and 
ownership structures upon disclosure. However, without being applied in conjunction 
with other related theories such as legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and 
institutional theory, agency theory alone is inadequate to explain the CSR disclosure 
phenomenon.   
Reviewing the literature of CSED and its determinants in developed and developing 
countries in general, and in Saudi Arabia is particular is one of the aims of this chapter. 
This CSED literature review has indicated a necessity of comprehensive studies to 
examine the practice of CSED in Saudi Arabia. Based on previous studies,  there is 
scarcity in studies investigating the extent and the nature of CSED as well as the 
factors influencing the variation in the level of CSED and CSED categories in 
developing countries (N. A. Ghazali, 2007; Kansal et al., 2014). Taking into 
consideration the deference’s between developing countries in terms of the societies 
point of view of the role of business in society which result in variation in the extent 
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and nature of CSED (for more see: Chih, Chih, and Chen, 2010; Kamla, 2007; Matten 
and Moon, 2008; Williams, 1999). By doing so, the current study will add to the 
developing countries in general and to the Saudi Arabian in particular. The next sub-
section will present the development of research question one after providing the 
rational and the gaps in the literature.  
3.6.4 Research question 1 development 
Saudi Arabia (as discussed in Error! Reference source not found. ) is considered a 
developing country which has institutional, regulatory and contextual characteristics 
similar to Islamic and Arab countries. It is ruled by shariah15  (Islamic law); the 
constitution and formal roles and regulations are based on Islamic law (Al-Matari et 
al., 2012; Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008). Therefore, Islamic perspectives and values 
(for example, equality, transparency, generosity,  philanthropy, morality and 
accountability) affect life activities Saudi Arabia such as economic system, laws and 
regulations, and business (Abdul Rahman, 1998; Kamla, 2009; Sarkar, 2008).  
Since 2008, Saudi Arabia has achieved an important economic position at 
international level as a member of the G20 (Al-Matari et al., 2012). Its economy is the 
largest economy in (MENA) and one of the largest economies in the world (Al-Filali 
and Gallarotti, 2012; Al-Matari et al., 2012, Piesse et al., 2012). Additionally, Saudi 
Arabia perform 25% of the total Arab Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2010, and 
44% of the total Arab market capitalisation (Alshehri and Solomon, 2012; Albassam, 
2014). It is one of the largest oil-producing countries in OPEC, in 2010 it was 
accountable for 31% of the total oil production of OPEC (Albassam, 2014; Habbash 
et al., 2015).  
Saudi Arabia is one of the most competitive economies and the world’s fastest 
reforming business environment, this makes Saudi Arabia an ideal investment 
opportunity. Its tax system as it is the third most rewarding system in the world. 
Another factor that gives Saudi a significant status is its growing economy: Saudi is 
                                                 
15 Shari’ah is the “Islamic law about human conduct and regulates everything referring to the life of 
the Muslim”. It is based on Quraan (God’s Holy Words), “the deeds and expressions of the Prophet 
(the Sunna) and the consensus of Islamic scholars” (Macarulla and Talalweh, 2012, P. 816). 
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one of the world fastest growing economies with 6.8 % in 2012 (SAGIA, 2013). 
Moreover, it is the largest free market in (MENA) region (SAGIA, 2013). The Saudi 
government offers incentives such as tax discounts and allowing foreign owners to 
take loans from Saudi banks belonging to the government in order to encouraged 
foreign companies to invest in Saudi Arabia. By 2005 there were a total of 642 foreign 
companies, of which 174 were industrial enterprises (SAMA, 2006). 
As a result of the factors that is mentioned in the previous paragraph, some of the 
Saudi regulations have been changed, such as, the accounting profession (Al-Rehaily, 
1992), corporate governance code (Albassam, 2014), investment policies and stock 
market regimes (Tadawul, 2015). Some of these regulations and code require 
companies to pay more attention to accountability and transparency. As an example 
in the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) (2006, Article 10) includes 
stakeholder rights in sub-section “e) outlining a written policy that regulate the 
relationship with stakeholders with a view to protecting their respective rights; in 
particular” (Authority, 2006). Additionally, Part Three of the SCGC focuses 
specifically on enhancing corporate transparency and voluntary disclosure (Authority, 
2006). Corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSED) is one of the voluntary 
disclosures that is expected to increase due to the development and the growth that 
took place recently in Saudi Arabia.  
Another reason that enhances CSED to increase in Saudi Arabia, although it is a 
voluntary practice, is the pressures on companies from the government, social groups 
and the media on Saudi companies to be socially responsible. The government 
pressure can be revealed from some regulation such as corporate governance codes 
and Ministry of Labour regulation. The social groups’ pressure can be created from 
the awareness of social responsibility that they spread across the society. The media 
also play a significant role in placing pressure by CSR news on socially responsible 
and irresponsible companies.  
The current literature suggests attention giving to studying and investigating CSED 
and corporate governance has been growing in Islamic and Arab countries, including 
Saudi Arabia (Alsaeed, 2006; Kamla and Roberts, 2010; Baydoun et al., 2013). Due 
to the differences in religious, social and political systems in these countries compared 
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to those of developed countries, where most studies have focused. Therefore, these 
important and distinctive regulatory, institutional and contextual differences can have 
significant implications for the effectiveness of corporate disclosure, accountability, 
governance and performance mechanisms.  
Based on the status of Saudi Arabia (as discussed in this section) and its significant 
economic, business environment, and based on its place in MENA and the boarder 
world, companies are expected to disclose more corporate and social information in 
recognition of their role in the society. It is stimulating to know are the previously 
mentioned factors motivating companies to disclose corporate social and 
environmental information in Saudi Arabia where CSED is still voluntary and at its 
infancy. Additionally, it is motivating to know also if the level of CSED is aligned 
with the country’s reputation.  
According to Adams et al., (1998) studies examining the quantity and quality of 
CSED, and exploring its experiences are considered necessary to improve the quantity 
and quality of CSED reporting in a country. Therefore, this research has several aims: 
first aim is to examine the extent of CSED in Saudi Arabia and the second is to 
investigate the nature of the disclosed social and environmental information amongst 
the Saudi-listed companies.   
To accomplish the first and the second aim of this research, the following research 
question, as mentioned below, will be addressed in Chapter 5.  
RQ1: What is the extent and the nature of the social and environmental information 
that is reported by the Saudi-listed companies?  
The address this research question (RQ 1) the level of disclosure (number of issues 
reported) and the nature (the type and categories) of CSED will be analysed using 
Saudi-listed companies’ annual reports 
By addressing this research question, the understanding of CSED will be enhanced in 
general and the reason behind companies reporting different categories with different 
levels in specific. Particularly after reviewing the CSED literature in developed and 
developing countries, it can be argued that little investigation has been carried out in 
Saudi Arabia. Remarkably, the majority of studies conducted in Saudi Arabia do not 
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take into consideration a multi-theoretical stance. A multi-theoretical perspective will 
enhance the analysis of the results of this study. It includes four theories, stakeholder, 
legitimacy, institutional and agency theory. Analysing the results using the most 
relevant and commonly used theories will enrich the analysis and the subsequent 
exploration of the findings. In contrast with some of the previous studies, this 
examination goes into greater depth and includes all the companies listed in the Saudi 
Stock Market on the date the data was collected. This larger sample provides more 
accurate results that can be generalised. Earlier discussions evidence a need for further 
studies addressing the phenomenon of CSED. This study reacts to the demand for 
more studies in the context of developing countries (Ghazali, 2007; Kansal et al., 
2014). 
This research question will be addressed in chapter five via the analysis of annual 
reports of the entire sample. Content analysis of CSED practice in Saudi listed annual 
reports will be presented to measure the extent of CSED. Additionally, a detailed 
analysis of what Saudi listed companies disclose (CSED categories) will be carried 
out. This analysis will provide an overview of CSED practice in Saudi Arabia, the 
average of general disclosure and what information is disclosed in their annual reports. 
Moreover, Chapter Five will discuss why some categories are disclosed more 
frequently than others based on theories the objective of which is to address research 
question one. Another significant issue which assists understanding of CSED in Saudi 
Arabia relates to the determinants of CSED. 
After providing the motives and the development of RQ1 the next section will focus 
on reviewing the empirical literature related to the determinants of CSED.   
3.7 Empirical literature of determinants of CSED   
This section will be organized as follows: section 3.7.1 presents firm characteristics 
that influence CSED followed by section 3.7.2 which provides corporate governance 
mechanisms with relation to CSED. In each subsection, key studies and related theory 
are provided to suggest and justify the association between firm characteristics, 
corporate governance and CSED.  
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3.7.1 Firm characteristics  
This section presents firm characteristics as determinants of CSED by providing a 
discussion of the association between each firm characteristic and CSED using the 
related theories that justify the association and are supported by the literature. In 
addition, the hypotheses related to each firm characteristic will be developed in this 
section. Companies with different characteristics have different levels and types of 
social and environmental disclosure (Alsaeed, 2006). Although they operate in the 
same country and have the same rules, regulations, legal enforcement and media 
pressure; there are other determinants that could affect the level of corporate social 
and environmental disclosure (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Branco and Rodrigues, 
2008). Firm characteristics, such as size, age, leverage, profitability and other 
characteristics as determinants of social and environmental disclosure have been the 
subject of a significant number of studies in the West (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; 
Raffournier, 1995; Cooke, 1992; Wallace and Nasser, 1995). There are also several 
in developing countries (Alsaeed, 2006; Macarulla and Talalweh, 2012; Naser et al., 
2002).  
In investigating the association between the level of social and environmental 
disclosure and firm characteristics different theories, such as stakeholder theory, 
legitimacy theory, institutional theory and agency theory, have been used to explain 
such relationships. Stakeholder theory is used to explain how firm characteristics play 
a role in satisfying stakeholders. For example, it is argued that larger firms are exposed 
to a wider range of stakeholders and are thus expected to be exposed to more pressures 
than smaller companies (Gray et al, 2000). Legitimacy theory is concerned with the 
firms’ abilities to maintain their legitimacy so that they can operate by engaging with 
their stakeholders and the wider society. As a result, legitimacy theory can explain the 
effect of some firm characteristics on the level of CSED such as firm age. It can be 
argued that old firms maintain their legitimacy by proving to society that they are 
legitimate to exist and operate Consequently, they disclose more social and 
environmental activities as well their accounting system and how it can be improved 
(Alsaeed, 2006). 
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On the other hand, institutional theory takes the view that companies report to comply 
with legal requirements, policies, rules and regulations (coercive isomorphic 
pressures). Additionally, to be able to compete with other companies (mimetic 
isomorphic pressures), such as those operating in the same industry they either try to 
disclose more CSED information in order to be a leader in the field thereby creating 
competitor advantage; or, they to try to compete with other companies Agency theory 
can explain companies’ approach to corporate social and environmental disclosure: 
companies with higher level of leverage tend to disclose more social and 
environmental information to decrease the agency costs from the asymmetry 
information.  
In this section, the findings of different studies have been discussed. For example, 
some characteristics are found to have a positive effect on the level of disclosure while 
some have a negative effect. Firm size, firm age, profitability and leverage are the most 
considered characteristics when investigating determinates of the level of corporate 
social environmental disclosure (Alsaeed, 2006; Khan et al., 2012; McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2000; Waddock and Graves, 1997). As mentioned previously, the majority of 
CSED studies were conducted in relation to developed countries (Gray et al., 1995; 
Guthrie, 1983; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Hassan and Kouhy, 2014; Kamal and 
Deegan, 2013; Ortas et al., 2014). This is also the case when addressing the effect of 
firm characteristics on CSED in developing countries. The aim of these studies is to 
explain the factors behind companies engaging in CSED (Adams et al., 1998; Adams 
and Kuasirikun, 2000; Bhattacharyya, 2014; Gray et al., 2001; Hackston and Milne, 
1996). The gap between the number of studies in developed and developing countries 
results in a need for more studies on this phenomenon (Ahmed Haji, 2013; Alsaeed, 
2006; Belal and Momin, 2009; Kansal et al., 2014).  
Adams et al (1998) carried a survey of Western European corporations to investigate 
the influence of firm characteristics on corporate social reporting. They found that the 
information disclosed differs from country to country, although they did not ascertain 
the reason behind these differences. Branco and Rodrigues (2008) investigated the 
effect of firm characteristics, such as firm’s size, media exposure and financial 
leverage, on reporting. They used content analysis to measure the extent of CSR 
disclosure of 49 Portuguese listed companies using annual reports and web sites. They 
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found a positive association between firm size and media exposure. However, 
Industry, consumer proximity, environmental sensitivity and profitability are 
insignificant factors in a more recent study, Galani et al. (2012) developed an 
environmental index, with 15 disclosure items, to analyse 34 Greek companies’ 
environmental disclosure. The results demonstrate a significant association between 
company size, global reporting, initiative reporting, industry membership and 
environmental disclosure. 
 Andrikopoulos and Kriklani’s (2013) study consists of 139 Danish listed companies 
to investigate the determinant of environmental reporting. They found a significant 
relationship between company’s size, profitability, leverage and the market-to-book 
ratio, and profitability and the level of environmental disclosure. Bhattacharyya 
(2014) examines the level of social and environmental reporting in Australia, 
including the association between firm characteristics and Social and Environmental 
reporting. The results indicate a low level of social disclosure with a significant 
difference in the level of disclosure between large companies and small industry. 
Moreover, there is a negative association between profitability measured by return on 
total assets and social and environmental disclosure. Additionally, no association has 
been found between companies’ age, external auditor size and the level of social and 
environmental disclosure. 
In Saudi Arabia, few studies have been conducted to examine the association between 
firm characteristics and the level of disclosure. AlSaeed (2006) conducted a study to 
investigate the relationship between some firm characteristics (i.e., size, leverage, age, 
profitability, ownership dispersion, liquidity and audit firm size) and the extent of 
CSR disclosure. He developed a checklist of 20 voluntary (including social and 
environmental disclosure) disclosures to assess 40 listed companies. The results 
showed that only firm size has a significant positive impact on the extent of CSR 
disclosure, while all other aspects have insignificant impact. AlSaeed (2006) study 
considered being the first study in Saudi Arabia to investigate firm characteristics to 
explain the variation of voluntary disclosure (including social and environmental 
disclosure); however, the sample in his study was only 40 companies which were the 
listed companies at the time that he collected the date (2003).  
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Macarulla and Talalweh (2012) examine  the determinants of the  level of Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) disclosure using the annual reports of  134 listed 
companies  in 2008. Thy constructed an index which includes three main categories: 
labour, social and environment. They found that firm size, economic sector and 
profitability are the characteristic that positively affect the level of CSR disclosure. 
On the other hand, type of auditing firm (international or local) and the regulated 
sector have an insignificant effect on the level of disclosure. Habbash (2015) in a 
recent study investigated the influence of corporate governance and corporate 
characteristics on corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure in Saudi Arabia. 
The sample includes 267 annual reports of Saudi non-financial-listed companies using 
a checklist of 17 CSR disclosure items. The findings show that firm size, and firm age 
are positively influencing CSR disclosure, while leverage has a negative influence and 
firm profitability is found not to has an influence on CSR disclosure.  
Each firm characteristic included in this study will be discussed in the following sub-
sections in addition to developing hypotheses after explaining the relation between 
each firm characteristic and CSED based on the appropriate theory and the relevant 
literature. The firm characteristics that will be investigated in this research are: size, 
age, profitability and leverage – all of which are viewed as determinants that influence 
CSED. 
3.7.2 Corporate governance mechanism 
This section will explore the relationship between corporate governance, corporate 
social and environmental disclosure and how corporate governance determines the 
level of CSED. According to Jamal et al. (2008) there is an overlap between CG and 
CSR. Cadbury (2000) defines corporate governance as ‘‘the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled,’’ therefore, it encompasses all business 
decisions and strategies including engagement decisions related to social and 
environmental responsibilities. The cruxes of debates in corporate governance are the 
conflicts of interests between principals (owners) and agents (Managers). This conflict 
of interest not only increases agency costs but results in managers providing an 
increased amount of accounting and voluntary information in annual reports, 
including corporate social and environmental information. Samaha et al. (2012), based 
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on agency theory, indicate that CSED helps to reduce information asymmetry and 
agency costs and in turn improves investor confidence. 
The basic concept of corporate governance used to be concerned with the conflict 
between shareholders and managers, however today the notion has been broadened to 
include debates related to accountability and transparency which satisfy all 
stakeholders and society (Gill, 2008). In doing so, the company is taking into 
consideration not only shareholders but other stakeholders such as customers, 
employees, government and society (Gill, 2008). This concept of companies 
considering all stakeholders (not only shareholders) has been supported and argued 
by stakeholder theory. According to stakeholder theory, when planning or making any 
decision, organisation management should include all stakeholders. Corporate 
governance can play a significant role in ensuring that stakeholders are treated and 
protected as shareholders (Clark, 1998; Solomon, 2010) in order to prove that they are 
legitimate to operate and this can be argued under legitimacy theory.  
Institutional theory could also explain the relationship between corporate governance 
and the level of CSED, since corporate governance is approaching a higher level of 
CSED under governmental and societal pressure. Following globalisation came 
increasing pressures from governments, powerful stakeholders and the media. All of 
this has resulted in companies paying greater attention to social and environmental 
practices and disclosures (Kamal and Deegan, 2013). Improving voluntary disclosure, 
ethics, accountability and transparency are also part of corporate governance duties 
(Goodstein et al., 1994; Jamali, 2008; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Monks 
and Minow, 2011; Bouwman, 2011; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012; Allegrini and 
Greco, 2013). It can be argued that corporate governance codes assist in improving 
corporate accountability, transparency and voluntary disclosure (Aguilera et al., 2006; 
Jo and Harjoto, 2012). These concepts, ethics, accountability and transparency, are 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) concerns, therefore good corporate governance 
should lead to more corporate social and environmental activities and disclosures. 
Jamali et al (2008) and Kamal and Deegan (2013) state that corporate social 
responsibility and corporate governance should not be looked at separately since both 
are complementary to each other. Additionally, they claim that corporate social 
responsibility can be considered a part of corporate governance practices.   
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Studies addressing the effect of corporate governance on corporate social 
responsibility and disclosure have been conducted more frequently in developed 
countries than developing countries (Jamali et al, 2008). This calls for further studies 
to be conducted in developing countries. Moreover, the majority of studies focus 
either on corporate governance or corporate social practices and disclosure separately. 
In Malaysia, Ghazali (2007) investigated the effect of ownership structure (one aspect 
of corporate governance) on corporate social responsibility reporting. He analysed the 
annual reports of Malaysian companies and found that the higher the managerial 
equity ownership the lower the corporate social disclosure level. A positive 
association has also been found between governmental ownership and the level of 
corporate social disclosure. In addition to ownership structure, Said et al. (2009) 
examine the influence of more corporate governance mechanisms such as board size 
and independence, CEO duality and audit committee on corporate social disclosure. 
The results demonstrate that only governmental ownership and audit committee 
influence the level of corporate social disclosure. 
Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) conducted a study on USA and European listed 
companies in the year 2003, they found that corporate governance is a fundamental 
determinant of sustainability disclosure. Kamal and Deegan (2013) focused on CSE-
related governance disclosure. Their study investigated the disclosure of social and 
environment related governance information in Bangladesh and the changes in 
Bangladeshi companies’ disclosure over time. Legitimacy theory is the base of their 
study as they argued that companies disclose social and environment related 
governance information in order to gain and maintain their legitimacy to operate in 
society. The findings of this study show that the disclosure of governance information 
lagged behind social responsibility, in addition to an increase in CSR related 
governance disclosure over the years.  
In a study  of Bangladesh, Khan et al. (2013) also examine the association between 
corporate governance and the level of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
disclosures by analysing companies’ annual reports. They base their study on 
legitimacy theory to understand the association between corporate governance 
mechanisms such as ownership structure, board independence, CEO duality, audit 
committee and CSR disclosure. The findings indicate a positive association between 
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public ownership, foreign ownership, board independence, audit committee and CSR 
disclosure. In contrast, a negative association can be detected between managerial 
ownership and CSR disclosure; however, it becomes positive for export oriented 
industries. CEO duality has been found to be insignificant in explaining the variation 
in CSR disclosure. The study indicates that corporate governance plays a vital role in 
companies’ legitimacy through CSR disclosures.  
In a study of Egypt, Samaha et al. (2012) examine the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms such as director ownership, block-holder ownership, board size, board 
composition, CEO duality, and the existence of audit committees on the extent of 
voluntary disclosure, particularly corporate governance disclosure in Egypt. The 
results indicate a low level of disclosure of voluntary items but a high level of 
disclosure for mandatory items based on Egyptian Accounting Standards (EASs).  
Since Egypt is a developing country, the lower disclosure level could be the result of 
an inadequate regulatory framework in Egypt. They found that the proportion of 
independent directors on the board of directors in addition to firm size positively affect 
the level of corporate governance disclosure. On the other hand, CEO duality and 
block-holder ownership negatively affects the level of disclosure. The results of the 
study support theoretical arguments that claim companies disclose corporate 
governance information to reduce information asymmetry and agency costs and to 
improve investor confidence in the reported accounting information.  
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) conducted a study to examine the  influence of corporate 
governance mechanisms, cultural characteristics and firm characteristics on voluntary 
disclosures in Malaysian listed companies. They discovered a significant association 
between the non-executive director, the domination of family members by boards and 
voluntary disclosure. Additionally, one cultural factor is the number of Malay 
directors on the board, which is significantly correlated to voluntary disclosure. In a 
recent study conducted in Malaysia, Esa and Ghazali (2012) investigate the 
association between corporate governance mechanisms and the level of corporate 
social (CSR) disclosure of 27 Malaysian government-linked companies (GLCs) for 
two years (2005 and 2008). The results demonstrate that board size is positively 
associated with the extent of CSR disclosure. Siregar and Bachtair (2010) investigate 
the determinants of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure which are board 
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size, foreign ownership, firm size, profitability and leverage. They apply content 
analysis to analyse the annual reports of companies operating in Indonesia. The results 
provide evidence of a positive association between board size, firm size and CSR 
disclosure, while profitability and leverage are found to be insignificant determinants 
of CSR disclosure.  
In relation to Saudi Arabia,  few studies address the corporate governance mechanisms 
as CSED determinants (for example see Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Alsaeed, 2006; 
Habbash, 2015). Starting with Alsaeed’s (2006), his study investigates the influence 
of two corporate governance aspects on the voluntary disclosure level. The aspects 
are ownership dispersion and audit firm size; both of which are yet to prove they have 
any effect on voluntary disclosure level. Although this is the first study to investigate 
the association between some corporate governance aspects and the level of voluntary 
disclosure, it includes only two aspects in addition to a small study sample. Moreover, 
only 20 voluntary items have been incorporated into the voluntary disclosure index. 
This study was conducted prior to the reform of Saudi corporate governance in 2006.   
Al-Janadi et al. (2013) examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms 
(internal and external) on voluntary disclosure in Saudi Arabia. The annual reports of 
87 Saudi listed companies from 2006 – 2007 are the source of the study data. The 
findings emphasise the vital role that corporate governance mechanisms play in the 
reporting quality. Board size, non-executive directors, CEO duality, audit quality, and 
government ownership, positively correlate to voluntary disclosure.  
After the reform of Saudi corporate governance in 2006, Habbash (2015) investigates 
the influence of Corporate Governance and corporate characteristics on corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) disclosure practices in Saudi Arabia. The study found an 
increase in the level of CSR disclosure compared to previous studies on Saudi Arabia, 
for example Al-Janadi et al. (2013) and Macarulla and Talalweh (2012). This 
improvement may be the result of the reformed Saudi corporate governance code in 
2006. The findings provide evidence of a positive influence of family ownership, firm 
size, and firm age on CSR disclosure, but a negative influence of firm leverage. Board 
independence, role duality, institutional ownership, firm profitability, and industry 
type are found to have an insignificant influence on CSR disclosure.  
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Addressing this issue will require the testing of a number of hypotheses related to 
corporate characteristics and corporate governance aspects that are considered 
significant when studying corporate voluntary disclosure.  In order to explain the 
variations in the level of CSED, this research will address a number of corporate 
governance characteristics including ownership structure, board size, independent 
directors, audit firm size and CEO duality. The following subsections will present a 
review of the empirical literature on the relationship between different corporate 
characteristics and corporate governance aspects and corporate social and 
environmental disclosure.  Using this literature together with the relevant theoretical 
justifications, hypotheses will be developed to investigate the Research question 2.  
3.7.3 Research question 2 development  
The rationale for developing Research Question 2 is to build some rich understanding 
of the practice of CSED in Saudi Arabia by investigating the determinants of the level 
of CSED in general and its categories. Despite of the status of Saudi Arabia and the 
factors discussed in the previous sub-section which considered a motivation for this 
research, more factors are discussed below. In Saudi Arabia, corporate social and 
environmental disclosure is a voluntary disclosure where there is no enforcement 
regulatory law or regulation to force companies to perform it. However, there is 
pressure from different institutions which reassure companies to report social and 
environmental disclosure. For examples of the pressure, the pressure resulted from 
powerful stakeholders and societal expectations, the government (government laws 
and regulations such as Labour codes and Saudisation), NGO and media (J. L. 
Campbell, 2007; Elsbach and Sutton, 1992; O'Donovan, 2002; Tilt, 1994).This 
argument is supported by different theories such as stakeholder, legitimacy, institution 
and agency theory (as discussed previously in section 3.7) 
Due to the variation between companies in terms of firm characteristics and corporate 
governance mechanisms, the respond to these expectations is varied as well. This 
variation can be shown in the level of CSED.  Nevertheless, these companies are 
operating in the same country with the same legal system (Bozec et al., 2010) and 
cultural practices (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Kamla and Roberts, 2010) and even in, 
some cases, in the same industry. In this regards, there are few studies which examined 
  
100
determinants of CSED in developing countries (see Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; 
Mahadeo et al., 2011) and in Saudi Arabia (Albassam, 2014; Habbash, 2015). This 
indicates that there is a real need to undertake research examining determinants of 
CSED in the developing countries in general and in Saudi Arabia in specific.  
In order to enhance our understanding of the influence of firm characteristics and 
corporate governance mechanisms on the level of CSED (aim 3), research question 2 
is raised as follows: 
RQ2: what are the determinants of the level of CSED reported by Saudi-listed 
companies? 
This research question is divided into two sub-questions since it includes two types of 
determinants; RQ2.a and RQ2.b (relevant hypotheses for each will be developed in 
sub-sections 3.7.4 and 3.7.5, respectively). Firm characteristics include firm size, firm 
age, profitability (ROA) and leverage, as implied in the following sub-question:  
RQ2.a: Do corporate characteristics of Saudi Arabian listed companies affect the 
level of their CSED?  
Additionally, corporate governance mechanism is the other determinant that will be 
investigated in this research including ownership structure (government, managers 
and foreign), board of directors’ size, board of directors independence, audit firm size 
and CEO role duality as implied in the following sub-question: 
REQ2.b: Do corporate governance mechanisms of Saudi Arabian listed companies 
affect the level of CSED? 
Based on what has been discussed in the literature subsection (3.7.2: Corporate 
governance), it can be argued that Saudi Arabia lacks research addressing the effect 
of corporate governance mechanisms on corporate social and environmental 
disclosure (Habbash, 2015). This lack of research creates a need for more research to 
address the association between corporate governance and CSED (Albassam, 2014). 
Particularly in countries like Saudi Arabia where its corporate governance system 
concerns more about shareholders’ interests more than stakeholders (as discussed in 
section 2.8: corporate governance framework). As a result, companies are more 
  
101
accountable to shareholders more than other stakeholders (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004). 
This can be shown in the SCGC, as it includes 3 main sections one of these sections 
in to protect shareholders’ rights with a significant number of articles under the main 
section. Moreover, there is another main section has been giving to accountability and 
transparency with one article protecting stakeholder rights16. However, companies are 
considering stakeholders’ interests and expectations while operating. Moreover, 
reporting information about their plans and activities they are performing to show 
their attention given to satisfying stakeholders such as corporate social and 
environmental disclosure. According to Jensen (2002) (as mentioned in section 3.4.4: 
Agency theory) there is a significant relation between shareholders’ interests which is 
value maximization and stakeholders interests “enlightened value maximization”. He 
claims that value maximization is a long-run objective that is achieved by satisfying 
stakeholders’ needs and expectations such as customers, employees, suppliers, and 
the government.    
Consequently, this study is considered significant since it seeks to investigate the 
factors affecting the level of CSED (including corporate governance factors. 
Especially since reviewing the literation (section 3.4.4: Agency theory) recommends 
that corporate social and environmental disclosure is researched in conjunction with 
corporate governance.  
Research Question 2 will be addressed in (Empirical analysis of the determinants of 
the level of CSED) using regression analysis to analyse the data collected through 
content analysis from the Saudi-listed companies’ annual reports.  
Each firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanism included in this study 
will be discussed in the following sub-sections. In addition to developing hypotheses 
after explaining the relation between each firm characteristic and CSED based on the 
appropriate theory and the relevant literature. The firm characteristics and corporate 
                                                 
16 Article 10 in Saudi Corporate Governance Codes includes stakeholder rights in sub-section “ e) 
Outlining a written policy that regulate the relationship with stakeholders with a view to protecting 
their respective rights; in particular” (Authority, 2006) 
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governance mechanisms that will be investigated in this research are: size, age, 
profitability, leverage, ownership structure, board size, board independence, audit 
firm size and CEO role duality – all of which are viewed as determinants that influence 
CSED. Hypotheses development related to firm characteristics 
This section presents firm characteristics as explanatory factors that are affecting the 
level of CSED as discussed in the previous section. In order to answer research 
question 2 particularly sub-question RQ2. The following hypotheses will be 
developed.    
Company size and CSED 
Firm size is considered one of the main and the most studied characteristics that 
influence firms’ social and environmental activities and disclosure (Ruf et al., 2001). 
Although some of the earlier studies (such as: Ng, 1985; Singh and Ahuja, 1983) 
found no association between firm size and corporate social disclosure, most of the 
later studies argued that there is an association (Alsaeed, 2006; Bhattacharyya, 2014; 
Hackston and Milne, 1996). According to Udayasankar (2008), firm size has an 
influence on CSR, and it is strongly believed that larger firms are engaged in social 
responsibility more than smaller firms and they disclose more social and 
environmental information than smaller firms (Waddock and Graves, 1997). Large 
companies are more exposed to the public than small firms; as a consequence of which 
they are most likely to disclose more information for a several numbers of arguments 
supported by stakeholder, legitimacy and institutional theory (Naser and Nuseibeh, 
2003).  
First, larger companies usually got more stakeholders to satisfy than smaller 
companies. Based on stakeholder and legitimacy theories, companies tend to disclose 
corporate social and environmental activities as a response to their stakeholder groups 
and societal expectations thus, maintain their legitimacy. Furthermore, it could be a 
tool to present their self-constructed image and good reputation to the community to 
legitimize their operations (Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Reverte, 2009).  
Second, larger companies attain public, media and governmental attention as well as 
pressures to contribute to society (Abbott and Monsen, 1979; Dowling and Pfeffer, 
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1975; Lindblom, 1993; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Therefore larger companies 
disclose more information to show their contribution to society and environment 
(Naser et al., 2006).  
Third, larger companies usually lead smaller companies, as suggested by institutional 
theory (mimetic isomorphism) larger companies disclose more social and 
environmental information. Additionally, larger companies are expected by the 
government also to be socially responsible and they are expected to report mores 
social and environmental information. According to Institutional theory, companies 
respond to the government pressure (coercive isomorphism) to contribute to the 
community (for example: Job nationalisation) by reporting social and environmental 
information. As a result, they will be entitled to receive governmental benefits and 
rewards. finally, larger firms tend to disclose more information in their reports to 
lower the cost of obtaining new funds (Botosan, 1997). 
The majority of previous studies have supported the existence of a positive 
relationship between firm size and the extent of social and environmental disclosures 
(for example see (Alsaeed, 2006; Gray et al., 2001; Gray et al., 1995; Hackston and 
Milne, 1996; Huang and Kung, 2010; Jennifer Ho and Taylor, 2007; Menassa, 2010; 
Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012; Reverte, 2009; Skouloudis et al., 2013; Wallace and 
Naser, 1996). Some studies are on developed countries such as Hackston and Milne 
(1996), McMurtrie (2005), Jennifer Ho and Taylor (2007), Reverte (2009), Michelon  
and Parbonetti (2012) and Skouloudis et al (2013). Other studies are in developed 
countries such as  Huang and Kung (2010) and Menassa (2010). Only few studies in 
Saudi Arabia have been conducted (Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Alsaeed, 2006; Habbash, 
2015) in both of which a positive association between firm size and level of disclosure 
has been identified. 
This study will examine the following hypothesis (H1) using more recent data, a larger 
sample and a multi-theoretical framework assist in analysing the results: 
H1: larger companies are more likely to disclose more social and environmental 
information than smaller companies  
  
104
Company age and CSED 
According to Camfferman and Cooke (2002), when investigating CSR disclosure, it 
is important to investigate a company’s age as a factor related to CSR disclosure. The 
reason for investigating the effect of a company’s age on the level of corporate social 
and environmental disclosure is the assumption that older companies disclose more 
social and environmental information throughout time (Alsaeed, 2006).  This 
assumption is supported by legitimacy theory; arguing that older companies have built 
legitimacy throughout their operating years, so that developing their reporting of 
social and environmental information maintains their legitimacy. Based on 
stakeholder theory, older firms have more experience in dealing with stakeholders’ 
needs, media and government rules and regulation than newly established firms. 
Moreover, stakeholders of old firms have more expectations and older firms disclose 
more social and environmental information to satisfy their stakeholders’ needs. From 
an institutional theory perspective, older companies usually have more experience in 
operating as well as a more developed reporting system to report more social and 
environmental information. Few studies investigated the association between firm age 
and CSED, compared to firm size. Kansal et al. (2014) and Alsaeed (2006) studies 
have inconclusive results, they found that firm age has an insignificant effect on the 
level of disclosure. On the other hand, Menassa (2010) found a weak relationship 
between company age and level of disclosure in Lebanese banks.  Muttakin and Khan 
(2014) in Bangladesh and Habbash (2015) in Saudi Arabia found a positive 
association between a company’s age and corporate social disclosure. 
This study will add to the existing literature by investigating the effect of firm age on 
the level of CSED, and by examining the following hypothesis:    
H2 Older companies are more likely to disclose more social and environmental 
information than newly established companies  
Profitability and CSED 
It has been argued that company profitability is one of the main determinants of CSED 
disclosure (Wang and Qian, 2011). Higher profitability encourages management to 
provide more information to prove their ability to maximise shareholders’ value and 
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thus increase managerial compensation (Alsaeed, 2006).   Also, companies with high 
profitability disclose more voluntary information including social and environmental 
disclosure to show stakeholders and the public their achievements and promote a 
positive impression of their performance. This argument is supported by stakeholder 
theory and legitimacy theory (Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Reverte, 2009). 
Companies with higher profitability contribute more to the society and tend to report 
more on their social and environmental activities to prove that they meet societal 
expectations and need and that they  are legitimate to operate in society as suggested 
by legitimacy (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). In particular, more profitable companies 
are under more pressure from media, NGO and the government, they are expected to 
declare their environmental harmless operations.  
From an agency theory perspective, managers of firms with high profitability tend to 
show their achievement in detail since it will reflect on their reputation, image and 
salary. In contrast, when the profitability is low managers tend to hide some 
information, and disclose less to avoid negative effects on the companies’ market 
value (Gallego-A lvarez and Quina-Custodio, 2016).      
Overall, studies on the association between profitability and CSED remain 
inconclusive. Some studies found significant relationship (e.g. Gray et al., 2001) and 
some found no relationship (Alsaeed, 2006; Cowen et al., 987; Habbash, 2015). 
According to (Menassa, 2010), the results of the association between profitability and 
the level of disclosure differ according to the proxy used for profitability, return on 
assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), profit margin (PM). Also distinguishing 
between profitability time period, such as long and short-term profitability, could 
explain the inconclusive results. Nevertheless, the results are inconsistent on short 
term profitability. Freedman and Jaggi (1988) and Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) found 
association between CSD and profitability in the same short time, while Roberts 
(1992) suggested a relationship with lagged profits. 
On the other hand, previous studies found a positive association between short term 
profitability and CSD but did not provide any evidence of relationship between long 
time profitability and CSD (Patten, 1991 and Hackston and Milne, 1996). Belkaoui 
and Karpik (1989) found a positive association, arguing that managers who know how 
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to make profits for the company must also have positive attitude towards corporate 
social responsibility. Liu and Anbumozhi (2009) also argued that there is a positive 
association between profitability and social and environmental disclosure. More 
studies that found a similar positive association (Patten, 1991; Hackston and Milne 
1996; Gray et al., 2001; Skouloudis et al., 2013; Kansal et al., 2014; Muttakin and 
Khan, 2014).    
In this regard, this study will use return on assets (ROA) as a proxy for profitability 
to test the following hypothesis (H3): 
H3: companies with higher return on assets (profitability) are more likely to 
disclose more social and environmental information than companies with 
lower return on assets (profitability). 
Leverage and CSED 
Companies with higher level of leverage are thought to disclose more social and 
environmental disclosure than firms with lower level of leverage. The assumption 
behind this argument is supported by stakeholder, legitimacy and agency theories. 
Based on stakeholder theory, companies with higher debt in their capital structure 
endeavour disclosing more information to satisfy creditors’, shareholders’ and 
investors’ needs. They also disclose more to show that they are legitimate to operate, 
although they are high in debt and this what legitimacy theory suggests. Moreover, as 
suggested by agency theory, agency costs increase with a the increase of the level of 
leverage (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012). As a result, managers of companies with 
high level of leverage disclose more information including social and environmental 
information to lower agency cost (Alsaeed, 2006; Gallego-A lvarez and Quina-
Custodio, 2016). When the debt level increases, a conflict of interest between 
shareholder and creditors results, so and to prevent this from happening creditors seek 
more information to reduce information asymmetry and to make sure that the 
company will be able to pay the debt in the future (Gallego-A lvarez and Quina-
Custodio, 2016). Therefore, a positive association between firm leverage and CSED 
is suggested (e.g., Fama and Miller, 1972). 
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The results from previous empirical literature regarding the association between firm 
leverage and CSED are still inconclusive. Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), Wallace et 
al. (1996), Haniffa And Cooke (2005), Alsaeed (2006) and Reverte (2009) found that 
companies’ leverage failed to explain the variation in CSR level of disclosure. 
Moreover Branco and Rodrigues (2008) provide evidence of a negative association 
between financial leverage and CSR disclosures on the internet. On the other hand, 
Malone et al. (1993) found that a firms’ leverage positively affects the level of 
disclosure.  Esa and Ghazali (2012) stated that in the case of higher financial leverage, 
managers attempt to show their  responsibility toward society by disclosing more CSR 
information in their reports.  
In this study, a total liability to total assets ratio is employed to measure leverage and 
to examine the following hypothesis (H4): 
H4: companies with High leverage are more likely to disclose more corporate 
social and environmental disclosure than companies with lower leverage. 
In addition to firm characteristics as determinants of CSED, it’s equally as important 
to discuss corporate governance aspects as a determinant of CSED in Saudi Arabia. 
The effects of corporate governance aspects on the level of CSED will be discussed 
in the next section.   
3.7.4 Hypotheses development related to cooperate governance 
mechanism 
This section presents corporate governance mechanisms as explanatory factors that 
are affecting the level of CSED as discussed in the previous section. In order to answer 
research question 2 particularly sub-question RQ2.b the following hypotheses will be 
developed.  
Ownership Structure and CSED 
Ownership structure is considered one of the most significant factors of corporate 
governance practices (Albassam, 2014; Konijn et al., 2011), in addition to being one 
of the strongest explanatory factors for the variation in disclosure level (Choi, 1999; 
Cormier and Gordon, 2001; KiliÃ§ et al., 2015). As mentioned in the previous section, 
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corporate governance practices consider both corporate social and environmental 
activities and voluntary disclosure. Since ownership structure is regarded as a 
characteristic of corporate governance it is said to affects corporate social and 
environmental practices and disclosure. Previous studies investigating the association 
between ownership structure and disclosure level found mixed results. Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002), Barako et al. (2006a), Khan et al (2012), Skouloudis et al. (2013) and 
Muttakin and Khan (2014) identified a positive association between ownership 
structure and disclosure level. However, Raffournier (1995), Naser et al. (2002), Eng 
and Mak (2003) and Al Saeed (2006) found no such association. Ownership structure 
varies from one company to another; thus, the upcoming subsections will explore the 
different types of ownership in relation to corporate social and environmental 
disclosure.  
Government Ownership and CSED 
Institutional theory suggests that government ownership influences corporate  
disclosure, particularly in developing countries where ownership concentration is 
common (Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012). Governmental regulations and 
legislations  are aspects that affect a firm’s level of corporate social and environmental 
disclosure (W. Li and Zhang, 2010). As a result, government ownership will demand 
more accountability and transparency, giving rise to further social and environmental 
reporting. According to Albassam (2014), governmental ownership is considered high 
in Saudi Arabia. This could result in a reduction in conflicts of interests between 
manager’s plans and governmental social requirements, considering government 
plans and actions are based on social demands which differ from manager’s goals 
(maximizing shareholders value) (Habbash, 2015). It can be suggested that companies 
whose large number of shares was held by the government would be more socially 
responsible and would disclose more social and environmental information.  
Agency theory suggests that, in the case of governmental ownership, a balance will 
be reached between the goals of principals (governmental owners) and agents 
(managers). The company will generate profits whilst continuing to be socially 
responsible.  The fact that the government establishes regulations to ensure companies 
remain socially responsible is another reason for the positive association between 
governmental ownership and CSED level. Companies that are owned by the 
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government have a responsibility to set an example to other companies by being 
socially responsible and this will be evidenced in reporting (Habbash, 2015). 
Governmental ownership encourages good governance, accountability, transparency, 
corporate social responsibility and disclosure (Yaseen Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Eng and 
Mak, 2003; Habbash, 2015; Collins G. Ntim, Lindop, and Thomas, 2013; Said et al., 
2009). Stakeholder theory can also explain the association between government 
ownership and the level of CSED. Companies disclose CSED to satisfy the needs and 
expectations of the powerful stakeholders such as government shareholders (Gray et 
al., 1996; Robert, 1992).  
A positive association has been found between governmental ownership and 
voluntary CSED in previous studies such as Eng and Mak (2003), Ghazali (2007), 
Amran and Devi (2007) Khan et al. (2012), Ntim and Soobaroyen (2012), and 
Habbash (2015).  
This study will examine the effect of governmental ownership by testing hypothesis 
(H5) as follows:   
 H5: There is a positive relationship between government ownership and the 
level of corporate social and environmental disclosure 
Managerial ownership and CSED 
The association between managerial ownership and the level of CSED is supported 
by two opposing arguments.  The first argument states that concentrated managerial 
ownership will lead to lower level of CSED. Managers pay less attention to public 
accountability and other stakeholders (Kuo and Hung, 2012). Moreover, managers are 
unwilling to invest in socially responsible activities because they’re unaligned with 
their benefits (Oh et al. 2011; Ghazali 2007). According to McConnell  and Servaes 
(1990) managers may use inside information for their own interests in order to 
maximize their wealth regardless of the company’s performance, and this will suggest 
lowering their ownership.  
However, if managerial ownership is low their motivation to improve the company’s 
performance will decrease as a result of a decrease in the level of disclosure (Eng and 
Mak, 2003; Fama and Jensen, 1983). This point leads to the second argument: there 
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is a positive association between managerial ownership and CSED. This is further 
supported by arguments that highlight the link between corporate governance 
reducing agency costs and the conflict of interest between principals and agents by 
controlling managers behaviour. Jensen and Meckling (1976) claimed that managerial 
ownership has a similar effect on controlling managers behaviour to mitigate agency 
problems. Additionally, managerial ownership increases the incentive for managers 
to improve the company’s performance and maximize shareholder value which will 
result in an increase in the level of social and environmental disclosure. Furthermore, 
there is external pressure from stakeholders on companies which they cannot ignore 
for fear of losing their legitimacy. This is explained by stakeholder and agency 
theories which instruct managers to prove to stakeholders that they are legitimate to 
operate. Additionally, institutional theory suggests that managers should consider 
governmental and global standards and regulations and act according to 
accountability, transparency and social responsibility. Therefore, based on agency 
theory, stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory and institutional theory, a positive 
association can be detected between managerial ownership and CSED.         
Previous studies on the relationship between managerial ownership and the level of 
CSED are inconclusive, since Eng and Mak (2003), Ghazali (2007) and Chau and 
Gray (2010) have found a negative association between managerial ownership and 
CSED. While Belal and Owen (2007) and Islam and Deegan (2008) found a positive 
association. Huafang and Jianguo (2007) failed to find any association between 
managerial ownership and CSED. In order to investigate the association between 
managerial ownership and the level of CSED the following hypothesis (H6) will be 
examined:  
H6: there is a positive association between managerial ownership and the 
level of corporate social and environmental disclosure 
Foreign ownership and CSED  
Companies with foreign ownership are expected to have higher level of corporate 
social and environmental disclosure in order to assist in decision making (Khan et al., 
2013). This could be due to several reasons.  For example, based on legitimacy theory, 
companies disclose more social and environmental information to prove to foreign 
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investors that they are legitimate to continue with the current investment. Another 
reason is that the foreign ownership management is separate from the owner which 
enhances CSED  (Schipper, 1981). Another reason is that foreign investors have 
different values and ethics and according to institutional theory global regulations 
could put pressure on companies to disclose more social and environmental disclosure 
Bradbury 1991). Haniffa and Cooke (2005) conducted a study in Malaysia and found 
a significant positive association between foreign ownership and CSED aiming to 
maintain their legitimacy. This study will examine the effect of foreign ownership on 
the level of CSED by testing the following hypothesis (H7):   
 H7: there is a positive association between foreign ownership and the level of 
CSED 
Corporate Board of directors Size  
The corporate board of directors has a vital responsibility to control the actions of 
managers’ which affect the companies’ strategies and plans (Said et al., 2009). There 
are two different views regarding the board of directors size: the first view claims that 
a smaller board size is more effective as they are able to provide a higher quality of 
monitoring and controlling. The reason for this is that the level of conflict is lower 
with in a small board size than in a larger board. (Al-Janadi et al., 2013). The other 
view suggests that a larger board size has an increased level of knowledge thus; they 
are more capable of managing the company (Pfeffer, 1972). Additionally, increasing 
the size of the board helps to reduce the uncontrolled power of managers (Al-Janadi 
et al., 2013)To overcome this problem and to limit the size of the board, the Saudi 
Corporate Governance Code has specified that the board of directors should have a 
minimum of 3 members and a maximum of 11. Each company has the right to choose 
an appropriate number of board directors best suited to the company’s needs. 
According to agency theory, as a corporate governance mechanism, the board of 
directors aims to reduce managers’ opportunistic behaviour by controlling their 
decisions. It also reduces the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers 
which only serve to increase agency costs. Moreover, the board of directors seeks to 
improve the company’s accountability, transparency and social responsibility. 
Previous studies such as Said et al. (2009),  Siregar and Bachtair (2010), Khan (2010) 
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and Das et al. (2015) found that a large board of directors has a positive effect on 
CSED. As a result, a positive association has been found between the size of directors 
board and the level of CSED and this will be examined via the following hypothesis 
(H8):  
H8: There is a positive relationship between the size of the board of directors 
and the level of corporate social and environmental disclosure. 
Proportion of Independent Directors 
It is argued that Independent board members represent the interests of stakeholders, 
and therefore improve corporate governance (Solomon, 2010). According to 
Stakeholder theory, the existence of independent board directors place pressure on 
management to ensure that they operate successfully as well as to satisfy stakeholders’ 
needs. Conjointly agency theory suggests that the existence of independent board 
members controls managers opportunism to protect shareholders and reduce agency 
costs and information asymmetry (Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Haniffa and Cooke (2002) examined 167 Malaysian 
listed companies and found that independent directors play an essential role in 
ensuring that companies’ decisions and actions are aligned with the norms and values 
of society to ensure their legitimacy, as assumed by legitimacy theory. Consistent with 
this, it can be argued that the existence of independent board members will enhance 
accountability, transparency and CSED. In Saudi Arabia, the phenomenon of 
independent board members is considered new (Mandourah, 2012). According to the 
Saudi Corporate Governance Code, the independent board members shall not be less 
than two members or one-third of the members, whichever is greater (article 12: e). 
Previous studies found a positive association between the proportion of independent 
board directors and CSED, for example Huafang and Jianguo (2007), Harjoto and Jo 
(2011), Hussainey et al. (2011), Khan et al (2012), found that board independence 
positively affects the level of CSR disclosures. The positive association between the 
proportion of independent board directors and the level of CSED will be examined 
via the following hypothesis (H9):  
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H9: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of independent 
board members and the level of corporate social and environmental 
disclosure. 
Audit Firm Size  
Audit firms are third parties who assure the reliability and validity of financial reports 
(Porter, Simon, and Hatherly, 2003). They are one of the external corporate 
governance mechanisms, who help by checking a company’s financial performance 
to monitor managers (Haniffa and Hudaib 2007). There are two types of audit firms: 
large (big 4) and small (not big 4). Large audit firms are more concerned with their 
reputation and are therefore more willing to associate with firms that disclose more 
information in their published financial reports (Alsaeed, 2006; Depoers, 2000). 
Agency theory is concerned with audit quality since providing more reliable and 
credible information in the reports reduces agency costs and big audit firms enhance 
disclosure quality (Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This argument is consistent with the concept of 
legitimacy theory, the large audit firm considers their legitimacy and therefore request 
more information reporting including CSED. On the other hand, smaller audit firms 
are more concerned about losing their clients and as a result they give serious 
consideration to the customers’ needs (Alsaeed, 2006; Malone et al., 1993). As a 
result, small audit firms are expected to require less information to be disclosed. 
Several studies examined the association between audit firm size and CSED such as 
Barako et al. (2006), Al saeed (2006) and Habbash (2015) who found no connection 
between audit firm size and CSED. Ntim et al (2012a) however found a positive 
association with voluntary disclosure in South Africa. Khan et al. (2012), and Al-
Janadi et al. (2013), also found a positive association between audit firm size and 
CSED. Based on the argument that audit firm size positively affects the level of 
CSED, the following hypothesis (H10) is proposed:  
H10: There is a positive association between audit firm size and the level of 
corporate social and environmental disclosure  
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CEO role duality  
CEO duality is an important corporate governance mechanism to investigate; it 
materializes when the chief executive officer (CEO) role is merged with the 
chairman’s. CEO role duality negatively affects the control system, presents a conflict 
of interest and reduces the level of accountability (Michelon and Parbonetti, 2014). 
According to Roberts et al. (2005) it is more effective for the company to separate the 
CEO and Chairman roles, as each individual will be able to do the job with minimum 
conflict (Albassam, 2014). Moreover, companies which separate the two roles achieve 
greater quality in making decisions concerning stakeholders, than companies which 
prefer CEO role duality (Pike and Haniffa, 2008). There are two opposing views to 
consider here, one supports the separation of the CEO and Chairman roles and the 
other dismisses it (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). The reason behind the first view (the 
separation of CEO and chairman roles) is that the performance of companies which 
separate them is monitored and controlled more carefully than companies with CEO 
and Chairman duality. By contrast, the second view suggests that many companies 
which combine the role of CEO and chairman are performing well and are controlled 
and monitored effectively by the board. However, amalgamating the two roles and 
corresponding duties gives more power to the CEO and could result in decisions being 
made in his own best interests and not necessarily in those of the company as a whole. 
Additionally, it is argued that the neglect of stakeholder’s interests and having less 
involvement in the community and disclosure are consequences of CEO role duality. 
Agency theory supports the first view (separation of CEO and chairman roles) since 
the separation reduces concentration of decision making power as well as minimising 
conflicts of interest and agency costs. The separation of CEO and chairman roles 
increases the efficiency of the control system which in turn protects stakeholders’ 
rights and results in better disclosure quality (Al-Janadi et al., 2013). The findings 
from the previous study provide an inconclusive association between CEO role duality 
and CSED; no association and negative association. Cheng and Courtenay (2006), 
Said et al. (2009), Michelon  and Parbonetti (2012), Giannarakis et al. (2014) and 
Habbash (2015) found no association between CEO role duality and voluntary 
disclosure including CSED. However, Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Eng and Mak 
(2003), Arcay and Vazquez (2005), Huafang and Jianguo (2007),  Hussainey et al. 
(2011) and Al-Janadi et al. (2013) found a negative association.   
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Since the Saudi regulation included in the Saudi Corporate Governance Code 
prohibited the combining of the CEO and Chairman positions (Articl12:d) (Authority, 
2006), together with the previous discussion’s  agency theory based argument that 
combining the two roles negatively affects the level of CSED. This research will 
examine the association between CEO role duality and the level of CSED via the 
testing of the following hypothesis (H11):  
H11: there is a negative relationship between CEO duality and the level of 
corporate social disclosure. 
Similar to the second research question there is a rational for the third research 
question as discussed in the next sub section after reviewing the related empirical 
literature of determinants of CSED categories.  
3.8 Empirical literature of determinants of CSED 
categories  
In the context of the determinants of each category of corporate social and 
environmental disclosure, limited studies have been conducted in this regard. For 
example, Adams et al (1998) examine the amount and nature of social disclosure 
varied significantly across six European  countries using 150 annual reports. They 
split social disclosures into three categories: environmental reporting, reporting on 
employee issues, and ethical reporting. They found that company size and industry 
are the significant factors that affect the level disclosure. Ho and Taylor (2007) in a 
comparison study between the USA and Japan examined the annual reports, stand-
alone reports, and special website reports of 50 companies in 2003. They form five 
categories in investigating corporate social and environmental disclosure, which are 
economic disclosure, social disclosure, environmental disclosure, non-economic 
(social1environmental) disclosure, and total (economic1social1 environmental) 
disclosure. They examined the effect of firm characteristic and country (Firm size, 
Profitability, Liquidity, Leverage, Industry) on the five categories. The results indicate 
that the level of the disclosure id higher for Japanese firms. Additionally, a positive 
association between Firm size, firms operating in the manufacturing industry and the 
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level of disclosure has been found. On the other hand, a negative association has been 
found between Profitability, liquidity and the level of disclosure.  
The Branco and Rodrigues study (2008) investigate whether there is an association 
between international experience, company size, industry affiliation, environmental 
sensitivity and media exposure with CSRD in Portuguese Companies. They used 
Internet (corporate web pages) and annual reports to analyses the social 
responsibility disclosure (SRD) and what are the factors influencing it. The results 
indicate that companies disclose social responsibility information to legitimise their 
actions to their stakeholder groups and to enhance the external perception of 
reputation. The results also show both factors (firm size and media exposure) have 
a positive influence on SRD. Nonetheless, Industry, consumer proximity, 
environmental sensitivity and profitability are insignificant factors. The study 
includes four categories under SRD which are similar to the present study categories 
(environment, human resource, product and consumer and community involvement 
disclosure). In a similar study Bayoud et al. (2012) examined the effect of  firm 
characteristics on the categories of corporate social and environmental disclosure. The 
study applies a mixed method (quantitative and qualitative) using a sample which 
includes 135 Libyan organisations across four sectors. He found a positive association 
between company age and industry type and the level of CSRD. The qualitative 
findings show a positive association between all factors used in the study and the level 
of CSRD in Libyan companies.  
Michelon and Parbonetti (2012), examine the influence of corporate governance 
mechanisms (board composition, leadership and structure, CEO role duality) and firm 
characteristics (Corporate size, profitability, leverage, risk, age, listing status, 
reputation, country and industry). This study used   annual reports, stand-alone reports 
such as social, environmental and sustainability reports of US and European 
companies to collect the required data. Stakeholder theory has been applied to this 
study. The disclosure includes four groups, strategic, financial, environmental and 
social information. They found that company size and corporate governance are 
significant determinant of disclosure. In a recent study, Giannarakis et al. (2014) 
includes 4 categories under corporate voluntary disclosure; environmental, social and 
governance.  They examine the level of disclosure in relation to corporate governance 
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mechanisms and firm characteristics (CEO duality, Women in board, greenhouse gas 
emission, leverage, Industry) during the period 2009 -2012.  
3.8.1 Research question 3 development 
The motivation behind raising this research question is similar to research question 2. 
Although both research questions are investigating the effect of firm characteristics 
and corporate governance mechanisms on CSED, the third research question specifies 
the categories of CSED. Six categories are included under CSED, environment, 
human resource, product and consumer, community involvement, economic and 
general disclosure. According to AlNodel and  Hussainey, (2010), the literature 
indicates a need to investigate the influence on CSED categories as the previous 
studies on Saudi Arabia have not explore this phenomena. Additionally, this type of 
investigation has been recommended by a number of authors (see Martin Reginald 
Mathews, 1995; Parker, 2005; Parker, 2011). Therefore, this research examines the 
influence of firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms on CSED 
categories by addressing research question 3 as follow:  
RQ3: What are the determinants of the level of CSED in terms of the categories 
that are reported by Saudi Arabian listed companies?  
Two sub-objective and sub-questions are under the third question, one is related to 
firm characteristics aims to examine the effect of specific firm characteristics (e.g., 
firm size, firm age, profitability (ROA) and leverage) on the level of CSED categories 
in Saudi Arabia:  
RQ3.a: Do corporate characteristics of the Saudi Arabian listed companies 
affect the level of each category of the CSED?  
The other sub-objective is related to corporate governance aims to examine the effect 
of specific corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., ownership, board of directors size, 
board independence, CEO duality and audit firm size) on the level of CSED categories 
in Saudi Arabia:  
RQ3.b: Do corporate governance characteristics of the Saudi Arabian listed 
companies affect the level of each category of the CSED?  
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This research question is addressed in Chapter 7: Empirical analysis of the 
determinants of the level of disclosure categories by specifying the investigation of 
the variation in the level of Saudi listed companies reporting each CSED category. By 
doing so, this research will add to the developing countries literature in general and 
the Saudi literature in particular. 
 In summary, investigating the practice of CSED in Saudi Arabia in terms of the extent 
and nature, as well as the determinants of the level of disclosure and in general and 
the categories in specific will contribute to the Saudi literature. This investigation will 
give an overview of CSED in Saudi Arabia which will be constructive for three 
segments: academic, business and regulatory. Regarding the academic segment, as 
mentioned previously there is a shortage of CSED literature in Saudi Arabia and the 
results from previous studies are to an extent inconclusive (Habbash, 2015; Mandurah 
et al., 2012). Furthermore, the results from previous studies indicate that the level of 
CSED considered low in comparison to the figures and the factors of Saudi Arabia. 
This study uses an extensive index considers more CSED, in addition to using multi-
theoretical perspective consisting of the most used theories in this regard which give 
the study an advantage. This research will benefit future research as they could build 
on the results of this study.  
In the context of business, regulatory bodies and policy maker, this study considered 
significant. The findings of this study assist to understand whether the empirical 
evidences support and justify the need for a change in organizations decision, policy-
makers or regulatory authorities’ rules and regulation in terms of enhancing 
companies to engage in social and environmental activities thus, reporting these 
activities or information in Saudi Arabia.  
3.8.2 Hypotheses development of the determinant of CSED based on 
the categories  
Six categories are included under CSED which are environment, human resource, 
products and consumers, community involvement, economic and general social 
disclosure. The determinants of each category will be investigated and the following 
hypotheses will be developed and tested in chapter 7 to answer RQ3.   
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Hypotheses related to environmental disclosure.  
The first category is environmental disclosure; two hypotheses will be developed to 
examine the relationship between environmental disclosure as the dependent variable 
and firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanism. The first hypothesis is 
related to firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, ROA and leverage) and it is as 
follow:  
H12: There is a positive association between firm characteristics (firm size, 
firm age, return on assets and leverage) and the level of environmental 
disclosure 
The second hypothesis is related to corporate governance mechanisms (managerial 
ownership, governmental ownership, foreign ownership, board of directors’ size, the 
proportion of independent members in the board of directors, CEO duality and audit 
firm size) and it is as follow:  
H13: there is a positive association between corporate governance 
mechanisms (managerial ownership, governmental ownership, foreign 
ownership, board size, the proportion of independent in the board of directors, 
CEO duality and audit firm size) and the level of environmental disclosure 
Hypotheses related to human resource disclosure. 
The second category is human resource disclosure; two main hypotheses will be 
developed in this subsection. The first is testing the association between firm 
characteristics (firm size, firm age, ROA and leverage) and human resource disclosure 
as follows:  
H14: There is a positive association between firm characteristics (firm size, 
firm age, return on assets and leverage) and the level of human resources 
disclosure 
And the second is testing the association between corporate governance mechanism 
(managerial ownership, governmental ownership, foreign ownership, board of 
directors size, the proportion of independent members in the board of directors, CEO 
duality and audit firm size) and human resources disclosure as follows:  
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H15: there is a positive association between corporate governance 
mechanisms (managerial ownership, governmental ownership, foreign 
ownership, board of director’s size, the proportion of independent in the board 
of directors, CEO duality and audit firm size) and the level of human resources 
disclosure. 
Hypotheses related to products and consumers disclosure.  
Products and consumers disclosure is the third category, in this sub-section, two 
hypotheses will be developed. Hypothesis related to the relationship between firm 
characteristics (firm size, firm age, ROA and leverage) and products and consumers 
disclosure as follows:  
   H16: There is a positive association between firm characteristics (firm size, 
firm age, return on assets and leverage) and the level of product and consumer 
disclosure 
The next hypothesis is related to the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanism (managerial ownership, governmental ownership, foreign ownership, 
board of directors size, the proportion of independent members in the board of 
directors, CEO duality and audit firm size) and products and consumers disclosure as 
follows:   
H17: there is a positive association between corporate governance 
mechanisms (managerial ownership, governmental ownership, foreign 
ownership, board of director’s size, the proportion of independent in the board 
of directors, CEO duality and audit firm size) and the level of product and 
consumer disclosure  
Hypotheses related to community involvement disclosure.  
The fourth category is community involvement disclosure; in this sub-section, two 
hypotheses are developed to test the association between firm characteristics, 
corporate governance and community involvement disclosure. the first is related to 
firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, ROA and leverage) and community 
involvement disclosure as follows:  
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H18: There is a positive association between firm characteristics (firm size, 
firm age, return on assets and leverage) and the level of community 
involvement disclosure 
The second is related to corporate governance mechanism (managerial ownership, 
governmental ownership, foreign ownership, board of directors size, the proportion 
of independent members in the board of directors, CEO duality and audit firm size) 
and community involvement disclosure as follows:  
H19: there is a positive association between corporate governance 
mechanisms (managerial ownership, governmental ownership, foreign 
ownership, board of director’s size, the proportion of independent in the board 
of directors, CEO duality and audit firm size) and the level of community 
involvement disclosure  
Hypotheses related to economic disclosure.  
Economic disclosure in the fifth category in the CSED index, this sub section presents 
the hypotheses related to this category. The first hypothesis to test the association 
between firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, ROA and leverage) and economic 
disclosure as follows:  
H20: There is a positive association between firm characteristics (firm size, 
firm age, return on assets and leverage) and the level of economic disclosure 
The second hypothesis is to test the association between corporate governance 
mechanism (managerial ownership, governmental ownership, foreign ownership, 
board of directors size, the proportion of independent members in the board of 
directors, CEO duality and audit firm size) and economic disclosure as follows:   
H21: there is a positive association between corporate governance 
mechanisms (managerial ownership, governmental ownership, foreign 
ownership, board of director’s size, the proportion of independent in the board 
of directors, CEO duality and audit firm size) and the level of economic 
disclosure  
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Hypotheses related to other social disclosure.  
The last category in the CSED index devised in this study relates to general social 
disclosure (as will be shown in section 4.6.1). The hypotheses related to general social 
disclosure are presented in this sub-section. The first hypothesis, H22, to test the 
relationship between firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, return on assets and 
leverage) and general social disclosure is as follows:   
H22: There is a positive association between firm characteristics (firm size, 
firm age, return on assets and leverage) and the level of general disclosure 
The second hypothesis, H23, examines the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms managerial ownership, governmental ownership, foreign ownership, 
board of director’s size, the proportion of independent in the board of directors, CEO 
duality and audit firm size) and general social disclosure as follows:  
H23: there is a positive association between corporate governance 
mechanisms (managerial ownership, governmental ownership, foreign 
ownership, board of director’s size, the proportion of independent in the board 
of directors, CEO duality and audit firm size) and the level of general 
disclosure  
The above hypotheses, related to research question 3, will be tested in Chapter 7. 
Figure 3.3 provides an overview of the determinants of CSED and its categories in 
addition to the theory that justifies the correlations between the determinants and the 
CSED. The two boxes on the sides of the figure represent the determinants of CSED 
and its categories. On the left side, the firm characteristics (firm size, age, profitability 
and leverage). On the right side, the corporate governance mechanisms are shown 
(ownership structure, board size, board independency, audit firm size and CEO role 
duality). Four theories are included, stakeholder, legitimacy, institutional and agency 
theory.  
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Figure 3.3: Factors and theories justifying CSED and its categories. 
3.9 Chapter summary    
This chapter constitutes a significant section of the thesis as it presents the key 
concepts of CSR and CSED in general as well as in the Saudi context as growing 
phenomena. The chapter also presents intentions of the government and how they will 
affect CSR and CSED.  Furthermore, the development of CSED is explored in this 
chapter, and how this development reflects on Saudi Arabia.  The Saudi government 
2030 vision shows that the intention is to adopt more transparency as well as to give 
greater attention to the third sector. This will reflect on companies’ social 
responsibility and disclosure. Saudi Arabia is a traditional Islamic country in which 
Sharia law controls all trading aspects.  Zakat and Sadaqat and other similar concepts 
are forms of social responsibility because they contribute positively to society. 
 In addition to the key concepts, this chapter presents the appropriate theoretical 
framework (multi-theoretical framework) consisting of the main and most commonly 
used theories to explain CSED. Stakeholder, legitimacy, institutional and agency 
theories are all explored in this chapter. Each theory is discussed and connected to the 
research aim which is to analyse CSED practices in Saudi Arabia. Stakeholder theory 
suggests that companies tend to disclose social and environmental information in 
order to satisfy stakeholder needs. Moreover, legitimacy theory argues that companies 
should take into account the values and norms of the community in which they 
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operate, and that there are social contracts between companies and the community. 
This social contract dictates the relationship between both companies and the 
community. Therefore, companies disclose social and environmental information in 
order to demonstrate that they are active members of the community and are operating 
legitimately. Institutional theory takes a wider view to include economic, social and 
political aspects. It suggests that social values, norms and cultures, as well as 
regulatory and competitive norms and values should also be included in companies’ 
activities and accounting practices.  
Since Saudi Arabia is a developing country, institutional theory explains corporate 
social and environmental disclosure and how governmental regulations affect the 
level and the type of disclosure. Agency theory is also used in this study as reducing 
agency costs resulted from symmetry information and conflict of interests between 
managers and owners is one of agency theory suggestions as well as its one of the 
social and environmental disclosure advantages. In addition, “enlightened value 
maximization” indicates to the link between shareholders’ values maximization, as a 
long-run objective, and the satisfaction of stakeholders. By reporting social and 
environmental disclosure, the agency costs will reduce.  
In this chapter literature reviews of previous key studies conducted to analyse CSED 
in developed, developing, GCC countries and Saudi Arabia are analysed leading to 
the proposal of Research Question 1 “RQ1: What is the extent and nature of social 
and environmental information that is reported by the Saudi listed companies?”. 
Additionally, the literature related to the determinants of CSED is divided into two 
types of determinants; firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms. A 
review of the literature shows a lack of studies conducted in Saudi Arabia and thus 
creates a need to address Research Question 2 and 3. RQ2: what are the determinants 
of the level of CSED reported by Saudi-listed companies?” And RQ3: What are the 
determinants of the level of CSED in terms of the categories that are reported by Saudi 
Arabian listed companies?  
Both research questions have sub-questions; the first relates to firm characteristics 
including size, age, profitability and leverage. The second links to corporate 
governance mechanisms including ownership structure (government, managers and 
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foreign), board size, board independence, audit firm size and CEO role duality. Each 
factor discussed in relation to the appropriate theories, supported by relevant literature 
and examined under proposed hypotheses.  
In order to maximise the value of this research, an appropriate research methodology 
should be discussed and applied. The next chapter will present the research 
methodology applied in this research. 
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Chapter 4: Research methodology and method 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research methodology and methods that underpin the study, 
as choosing the appropriate research approach and research method is essential in 
order to conduct the research and achieve reliable results. This chapter has three main 
objectives: firstly, to discuss the research paradigm, which is a positivist paradigm 
based on the philosophical assumption, as discussed in the second objective. The 
second objective is to deliberate the philosophical assumptions that led to the choice 
of the research paradigm, which are ontological and epistemological and the method 
is presented in the third objective, the third objective is to discuss the chosen research 
method aligned with the research objectives and questions. This research employed a 
quantitative research method and adopted a content analysis approach to answering 
the research questions of the study. This chapter will also present the data collection 
technique and the measurement of the variables, including the CSED index and 
explanatory variables measures. Statistical analysis techniques are also addressed in 
this chapter.     
This chapter will be organised as follows: section 4.2 discusses the research paradigm; 
section 4.3 deliberates the research philosophical assumptions; section 4.4 discusses 
the research method, including content analysis approach; section 4.5 presents the data 
collection technique, including the study sample and data source; section 4.6 will 
discuss the measurements of the study variables, including CSED, the firm 
characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms; and section 4.7 presents the 
statistical analysis techniques, including the statistical test done to test the related 
hypotheses to answer the research questions. Finally, section 4.8 summarises the 
chapter.      
4.2 Research paradigm 
The research paradigm is the framework of the research, giving guidance on how the 
research will be conducted, including the philosophies, beliefs, perceptions, values, 
attitudes and assumptions that the researchers have in common. The research paradigm is 
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about the world and the nature of knowledge (Collis and Hussey, 2013; 2007). There 
was one research paradigm for several years, until the beginning of industrialisation 
and capitalism. Different research paradigms have been introduced as a result of 
researchers realising that the natural sciences and social sciences should be 
distinguishable from each other (Albassam, 2014). Positivism is one of the most 
common paradigms that has been used in management research (Bryman, 2003). The 
concept of positivism is that knowledge results from empirical research, such as 
observations and experiments. Additionally, knowledge is independent and 
unaffected by social norms and assumptions (Saunders et al., 2009). The positivist 
paradigm depends on logical reasoning, mathematical proof and objectivity, rather 
than subjectivity and interpretations (Walliman, 2005). This paradigm depends on 
theories to explain social phenomena in the business context, assuming that the 
variables used in business research can be measured and analysed by using the 
quantitative method (Bryman, 2013; Collis and Hussey, 2013; Saunders et al., 2009). 
This research aims to analyse corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSED) 
practice in Saudi Arabia and to examine the determinants of CSED and its categories. 
Therefore, the positivism research paradigm is the chosen paradigm to conduct this 
research. 
The positivist paradigm that has been chosen for this study is based on specific 
criteria. According to Creswell (2009), there are four essential criteria that a 
researcher should take into consideration when choosing a research paradigm. First is 
the researcher’s worldview, second is the researcher’s experience, third is the 
researcher’s psychological attitude and fourth is the nature of the problem. The 
researcher’s worldview means the concept or worldview that the researcher has put 
into the research. Some researchers favour the positivist paradigm and some favour 
interpretivism, depending on the ontological, epistemological, axiological, rhetorical 
and methodological assumptions, which are discussed in the next section. This 
research examines the relationships between the firm characteristics, corporate 
governance mechanisms and CSED by using data from annual reports. Therefore, the 
results of this research will be objective, based on facts and numbers. It will be 
independent and not subjective. The second criterion is the researcher’s experience, 
skills and training, such as quantitative or qualitative data analysis and computer 
skills, which can affect the selection of the research paradigm. This research applies a 
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quantitative method to analysing the data, based on the nature of the research’s aim and 
questions, as well as the nature of the data. The third criterion is how the psychological 
aspects also affect the choice of the appropriate research paradigm. Positivism is a 
traditional paradigm based on firm rules and procedures, while the interpretivist paradigm 
is more flexible in its procedure (Creswell, 2009). The fourth criterion is the type and 
nature of the research problem, which is a significant factor in choosing the research 
paradigm.  
According to Saunders et al. (2009), the positivist paradigm is more appropriate if the 
research examines the influence of factors on a social issue. In contrast, interpretivism 
is more appropriate in the case of research that explores new social phenomena. This 
research will examine the determinants of corporate social and environmental 
disclosure in Saudi Arabia, and by applying the previous criteria to this study, it can 
be argued that positivism is the appropriate research paradigm.  
In addition to the previous criteria, philosophical assumptions are also important in 
choosing the research paradigm. These assumptions will be discussed in the next 
section.  
4.3 Research philosophical assumptions  
Three philosophical assumptions have been taken into consideration while choosing 
the positivist paradigm for the current research. These assumptions, suggested by 
Bryman (2013), are ontological, epistemological and methodological. Firstly, the 
ontological assumption concerns the nature of reality, positivism assumes that reality 
is objective and is separate from the researcher. Secondly, the epistemological 
assumption addresses the relationship of the researcher to the research, and positivism 
suggests that the researcher is independent from what is being researched. Thirdly, 
the methodological assumption is concerned with the process of research, such as the 
deductive process in the positivist paradigm, and the study of cause and effect.  
4.3.1 Ontological consideration  
Ontology is about the philosophical assumptions that concern the nature of reality of 
the existing knowledge to be investigated (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Saunders et 
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al., 2009). As mentioned in the previous section, the paradigm of this research is 
positivism, which argues that social reality as objective (Collis and Hussey, 2009), 
based on numbers and facts that are quantitatively measured by using statistical 
analysis. This study investigates CSED practice in Saudi Arabia and the association 
between the firm characteristics, corporate governance mechanisms and the level of 
CSED. The quantitative approach is used to measure the level of these aspects, and 
the outcome of this study includes more numbers than words. Therefore, the results 
are objective and value free (Bryman, 2003).  
4.3.2 Epistemological consideration  
According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2008, p.60), epistemology is a “general set of 
assumptions about the best way of inquiring into the nature of the world”. In the 
positivist paradigm, the researcher should be independent of the research to reduce 
bias. Additionally, a quantitative approach attempts to reduce bias by using an 
appropriate data collection and sampling approach. This study aims to examine 
corporate social and environmental disclosure in Saudi Arabia by considering the 
quantity and the nature of the provided information through companies’ reports. 
Additionally, it aims to examine the relationship between corporate social and 
environmental disclosure, the firm characteristics and aspects of corporate 
governance. To address this issue, CSED, content analysis and statistical analysis are 
all used; this allows the researcher to be independent from the research. The outcome 
of this study depends more on numbers than words, and is objective and value free. 
As a result, positivism is the suitable approach for this stage (Bryman, 2003).  
4.3.3 Methodological consideration 
According to Saunders et al. (2009), methodological consideration is concerned about 
the theoretical, philosophical framework and its implications for the chosen research 
method. It answers the question of how research should be undertaken. In a positivist 
approach, the deductive process is used to test the hypotheses and seek to develop the 
generalisability of the findings in order to explain and understand certain phenomena. 
To do so, the information and instruments should be both valid and reliable (Johl et 
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al., 2012). This study applies deductive approaches to investigate CSED practice in 
Saudi Arabia and its determinants. 
A deductive approach is concerned with the relationship between the theory and the 
research that starts with a previous study or theory to guide the research (Adams, 
2007). It begins by identifying the theories and the relative literature. The stages of 
this research run in parallel with the deductive process, which is presented in Figure 
4.1, according to Bryman and Bell (2015). The first stage is the starting point of this 
research and this involves exploring both the theoretical and empirical literature 
related to CSED, the firm characteristics and corporate governance aspects. It can be 
shown by exploring literature related to the research in Chapter 3 that CSED is a 
growing phenomenon that has received attention in developed and developing 
countries. However, CSED is more recent in developing countries than in developed 
countries. The research question of this study is based on previous studies and 
theories, such as the stakeholder, legitimacy, institutional and agency theories. 
Therefore, a deductive approach is the most appropriate approach. During the second 
stage, research questions and hypotheses will be formed that aim to investigate 
corporate social and environmental disclosure practices and categories, in addition to 
its determinants. The following stage collects the required data by using secondary 
data from the companies’ financial reports. The collected data is then being analysed 
during the next stage by using statistical tests. Finally, the last stage links the results 
with the objectives and theories, and this is what a deductive paradigm is about.  
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Figure 4.1: The process of deduction (Bryman and Bell, 2015, p.23). 
4.4 Research method   
This section discusses the method employed to conduct this research, according to the 
research objectives and questions. The quantitative method considers one of the most 
popular approaches in corporate social and environmental disclosure (e.g., Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2002; Alsaeed, 2006; Ntim et al., 2012a; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). It 
deals with the numerical data and measurement that is required while investigating 
the relationships between the variables in a particular sample.  
This study uses the quantitative method because of the nature of the research problem, 
the objectives and the questions. It is based on research questions that aim to examine 
the level of corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSED) practice in Saudi 
Arabia. Additionally, this study investigates the factors that affect the level of CSED 
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and seeks to understand the motivation of companies that disclose social and 
environmental practices. There are various methods of collecting data (e.g., 
questionnaires, observation, document analysis etc.). To ensure the required 
information is collected, it is essential to choose the appropriate method, which will 
enable the research questions to be answered as unambiguously as possible. In this 
study, content analysis is employed to collect and code the data, which will be 
discussed in the next sub-section.  
4.4.1 Content analysis 
Content analysis is used to establish a platform of corporate social and environmental 
categories that are mostly disclosed in the annual reports of all Saudi-listed companies 
in (2012). According to (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 18), content analysis can be defined 
as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from text (or 
other meaningful matter) to the context of their use”. From the previous definition, 
the content analysis method codifies the text into categories that are based on 
particular principles (Abbott and Monsen, 1979). This technique has become a widely 
used method by a significant number of researchers when conducting research into 
corporate social and environmental reporting (see: Alsaeed, 2006; Amran and Devi, 
2008; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Cormier et al., 2005; Deegan et al., 2002; Gray et 
al., 1995; Habbash, 2015; Hackston and Milne, 1996). It has been “the research 
method that is most commonly used to assess organisations’ social and environmental 
disclosures” (Milne and Adler, 1999, p. 237as cited in Vourvachis and Woodward, 
2015).  
In this research content analysis, it is used to measure the social and environmental 
disclosure of companies because it is objective, systematic and reliable (Krippendorff, 
2004). Additionally, it is a suitable technique to analyse CSED as annual reports are 
accessible (Aras et al., 2010; Hughes, 2001). The results can be obtained through 
different requirements, such as identifying the CSED and its categories, units of 
analysis, the reliability and the validity of the content analysis technique that has been 
chosen, which will be assessed in the next section. Furthermore, there should be a list 
of rules for systematic and consistency analysis when collecting social and 
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environmental information and its categories from annual reports (as shown in 
Appendix 4) (Gray et al., 1995; Hackston and Milne, 1996).  
The first step of content analysis is to identify the aim and the research questions that 
will be investigated in the study. This study aims to investigate CSED practice and its 
categories in Saudi Arabia and three main questions need to be addressed to do this 
investigation. The first is to investigate the extent and nature of CSED in Saudi-listed 
companies. The second is to examine the effect of the firm characteristics and 
corporate governance mechanisms on CSED in Saudi Arabia. And the third is to 
examine the effect of the firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms 
on each category of CSED in Saudi Arabia. To answer these research questions an 
investigation of CSED in the annual reports of Saudi-listed companies is required by 
using the content analysis technique. The sub-section below presents the various steps 
of the content analysis methods.  
4.5 Data collection technique  
This research is based on secondary data, which are annual reports and financial 
reports. This data is needed to develop a balanced understanding of corporate social 
and environmental disclosure (CSED) practice in Saudi Arabia, as well as the 
association between CSED, the firm characteristics and corporate governance. This 
section discusses the study sample and data sources in order to conduct this study’s 
quantitative analysis. This section is divided into two sub-sections: subsection 4.5.1 
discusses the study sample and subsection 4.5.2 addresses the data sources and 
selected data.  
4.5.1 Study sample 
The sample of the study consists of 164 Saudi-listed companies that operated in 15 
different sectors in 2011 and 2012 (see appendix 2 and 5). A total of 244 annual 
reports for the entire population of companies in Saudi Arabia were used to collect 
the data. The sample consists of 80 reports on 31 December, 2011, which were 
available at the data collecting time, and 164 reports on 31 December, 2012, the last 
year that most companies’ reports were available when the data collection began (see: 
Alsaeed, 2006; Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003). The annual reports were collected from 
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the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) website. For the sake of reliability, the annual 
reports of 164 companies in 2012 have been used for the statistical analysis in order 
to investigate the practice of corporate social and environmental disclosure and its 
categories and the determinants. However, 4 companies were excluded from the 
sample because there were no available reports for them when the data was collected. 
As a result, the actual sample is 97.5% of the total sample. Additionally, by comparing 
CSED in the available annual reports of the 80 companies in 2011 and 2012, it was 
found there were no significant differences between the social and environmental 
disclosure during these two periods. Furthermore, the laws and regulation that might 
affect social and environmental disclosure usually tend to remain constant over a short 
period of time (Botosan, 1997).  
The sample of this study includes all the Saudi-listed companies in 2012. Although 
some of the existing studies have excluded financial firms or chosen particular sectors 
(Habbash, 2015; Khan et al., 2012), this study includes them (consistent with: 
Albassam, 2014; Hackston and Milne, 1996) for the following reasons. Firstly, similar 
rules and regulations are applied to all the companies, including financial and non-
financial companies (for example, Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC), listing 
requirement and the Company Act) (Albassam, 2014). Secondly, including all the 
companies in all the sectors will assist in the exploration of more companies and the 
result will, therefore, be more general. Thirdly, most of the studies that excluded 
financial companies were conducted in developed countries, where there is a large 
number of companies, but the number of listed companies in developing countries is 
limited, including Saudi Arabia. As a result, the sample of the study would be limited 
if financial firms were excluded.  
4.5.2 Data source 
Two different types of data were used to investigate CSED in Saudi Arabia and 
examine the association between firm characteristics, corporate governance 
mechanisms and CSED: (i) CSED information and (ii) the firm characteristics and 
corporate governance mechanisms information. Firstly, the CSED information was 
manually extracted from the firms’ annual reports using content analysis. A total of 
160 annual reports, which represents 97.5% of the total sample, were collected from 
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different sources: (i) the Tadawul database and (ii) company websites. Secondly, the 
firm characteristics and corporate governance variables were obtained from 3 sources: 
(i) the Bloomberg database, (ii) the Tadawul database and (iii) the companies’ 
financial reports (such as audited firms’ financial statements from the Tadawul’s 
database). Content analysis technique was used to collect and analyse the required 
data, which will be discussed below. 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, annual reports are the source of CSED data, 
although companies disclose their social and environmental information through 
different media, such as annual reports, stand-alone reports, websites and other media 
(see: Branco and Rodrigues, 2008). However, including the entire documents would 
be unbearable and time-consuming and Unerman (2000) has advised researchers to 
limit the data source documents for two reasons. This is because the large number of 
documents published by large companies each year would result in a vast number of 
documents to be analysed by a researcher. In addition, there is the question of the 
availability of the published documents on the database archive, as it may be 
challenging to get hold of the complete required data. As a result of what has been 
discussed, it is unfeasible to use all the documents to measure CSED; therefore, this 
research only focuses on the companies’ annual reports as a document of analysis for 
the following reasons. 
Annual reports are documents that all listed companies are required to publish in the 
Tadawul database, as the Capital Market Authority (CMA) makes them mandatory. 
As a result, they are accessible, easy to obtain and are widely distributed, including 
on the company’s website (Adams and Harte, 1998; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000). 
Moreover, companies provide corporate social and environmental disclosure in their 
annual reports, even if they publish a stand-alone report. Furthermore, an annual 
report is a significant corporate document that provides comprehensive information 
about the company’s performance, including financial and non-financial information 
(Daub, 2007), and is considered to be a highly credible source of information (Tilt, 
1994). This is consistent with many previous studies that have used annual reports in 
CSED (for example see: Alsaeed, 2006; Amran and Devi, 2007; Belal, 2001; 
Habbash, 2015; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Sobhani et al., 
2009). Therefore, annual reports will be the source of date collection of this study. 
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This is consistent with CSED previous studies that have used content analysis 
technique, which will be discussed in the next section. As a result of doing this, the 
results obtained from this study can be compared with those of previous studies.  
The next section will discuss the variables measurements, including dependent 
(CSED) and independent (firm characteristics and corporate governance 
mechanisms). In order to collect the data from the annual reports, a CSED index was 
constructed to identify CSED and the categories that are discussed below. Other 
variable measurements will be discussed as well to investigate the CSED and its 
categories and examine the determinants of CSED.    
4.6 Variables measurement: 
This section provides the measurements of the variables that are used in this study to 
investigate CSED practice in Saudi Arabia and its categories. CSED is the dependent 
variables, and the firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms are the 
independent variables. This study aims to investigate the influence of the firm 
characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms on the level of CSED. 
Measurements of the factors will be discussed in this section, as follows: 4.6.1 
provides the measures of CSED and its categories, 4.6.2 the measures of the firm 
characteristics, and 4.6.3 the measures of corporate governance mechanisms.        
4.6.1 Corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSED index) 
This research investigates CSED practice in Saudi Arabia and its categories in 
addition to the determinants by using Saudi-listed companies’ annual reports. Content 
analysis is the data collection method that is used through a constructed CSED index. 
This index is constructed to measure CSED and its categories and is based on previous 
studies, such as Hackston and Milne (1996), which were based on earlier structures 
developed by Ernst and Ernst (1978), Guthrie (1982) and Gray et al. (1995). There 
were six main categories of disclosure in the previous research, which were 
environment, energy, human resources, product and safety, community involvement 
and others. The sub-categories of disclosure are classified under each category. In this 
study, energy is considered as a sub-category under the environment, and the 
categories of economic and general social disclosure have been added. This index is 
  
137
also based on the Global Reporting Initiative approach (GRI) (2011) as an economic 
category, in addition to other sub-categories and items extracted from the GRI (2011). 
Furthermore, the index includes items from legal laws and regulations documents, 
such as The Labour Law and The Zakat and Tax System. The index has been widened 
with the aim of including the majority of social and environmental information 
reported by Saudi-listed companies. 
 By doing this, the study will contribute to Saudi literature by intensely investigating 
CSED practice and the categories disclosed by Saudi-listed Companies. It will also 
assist regulatory bodies in improving the practice of CSED by providing 
comprehensive results about what is reported by Saudi-listed companies. 
Furthermore, companies will benefit from this study by being able to check if their 
social and environmental disclosure plans and policies are compatible with the market 
or if there is a need for change.    
CSED in this study has six main categories: the environment, human resource, 
products and consumer, community involvement, economic and general social 
disclosure, which were developed from Hackston and Milne (1996), Branco and 
Rodrigues (2008) and GRI (2011) and other Saudi regulations, as mentioned above. 
Each category includes sub-categories and items. Environmental disclosure includes 
information related to pollution prevention or reduction, conservation of natural 
resources, energy conservation, aesthetics, biodiversity and other environmental 
disclosure. Human resource disclosure encompasses information related to 
employee training and development, employees’ pay and benefits, employees’ health 
and safety, equal opportunities and employees’ social life. Product and consumer 
includes information related to product and service development, product and service 
quality and safety consumers’ relations. Community involvement comprises of 
information related to education and training contribution, art and culture 
contribution, public health and safety contribution, sponsoring sports or recreational 
projects, donation and other community involvement disclosure. Economic 
disclosure includes information related to economic performance, market presence 
and job nationalisation (Saudisation). Other social disclosure encompasses reporting 
policies for disclosure and transparency, awards for transparency, implementing 
sustainability management, declaring accounting standards, anti-corruption policies 
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and procedures, disclosing ethics practices, the percentage of the company’s profit 
spent on CSR, CSR awards received and general CSR information.  
The figure 4 below presents the main six categories and sub-categories included in the 
study index.   
 
Figure 4.2: The categories of CSED index 
After constructing the primary CSED index (and before adding the job nationalisation 
(Saudisation) a pilot study was conducted on a sample of 30 companies (2 companies 
from each industry). These companies were chosen randomly (see Appendix 6) and 
the results from the pilot study showed that almost the entire sample disclosed 
information about Saudisation, employee-related information and community 
involvement. As a result, a Saudisation item has been included in the index under 
economic disclosure. The reason for adding it under the economic disclosure category 
is the aim of the Saudisation, which is unemployment reduction. The final CSED 
index, which includes the categories and sub-categories, is presented in the figure 
below and Appendix 4.  
 
4.6.2 The CSED scoring  
A binary coding has been used to collect the CSED data of Saudi-listed companies’ 
annual reports by using the constructed CSED index through the content analysis 
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technique. This method depends on checking the presence or absence of corporate 
social and environmental items in the index. If the item is disclosed in the annual 
report, then it will be scored 1 and 0 otherwise. This scoring scheme has been used in 
a significant number of CSR disclosure in previous studies (e.g., Belkaoui and Karpik, 
1989; Campbell et al., 2006; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Samaha et al., 2012). Despite 
criticism of the binary scoring scheme17, this study has adopted it for the following 
reasons. Firstly, the study aims to investigate CSED practice in Saudi Arabia to find 
out what companies are reporting and to what extent they are doing so. Using the 
binary scoring scheme will enable the study to test what companies are reporting by 
stating the information’s existence or absence. Therefore, using this scheme seems 
appropriate in the study’s examination of the level of CSED by summing up the total 
disclosure. Secondly, binary scoring is often more objective and less biased than other 
schemes, such as weighted coding as binary scoring, as it does not need the 
researcher’s judgement to give weight to the information (Beattie et al., 2004; Hassan 
and Marston, 2010).  
Two issues will be discussed in the next sub-section to ensure the quality of the index 
and the data collected through the index – the reliability and validity of the constructed 
index.  
4.6.3 Reliability and validity of the constructed index 
This sub-section discusses the reliability and validity of the constructed index, which 
is needed to ensure the quality of the index. Reliability means “the ability of a 
measurement instrument to reproduce consistent results on repeated measurements” 
(Hassan and Marston, 2010, p. 24). In other words, how consistent the results are when 
the measurement process from the index is repeated. Stability and consistency are 
discussed to ensure the coding procedure’s reliability (Sekaran and Bougie, 2011). 
Stability is the ability to repeat the measurement process with the same results over 
                                                 
17 Binary coding does not consider the quality of disclosed information (Beattie et al., 2004). 
Additionally, this method does not consider the differences in the disclosed information (Hassan and 
Marston, 2010). 
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time. On the other hand, consistency is related to the sub-measurements of the index 
and the extent to which they measure the same thing (Hassan and Marston, 2010).   
To examine the reliability of the index, there are three common ways: inter-coder 
reliability, test-retest and internal consistency (Hassan and Marston, 2010; Sekaran 
and Bougie, 2011). Inter-coder reliability needs more than a coder and the results of 
the coding from a different coder should be similar. The process could not be used in 
this study, as it was conducted by a single researcher (see: Albassam, 2014).  
The second way is test-retest reliability. This method, which ensures the consistency 
and stability of the index, is employed in this study. After constructing the index, test-
retest was done to ensure the reliability of the index at an early stage of the data 
collection. After collecting the data again, it was checked against a sample of the 
annual reports and the same result was found.  
The third way of ensuring reliability is internal consistency, which is considered to be 
a common technique for assessing the reliability of the index’s themes or categories. 
Cronbach’s Alpha (α) is one of the tests used to measure the internal consistency of 
the CSR disclosure index (Rahman and Post, 2012). This test aims to examine how 
well the categories of CSED fit together in the index (Neuendorf, 2002). The results 
from the Cronbach’s alpha test of CSED disclosure and its six categories 
(environment, human resource, product and consumer, community involvement, 
economic and other general social categories is (α=.77). According to Nunnally (1978, 
as cited in (Ali, 2014)), if Cronbach’s alpha value is greater than .70, the internal 
consistency is considered to be high. This value indicates that the consistency of the 
index measurements is high if the reliability is high.  
According to (Bryman and Bell, 2015) validity is required to ensure the index has 
measured a certain phenomenon in the way it should. Previous studies, such as 
Botosan (1997), Gul and Leung (2004), have checked the validity of the level of 
voluntary disclosure score by comparing the study results with previous studies that 
examine the level of CSR disclosure. This study will use the same method of 
comparing the results of the study with the previous study. If the results are consistent 
with the existing literature, the study disclosure of the measurements of the study will 
be considered valid.  
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This study aims to examine the effect of the firm characteristics and corporate 
governance mechanisms on CSED in Saudi Arabia. The previous section identifies 
CSED and its categories in addition to addressing how it is measured. The next sub-
section will provide the measures of the explanatory variables (the firm characteristics 
and corporate governance mechanism).     
4.6.4 Firm characteristics measurements 
To examine the effect of the firm characteristics on CSED in Saudi Arabia, each 
characteristic will be identified in the next sub-section. The measures of each 
characteristic will be presented as well. The firm characteristics that are included in 
this study are: firm size, firm age, firm profitability (ROA) and firm leverage. The 
variables were chosen on a theoretical basis, which is consistent with previous studies 
(as mentioned in Chapter 3, section 3.7) that have examined the association between 
the firm characteristics, corporate governance and CSED. Therefore, this facilitates a 
comparison with the results of the previous studies. More precisely, there are more 
factors that may influence CSED which are not included in this study for the following 
reasons: a lack of theoretical justification for the effect of the factors on CSED and 
the non-availability of some variables that could limit the use of these variables. 
Firm Size 
Firm size is a significant factor that influences CSED. Different measures have been 
used to measure it. There are no theoretical reasons to select a particular measure of 
firm size (Hackston and Milne, 1996). For example, total sales (Alsaeed, 2006; Amran 
and Devi, 2008; Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Cormier et al., 2005; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Patten, 2002a; Waddock and Graves, 1997), number of employees (Waddock 
and Graves, 1997, Stanwick and Stanwick, 1998) and total assets (Waddock and 
Graves, 1997) are well known measures. The sample consists of financial and non-
financial firms in this research. Therefore, firm size is operationalised as the natural 
log of the book value of a firm’s total assets from the annual reports (Cormier et al., 
2005). It is better to use total assets in this case, rather than total sales because it is 
easier to compare them between financial and non-financial firms than it is with total 
sales.    
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Firm age  
It is argued that a company’s age is a significant factor when investigating CSR 
disclosure (Camfferman and Cooke, 2002). This study will investigate the influence 
of company age on CSED, based on the assumption that older companies disclose 
more social and environmental information over time (Alsaeed, 2006; Cormier et al., 
2005; Habbash, 2015) and so use the natural log of total operating years since a 
company was established (Alsaeed, 2006).  
Firm Profitability 
Several measures of profitability have been used in previous research, including both 
accounting-based measures and stock-market based measures. For example, net 
income, net profit margins, operation earnings, stock price change, sales, ROA, EPS 
growth and average ROE (McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis, 1988; Ullmann, 
1985). In this study, the accounting-based measure (ROA) is used to measure 
profitability based on previous CSED studies (Amran and Devi, 2008; Belkaoui and 
Karpik, 1989; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Reverte, 2009). ROA is measured by the 
ratio of total net profit to the calculated total assets (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989).  
Firm leverage  
Previous studies have shown that the level of leverage has an effect on corporate 
disclosure, including social and environmental disclosure (Alsaeed, 2006; Barako et 
al., 2006a; Reverte, 2009). Leverage is included in the determinants of the level of 
CSED in this study. This is measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
(Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002).  
4.6.5 Corporate governance characteristics  
Ownership structure 
Ownership structure in this study includes government ownership, managers’ 
ownership and foreign ownership. Each of these different forms of ownership will be 
discussed in this sub-section. Government ownership: previous studies have found 
that government ownership affects CSED (see: Amran and Devi, 2007; Eng and Mak, 
2003; Habbash, 2015). Government ownership is measured as the ratio of shares held 
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by government institutions, which is consistent with CSED previous studies 
(Albassam, 2014; Habbash, 2015). Managers’ ownership: it is argued that this is 
associated with CSED (Belal and Owen, 2007; Islam and Deegan, 2008). It is 
measured as the ratio of shares held by executive and non-independent directors. 
Foreign ownership: this is another type of ownership that has an effect on CSED, as 
argued by (Amran and Devi, 2008; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). It is measured by the 
ratio of shares held by foreign institutions.  
Size of the board of directors  
It is argued the size of the board of director has an effect on the level of CSED (Khan, 
2010; Said et al., 2009; Siregar and Bachtiar, 2010). It is measured by the number of 
directors on the board.  
Board independence 
Previous studies have shown that the proportion of independent directors on the board 
is associated with CSED (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Jo and Harjoto, 2012; Khan et 
al., 2012). It is measured by the proportion of independent member on the board of 
directors (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005).  
Audit firm size  
Several studies examined the association between audit firm size and CSED, such as 
Barako et al. (2006), Alsaeed (2006) and Habbash (2015) Khan et al. (2012), Al-
Janadi et al. (2013). Audit firm size is a variable measured by using a dummy variable 
where 1 is presented if the company is audited by one of the big four18 and 0 otherwise 
CEO role duality 
CEO duality is a significant factor that needs to be investigated in relation to CSED. 
There have been studies by prior studies on this, including Haniffa and Cooke (2002), 
                                                 
18 The big four auditing companies are Deloitte and Touch, Ernest and Young, KPMG and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
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Eng and Mak (2003), Michelon and Parbonetti (2012), Al-Janadi et al. (2013), 
Giannarakis et al. (2014) and Habbash (2015). CEO duality occurs when the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) role is merged with the Chairman’s. It is measured by using 
a dummy variable; 1 if CEO is Chairman and 0 otherwise Haniffa and Cooke (2005).   
Table 4.1: Explanatory variable  measures and date sources 
Explanatory 
factor 
Theoretical perspectives Measures Data source 
Company size  Stakeholder, legitimacy and 
institutional theories 
Natural log of company’s total 
assets 
Bloomberg 
database  
Company age Legitimacy and institutional 
theories  
Natural log of total of 
companies operating years 
since established  
Saudi Stock 
Market (Tadawul) 
website   
Profitability 
(ROA) 
Stakeholder and legitimacy theories Ratio of total net profit to total 
assets 
Bloomberg 
database 
Leverage Stakeholder, legitimacy and agency 
theories 
Ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets 
Bloomberg 
database 
Governmental 
ownership 
Institutional and agency theory Ratio of shares held by 
government institutions 
Annual reports 
Managerial 
ownership 
Agency, stakeholder, legitimacy 
and institutional theories  
 
Ratio of shares held by 
executive and non-
independent directors 
Annual reports 
Foreign 
ownership 
Legitimacy and institutional 
theories 
Ratio of shares held by 
foreign institutions 
Annual reports 
Board size Agency theory The number of directors on 
the board 
Annual reports 
Board 
independence 
Stakeholder, legitimacy and agency 
theories 
The proportion of independent 
members on the board of 
directors 
Annual reports 
Audit firm 
size 
Agency and legitimacy theories 1 if the company is audited by 
one of the big four19 and 0 
otherwise 
Annual reports 
CEO role 
duality 
Agency theory 1 if CEO is Chairman and 0 
otherwise 
Annual reports 
                                                 
19 The big four auditing companies are Deloitte and Touch, Ernest and Young, KPMG and 
PriceaterhouseCoopers. 
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The table above presents a summary of the explanatory factors that have been used in 
this study to explain variations in the level of CSED. The table includes the theoretical 
perspective that justifies using the factors, the used measures and the data source.      
After discussing the data collection method and the variable measurement used to 
achieve the main aim of the study’s objectives, statistical analysis techniques will be 
discussed in the following section.   
4.7 Statistical analysis techniques: 
The main aim of this study is to investigate CSED in Saudi Arabia through different 
objectives. The two objectives are to analyse the extent and the nature of CSED in 
Saudi Arabia. These will be addressed by answering RQ1: What is the extent and 
nature of the social and environmental information reported by the Saudi-listed 
companies? This research question will be addressed by using descriptive statistics to 
analyse to what extent Saudi-listed companies are reporting social and environmental 
disclosure in general, and what categories they are reporting specifically. This will be 
done in Chapter 5, which is divided into two main sections. The first analyses the 
extent and nature of CSED through detailed analyses of the categories and information 
that Saudi-listed companies are disclosing.  
The study objectives are also related to the determinants of CSED in Saudi Arabia. It 
will be addressed through RQ2: What are the determinants of the level of CSED 
reported by Saudi-listed companies? This research question includes 2 sub-
questions20 that are related to firm characteristics and corporate governance 
mechanisms, which will be addressed in Chapter 6. To answer this research question 
and sub-questions, 11 hypotheses21 have been developed in Chapter 3 (section 3.7). 
Different statistical techniques will be used to address the second research question 
and test the related hypothesis. Descriptive statistics, ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) 
                                                 
20 RQ2.a: Do corporate characteristics of Saudi Arabian-listed companies affect the level of the 
CSED? And RQ2.b: Do corporate governance mechanisms of Saudi Arabian listed companies affect 
the level of the CSED?        
21 Hypotheses that test the correlation between firm characteristics (H1, H2, H3, H4), corporate 
governance mechanisms (H5, H6, H7, H8, H9, H10, H11) and CSED. 
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and T-test are used (for more details see Chapter 6). Following the previous studies, 
OLS regression (multivariate)22 is employed to examine the determinants of CSED 
because of the nature of the variables (continues and dummy) and assuming that all 
relations are linear (see: Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Reverte, 2009). Furthermore, 
OLS regression could be used, even if the independent variables are correlated (at an 
acceptable level) with one another (Cockes et al, 2006).  
Equation 1 presents the empirical model 1 
CSED= β1+ β1FS+ β2FA+ β3Prof+ β4Lev+ β5GOvOwn+ β6ManOwn + 
β7ForOwn+ β8BS+ β9BInd+ β10AudFS+ β11CEODual+ ε 
Where: 
CSED refers to the total of social and environmental disclosure index (including the 
six categories23. FS stands for firm size, which is measured by the natural log of 
company’s total assets (continues). FA is firm age, which is found by using the natural 
log of companies’ operating years since they were established (continues). Prof stands 
for profitability, represented as return on assets (ROA). This is measured by the ratio 
of total net profit to total assets (continues). Lev is leverage, which is calculated by 
the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (continues). GovOwn is government 
ownership, measured by the ratio of shares held by government institutions 
(continues). ManOwn stands for managerial ownership, measured by the ratio of 
shares held by the executive and non-independent directors (continues). ForOwn is 
foreign ownership, measured by the ratio of shares held by foreign institutions 
(continues). BS is board size, characterised by the number of directors on the board 
(continues). BInd stands for the proportion of independent members of the board of 
directors (continues). CEODual is the CEO role duality that is revealed in 1 if the 
company is audited by one of the big four and 0 otherwise (dummy variables). AudFS 
                                                 
22 Ordinary least squares (OLS) is one of the most commonly used prediction techniques. The steps 
prior to the regression, such as the data preparation and the OLS assumptions, will be discussed in 
Chapter 6 before running the regression. 
23 The six categories are: environmental, human resource, product and consumer, community 
involvement, economic and other social disclosure 
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denotes audit firm size, revealed in 1 if the CEO is Chairman and 0 otherwise (dummy 
variable). β is the slopes of the independent variables, while β0 is a constant or the 
value of CSED and ε is the error term, normally distributed about a mean of 0. 
The study objectives are related to the determinants of each category of the CSED in 
Saudi Arabia. To achieve these objective, RQ3 (which will be addressed in Chapter 
7) is: What are the determinants of the level of CSED in terms of the categories that 
are reported by Saudi Arabian listed companies? Under this research question, 2 sub-
questions24, related to the firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms, 
need to be addressed, as well as 23 hypotheses25 (Chapter 7, section 7.5). In order to 
do this, several statistical analyses have been employed, such as descriptive statistics, 
ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) and T-test (for details see Chapter 7). Furthermore, 
negative binomial regression is employed to examine the determinants of each CSED 
category. It is based on the nature of the dependent variables, which are the 6 
categories of CSED (environmental disclosure, human resources disclosure, products 
and consumers disclosure, community involvement disclosure, economic disclosure 
and general disclosure). These dependent variables are limited count variable, with 
most of observations zeros. The variance is larger than the mean, which results in not 
a normally distributed sample. In this case, a simple ordinary least squares regression 
analysis yields biased results (Hausman et al., 1984; Crepon and Duguet, 1997; 
Greene, 1997). As a result, a negative binomial regression model (for details see 
Chapter 7) is more appropriate and is widely used in analysing such types of count 
data (e.g. Frome et al., 1973; Frome 1983; Haberman 1974; Holford 1983).  
Six negative binomial models will be developed to investigate the determinants of the 
level of CSED categories. Each category has its own model, as discussed below:  
                                                 
24 RQ3.a: Do corporate characteristics of the Saudi Arabian listed companies affect the level of each 
category of CSED? And RQ3.b: Do corporate governance characteristics of the Saudi Arabian listed 
companies affect the level of each category of CSED?  
 
25Hypotheses related to each category with firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms.    
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Equations 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 present the empirical model and equations 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
and 7 are related to the CSED categories, environmental disclosure, human resources, 
product and consumer, community involvement, economic and general social 
disclosure consecutively:   
ED= β1+ β1FS+ β2FA+ β3Prof+ β4Lev+ β5GOvOwn+ β6ManOwn + 
β7ForOwn+ β8BS+ β9BInd+ β10AudFS+ β11CEODual+ ε 
HRD= β1+ β1FS+ β2FA+ β3Prof+ β4Lev+ β5GOvOwn+ β6ManOwn + 
β7ForOwn+ β8BS+ β9BInd+ β10AudFS+ β11CEODual+ ε 
PCD= β1+ β1FS+ β2FA+ β3Prof+ β4Lev+ β5GOvOwn+ β6ManOwn + 
β7ForOwn+ β8BS+ β9BInd+ β10AudFS+ β11CEODual+ ε 
CID= β1+ β1FS+ β2FA+ β3Prof+ β4Lev+ β5GOvOwn+ β6ManOwn + 
β7ForOwn+ β8BS+ β9BInd+ β10AudFS+ β11CEODual+ ε 
ED= β1+ β1FS+ β2FA+ β3Prof+ β4Lev+ β5GOvOwn+ β6ManOwn + 
β7ForOwn+ β8BS+ β9BInd+ β10AudFS+ β11CEODual+ ε 
GD= β1+ β1FS+ β2FA+ β3Prof+ β4Lev+ β5GOvOwn+ β6ManOwn + 
β7ForOwn+ β8BS+ β9BInd+ β10AudFS+ β11CEODual+ ε 
Where:  
ED is the total of environmental disclosure index (count); HRD is the total of human 
resource disclosure index (count); PCD is the total of product and consumer 
disclosure index (count); CID is the total of community involvement disclosure index 
(count); ED is the total of economic disclosure index (count); GD is the total of 
general social disclosure index (count). FS stands for firm size, which is measured by 
the natural log of company’s total assets (continues), and FA is firm age, which is 
found by using the natural log of companies’ operating years since they were 
established (continues). Prof stands for profitability represented as the return on assets 
(ROA). This is measured by the ratio of total net profit to total assets (continues). Lev 
is leverage, which is calculated by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
(continues). GovOwn is government ownership, measured by the ratio of shares held 
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by government institutions (continues). ManOwn stands for managerial ownership, 
measured by the ratio of shares held by executive and non-independent directors 
(continues). ForOwn is foreign ownership, measured by the ratio of shares held by 
foreign institutions (continues). BS is board size, characterised by the number of 
directors on the board (continues). BInd stands for the proportion of independent 
members of the board of directors (continues). CEODual is the CEO role duality that 
is revealed in 1 if the company is audited by one of the big four and 0 otherwise 
(dummy variables). AudFS denotes audit firm size revealed in 1 if the CEO is 
Chairman and 0 otherwise (dummy variable). β is the slopes of the independent 
variables, while β0 is a constant or the value of CSED and ε is the error term, normally 
distributed about a mean of 0. 
4.8 Chapter summary  
This chapter discussed the research methodology and method that is employed to 
achieve the study’s main aim and objectives. The main aim of this research is to 
investigate CSED practice in Saudi Arabia. Several objectives are addressed to 
achieve this aim, including the examination of the determinant of CSED and its 
categories. This research has a positivist approach as it examines the correlation 
between CSED, the firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms. It 
started with a review of the literature and relevant theories, then developed the 
hypothesis, followed by data collection and analysis, and finally linked the results 
back to the theories and literature. Therefore, a deductive approach is followed. 
Content analysis is the technique used in this research to collect the data from the 
Saudi-listed companies by using the CSED index. The index consists of 6 main 
categories, which are environmental, human resources, product and consumer, 
community involvements, economic and general social disclosure. The reliability and 
validity of the index are discussed in this chapter as well. The sample of the study 
consists of all the Saudi-listed companies at the end of the calendar year 2012. This 
chapter also focuses on the statistical analysis techniques used to test the hypotheses 
multivariate regression and negative binomial regression analysis.     
The next chapter, Chapter 5, will discuss the extent and the nature of CSED in Saudi-
listed companies.  
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Chapter 5: CSED analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will discuss and analyse the results from the content analysis of annual 
reports of the Saudi listed companies. An index has been constructed in this study to 
investigate corporate social and environmental disclosure in Saudi Arabia. This index 
includes six main categories which are environmental disclosure, human resources 
disclosure, product and consumer disclosure, community involvement disclosure, 
contribution to economy disclosure and other social disclosure. This chapter has two 
main objectives to achieve; the first is to examine the extent of the CSED using 
content analysis to evaluate the annual reports of the Saudi listed companies, 
providing statistical analysis. The second is to analyse the nature of the CSED in terms 
of the types of categories that have been reported by Saudi Arabian listed companies. 
This analysis will provide an overview of CSED practice in Saudi Arabia and by doing 
so, it responds to the first research question which is “what is the extent and the nature 
of the social and environmental information that is reported by the Saudi-listed 
companies?”. This chapter will also discuss the reason behind the variation in the 
level of categories disclosed by the Saudi-listed companies based on theories. The 
detailed analysis of the extent and the nature of CSED in Saudi Arabia will add to the 
literature. Particularly, as far as the author knows, this is the first study to analyse in 
depth the nature of CSED in Saudi Arabia. Each category and sub-category is defined, 
statistically described and analysed with examples provided from the companies’ 
disclosure. The chapter is divided into three sections; section 5.2 presents the extent 
of corporate social and environmental disclosure by presenting the descriptive 
statistics. This is followed by section 5.3, which analyses the nature of CSED 
categories reported by Saudi listed companies including the sub-categories as well as 
providing supporting evidence from companies’ reports. This section includes six sub-
sections for the six main categories. Finally, a summary of the key findings is 
concluded in section 5.4.      
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5.2  The extent of corporate social and environmental 
disclosure 
This section presents descriptive statistics of corporate social and environmental 
disclosure (CSED) by Saudi listed companies aiming to address the first part of the 
first research question. It concerns the extent of CSED in the Saudi context by 
analysing listed companies’ annual reports using a constructed check list (index). The 
descriptive statistics show that a significant percentage of Saudi listed companies 
disclosed information on social and environmental practices in their annual reports of 
the taxable years ending in 2012. A total of 70% of the Saudi listed companies report 
social and environmental information with an average of 7.22 information items (with 
a minimum of 1 item and a maximum of 66). In comparison to previous studies 
conducted in Saudi Arabia, this percentage is considered high. As mentioned in 
Literature ), previous studies have proven that the level of CSED has increased in 
Saudi Arabia. It increased from 14% in 2006 and 2007 (Al-Janadi et al., 2013) to 16% 
in 2008 (Macarulla and Talalweh, 2012) then 21.86%  (online disclosure) 
(Khasharmeh and Desoky, 2013) in Gulf cooperative countries including 44 Saudi 
companies and finally in the most recent study 24%  (Habbash, 2015).  
The percentage of CSED found in this study is considered high (in comparison to 
previous studies in Saudi Arabia) as there is no legal enforcement upon companies to 
report social and environmental information. To an extent, there are however, legal 
enforcements upon performing some of the activities that can be considered as social 
responsibility. Most of the enforcement regulations fall under the human resource 
category and include information such as the minimum wage, working hours and 
environment and retirement system. This could explain why the human resource 
category in the index has the highest disclosure proportion which is 41% in 
comparison to other categories as shown in table 5.1. The Ministry of labour issued 
The Saudi Labour Law in 2005 (amended in 2015) to organize the relationship 
between the companies and employees to maximize the benefits and reduce problems. 
The labour law addresses different issues such as: the employment system, working 
hours, health and safety, the employment of disabled people, the retirement system, 
employment contracts and training systems. It can be shown that there are some 
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similarities between the governmental labour law and the disclosed items, which will 
be discussed later in this chapter. This could explain the reason why 61% of Saudi 
listed companies that are reporting social and environmental activities report human 
resource items. 
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of CSED categories disclosed by Saudi-listed companies 
CSED Category 
CSED 
Items as 
in Index 
Percentage 
of disclosed 
items 
No. of 
companies 
Disclosing 
Percentage 
of total 
Sample 
Environmental disclosure 87 7.21 29 17.8 
Human resource disclosure 500 41.46 100 61.3 
Products and consumer disclosure  35 2.90 22 13.5 
community involvement disclosure  295 24.46 71 43.6 
Economic disclosure 243 20.15 87 53.4 
General disclosure 46 3.81 31 19.1 
Total  100   
Community involvement disclosure and economic disclosure have similar 
percentages as shown in table 5.1 (community involvement 24% and economic 
disclosure 20%). Since Saudi Arabia is a traditional Islamic country, 24% is an 
expected percentage for community involvement disclosed items in the CSED index. 
From an Islamic perspective, companies are required to contribute positively to 
society by making donations to charities or via community contribution. Moreover, 
Islamic values promote group or community interests over individual interests; 
therefore, companies are required to pay attention to the environment and the 
community when operating as a response to societal expectations (norms, values and 
beliefs). In addition, The Department of Zakat and Income Tax (DZIT)26 deduct 
                                                 
26 (DZIT) is a government agency which reports to the Ministry of Finance where companies pay their 
zakat and according to Article1 in Zakat royal decree: “Zakat duty shall be collected in full in 
accordance with the provisions of Islamic law (Shariah)  from all Saudi persons, shareholders of Saudi 
companies whose all shareholders are Saudi, and Saudi shareholders of joint companies whose 
shareholders are Saudi and non-Saudi” (GAZT, 2015).  
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companies’ donations from companies “Zakat”27 according to Article 1128. This could 
encourage companies to be more socially responsible and to donate to the authorized 
charities as they will be paying this amount anyway, either to charities or Zakat. The 
previous reasons could explain why almost 44% of the sample companies that are 
disclosing social and environmental activities in the CSED index are disclosing 
community involvement activities (Figure 5.1). This significant percentage can be 
explained by the companies’ intention to gain or maintain their legitimacy to operate 
by satisfying relative stakeholders and society expectations and by interacting 
positively with the community as argued by Gray et al. (1995). Additionally, 
responding to different institutional pressures such as the government or global 
regulatory requirements as well as peer pressure (coercive, normative and mimetic 
isomorphism) could also explain the high percentage of Saudi listed companies 
disclosing social and environmental information. These results are consistent with 
evidence from developing countries where human resource and community 
involvement disclosure occupied the highest percentage in corporate and social 
disclosure (for example see Imam, 2000; Islam and Deegan, 2007).  
 
Figure 5.1: The percentage of CSED categories disclosed in Saudi-listed companies’ annual 
reports of the taxable years ending in 2012 
                                                 
27 Zakat is the second pillar in Islam where Muslim people who are financially capable pay 2.5% to 
specific groups of people; it is an Islamic social tax (Kamla et al., 2006). Companies are also required 
to pay Zakat to the government as a type of tax.   
28 Article 11 Donations: when the tax base is counted for each taxpayer, a deduction is allowed for 
donations paid during the taxable year to public bodies, charities licensed in the Kingdom(GAZT, 
2015). 
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Economic disclosure ranks third in terms of the total CSED items disclosed with 20% 
of the total disclosure and a high percentage of companies reporting on economic 14). 
The reason why most of the companies report on economic items is that Saudisation 
(job nationalisation) is under this category. The Saudi Labour Ministry has been 
determined to encourage companies to nationalise jobs by either recruiting new Saudi 
staff or replacing foreign employees with local employees in occupied jobs. This law 
was introduced to reduce the unemployment rate and ensure that there will be ample 
skills among the locals. The Saudi Labour Ministry also imposes fines on companies 
that do not comply with this requirement. Furthermore, companies that are not 
following Saudisation regulations may be prohibited from receiving any 
governmental benefits while companies following Saudisation requirements are 
rewarded by the Saudi government. 53% of Saudi listed companies that report 
corporate social and environmental disclosure reported economic items, this 
percentage is considered statistically significant.  
The frequency at which environmental issues are reported by Saudi companies is 
much lower and comprises around only 7% of the total disclosure, whereas only 18% 
of all companies report environmental disclosure. The low percentage could be due to 
the high cost of environmental anticipation, and the fact that regulations dealing with 
environmental activities are not firm and usually not enforced. The last two categories, 
product and consumer disclosure (3%) and general disclosure (4%) have the lowest 
percentages (Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1). 
Overall, this section presents the descriptive analysis of CSED in general and the main 
categories in particular that were disclosed by Saudi-listed companies in 2012 annual 
reports. The results indicate that 70% of Saudi-listed companies disclose social and 
environmental disclosure with variation in categories disclosure percentage. Human 
resource ranks in first place in terms of the highest level of disclosure followed by 
community involvement disclosure then economic disclosure while environmental 
disclosure, product and consumer disclosure and general social disclosure are the least 
reported issues consecutively. The next section provides an in-depth analysis of the 
nature of CSED by closely examining CSED categories and sub-categories supported 
by evidence from Saudi-listed companies’ annual reports.  
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5.3 The nature of categories of corporate social and 
environmental disclosure 
This section aims to comprehensively analyse the nature of corporate social and 
environmental disclosure in Saudi listed annual reports, to investigate which 
categories and sub-categories they disclose and why. These categories and sub-
categories form the CSED index for this study based on GRI 3.1 (2011), the check list 
of Hackston and Milne (1996) and some Saudi laws and regulations related to the 
Saudi context, as mentioned in chapter 4. The categories and sub-categories included 
in this section are the categories that were disclosed by the Saudi listed companies in 
the study sample (evidence from Saudi-listed companies’ annual reports are 
provided). The other categories in the study Index that haven’t been disclosed are not 
mentioned in this chapter. This section is organized as follows; 5.3.1 is environmental 
disclosure analysis including five sub-categories. 5.3.2 Analyse the disclosure related 
to human resource information including five sub-categories, followed by section 
5.3.3 which analyses the third category, product and consumer disclosure. This 
category includes three sub-categories while 5.3.4 analyses community involvement 
disclosure which comprises of five sub-categories. Economic disclosure is analysed 
in 5.3.5 consisting of two sub-categories, and other social disclosure is analysed in 
5.3.6.        
5.3.1  Environmental disclosure analysis:   
The environmental disclosure category includes any environment-related disclosure. 
This category, in general, has been disclosed by 29 companies from the sample which 
is 18% of the total companies reporting CSED (Table 5.1). The environmental 
disclosure category includes pollution, conservation of natural resources, energy, 
aesthetics, biodiversity and other environmental disclosure as sub-categories. Each 
sub-category, as mentioned above, includes more items which will be discussed in a 
separate sub section as follows: 
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Pollution prevention or reduction  
One of the CSED index sub-categories of this study is pollution control or reduction 
including all types of pollution. This sub-category reflects companies’ concerns about 
the environment especially the prevention or reduction of pollution in different ways. 
This item has been disclosed by 19 companies (Table 5.2). The National shipping 
company of Saudi Arabia in the transport industry is one of the companies that is 
disclosing pollution reduction in its annual report. As shown below their statement 
indicates their commitment to international environmental organizations regulations 
in pollution reduction. Although it is voluntary to disclose CSE information, as a result 
of operating in the transport sector The National shipping company of Saudi Arabia 
is required to give more attention to the environment in order to prove a company’s 
legitimacy. 
“The company is committed to the strict environmental 
regulations that are compatible with the standards of the 
international environmental organizations to protect the 
hydrological environment and   climate by reducing the pollution 
resulted from engines and equipment they use” (National Shipping 
Company of Saudi Arabia, P:34) 
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics of environmental disclosure sub-categories disclosed by Saudi listed 
companies 
Environmental disclosure Sub-
category 
No.  of companies disclosing 
sub-categories 
percentage of companies 
disclosing sub-categories 
Pollution prevention or reduction  19 12.1 % 
Conservation of natural 
resources 14 8.9 % 
Energy conservation  4 2.5 % 
Aesthetics 6 3.8 % 
Biodiversity and other 
environmental disclosure 
5 0.64 % 
The Saudi Electricity Company is the only organization which has disclosed the 
amount spent on a company’s research and development for pollution education. As 
per their statement below they pay attention to research that helps to find enhanced 
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solutions for improving the quality of power generation (without pollution) as well as 
developing the service. Since they are both one of the largest companies in Saudi 
Arabia with state ownership and a major electricity provider, stakeholders and the 
local community expect them to contribute to the environment as suggested by 
stakeholder and legitimacy theory.  Institutional theory suggests that they are also 
expected to adhere to national and international standards when operating.  
 “The cooperation of the company with local and international 
universities as well as with research centres to find suitable 
solutions to the problem of carbonic ashes” (P: 61), “The 
company is concerned with planning and developing the quality 
of the current electricity power generator and the future 
generators” (Saudi Electricity Company, P: 75).      
The company’s report on their non-polluting operations either voluntary or in 
compliance with pollution laws and regulations (i.e. ISO 14000, GOTS). This issue 
has been disclosed by many companies (e.g. 10 companies). As an example, The 
National Shipping Company of Saudi Arabia and Saudi Cement reported the same 
issue. As shown below, both companies stated that they are applying the international 
standards and are certified for their non-polluting operation.      
“The company takes into account improving its operations in oil and gas 
transport by applying the standards of (ISO 9001:2008)” (The National 
Shipping Company of Saudi Arabia, P: 20).   
 “The company continues its commitment in applying the global quality 
standards and maintained its (ISO 9001:2008) certificates” (Saudi 
Cement, P: 11).  
Using new equipment to reduce pollution is another issue that 4 companies have 
disclosed in their annual reports. For example, and as shown below, Saudi Cement 
Company and Saudi Electricity Company disclosed disposing of machines or 
materials which negatively affect the environment or using new equipment to reduce 
pollution.    
 “New equipment that is compatible with the latest technology to reduce 
dust emission for an industrial environment that exceeds the requirement 
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of the Saudi Presidency of Metrology and the environment (PME)” 
(Saudi Cement company, P: 8). 
 “The company is using the Flue Gas Desulphurization (FGD) technique 
instead of burning fuel to decrease Oxides of sulfur gases that pollute the 
air while producing energy” (Saudi Electricity Company, P: 102). 
Both companies, Saudi Cement Company and Saudi Electricity Company, are 
operating in sectors that have a direct effect on the environment (cement and energy 
sectors). Legitimacy theory suggests that they are therefore expected to pay attention 
to the environment and to the disclosure of further environmental information to prove 
their legitimacy.   
Similarly, Saudi Cement Company and Northern Region Cement Company reported 
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and reductions achieved, as displayed 
below. Institutional theory explains that comparable environmental issues are 
disclosed by companies operating in the same sector. Mimetic pressures from 
companies operating in the same industry encourage companies to disclose similar 
issues that concern stakeholders.   
 “The company is keen to carry out regular maintenance for the filters 
which purifies the air emitted from the production lines” (Northern 
Region Cement company, P: 11) 
In addition to the previous sub-categories, supporting anti-litter campaigns, the 
Sustainability program and using environmental harmless materials are additional 
items that have each been reported by only one Saudi- listed companies. 
Conservation of natural resources 
This sub-category concerns a companies’ natural resource conservation such as 
recycling (all types of recycling, i.e. water, air etc.) and using recycled materials, 
wastes recycling, installing or upgrading of systems to conserve natural resources and 
conservation policies and strategies. Regarding the issue of the conservation of natural 
resources, 14 companies have reported related items (Table 5.3). As stated below 
Saudi Kayan Petrochemical Company is one of the companies that reported on natural 
resources conservation. The company revealed that it considers environmental 
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protection including natural resources conservation, recycling and waste reduction. 
When planning a company’s strategy, all previous aspects are related to natural 
resources conservation.           
“The company’s strategy for health and safety and environmental 
protection includes the preservation of natural resources, reducing 
waste, air, water and soil pollutants. In addition to recycling or disposal 
of waste in a safe manner which is not harmful for the environment” 
(Saudi Kayan Company, P:20) 
Similarly, Najran Cement Company reported that the company is concerned with the 
efficient use of material resource in the manufacturing process coupled with the 
amount of natural resources efficiently used under natural resources conservation as 
shown below. They stated that they signed a contract with a company aiming to 
exploit the wasted thermal energy. They also stated that they did this in order to 
comply with governmental guidance and international standards which encourages 
the use of alternative energy.   
 “In order to comply with governmental guidance in encouraging the use 
of alternative energy in line with the international effort to reduce the 
gas emission and pollution the company sign a contract with a Chinese 
company to start a project to exploit the wasted thermal energy” Najran 
Cement Company, P:12). 
Both companies are industrial companies (pharmaceutical and cement) and both are 
directly affecting the environment. Based on legitimacy, stakeholder and institutional 
theories companies operating in industrial sectors are expected to disclose more 
environmental issues. They do so to prove to the government, stakeholders and the 
local community that they are legitimate, environmentally friendly and 
environmentally responsible. They prove their legitimacy by reporting that they follow 
national and international standards when operating. 
Energy conservation  
The conservation of energy disclosure including companies’ policies in energy, the 
amount of energy saved and initiatives to use renewable energy are the items disclosed 
by 4 companies (Table 5.3). Filling and Packing Company is one of the companies 
  
160
that reported energy conservation. They stated that they are using solar energy to 
reduce electrical energy as shown below:  
“The Company reduces its electrical energy by utilizing the use of 
solar energy” (Filling and Packing Company, P: 12).  
As shown below Najran Cement Company also reported the amount of money spent 
on energy conservation programs to testify that they are concerned with energy 
conservation and are environmentally responsible, particularly since they’re an 
industrial organisation:  
  “The wasted thermal energy exploitation project is expected to be completed 
by 2013 with the cost of 168 million Saudi Riyals” (Najran Cement Company, 
P: 12) 
Most of the items in this sub-category have not been disclosed by Saudi listed 
companies. For example, research aimed at improving the energy efficiency of 
products, disclosing a company’s concerns about energy shortage, running energy 
saving programmes for employees, developing cleaner energy technologies and 
awards received for energy saving. This could be a result of the expense of applying 
these strategies and requires forward planning. Only large highly profitable companies 
would be able to afford the implementation of such major changes.   
Aesthetics 
This sub-category relates to activities concerned with a companies’ contribution to the 
beautifying of the environment in which they operate. For example, using art or 
sculptures or planting trees (not related to pollution reduction). Furthermore, cleaning 
(includes sea costs, or any other form of cleaning), designing facilities harmonious 
with the environment, restoring historical buildings/structures are issues related to the 
aesthetics sub-category. Only 6 companies reported on activities related to aesthetics 
(Table 5.3).   
Biodiversity and other environmental disclosure   
This relates to companies disclosing biodiversity and general environmental activities 
such as wildlife conservation, environmental protection (in general) and general 
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environmental disclosure such as awareness programs (e.g. earth day, world 
environmental day). Out of the Saudi listed companies only 5 disclosed items in 
relation to biodiversity and other general environmental disclosure (Table 5.3). 
The Environmental disclosure category is not popular in the annual reports of Saudi-
listed companies. The majority of the companies that reported this category are 
industrial companies that have either a direct or indirect effect on the environment. 
Implementing environmentally friendly operating systems including equipment is 
said to incur significant expenses. The fact that companies should exhibit a greater 
awareness of environmental issues when operating is considered a new but growing 
phenomenon. The next section carries out an analysis of human resource disclosure.           
5.3.2 Human resource disclosure: 
As previously mentioned, human resources disclosure is the most disclosed category 
by Saudi listed companies, since 100 companies have reported human resource 
activities, 61% of the companies reported social and environmental disclosure (Table 
5.1).  
Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics of human resources disclosure sub-categories disclosed by Saudi 
listed companies 
Sub-category Number of companies disclosing 
Percentage of all disclosing 
companies 
Employees training and 
development 75 48 % 
Employees pay and benefits 53 34 % 
Employees health and safety 26 17 % 
Equal opportunities 10 6.4 % 
Employees social life 6 3.8 % 
This category includes all activities related to human resources in the company such 
as employee training and development, pay and benefits, employee contribution and 
association in the company, employee health and safety, the employment system and 
measures of the system, employee equal opportunities and employee social life. Each 
sub-category will be discussed in the following sub sections: 
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Employees training and development 
75 Saudi listed companies, equalling 48% of the companies that reported social and 
environmental information (Table 5.4) have disclosed different items related to 
employee training and development.  For example, providing different types of 
training (in-house training, outside training, online training and abroad training) are 
items related to this sub-category. The Savola Group’s annual report reveals that the 
company has different courses and workshops, as stated below:  
 “During 2012 training courses and workshops were held in all sectors” 
(Savola Group, P: 25) 
The Savola Group reported another item which is collaboration with a training expert 
(national and international)  
 “the academy has launched an international program in cooperation 
with “Thunderbird University” for management offering a Master’s 
degree for the employees in Business Administration” (Savola Group, 
P:32) 
Providing on-going learning and development programs for employees, providing the 
appropriate training to develop employees’ skills and qualifications, establishing or 
developing training centres, on-going plans for employees’ development are all items 
documented by Saudi companies in their annual reports. Employee’s performance 
appraisals and assessment, time and amount spent on trainings, courses, workshops 
and development programs, the number of employees who underwent trainings, 
courses, workshops and development programs, young employees training programs, 
knowledge transform programs and mentoring professionals programs. Regarding 
employee development programs ran by the company’s academy, Saudi Basic 
Industries Corporation discloses as shown below that the company has its own 
academy for the purpose of employee’ development and training: 
  “Sabic Academy makes a significant contribution towards supporting 
the development of employees through highly concentrated training 
programs designed specially to increase employees’ qualifications” 
(Saudi Basic Industries Corporation P: 32) 
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Issues such as collaboration with universities and institutions regarding training 
programs, helping employees to gain more experience by sending them to work in the 
company’s overseas branches, supporting employees to continue their studies and get 
a higher degree and sponsoring employees to continue their studies abroad have also 
been disclosed by Saudi companies. The Savola Group is one of the companies that 
reported the sponsoring of young employees to continue their studies abroad, as 
shown below.  In addition, they reported the number of students who joined this 
program and how many of them graduated: 
 “The company seeks to attract young gifted secondary school students 
and sponsor them to continue their Bachelor degree abroad to meet the 
company’s need in specific fields. In 2012 200 students joined the 
program and 80 students graduated” (Savola Group, P: 33)      
Employees pay and benefits 
Issues related to employees pay and benefits have been reported by 53 Saudi listed 
companies (34% of the companies that are reporting social and environmental 
information) (Table 5.4). This sub-category includes payments and benefits awarded 
to the employees by the company such as ability and performance based rewards, as 
reported below by Saudi British Bank. They stated that the company adapted a 
performance based bonus strategy and invested in a performance management 
program:  
“SAB continues to invest in their Performance management system to 
ensure achievement of high performance, this includes the process of 
performance assessment and the adaptation of a performance based 
bonus strategy” (Saudi British Bank, P: 36) 
Moreover, companies reported on performance based incentives given to employees 
to encourage them to perform better and to guarantee their loyalty. Regarding this 
issue Riyadh Bank stated that through their incentive and bonus program, the bank 
aims to guarantee employees loyalty, as shown below:     
 “ the bank works hard to build employee trust and aims to guarantee 
their loyalty to the bank via incentive programs, bonus and saving 
investment programs” (Riyadh Bank, P27,28).   
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Saudi-listed companies documented that companies offered a shares and options 
scheme to increase their employees’ loyalty and tighten job security. For example, 
Nama Chemicals Company reported that the company offered shares to its employees 
with affordable instalments:    
 “In 2012 the company issued more shares to give employees who were 
not entitled to own shares during the previous IPO the opportunity to do 
so. The employees’ share scheme aims to give employees the chance to 
own Nama shares by making affordable instalments. This action was due 
to the company’s awareness of the importance of employees’ job 
security” (Nama Chemicals Company, P: 15).      
Company benefits such as employees’ personal saving and investment funds and staff 
loan programs (including cash, vehicles and land) are further areas reported by Saudi-
listed companies, in addition to the provision of staff accommodation and staff home 
ownership schemes. In this regard, Riyadh Bank reported providing saving and 
investment fund for employees:  
 “The bank works on building trust between employees and the bank 
aiming to guarantee their loyalty to the bank through incentive programs 
in addition to bonus and saving investment programs” (Riyadh Bank, 
P:27,28). 
Rabigh Refining and Petrochemical Company reported house ownership schemes as 
a form of employee pay and benefits: 
“The board of directors has approved employee’ house ownership 
scheme. The aim of this scheme is to provide stability for employees and 
locate them near to the company’s facilities which should have a positive 
impact on their performance and loyalty” (Rabigh Refining and 
Petrochemical Company, P: 21). 
In their annual reports, Saudi Steel Pipe Company disclosed another item under the 
employee pay and benefits sub-category which is offering interest free loans to 
employees: 
“The company reserves a budget equivalent to half of the employment 
allowance for the interest free loan scheme. This program aims to 
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increase employees’ loyalty, this program includes loans for the 
purchase of land, houses, and vehicles as well as marriage and 
emergency loans. The balance of employees’ loans in 2012 reached 
14,609,596 SR with 234 employees benefiting from this scheme” (Saudi 
Steel Pipe Company, p: 14).       
This item discusses the assistance and guidance offered by companies to 
employees nearing retirement in addition to funds plans, this benefit is also 
available for those who have been made redundant. The Employees pay 
and benefits sub-category includes companies offering assistance to new 
employees. For example, paying 2 basic salaries in addition to providing 
a social security fund. The Saudi Research and Marketing Group reported 
providing an emergency fund for employees facing exceptional 
circumstances:     
“the company launched an emergency fund for employees who face 
emergency circumstances and problems seeking to strengthen the 
relationship between the company and its employees in addition to 
increasing employee loyalty to the company” (Saudi Research and 
Marketing Group, P:19). 
Another item in this sub-category is providing compensation in the event 
of death or disability. In this regard, the Savola Group reported this item 
in their annual report: 
“the company continued to offer its support during 2012 to employees by 
forming an agreement with Saudi British Bank to pay 24 salaries as 
compensation to the employee in case of death or disability” (Savola Group, 
p:26).  
Employees health and safety  
The Health and safety sub-category was reported by 26 companies representing 17% 
of the total Saudi-listed companies disclosing social and environmental information 
(Table 5.4). Disclosure related to employee’ health and safety is cited under this sub-
category. Such as health and safety training, cooperation with third parties for health 
and safety system auditing, health and safety awareness programs, health campaigns 
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and awards for safety. To give an example of the health and safety disclosure, Eastern 
Province Cement Company stated that the company’s concern with employee health 
and safety is evidenced by the supply of health and safety equipment and subsequent 
training for employees: 
“The company pays great attention to health and safety in the 
workplace and constantly strives to increase awareness through 
continual health and safety training for employees. Moreover, the 
company has provided personal protection equipment and urges 
employees to use this equipment during their working day” 
(Eastern Province Cement Company, P: 5).    
Furthermore, Saudi listed companies reported on cooperating with government 
organizations (e.g. civil defence), by adhering to international standards for measuring 
the company's health and safety performance and equipping the workplace to make it 
suitable and supportive for disabled people. For example, below it states that the 
Savola Group disclosed a total accessibility program for disabled people. This 
program is concerned with disabled employees’ mobility, the company also trained 
selected employees in the human resources department in dealing with disabled 
employees: 
“the company has adapted (total accessibility program) to insure 
easy mobility and access for disabled employees between the 
company’s building and different facilities. Moreover 85 
employees in the human resources department have been trained 
on dealing with disabled people in the workplace” (Savola Group, 
p: 27). 
Equal opportunities   
The Equal opportunities sub-category relates to employees having equal opportunities 
in the workplace. This sub-category was disclosed by 10 Saudi-listed companies 
(Table 5.4). Equal opportunities include company plans, diversity or equal 
opportunity training. This is demonstrated below in Alahli Takafoul Company’s 
vision: 
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“The company employs more females, who represent 20% of the 
total number of staff at present. Moreover, the company employs 
some special needs individuals in line with its vision to provide 
equal employment opportunities” (Alahli Takaful Company, P. 11). 
Companies also disclosed increasing the number of female employees and the 
percentage of female employees in the company.  This is not only the company’s 
intention but also the Saudi Arabian government’s intention, even so, few companies 
reported items related to employing more women.  In this regard Saudi Airlines 
Catering disclosed that they are attracting more females to work in the company:  
“The company aims to recruit Saudis; it managed to achieve a continuous 
increase in the percentage of Saudisation especially in attracting disabled 
people and female elements….. the Saudi Female has shown significant 
success in the company kitchen supplies after many years of male 
occupation in this profession” (Saudi Airlines Catering, P:17).      
Regarding the percentage of female employees in the company, Malath Cooperative 
Insurance and Reinsurance Company reported that 12% of the company’s employees 
are female: 
 “the female element represents 12% of the total number of employees as 
the company has provided a suitable and attractive work environment for 
Saudi female employees” (Malath Cooperative Insurance and Reinsurance 
Company, P: 3). 
Employees social life 
This sub-category relates to a companies’ consideration of its employees’ social lives; 
and only 6 companies disclosed information in this category (Table 5.4). The 
Employee’ social life sub-category includes issues such as company surveys on 
employees’ social lives, socialising with staff members and their families, trips and 
events, establishing a company’s own community and providing support for 
employees’ families. For example, the provision of family member education or 
training, maternity or family leave. 
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The Human resources category including all sub-categories is argued to be one of the 
most noteworthy categories reported by a significant number of Saudi-listed 
companies. Based on stakeholder theory, employees are essential stakeholders who 
companies pay attention to when performing as well as reporting. Achieving 
employee loyalty, lowering employee turnover rates, retaining and attracting good 
employees are aspects that companies consider. Disclosing information related to 
employees proves to stakeholders and the local community that the company is 
socially responsible. Legitimacy theory also dictates that the company is 
authenticating their legitimacy by reporting on human resource information. This 
category is the most reported by Saudi-listed companies and the result is consistent 
with previous studies conducted in developing countries (Alsaeed, 2006; Belal, 2001; 
Gray et al., 2001; Guthrie and Parker, 1990; Ratanajongkol et al., 2006).  
Another reason to explain why human resources is the most reported category by 
Saudi-listed companies is that a significant number of government enforcement 
regulations fall under the human resource category and includes information such as 
the minimum wage, working hours and retirement system. According to institutional 
theory (coercive isomorphism) companies report human resource information to show 
the government that they are following the regulations. Another justification for the 
high percentage of Saudi-listed companies reporting human resource information is 
peer pressure. Based on institutional theory (mimetic isomorphism) companies report 
human resource information to gain competitive advantage, consequently, they can 
retain and attract good employees.       
5.3.3 Product and consumer disclosure: 
Product and consumer disclosure is one of the least disclosed categories by Saudi 
listed companies as only 22 companies disclosed information on it. (14% of the 
companies disclosing social and environmental information (Table 5.1). This category 
includes product development, product safety, product quality and consumer 
relations.   
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Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics of product and consumer disclosure sub-categories disclosed by 
Saudi listed companies 
Sub-category  Number of companies disclosing 
Percentage of all disclosing 
companies 
Product and service 
development 2 1.2 % 
Product and service quality 
and safety 22 14.1 % 
Consumer relation 3 1.9 % 
Product and service development 
Development related to the company’s products or services and research related to 
product development are issues fall under this sub-category. The Abdullah Al Othaim 
Markets Company disclosed issues which fall under the product development sub-
category as shown below in their report, they reveal that the company pays attention 
to service development: 
“In line with the company’s interests in developing its services 
and responding to the customers’ needs during 2012, the 
company has continued in its development operations on the 
identity, mechanism and operational regulation for its 
‘acquisition card’ which was launched in 2011 through building 
a communication centre and electronic website to benefit the 
card’s customers, activate cards and manage customer 
communication.  This development resulted in a 31.4% increase 
in the percentage of card customers out of the company’s total 
customers in 2012.  In addition to this, the company developed 
its loyalty program; built its customer database and established 
an integrated communication centre” (Abdullah Al Othaim 
Markets Company, p: 23).   
Product and service quality and safety  
The Product quality and safety sub category was disclosed by 22 companies (Table 
5.1). This sub-category includes items such as the control or auditing of product 
quality by third parties (i.e. ISO 9000), the disclosure of the extent to which products 
meet applicable safety standards (i.e. ISO 22000), the improvement of product quality 
and the firm's product quality awards. Regarding product quality and safety issues, 
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Eastern Province Cement Company disclosed that they pay great attention to the 
quality of the cement and that they are applying high standards as per the following:  
“The company pays great attention to the quality of cement 
products through applying the best standards and using 
recommended control devises to reach high quality products to 
satisfy consumers’ ambitions.  Because of this the company 
retained its quality trade mark awarded by the Saudi Standard, 
Metrology and Quality Organization (SASO). And renewed its 
international quality certificate ISo 2008-9001” (Eastern 
Province Cement Company, P: 4) 
Consumer relations 
Consumer relations concerns building relationships with customers, ensuring 
customer' satisfaction by carrying out customer’ satisfaction surveys and any other 
consumer care disclosure. This sub-category was reported by only 3 companies which 
is considered very low.     
The previous section provided an analysis of the product and consumer disclosure 
category which is one of the least reported categories by Saudi-listed companies 
despite the fact that it contains significant issues. The next section conducts an 
analysis of the community involvement disclosure.    
5.3.4 Community involvement disclosure: 
This category is the second most disclosed category. As mentioned previously in 
section (5.2); 71 companies disclosed items related to community involvement which 
represents 46% of the companies that are disclosing social and environmental 
disclosure (Table 5.1). The Community involvement category includes 5 sub-
categories; support for education (including training), support for art, culture and 
sports, support for health and safety and other community activity including 
donations. 
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Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics of community involvement disclosure sub-categories 
disclosed by Saudi listed companies 
Sub-category Number of companies disclosing 
Percentage of all 
disclosing companies 
Education and training contribution  45 29 % 
Art and culture contribution  15 10 % 
Public health and safety contribution 20 13 % 
sponsoring sports or entertaining projects 8 5.1 % 
Donation and other community involvement 57 37 % 
Education and training contribution 
Education and training support was reported by 44 Saudi listed companies (Table 5.5). 
This sub-category is about a companies’ contribution to the community in the way of 
promoting public education, supporting different types of research by investing in 
research and innovation, supporting educational institutions and sponsoring 
educational conferences and seminars. Dallah Healthcare holding company is one of 
the companies that reported contribution to the community as follows:   
“From the company’s social responsibility prospective, the 
company provides the following: technical support given to the 
operation management of the National institute for health 
training. In addition, the company sponsors Saudi medical 
students and offers financial assistance to support employees 
conducting medical research. Moreover, the company has 
sponsored several national and international health awareness 
events including smoking prevention, blood donations and 
patients care” (Dallah Healthcare Holding Company, P: 16, 17).  
Further items in this sub-category reported by some of the Saudi listed companies 
include funding scholarship programs or activities, inspiring young people in 
education, organizing or contributing in forums or conferences, co-operative and 
summer training for students, company visits or training of school students, Summer 
and part-time employment of students and traineeships for students (i.e. internships). 
Wafrah for Industry and Development Company disclosed that they provide the 
opportunity for students to train and gain experience in company’s factories:  
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 “to participate in supporting the community through donations to charities 
and schools in addition to welcoming students from different year groups to 
train and gain different experience in the company’s factories” (Wafrah for 
Industry and Development Company, P:29).  
Abdullah Al Othaim Markets Company also disclosed summer employment of 
students, the development of women’s skills and preparing them for the workforce:  
 “The company employed 183 Saudi Youths during the summer 
holiday” and “During 2012, The Company trained 770 Saudi females 
and qualified them for the labour market” (Abdullah Al Othaim Markets 
Company P: 7) 
They also disclosed the social services that their academy provides:  
“Alotheim Academy for Free training and development offered training 
and care for ‘Ensan orphanage’ children.  Moreover, the academy 
provided training to some special needs individuals which resulted in 
their employment in different branches of the company.  In addition, 
several social programs were offered to benefit the community. During 
2012 the estimated company fund for the academy reached one million 
SR” (Abdullah Al Othaim Markets Company, p: 16) 
Art and culture contribution 
This sub-category has been disclosed by 15 companies (Table 5.5). The Art and 
culture contribution sub-category is about a companies’ contribution to art and 
cultural events and activities. For example, cultural awareness and events (i.e. 
exhibition, campaign, programs), sponsoring or participating in social events (not for 
companies’ employees), sponsoring art exhibitions or events and participating in any 
national or international celebration. 15 companies reported items regarding art and 
cultural contribution including the National Shipping Company of Saudi Arabia who 
reported that they care to be actively present within the community as well as 
participating in Saudi national day, as stated below:  
“The company seeks to be actively present within the community, 
during 2012 it contributed to: Sponsoring ‘unity of language and 
communication’ programs for children with disabilities 
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charities, supporting charitable societies for the care of orphans 
(Ensan), Participating in the national festival for Heritage and 
culture, Participating in the activities of the National Day (82) 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” (National Shipping Company, p. 
35).  
Public health and safety contribution 
Contribution to public health and safety is a sub-category that has been disclosed by 
20 companies who revealed 13% of the companies that reported social and 
environmental information (Table 5.5). This sub-category includes sponsoring or 
participating in public health projects and awareness programs, establishing or 
supporting health institutions, providing healthcare facilities, workshops and 
conferences and donating cash or medical equipment to hospitals.  
Sponsoring sports or entertaining projects 
Only 8 companies disclosed activities related to the sponsoring sport or entertaining 
sub-category (table 5.5). It includes promoting and supporting local sports, sponsoring 
sports events and competitions and sponsoring local sport teams. Fitaihi Holding 
Group is one of the companies that disclosed items related to sponsoring sports or 
entertaining projects as follows:  
“The company sponsored 2 Handball games for the Saudi 
National team, and prepared a stadium for its employees close 
to their residence” (Fitaihi Holding Group, p: 45).  
Donation and other community involvement 
Donation and other community involvement is one of the most disclosed sub-
categories with 57 companies disclosing this sub-category, thus representing around 
36% of the disclosing companies (Table 5.5). This sub-category includes 
contributions to the development of local community facilities (i.e. roads, parks, 
infrastructure) and support for community activities and events. Additionally, the 
donation of cash or other (national and international), donation of company products, 
donations of employees' time, opening companies' facilities to the public, establishing 
or supporting charities, establishing or supporting community centres, sponsoring any 
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other community activity, sponsoring Islamic awareness lectures and events (i.e. 
pilgrim), helping in natural disasters aid and CSR awards. In relation to companies’ 
donations and social contributions the Saudi Chemical Company reported their 
employees’ contributions as per the below:   
“During 2012, the Saudi chemical company supported and 
sponsored several social and Health events. It also contributed 
to monthly employee donations to orphan charity organizations 
(Ensan)” (Saudi Chemical Company, P: 4) 
The National and international donations item. 
 This item was reported by some of the Saudi listed companies such as Bank Aljazira:  
“The bank provides (AlJazira social responsibility campaign), 
through its different aspects and activities in various counties 
and cities of the kingdom, benefited 2372 young men and women. 
In addition to the bank’s participation in National and Islamic 
posts for example the response to the orders of His Majesty the 
king of Saudi Arabia to support the Saudi national campaign to 
aid brothers in Syria, where the Bank has provided the amount 
of five hundred thousand riyals” (Bank Aljazira, P.33).  
The Community involvement disclosure category including all sub-categories was 
highly reported by Saudi-listed companies. This result is expected to be found in a 
developing Islamic country and traditional culture where group rights are prioritised 
over those of individuals and generosity is one of the common behaviours. By 
reporting information related to community involvement, companies can easily be 
perceived as socially responsible. According to legitimacy theory, companies use this 
type of information and activities to prove that they are legitimate to operate. Another 
aspect that could explain the large number of companies reporting community 
involvement issues is the fact that these activities can be aligned with government 
plans and strategies. This argument is supported by institutional theory (coercive 
isomorphism). Regarding donations to authorised charities, the amount donated to 
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charities by companies is deducted from the amount of zakat29 that the company 
should pay to the Authority of Zakat and Taxation from their profits. Contributing to 
the community and disclosing this contribution may positively affect a company’s 
reputation and image which results in a competitive advantage for the company. This 
argument is supported by institutional theory (mimetic isomorphism).     
5.3.5 Economic disclosure: 
The Economic disclosure category indicates the companies’ contribution to the 
economy by disclosing their economic performance and job nationalisation. As 
mentioned previously this category represents 25% of the disclosed categories (Table 
5.1).    
Table 5.6: Descriptive statistics of economic disclosure sub-categories disclosed by Saudi 
listed companies 
Sub-category  Number of companies disclosing 
Percentage of all 
disclosing companies 
Economic performance  8 5.1 % 
Job Nationalisation (Saudisation) 87 56 % 
Economic performance 
Economic performance includes a company’s contribution to the national and 
international economy, job creation, providing entrepreneurial development 
programs, contributing to food security programs and the recruitment of fresh 
graduates. The Saudi British Bank disclosed the following in relation to job creation:   
“From a social responsibility perspective, the bank was a 
pioneer in providing many social programs and one of the best 
examples of this is sponsoring a major event which focuses on 
increasing job opportunities for Saudi women to develop and 
raise the level of Human Capital in Saudi.  The event was 
inaugurated by His Excellency the Minister of Labour and Head 
                                                 
29 ‘Zakat’ is Islamic social tax: every Muslim individual and company must pay 2.5% of their wealth 
towards a charitable cause, such as making donations to the poor and needy (Kamla et al., 2006). 
Companies are also required to pay Zakat to the government as a type of tax.  
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of Development of the Saudi human resources fund. During the 
event, a company owner’s guide was distributed which explains 
the steps to be taken by the private sector to help increase the 
employment of Saudi women” (Saudi British Bank, P: 37).  
Job nationalisation (Saudisation). 
This sub-category is one of the most disclosed items in the CSED Index of this study 
since 87 of the reporting companies reported items related to job nationalisation 
(Saudisation) (Table 5.6), and this number presents around 56% of the reporting 
companies (Table 5.1). Job nationalisation (Saudisation) is related to employing and 
developing Saudi employees, providing job opportunities for Saudi employees, 
replacing foreign employees with Saudi employees, adopting a Saudisation plan and 
increasing job opportunities for Saudi nationals. Regarding employing and developing 
Saudi employees in addition to the level of the nationalized jobs, Savola Group 
reported the following:  
“The company continues employing and developing Saudi 
employees” and “The majority of managerial and executive 
possessions are held by Saudi employees” (Savola Group, P25) 
They also reported the percentage of Saudi employees in the company as shown 
below: 
“There are about 5500 Saudi employees from both genders with an 
average of 40% of the company’s total employees” (Savola Group, P: 25)  
Further items related to Saudisation are: offering training and employment for 
unemployed people, awards received for Saudisation, cooperating with governmental 
organizations, agencies which sponsor Saudisation programs and disclosing (Nitaqat 
programs)30. 
                                                 
30 Nitaqat program is introduced by The Ministry of Labor to classify a companies’ performance in job 
nationalisation, four colours to represent four levels of Saudization (red, yellow, green and platinum). 
The aim of the program is to encourage companies to nationalize their jobs in order to receive 
governmental benefits (http://www.emol.gov.sa/nitaqat/nitaqat.pdf, 2015) 
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Economic disclosure is the third most reported category by Saudi-listed companies. 
This category includes job nationalisation (Saudisation) and it is this sub-category 
which makes this category the third in disclosure in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi 
government is firm with regards to Saudisation regulations and enforces companies 
to follow these regulations by issuing fines for failing to adhere to them or by 
withdrawing government benefits. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Ministry of Labour 
has its own system, the nationalisation employment system (Netaqat) to enforce 
companies to increase the number of Saudi employees. According to institutional 
theory (coercive isomorphism) companies chose to disclose this category as a result 
of pressure from the government. Additionally, legitimacy theory suggests that 
companies disclosed this category to prove that they are contributing to the economy 
and that they are serving to solve national and international issues, and are therefore 
legitimate to operate. 
5.3.6 Other social disclosure:  
This category includes policies for disclosure and transparency, awards for 
transparency, implementing sustainability management, declaring accounting 
standards, anti-corruption policies and procedures, disclosing ethics practices, the 
percentage of the company’s profit spent on CSR, CSR awards received and general 
CSR information. 31 companies disclosed other social disclosure which represent 
19% of the Saudi-listed companies that disclosed social and environment disclosure 
(Table 5.1). The Saudi Paper Manufacturing Company has disclosed the following 
regarding bribery and corruption:  
“The company is managed honestly and fairly and stays away from 
bribery, corruption and all practices that are not morally and 
professionally acceptable” (Saudi Paper Manufacturing, P: 2) 
In relation to applying accounting standards and the transparency scheme, the Fitaihi 
Holding Group disclosed the following:   
“The company confirms the application of Accounting Standards issued by 
Saudi organizations for legal accountants” and “We do not accept any illegal 
practices at work and we are pursuing transparency and integrity in all our 
businesses” (Fitaihi Holding Group, P: 42). 
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General CSR information, disclosing ethics and business practices, the percentage of 
the company’s profit spent on CSR, CSR awards received are also issues under other 
social disclosure. The Saudi International Petrochemical Company reported the 
percentage of the profits provided for social responsibility as per the following:  
 “The company allocated 1% of its yearly profits to charities and 
community service” (Saudi International Petrochemical Company, p: 39).   
5.4 Chapter summery 
This chapter provides an analysis of corporate social and environmental disclosure in 
Saudi Arabia with two objectives in mind. The first objective is to examine the extent 
of CSED, and the second is to examine the nature of CSED. Applying the results from 
the content analysis of Saudi-listed companies’ annual reports, it can be concluded that 
70% of Saudi-listed companies disclosed at least one item related to social and 
environmental aspects with an average of 7.2 items.  In comparison to CSED in Saudi 
Literature, this result (70%) is considered high, and shows an increase in the level of 
CSED in Saudi-listed companies,( Al-Janadi et al. (2013) found 14%, Macarulla and 
Talalweh  (2012) stated 16% , Khasharmeh and Desoky (2013) indicated 21.8% and 
Habbash (2015)  found 24% ). This result indicates an increase in Saudi-listed 
companies’ awareness of CSED. It indicates their cognizant of the importance of 
contribution both to society and the community in which they are operating as well as 
their obligation to report their contributions. 
The analysis carried out in this chapter revealed the three most reported categories as 
Human Resource, community involvement and economic disclosure consecutively 
(41%, 24% and 20%). These three categories are related to government regulations 
which could create pressure for companies. In addition, since community involvement 
comes second place in reporting, the status of Saudi Arabia as a traditional Islamic 
country affects the nature of CSED. Consequently, these three categories are reported 
the most by Saudi-listed companies.  On the other hand, the environmental disclosure 
category is not popular in the Saudi-listed companies’ annual report (7% of the total 
disclosure).  The majority of the companies that reported this category are industrial 
companies that have either a direct or indirect effect on the environment. The 
implementation of this category is considered uneconomical, since applying 
  
179
environmentally friendly operating systems including equipment is said to incur 
significant expenses. The fact that companies should exhibit a greater awareness of 
environmental issues when operating is considered a new but growing phenomenon. 
General, products and consumer disclosure are reported the least consecutively (4% 
and 3%).    
The evidence presented by the detailed analyses of the sub-categories under each 
CSED category indicates that certain sub categories are disclosed to a higher degree 
than others. Consistent with the results presented in previous paragraphs, the most 
frequently disclosed sub categories fall under the categories disclosed the most often. 
For example, job nationalisation (Saudisation) is the most frequently reported issue; it 
has been reported by 87 Saudi-listed companies (56% of the reporting companies). As 
mentioned previously by the Ministry of Labour companies have been encouraged to 
nationalise jobs by hiring new employees or by replacing foreign employees, thus 
aiming to decrease unemployment rates. Furthermore, they impose fines on companies 
that are not complying with regulations, while rewarding companies that are 
complying with government regulations. According to institutional theory (coercive 
isomorphism) companies chose to disclose this category as a result of pressure from 
the government. Additionally, legitimacy theory suggests that companies disclosed 
this category to prove that they are contributing to the economy and that they are 
serving to solve national and international issues, and are therefore legitimate to 
operate.  
The two most frequently reported sub-categories in the Human Resource category are 
Employee training and development (reported by 75 Saudi-listed companies), and 
employee pay and benefits (reported by 53 Saudi-listed companies). Consistent with 
stakeholder theory, employees are powerful stakeholders to whom companies pay 
attention when performing as well as reporting. Achieving employee loyalty, lowering 
employee turnover rates, retaining and attracting good employees are all aspects that 
companies consider. Legitimacy theory suggests that companies are confirming their 
legitimacy by reporting on human resource information. This category is the most 
frequently reported by Saudi-listed companies and the result is consistent with 
previous studies conducted in developing countries (Alsaeed, 2006; Belal, 2001; Gray 
et al., 2001; Guthrie and Parker, 1990; Ratanajongkol et al., 2006). Additionally, a 
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significant number of government enforcement regulations fall under the human 
resource category and includes aspects such as minimum wage, working hours and the 
retirement system. According to institutional theory (coercive isomorphism) 
companies report human resource information to prove their regulatory compliance to 
the government. Peer pressure might also responsible for the high percentage of Saudi-
listed companies reporting human resource information. Furthermore, another 
institution isomorphism (mimetic isomorphism) places pressure on companies to 
report human resource information to gain competitive advantage, consequently, they 
can retain and attract good employees.       
In the context of community involvement disclosure, two sub-categories were reported 
by a significant number of Saudi-listed companies. Donations and other community 
involvement were reported by 57 companies, whereas education and training 
contributions were reported by 45 Saudi listed-companies. This result is expected to 
be found in a developing Islamic country and traditional culture where group rights 
are prioritised over those of individuals and generosity is one of the common 
behaviours.  According to legitimacy theory, companies use this type of information 
and activities to prove that they are capable of meeting relative stakeholders and 
societal expectations and are legitimate to operate. By reporting community 
involvement information companies are also demonstrating to the government that 
their activities are aligned with government plans and strategies. This argument is 
supported by institutional theory (coercive isomorphism). Regarding donations to 
authorised charities, the amount donated to charities by companies is deducted from 
the amount of zakat and the income tax that the company should pay to the Authority 
of Zakat and Taxation from their profits. The disclosure of community contributions 
has a positive effect on a company’s reputation and image and leads to a competitive 
advantage for the company. This argument is supported by institutional theory 
(mimetic isomorphism).     
Together with the institutional pressure posed by regulations, competitors, 
international standards and the status of Saudi Arabia as a traditional Islamic country, 
these results indicate a significant increase in the level of CSED in Saudi Arabia. 
International pressure is represented by international standards and regulations that 
companies are required to apply in some cases. This could explain the low mean of the 
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level of CSED (7 information items).  Companies are aware of the importance of 
CSED; but they choose to disclose a low number of items. This could be due to the 
absence of regulations and codes application which help to shape CSED practice in 
Saudi Arabia. While this chapter investigated the extent and nature of CSED in Saudi 
Arabia, the next chapter, Chapter Chapter 6:, will empirically examine the 
determinants of CSED by Saudi-listed companies.   
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Chapter 6: Empirical analysis of the 
determinants of the level of CSED 
6.1  Introduction  
While Chapter Five focused on the detailed descriptive analysis of the CSED 
categories reported by Saudi-listed firms and addressed the first research question, 
what is the extent and nature of CSED by Saudi-listed companies?, this chapter 
projects a descriptive statistical summary of CSED and examined the determinants of 
CSED, which are used in the CSED models presented in this chapter and the following 
one. The results that have been obtained by estimating the multivariate regression 
model are presented and discussed in relation to the literature.  
The chapter addresses research question two, which investigates the determinants of 
CSED by Saudi Arabian-listed companies. This is as follows: RQ2: what are the 
determinants of the level of CSED reported by Saudi-listed companies? There are also 
two supporting questions: RQ2.a: Do corporate characteristics of Saudi Arabian-
listed companies affect their level of the CSED? and RQ2.b: Do the corporate 
governance mechanisms of Saudi Arabian listed companies affect their level of the 
CSED? To achieve the aim of the chapter, the relationship between the firm 
characteristics, corporate governance mechanism and CSED will be investigated 
using multivariate regression analysis.   
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 presents the descriptive statistics of 
CSED as a dependent variable, followed by section 6.3, the descriptive statistics of 
CSED based on the firm characteristics. Section 6.4 gives the descriptive statistics of 
CSED based on corporate governance mechanism, while section 6.5 shows the data 
preparation process that is followed before applying the statistical test. Section 6.6 
illustrates both the multivariate regression and the OLS assumptions, followed by 
section 6.7, which reports the findings of the multivariate regression analysis of the 
empirical model. Finally, Section 6.8 presents the summary and conclusion of the 
chapter. 
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6.2 Descriptive statistics of CSED 
As discussed in Chapter Four, CSED is the dependent variable that is measured by 
using the CSED index. This is done by allocating 1 for each disclosed item in the 
annual report and 0 otherwise. The level of disclosure per company and per category 
is measured by the total number of items disclosed. Table 6.1 represents the 
descriptive statistics for CSED and the firm characteristics. The table shows that the 
mean of CSED is 7.61, indicating that each company reported a minimum of 0 items 
and maximum of 66 on average. Although more than 70% of the sampled companies 
disclosed social and environmental disclosure, the mean of the CSED index is 
relatively lower than the average (37 items). This result indicates that companies have 
intended to disclose social and environmental activities, even if this has been at a basic 
level. This intention could be because of one of the following reasons, which are 
supported by legitimacy stakeholder and institutional theory. 
Companies disclose, even if it is just the minimum, in an attempt to appear socially 
responsible in order to gain or maintain legitimacy. This argument has been supported 
by legitimacy theory (Lindblom, 1993). Furthermore, they are satisfying stakeholders 
by assessing their needs and responding to them, as suggested by stakeholder theory 
(Gray et al., 1996c), and they are responding to governmental rules and regulation, or 
wish to gain a competitive over competitors, as discussed by institutional theory 
(Campbell, 2007). However, the mean of the items disclosed by the Saudi-listed 
companies is considered to be low and this could be because of the voluntary nature 
of the social and environmental disclosure. Therefore, companies will disclose 
because of one of the reasons mentioned previously in this section, but it is a low level 
of disclosure to a certain extent. 
This low level could be because of the voluntary nature of CSED, as there is nothing 
that enforces or guides companies to disclose social and environmental information. 
The result of this analysis is consistent with the previous studies conducted in Saudi 
Arabia. Alsaeed (2006) found the mean of the disclosure index of Saudi companies 
was also lower than the average, and argues that the low mean of disclosure could be 
a result of the inadequacy of the government’s enforcing of the regulation about 
engaging in corporate social and environmental activities and disclosure, as well as 
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the cost of performing social and environmental activities. The average of the 
disclosure in this study is around 21%, which is slightly higher than in previous 
studies, such as those by Macarulla and Talalweh (2012) (16%) conducted in 2008 
and Al-Janadi et al. (2013) (14.61%) conducted in 2006 and 2007. It is also slightly 
lower than Habbash (2015) which is (24%).  
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics of CSED and firm characteristics 
 N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Kurtosis Skewness 
CSED 157 7.61 0.00 66.00 9.30 10.41 2.56 
Lg Firm 
Size  123 21.37 17.55 26.53 1.91 .053 .66 
Firm age 157 21.9 1 60 15.20 -.56 .55 
Return 
on assets 157 5.46 -31.49 46.38 9.00 4.57 0.79 
Leverage 157 0.40 0.00 1.10 0.27 -0.88 0.38 
This table presents the descriptive analysis of CSED and the explanatory variables (firm 
characteristics) 
In order to proceed with the descriptive analysis, the sampled firms will be grouped 
in the following section. The grouping of these companies is based on their level of 
disclosure and will assist in showing clearer results. 
6.2.1  Companies grouping based on CSED level 
Three groups have been formed. The first consists of the companies that did not report 
any social or environmental information. The second has the companies reporting 
between one and nine items of social and environmental information, and the third 
contains companies that reported ten or more items of social and environmental 
information. The forming of the groups is based on the quartile statistical method, 
which was also used by (Curwin and Slater, 2007). The results show that the second 
group, which reported between one and nine items, has the highest percentage of 
companies, which is 48.7%, whereas the companies that reported ten or more items 
have a lower percentage of 29.5%. While the companies that did not report any social 
and environmental information represented around 21.8% of the total. The above 
statistics are reported in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1 below. 
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Table 6.2: Grouping companies according to the level of reporting 
 Number of firms Percentage % 
Not reporting 34 21.79 
1-9  76 48.72 
10+ 46 29.49 
Total   100.0% 
The results in the table above indicate that 78% of the Saudi listed companies are reporting CSED information in 
their annual reports with the majority reporting 1-9 items.  
  
 
Figure 6.1: Grouping companies according to the level of CSED 
6.3 Descriptive statistics of CSED based on firm 
characteristics independent variables:  
This section presents the descriptive statistics of the variables that will be used in the 
regression analysis, which are the firm characteristics as independent variables. 
Furthermore, it presents the analysis of the level of CSED based on the firm 
characteristics and seeks to investigate potential factors among the sampled firms that 
are correlated with CSED. Moreover, it seeks to answer the supporting research 
question A: Do the corporate characteristics of Saudi-listed companies affect their 
level of CSED? In order to investigate this supporting research question, this chapter 
will investigate the correlation between CSED and the firm characteristics in order to 
shed light on the possible impact that some of the corporate characteristics may have 
on the extent to which companies report on social and environmental information.  
21.79%
48.72%
29.49%
CSED groups
Not reporting
1-9 items
10+ items
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6.3.1 Firm size 
Firm size is one of the most studied firm characteristics related to CSED. In this study, 
it is measured by using the company’s total assets. In order to get better results, the 
natural logarithm of the total assets has been used as a measurement of firm size 
(Alsaeed, 2006). The descriptive statistics in Table 6.1 shows that the mean of firm 
size is 21.37 with a minimum of 17.55 and a maximum of 26.53 and the standard 
deviation is 1.91. This sub-section presents the descriptive statistical analysis of firm 
size, in addition to analysing CSED based on firm size to test hypothesis, H1.  
The first step taken to test this hypothesis is the analysis of variances (ANOVA), 
which has been conducted to compare the firm size of firms that have been grouped, 
based on their level of CSED (Table 6.3)  
Table 6.3: Firm size, firm age, return on assets and leverage mean for firms grouped, based 
on their level of CSED 
 
CSED groups 
Not reporting 1-9 items 10+ items 
Mean 
Coefficient 
of 
Variation 
(CV) 
Mean 
Coefficient 
of Variation 
(CV) 
Mean 
Coefficient 
of Variation 
(CV) 
Lg Firm size 20.46a 0.08 21.13a 0.08 22.46b 0.09 
Firm Age 20.46 0.68 17.38 0.82 26.86 0.63 
Return on 
assets 1.79
a,b 3.11 5.35a 1.75 8.44b 1.13 
Leverage 0.35a 0.74 0.38a 0.71 0.46b 0.56 
Notes: a denotes a significantly different firm size than b (P <0.001, one-way ANOVA). 
a denotes a significantly different return on assets than b while a, b is not significantly different to a or b (P <0.05, 
one-way ANOVA). 
a denotes a significantly different leverage than b (P <0.001, one-way ANOVA). 
The results in Table 6.3 show the firm size of companies that report more than 10 
social and environmental items is significantly larger than non-reporting companies 
or those reporting less than 10 items (p = 0.001, Table 6.3). Therefore, it could be 
argued that larger companies are reporting more social and environmental information 
than smaller firms. This result provides sufficient evidence to support H1, Spearman’s 
correlation coefficient is another test that has been employed to investigate the 
correlation between firm size and CSED (as shown in Table 6.4). The results show 
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that there is a statistically significant correlation relationship at the (0.01) level 
between firm size, and social and environmental disclosure. 
Table 6.4: Correlations between firm size, firm age, profitability (ROA) and leverage and 
social and environmental disclosure. 
 Correlation coefficient P-value 
Lg Firm size .642*** <0.001 
Firm Age .738*** <0.001 
Return on assets (ROA) .691*** <0.001 
Leverage .357*** <0.001 
*** Denotes a significant correlation of P < 0.01 (Spearman’s correlation) between the level of CSED and the 
explanatory variables in the table.  
The overall positive correlation, between firm size and CSED has been supported by 
the findings of the previous studies presented under stakeholder theory, legitimacy 
theory and institutional theory, as discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.7.1. These argue 
that larger firms are expected to report more social and environmental information to 
satisfy their stakeholder groups, as larger firms’ stakeholders have greater 
expectations than smaller firms. Larger firms also tend to report more social and 
environmental information to maintain their legitimacy and good reputation (Alsaeed, 
2006), and they pay attention to concerns such as governmental attention, as well as 
media and public groups (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Disclosing social and 
environmental information in order to gain a competitive advantage is another reason 
that motivates larger companies, as they generally lead smaller firms, as institutional 
theory suggests. The results correspond with the literature review, which proves that 
firm size is one of the characteristics that influence firms’ social and environmental 
activities and disclosure (Alsaeed, 2006; Bayoud et al., 2012; Gray et al., 2001; 
Hackston and Milne, 1996; Huang and Kung, 2010; Menassa, 2010; Wallace and 
Naser, 1996).  
6.3.2 Firm age 
Previous studies have revealed that firm age is a significant determinant of the level 
of CSED (for example, see: (Bayoud et al., 2012; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002). A 
number of the studies have used company age as one of the most important factors 
that can affect the level of disclosure, in particular CSED (Liu and Anbumozhi, 2009; 
Rettab et al., 2009). This is based on the argument that the legitimacy of old firms has 
been built up during the years of operation, which has been addressed by stakeholder, 
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legitimacy and institutional theory. H2 will examine and investigate whether older 
firms disclose more social and environmental information. The natural logarithm of 
firm age is the measure of firm age.   
The average of the companies’ age, as shown in Table 6.1, is 21 years with a minimum 
value of 1 year and a maximum of 60 years. Moreover, ANOVA has been conducted 
to compare firm size between the firms that have been grouped, based on the level of 
reporting (as shown in Table 6.3). The results show no association between firm age 
and the level of disclosure. Using Spearman’s Rank correlation coefficient (as shown 
in Table 6.4), the results indicate there is a statistically significant correlation 
relationship between firm age and social and environmental disclosure (p≤0-01). 
Therefore, this provides evidence that supports H2. The results of previous studies 
have been inconclusive, and the results of this analysis are consistent with previous 
studies (for example see: Habbash, 2015; Muttakin and Khan, 2014; Rettab et al., 
2009).  
6.3.3 Firm profitability (ROA) 
The third firm characteristic to be investigated in this study that relates to the level of 
CSED is firm profitability. The management of more profitable companies tend to 
disclose more social and environmental information in order to convince shareholders 
of their ability to maximise shareholders’ value, so as to increase their compensation 
(Alsaeed, 2006; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Muttakin and Khan, 2014) and present 
the company’s achievements to other stakeholders. The association that exists 
between firm profitability, which is measured by the return on assets, and the level of 
CSED will be investigated by testing H3.  
Table 6.1 presents the mean of the return on assets, which is 5.46, the minimum value,  
-31.49, and the maximum, 46.38. ANOVA technique has been conducted to compare 
the firm profitability (ROA) between firms that have been grouped, based on their 
level of CSED (Table 6.3). The return on assets for companies reporting more than 10 
social and environmental items is significantly larger than firms reporting less than 10 
items (p <0.05, Table 6.3). Therefore, it could be argued that firms with higher profits 
are reporting more social and environmental information than those with lower 
profits. To provide more evidence, Spearman’s correlation coefficient has been 
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analysed (as shown in Table 6.4). The results show that there is a statistically 
significant correlation relationship at the (0.01) level between firm profitability and 
social and environmental disclosure. 
This result supports H3 and has been explained by stakeholder theory, legitimacy 
theory and agency theory, as firms with high profitability have a greater intention to 
present their achievement to stakeholders and the public, as well as promote a positive 
impression that maintains their legitimacy and good reputation (Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2008; Reverte, 2009). Furthermore, managers of companies with a high 
profitability tend to disclose more information, including social and environmental to 
present their achievement, which reflects on their reputation in contrast to companies 
with lower profitability (Gallego-A lvarez and Quina-Custodio, 2016). The result of 
this analysis is consistent with (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Gray et al., 2001; 
Hackston and Milne, 1996; Kansal et al., 2014; Muttakin and Khan, 2014), as the 
results of their studies showed a positive correlation between firm profitability and 
CSED. 
6.3.4 Firm leverage 
Firm leverage is another factor related to CSED that has been investigated by previous 
studies. Firms with either higher leverage or debt tend to disclose more social and 
environmental information than those with lower leverage. This could be to satisfy 
stakeholders, including creditors, investors and shareholders and provide the 
information they require (Alsaeed, 2006). H4 will be tested to investigate the 
suggested positive association between firm leverage, measured by total liabilities to 
total assets ratio, and CSED. 
Before investigating the association between firm leverage and CSED, descriptive 
statistics are presented, as shown in Table 6.1. The mean of leverage is 0.40 and the 
standard deviation 0.27 with a minimum value of 0.00 and maximum of 1.10. To 
investigate the association between firm leverage and the level of CSED, ANOVA 
has been conducted to compare firm leverage between firms that have been grouped, 
based on their level of reporting (Table 6.3). The leverage for firms reporting more 
than 10 social and environmental items is significantly larger than non-reporting or 
firms that report less than 10 items (p < 0.01, Table 6.3). Spearman’s correlation 
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coefficient (as shown in Table 6.4) is another technique used to investigate the 
association between firm leverage and CSED, and the results show there is a 
statistically significant correlation relationship at the (0.01) level between firm 
leverage and social and environmental disclosure. 
Therefore, it could be argued that companies with higher leverage are reporting more 
social and environmental information than those with lower leverage. This result 
provides sufficient evidence to support H4, this hypothesis has been supported by all 
the stakeholders, legitimacy, institutional and agency theories, as companies aim to 
prove they are legitimacy to operate by providing more social and environmental 
information, although they have high leverage. Furthermore, managers tend to report 
more social and environmental information to lower agency costs that have increased 
as a result of the high level of leverage (Alsaeed, 2006; Gallego-A lvarez and Quina-
Custodio, 2016). In addition, satisfying stakeholders, including creditors, is a 
company concern, especially for those with a higher level of leverage. Therefore, 
companies disclose more social and environmental information, as explained by 
stakeholder theory.  
This result, which shows a positive association between firm leverage and CSED, is 
consistent with Esa and Ghazali (2012) Malone et al. (1993), Branco and Rodrigues 
(2008), Said et al. (2009), Habbash (2015), who found that a firm’s leverage positively 
affects the level of disclosure. 
6.4 Descriptive statistics of the CSED based on corporate 
governance mechanisms   
This section presents a descriptive analysis of corporate governance factors, such as 
independent variables, in addition to investigating the association between these 
factors, ownership structure, board size, board independency, audit firm size and CEO 
duality, as well as the level of CSED. Each of the corporate governance factors will 
be addressed in the sub-section. 
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6.4.1 Firm ownership  
The level of CSED is more likely to vary amongst different ownership structures. As 
highlighted in the literature, ownership structure is one of the significant factors that 
affects the level of CSED (Albassam, 2014; Konijn et al., 2011). This study has 
focused on types of ownership in governance structures, including managerial, 
governmental and foreign ownership and examined them with regards to their effect 
on the level of CSED. 
Government ownership 
The corporate level of social and environmental disclosure, which is based on 
institutional theory, is affected by different aspects, such as governmental laws, rules 
and regulations (Li and Zhang, 2010). As a result, government ownership demands 
more accountability and transparency, which means there is more reporting, including 
social and environmental reporting.  H5 is to be tested in this sub-section to investigate 
the relationship between governmental ownership and CSED.  
Table 6.5: Descriptive statistics of corporate governance mechanisms 
 N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Kurtosis Skewness 
Managers’ 
Ownership 
(%) 
157 6.96 0.00 60.30 11.86 7.09 2.59 
Government 
Ownership 
(%) 
157 8.33 0.00 83.60 17.30 5.96 2.51 
Foreign 
Investors’ 
Ownership 
(%) 
157 5.26 0.00 67.00 12.76 5.70 2.50 
Board Size 157 8.36 5.00 12.00 1.52 -0.46 0.01 
Independent 157 47.60 0.00 100.00 19.22 .508 1.17 
This table presents the descriptive analysis of explanatory variables (corporate governance 
mechanisms). 
The mean of the governmental ownership factor is 8.33, with a minimum of 0.00 and 
maximum of 83.60 (as shown in table 6.5). The analysis of variances (one-way 
ANOVA) is one of the tests that have been conducted to examine the relationship 
between governmental ownership and CSED. The results, as shown in (6.6), indicate 
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that the value of F-statistics is 4.177 (df =2) and is statistically significant at the 0.05 
level in the one-way ANOVA test, which specifies there is a statistically significant 
correlation between the companies’ level of social and environmental disclosure and 
governmental ownership. The mean of firms’ ownership in companies that report 
more than 10 items is statistically different from firms that do not report.  
Table 6.6: Managerial ownership, public ownership, foreign ownership, governmental 
ownership, board size and board independence mean for firm groups, based on level of 
CSED 
 
CSED groups 
Non-reporting Reporting 1-9 items Reporting 10≤ items 
Mean 
Coefficient 
of 
Variation Mean 
Coefficient 
of 
Variation Mean 
Coefficient 
of 
Variation 
Managers’ Ownership 5.20 2.20 5.39 2.26 7.60 1.56 
Public Ownership 62.01 0.34 62.11 0.39 25.93 0.38 
Foreign Investors 
Ownership 7.11
a 1.82 5.43a,b 2.28 1.98b 3.97 
Government Ownership 6.69a,b 2.14 5.47a 2.23 14.76b 1.72 
Board Size 8 1 8 2 9 1 
Independent 49.99 23.82 47.09 17.88 46.37 17.12 
Notes: a denotes a significantly different foreign ownership than b while a, b are not significantly different to a or 
b (P <0.1, one-way ANOVA). 
a denotes a significantly different government ownership than b while a, b are not significantly different to a or b 
(P <0.05, one-way ANOVA). 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient (as shown in Table 6.7) has been conducted to 
investigate the type of correlation there is between governmental ownership and 
CSED. The results show there is a statistically significant positive correlation 
(P<0.01). This result shows that companies are more likely to disclose more items 
when the government owns shares in Saudi-listed companies. This finding is in line 
with Hannifa and Cooke (2005).   
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Table 6.7: Correlations between ownership structure and the level of social and 
environmental disclosure 
 Correlation coefficient P-value 
Managerial ownership                      0.418*** 0.001 
Governmental ownership 
Foreign companies ownership 
                     0.467*** 
                     0.358***  
0.001 
0.001 
*** Correlation is significant at the (0.001) level (Spearman’s correlation).  
Managerial ownership  
As discussed in Chapter Three, the existing literature suggests there are no conclusive 
results regarding the association between managerial ownership and CSED. Studies 
suggest that companies that have a high concentration of managerial ownership tend 
to disclose less social and environmental information than companies with lower 
managerial ownership. This is because managers pay less attention to public 
accountability and other stakeholders (Chau and Gray, 2010; Eng and Mak, 2003; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006). In contrast, studies which argue that the external pressure 
that companies nowadays face from stakeholders to maintain their legitimacy should 
not be ignored (Belal and Owen, 2007; Islam and Deegan, 2008). This argument has 
been explained by the stakeholder, legitimacy and institutional theories, as managers 
need to respond to stakeholder demand and report social and environmental 
information. This is in addition to the governmental and global standards and 
regulations of accounting and reporting that managers should pay attention to. 
Therefore, H6 is to be tested to investigate the expected positive correlation between 
managerial ownership and CSED. 
Before examining the association between managerial ownership and CSED, a 
descriptive analysis of managerial ownership is presented, as shown in Table 6.5. The 
mean of the managerial ownership is 6.96, with a minimum of 0, a maximum of 60.30 
and a standard deviation of 11.86.  
To examine and test the hypothesis, a one-way ANOVA) was conducted and the 
results are presented, as shown in Table 6.6. The value of F-statistics is 0.770 (df =2) 
and is statistically insignificant in the one-way ANOVA test, which indicates that 
managerial ownership and CSED are not correlated.  
Following another technique, which examined the correlation between managerial 
ownership and CSED, Spearman’s correlation coefficient was used (as shown in 
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Table 6.7). The results show there is a statistically significant correlation between 
managerial ownership and social and environmental disclosure. 
The results of the two tests are not consistent; therefore, regression analysis will be 
used (in section 6.6) before an overall conclusion is reached. 
Foreign ownership  
According to Khan et al., (2013), companies with foreign ownership are expected to 
have a higher level of corporate social and environmental disclosure. Based on 
legitimacy theory, companies prioritise to prove their legitimacy to foreign investors 
and sustain the investment. Disclosing more social and environmental information is 
one way that companies use to prove their legitimacy. Another reason is that 
companies with foreign ownership are inspired by investors that enhance CSED more 
(Schipper, 1981). As a result, H7 suggests a positive association between foreign 
ownership and CSED.  
The descriptive statistics of foreign ownership is presented in Table 6.5 as the 
following: the mean is 5.26 with a minimum of 0 and maximum of 67.00. 
Furthermore, a one-way ANOVA has been conducted to examine the relationship 
between foreign ownership and CSED. As shown in Table 6.6, the value of F-statistics 
is 2.712 (df =2) and statistically significant at the 0.01 level in the one-way ANOVA 
test, which indicates there are statistically significant variations between a company’s 
level of social and environmental disclosure, based on foreign ownership. The mean 
of the foreign ownership in companies that report more than 10 items is statistically 
different from firms that are not reporting (Table 6.6). To investigate the type of 
correlation between foreign ownership and CSED, Spearman’s correlation coefficient 
(as shown in Table 6.7) has been conducted. The results show that there is a 
statistically significant positive correlation (P<0.01). This result is consistent with 
Khan et al. (2012).  
6.4.2 Board size and the proportion of independent members of the 
board of directors 
The board of directors and the existence of independent directors on the board are 
vital corporate governance factors, as they control the managers’ actions toward the 
strategies and plans of the company (Said et al., 2009). In addition, these factors place 
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pressure on the management to successfully operate and pay attention to stakeholders’ 
needs, based on stakeholder theory, as they need to be socially responsible and 
disclose in order to satisfy stakeholders. Therefore, a positive association between the 
size of the board of directors and CSED is suggested, as well as a positive association 
between an increase in the members of an independent board of directors and CSED. 
Two hypotheses H8 and H9 will be tested in this sub-section to investigate the 
associations between board size, independent board members and CSED. 
The descriptive analysis in Table 6.5 presents the mean of the board of directors’ size, 
which is 8.36, with a minimum of 5.00 and a maximum of 12.00. The descriptive 
analysis of the independent members of the board of directors, as shown in Table 6.5, 
shows that the mean of the proportion of the independent members of the board of 
directors is 47.60, with a minimum of 0.00 and maximum of 100.00.   
A one-way ANOVA has been conducted to test the above hypotheses. This examines 
the relationship between the size of the board of directors, the proportion of 
independent members of the board and CSED. The results indicate there is no 
association between board size and CSED, as the value of the F-statistics is .895 (df 
=2) and is statistically insignificant in the one-way ANOVA test. The results for the 
proportion of independent members of the board show there is no association between 
the proportion of independent members of the board and CSED, as the value of F-
statistics is .401 (df =2) and it is statistically insignificant in the one-way ANOVA 
test. Moreover, when comparing the means, as shown in Table 6.6, it can be argued 
that there are no differences between the size of the board based on the reporting 
groups. This result also applies to the proportion of independent members of the board 
of directors.  
Spearman’s correlation coefficient (as shown in Table 6.8) has been conducted to 
investigate the type of correlation that exists between board size, the proportion of 
independent members of the board and CSED. It can be noted from the results that 
there is a statistically positive correlation between board size, board independence and 
the level of corporate social environmental disclosure (which is significant at 0.01 
level).   
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Table 6.8: Correlations between board size, board independence and social and 
environmental disclosure 
 Correlation coefficient P-value 
Lg Board size .440*** .001 
Independent members .429*** .001 
 ***Correlation is significant at the (0.01) level. 
Therefore, this result indicates that companies with a larger board size are more likely 
to disclose more social and environmental disclosure, as well as board independence. 
Said et al 2009 also found the board of directors, the size, and board independence are 
all significant factors in explaining the variation and level of CSD.  
6.4.3 CEO duality 
CEO duality occurs when the CEO is the Chairman. It is argued that CEO duality 
reduces the companies’ accountability and transparency, as joining the role of the 
CEO and the chairman affects the control system, presents a conflict of interest and, 
thus, reduces the level of accountability (Michelon and Parbonetti, 2014). Stakeholder 
theory and legitimacy theory both explain the negative association that exists between 
CEO duality and CSED, due to CEO duality reducing companies’ accountability and 
transparency of companies. Therefore, their ability to meet stakeholders’ needs is 
reduced, which means they lose their legitimacy. As a result, a negative association is 
assumed between CEO duality and the level of CSED to be tested in H10. 
Table 6.9 shows that the majority CEO of Saudi-listed companies have a single role 
(146 companies). This could be the resulted of corporate governance regulations in 
SCGC (article 12d)31.  
  
                                                 
31 Article 12d in the SCGC states that conjoining the position of the Chairman of the Board of Directors with any 
other executive position in the company, such as the CEO, managing director or general manager, is prohibited.  
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Table 6.9: Level of CSED in firms with CEO duality and non-duality 
 N Mean Stdv. 
CEO duality  11 6.91 7.854 
Non-duality  146 7.66 9.416 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the explanatory factor (CEO). It presents the 
number of companies where the CEO has a dual role and companies where the CEO has a single 
role.   
CEO duality is a dummy variable with 1 if the CEO has a dual role and 0 otherwise. 
One-way ANOVA has been conducted in this case to test the above hypothesis. No 
relation has been found between CEO duality and CSED. The value of F-statistics is 
.83 (df =1) and is statistically insignificant in the one-way ANOVA test. This result 
is consistent with Ho and Wong (2001); Cheng and Courtenay (2006); Khan et al. 
2012; Habbash 2015, who found no association between CEO duality and voluntary 
disclosure. 
6.4.4 Audit firm size  
Audit firms are divided into two groups: large (big 4) and small (not big 4). Large 
audit firms are more concerned about their reputation and are, therefore, more willing 
to associate with firms that disclose more information in their published financial 
report (Alsaeed, 2006; Depoers, 2000). Large audit firms (big 4) take their legitimacy 
into account and, therefore, request more information reporting, including CSED. 
This argument is explained by legitimacy theory. The figure below (figure 6.2) shows 
that the majority of the Saudi-listed companies use one of the big 4 auditing companies 
to audit their reports (75.80%). H11 will be tested in order to investigate the 
association between audit firm size and CSED. 
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Figure 6.2: The descriptive analysis of Audit Firm Size. 
To test the above hypothesis, a T-test was conducted to examine whether there was a 
significant difference or not. Audit firm size was treated as a dummy variable 1 if the 
audit firm was one of the big 4 and 0 otherwise. The results are presented in Table 
6.10 
Table 6.10: Level of CSED in large and small audit firms 
 N Percentage  Mean Stdv. 
Big 4 119 75.80 8.30 10.078 
Not big 4 38 24.20 5.45 5.834 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the explanatory factor 
(audit firm size), whether the audit firm is one of the big four auditing 
companies or not.  
The results showed there is a statistically significant difference between the 
companies employing one of the big four audit firms and other companies that employ 
audit firms not from the big four. The value of the F-statistics is 2.77 (df =1) and is 
statistically insignificant. This result is in line with Al Bassam (2014) who found a 
positive relationship between the size of the audit firm and voluntary disclosure. 
After presenting the descriptive statistics of CSED and explanatory variables (firm 
characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms) and testing the correlation 
Companies audited by 
one of the big 4 (75. 
8%) 
Audit firm not one of 
the big-4 audit firms 
(24.20). 
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between CSED and the variable, the next section will present the multiple regression 
analysis.  
6.5 Multiple linear regression 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the statistical method or technique that is used to 
investigate the CSED determinant in this study is multiple linear regression, a classical 
linear regression that is consistent with previous studies (Alsaeed, 2006; Hackston and 
Milne, 1996). The next sub-section will present the process of multiple linear 
regressions. 
6.5.1 Data preparation and OLS assumptions 
This section presents the stages, prior to regression, that the data went through to 
achieve the best results. The first stage is to prepare the data for analysis. The data 
was collected in the following two ways: the CSED and corporate governance 
information was obtained manually from the companies’ reports and the Tadawul 
website32 and the Bloomberg database (Giannarakis et al., 2014) was used to collect 
financial data, such as total assets, ROA and leverage. An index was constructed to 
collect the CSED information for each company. The collected data from different 
sources was then gathered and defined in SPSS 21 to start the required analysis. The 
second stage in the data preparation was screening for missing data, which was carried 
out before performing the regression. Some of the data collected through the 
Bloomberg database was found to be missing, which resulted in a reduction in the 
sample size. The missing data, such as the debt ratio, ROA and leverage, was collected 
manually from the companies’ financial reports, with the aim of reducing the missing 
data as much as possible to get the best possible results.  
To develop the “best” model, so that all the estimated coefficients have the “right” 
signs (Gujarati, 2003, p.516), several assumptions were tested in relation to normality, 
multicollinearity, homoscedasticity, autocorrelation and linearity. The following sub-
sections cover the test for each of the assumptions. 
                                                 
32 Tadawul website: the official website of the Saudi Stock Exchange. 
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Assessing normality and linearity  
Normality can be defined as the extent to which the distribution of the sample data 
corresponds to a normal distribution (Hair et al., 1998). Normality can be examined 
by statistical or graphical methods. Skewness and kurtosis describe the normality of 
the data that is used in this study to assess for normality, as well as the histogram 
graphs. A perfect normality in the data distribution occurs when the kurtosis is equal 
to zero (Pallant, 2005), which is rarely achieved in the context of the social sciences 
(West et al., 1995). However, a skewness value of between -1.0 and +1.0 is not 
considered to be too extreme (Huck, 2004). It is argued that variables with absolute 
values of the skew index that are bigger than 3 can be described as “extremely” 
skewed, and the absolute values of the kurtosis index between about 8.0 to over 20.0 
are indicated as being “extreme” kurtosis (West et al., 1995, Kline, 2005). In this 
study, the normality assumption of continued variable has been tested by examining 
the distribution of the variables, whether they are normal or not (Cooke, 1998; Black, 
2001). This was done by using skewness, kurtosis, probability-probability (P-P) and 
histograms (Ntim et al., 2012). Following the past studies that have been carried out, 
such as (Ntim and Soobaroyen 2013, Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ramly, 2012), 
CSED, firm size, firm age and board size are normalised by taking the natural 
logarithm (LogCSRD, LogFS, LogFA, LogBS). Transforming the variables 
moderates the problem of non-normality and the linearity. Thus, two of the OLS 
assumptions are fulfilled in addition to checking the homogeneity and outliers 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ntim et al., 2012; Ramly, 2012). 
The other variables showed mixed results. ROA, leverage and the percentage of 
independent members of the board of directors were distributed fairly normally, while 
ownership variables suffered from the slightly non-normal distribution. However, 
Brooks (2008, p.164) recommends that “for sample sizes that are sufficiently large, 
violation of the normality assumption is virtually inconsequential”. Therefore, this 
study depends on a large sample (of 157 companies) that can alleviate the negative 
impact of the existing non-normality of some of the variables. The descriptive 
statistics of the variables are shown in Table 6.11 below.   
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Table 6.11: Table Descriptive statistics of the variables (normality test) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness33 Kurtosisb34 
Log CSRD 123 .00 1.82 .80 .43 -.29 -.52 
Log FS 157 7.62 11.52 9.29 .84 .67 .03 
Log FA 157 -.30 1.78 1.18 .43 -.66 -.44 
Log BS 157 .70 1.08 .915 .08 -.46 -.06 
ROA 157 -31.49 46.38 5.42 8.97 .80 4.61 
Leverage 157 .00 1.10 .40 .267 .38 -.88 
Man Own 157 .00 60.30 5.96 11.86 2.59 7.09 
For In Own 157 .00 67.00 5.26 12.76 2.50 5.70 
Gov Own 157 .00 83.60 8.33 17.296 2.51 5.96 
Ind 157 .00 100.00 47.60 19.22 .51 1.16 
CEO Dual 157 0 1 .07 .26   
Audit FS 157 0 1 .76 .43   
Notes: The variables of the corporate social and environmental disclosure are defined, as follows: the dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of the corporate social and environmental disclosure (lgCSED), the natural 
logarithm of firm size (lgFS), return on assets (ROA), leverage, managers ownership (ManOwn), foreign 
investment ownership (ForInOwn), government ownership (GovOwn), the natural logarithm of the board size 
(lgBS), the percentage of independence members of the board of directors (Ind), CEO duality (CEO Dual), audit 
firm size (AuditFS). Chapter Four presents the detailed definitions of the variables employed.  
Assessing Autocorrelation 
The existence of autocorrelation is another problem that could affect the results of the 
OLS regression. The Durbin-Watson (DW) is utilised to test the independent errors 
(autocorrelation) at a level of significance of 0.05 (Bayoud et al., 2012, Kajananthan, 
2012, Ntim et al., 2012). The result of the Durbin-Watson d value can range from 0 - 
4. If the d value of the Durbin-Watson equals 2, this leads to the independent error. 
For accuracy, the Durbin-Watson d value that is greater than 3 or less than 1 is a reason 
for concern (Field, 2009) and, according to Gujarati (2003), if the Durbin-Watson 
value is equal or close to 2, then there is no autocorrelation problem. The Durbin-
Watson d value for this data is 1.916, as shown in Table 6.11, which is not greater 
than 3 or less than 1. Therefore, there does not seem to be an autocorrelation problem 
in our data sample.   
Assessing multicollinearity  
Below is the correlation between all the variables to determine the possible 
multicollinearity among the variables. Multicollinearity occurs if the correlation 
                                                 
33 Skewness is used to test the variables’ normality. (It should be between 1 and -1 to be normally 
distributed; if it is more than 3, then it is extremely skewed.) 
34 Kurtosis is used to test the variables’ normality. (It should be less than 8; if it is between 8 and 20, 
then there is extreme kurtosis.) 
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coefficient between two continuous independent variables is large. Moreover, it 
becomes serious if it exceeds 0.800 (Bryman and Cramer, 2001; Guajarati, 2003). The 
correlation matrix for the dependent and independent variables in the corporate social 
and environmental disclosure models in Table 6.12 illustrates the Pearson correlation 
coefficient (parametric) and Spearman correlation coefficients (non-parametric), 
following Ntim et al. (2012) and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013). Both the correlation 
coefficients (parametric and non-parametric) appear to give moderately similar 
results, which enhances evidence that there is no major problem of non-normality 
amongst the variables in the model (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). The results show a 
significant positive correlation between six independent variables, which are firm 
size, firm age, ROA, leverage, governmental ownership and audit firm size, as shown 
in Table 6.12 with CSED at 0.64, 0.74, 0.69, 0.36, 0.47 and 0.21 respectively. 
However, the matrix indicates there is no multicollinearity problem, as the correlation 
confidant between the independent variables is fairly low. The highest correlation 
coefficient is between the firm age and ROA at (.607). This correlation coefficient is 
not considered high enough to cause serious multicollinearity. In addition to the 
correlation matrix, both the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance have been 
done to assess multicollinearity. According to Kennedy (1992) and Lardaro (1993), 
multicollinearity level is accepted if the VIF is less than 3, while it considers there to 
be a serious problem if the VIF exceeds 10. The results of the collinearity statistics, 
as presented in Table 6.13, have proved there is no multicollinearity problem, since 
VIF in the multivariate regression falls between the minimum (1.04) and maximum 
(2.044), which is less than 3. Regarding the tolerance statistics test, it can be seen that 
the variables’ value is between a minimum of (.49) and maximum of (.96). As a result, 
all the multicollinearity tests indicate that there is no serious problem in the 
multicollinearity interpreting the results of the OLS regressions. 
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Table 6.12: Correlation matrix 
 Log CSRD Log FS Log FA Log BS ROA Leverage Man Own For Invest Own Gov Own Ind CEO Dual Audit FS 
Log CSRD 1 .642*** .738*** .418*** .691*** .357*** .418*** .358*** .467*** .288*** -.039 .208** 
Log FS .642*** 1 .492*** .282*** .516*** .396*** .317*** .290*** .252*** .333*** -.005 .074 
Log FA .629*** .492*** 1 .274*** .607*** .204** .353*** .198** .365*** .290*** .015 .057 
Log BS .346*** .282*** .226*** 1 .329*** .144* .171** .189** .147* .040 -.026 .000 
ROA .598*** .516*** .444*** .286*** 1 .015 .333*** .306*** .369*** .279*** -.002 .072 
Leverage .378*** .396*** .220*** .158** .056 1 .141** .072 .082 .062 .002 .144 
Man Own .326*** .317*** .241*** .177** .260*** .161** 1 .071 .157* .126 -.069 .046 
For In Own .375*** .290*** .200** .175** .372*** .154 .049 1 .279*** .076 -.060 .151 
Gov Own .423*** .252*** .249*** .143 .287*** .040 .083 .231*** 1 .149** -.142 .114 
Ind .278*** .333*** .272*** .055 .263*** .084 .080 .054 .159** 1 .095 -.046 
CEO Dual -.038 -.005 .062 -.036 -.026 .022 -.038 -.052 -.120 .128 1 -.020 
Audit FS .205** .074 -.004 -.005 .005 .144 .011 .145 .022 -.042 -.020 1 
Notes: The bottom left half of the table contains Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients, whereas the upper right half of the table shows Spearman’s non-parametric correlation 
coefficients. ***,  ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Variables are defined as follows:  corporate social and environmental disclosure (lg CSED), firm 
size (lg FS), return on assets (ROA), leverage, managers ownership (Man Own), foreign investment ownership (For In Own), government ownership (Gov Own), board of 
directors size (lg BS), independency (Ind), CEO duality (CEO Dual), Audit firm size (Audit FS). Chapter Four presents detailed definitions of the variables employed.  
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Table 6.13: The OLS multiple regression analysis 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -1.24 .42  -2.93 .00   
Log FS .09 .04 .18 2.3 .02** .49 2.04 
Log FA .29 .07 .29 4.26 .00*** .66 1.51 
ROA .01 .00 .24 3.34 .00*** .56 1.77 
Leverage  .21 .10 .13 2.10 .04** .74 1.35 
Man Own .00 .00 .06 1.05 .30 .84 1.19 
Gov Own .00 .00 .15 2.47 .01** .82 1.23 
For in Own .00 .00 .04 .59 .56 .76 1.31 
Log BS .45 .32 .09 1.43 .16 .85 1.17 
Ind .00 .00 .06 1.03 .31 .85 1.17 
CEO Dual -.00 .09 -.00 -.04 .97 .93 1.07 
Audit FS .12 .06 .13 2.26 .03** .96 1.04 
Adjusted R2 0.63 
      
Std Error of the 
Estimate 0.26 
      
Regression-  
F-value 20.04 
      
Regression-
Significance 0.000 
      
Durbin-Watson 
statistics 1.92
a 
      
Brusch-test .10b       
Note: The variables of the corporate social and environmental disclosure are defined as follows: the dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of the corporate social and environmental disclosure (lgCSED), the natural logarithm of firm size 
(lgFS), the natural logarithm of firm age (lgFA) the return on assets (ROA), leverage, managers ownership (ManOwn), 
foreign investment ownership (ForInOwn), government ownership (GovOwn), the natural logarithm of the Board of 
directors size (lgBS), the percentage of independence members of the board of directors (Ind), CEO duality (CEODual), 
audit firm size (AuditFS). Chapter Four presents detailed definitions of the variables employed. 
 a. The Durbin-Watson test is taken to check for autocorrelation (this should be 2 or close to 2). b. If the test is significant, the 
null hypothesis is accepted that there is heteroscedasticity. 
Assessing heteroscedasticity   
Residuals analysis is applied to the results in order to check for a heteroscedasticity problem. 
Noruésis (1995, p. 447) defined residuals as ‘what are left over after the model is fit and they 
are also the difference between the observed value of the dependent variable and the value 
predicted by the regression line’. After calculating the squared residuals, which are regressed 
with the independent variables, the result of the Breusch–Pagan test (as shown in Table 6.13) 
indicates it is an insignificant test for heteroscedasticity, which means rejecting the null 
hypothesis that there is a heteroscedasticity. 
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In this section, several tests have been carried out to assess and check the validity of the OLS 
assumptions in order to ensure that OLS regression is the appropriate technique to examine the 
determinant of corporate social and environmental disclosure in Saudi Arabia. The tests include 
skewness, kurtosis, probability-probability (P-P) and histograms to assess normality, Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF), tolerance statistics to assess multicollinearity, Durbin-Watson to assess 
autocorrelation and Breusch-Pagan to assess heteroscedasticity. Some variables have been 
transformed in order to fulfil the normality and linearity assumptions. The next section will 
discuss the results of the multivariate regression by investigating the determinants of corporate 
social and environmental disclosure.
6.5.2 Multiple regression analysis  
The previous sub-section showed that the data meets the OLS regression assumptions (i.e., it 
does not have any problems, such as normality, linearity, heteroscedasticity, Multicollinearity 
and autocorrelation). Hence, OLS regression will be used to examine the determinants of 
corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSED) in Saudi Arabia, as was discussed in 
Chapter Four. By running this regression, the second research question will be addressed. This 
aims to investigate the determinants of the level of CSED (RQ2: What are the determinants of 
the level of CSED reported by Saudi-listed companies), including the two sub-questions which 
are:  
RQ2.a: Do the firm characteristics of Saudi-listed companies affect the level of CSED?   
RQ2.b: Does the corporate governance mechanism of Saudi-listed companies affect the level 
of CSED?  
Corporate social and environmental disclosure is the dependent variable that is conducted 
through a constructed index, including six main categories (environment, human resources, 
product and consumer, community involvement, economic and general disclosure) in addition 
to the sub-categories.  
The results of the OLS multiple regressions are presented in Table 6.13. The f value is 
significantly different from zero = 20.04, indicating that the model can explain the variation in 
the mean of CSED. In addition, the adjusted R2, as presented in Table 6.13, suggests that the 
model explains 63% of the total variation of CSED amongst the Saudi-listed companies. Based 
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on the results of the regression, six hypotheses are accepted (H1, H2, H3, H4, H6 and H11), 
while five hypotheses were rejected (H5, H7, H8, H9 and H10).  
Firm Characteristics 
The first four hypotheses investigate the effect of firm characteristics on the level of CSED in 
Saudi Arabia. These are as follows:  
Firm Size  
Starting with firm characteristics, the first hypothesis is that there is a positive association 
between firm size and CSED. The results in Table 6.13 show a significant positive correlation 
between firm size and the level of CSED at 5% level (β1=0.18, t-statistics =2.3), which led to 
acceptance of the first hypothesises. This result is consistent with legitimacy theory, as larger 
firms disclose more social and environmental information in order to maintain their legitimacy 
and good reputation (Alsaeed, 2006), as well as stakeholder theory, where the stakeholder 
groups of larger firms have greater expectations that need to be satisfied and create greater 
pressure than the stakeholders of smaller firms do (Roberts 1992, Meek et al., 1995). 
Institutional theory also proposes that government, media and public groups give more 
attention to disclosure by larger firms than they do to disclosure by smaller firms (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). Saudi labour law and regulations stated that companies are required to 
participate in the Saudisation programme that the government implemented in 2011 
(Department of Labour and Employment, Ministry of Labour). Larger firms are expected to 
participate more in this programme as they have more employees, as a result recruiting more 
Saudi employees or replacing foreign employees in occupied jobs. Moreover, larger companies 
are more likely to apply for governmental tenders than smaller firms in order to do this, and 
apply for government projects, as they are requested to submit a Saudisation certificate to show 
their legibility.  
As a result, the level of corporate social responsibility of large firms is expected to be higher 
than the level of smaller firms, thus the level of disclosing social and environmental activities 
or information is higher than smaller firms. Another explanation for the positive correlation 
between firm size and CSED might be the gaining of a competitive advantage over smaller 
firms, which is what institutional theory suggests. The results of previous studies in developed 
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and developing countries, in relation to firm size, are consistent with this study’s results. (For 
example, Ho and Taylor, 2007; Adams et al., 1998; Reverte, 2009; Hackston and Milne, 1996; 
Gray et al., 2001; Gray et al., 2003; Menassa, 2010; Branco and Rodrigues 2008; Muttakin and 
Khan, 2014; Hussainey et al., 2011).  
Alsaeed (2006) and Habbash (2015) also found that firm size is significant in Saudi Arabia and 
explained the variation in the level of CSED. While Said et al. (2009), Kansal et al (2014), 
Abdul Hamid (200) and Gallego-Alvarez and Quina-Custodio (2016) found that firm size is 
not a significant factor that affects the level of CSED.  
Firm age 
The result from the regression also indicates that firm age has a significant positive effect on 
the level of CSED in Saudi Arabia at 1% level of confidence (β2=0.29, t-statistics=4.26), as 
shown in Table 6.13, which directs to an acceptance of the second hypothesis. This result could 
be due to older firms having more experience in dealing with stakeholders’ needs, media and 
government rules and regulation than newly established firms. Moreover, stakeholders of old 
firms have more expectations and older firms disclose more social and environmental 
information to satisfy their stakeholders’ needs, which is what stakeholder theory suggests. Old 
firms have built their legitimacy through their operation years and they are keen to maintain 
this legitimacy and not lose it. Therefore, old firms are expected to disclose more social and 
environmental information, as suggested by legitimacy theory, while newly established firms 
are busy setting up their business. The leadership concept, as proposed by institutional theory, 
is another reason that could explain the correlation between firm age and the level of CSED. 
Old firms usually take the lead in business and, as a result, disclose more social and 
environmental information to gain a competitive advantage and, thus, lead the newly 
established companies. The result of this study is significant and the positive correlation is 
consistent with Muttakin and Khan (2014), Skouloudis et al (2013), Delaney and Huselid 
(1996), Rettab et al. (2009), in addition to Habbash (2015) in Saudi Arabia. However, neither 
Alsaeed (2006) in Saudi Arabia and Menassa (2010) in the Lebanon have found no association 
between firm age and the level of CSED.  
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Profitability (ROA) 
The third hypothesis is that there is a positive association between firm profitability (ROA) and 
CSED. The results in Table 6.13 shows there is a significant positive correlation between ROA 
and the level of CSED at 1% level of confidence (β3=0.24, t-statistics=3.34), which leads to 
acceptance of the third hypothesises, that proposes there is a positive association between ROA 
and CSED. This positive association has been suggested by stakeholder theory and legitimacy 
theory as the managers of firms with large profits tend to disclose more social and 
environmental information to persuade stakeholders of their ability to maximise the 
shareholder value and the companies’ achievements, which leads to an increase in 
compensation (Alsaeed, 2006). Moreover, by doing CSED, the managers of high profit-making 
companies will promote a positive image to maintain their legitimacy and good image (Branco 
and Roderigues, 2008; Reverte, 2009). They tend to show their achievement in detail since it 
will reflect on their reputation, image and salary as agency theory proposes. In contrast, when 
the profitability is low managers tend to hide some information, and disclose less to avoid 
negative effects on the companies’ market value (Gallego-A lvarez and Quina-Custodio, 
2016).       
In Saudi Arabia, as mentioned previously, the Labour Ministry has imposed rules on companies 
to ensure they assign Saudi employees and provide training and workshops for them. More 
profitable firms are expected to comply more with these regulations, as well as apply for 
government tenders that require a Saudisation certificate, which demonstrates the company’s 
commitment to the government’s laws and regulations. More profitable firms can also engage 
more in social and environmental activities, including community involvement, and can offer 
more benefits for their employees and, thus, disclose more social and environmental 
information. Performing additional and voluntary social and environmental activities also costs 
additional charges and, as a result, Saudi-listed companies with higher profits are more likely 
to perform more social and environmental activities and disclose more information about these 
activities than less profitable firms. Previous studies, such as Gray et al. (2001), Hackston and 
Milne (1996), Patten (1991), Belkaoui and Karpik (1989), Kansal et al. (2014), Muttakin and 
Khan (2014) and Skouloudis et al. (2013) are consistent with this study’s results, which found 
that ROA is a significant factor in explaining the variations that are found in the level of CSED. 
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However, Reverte 2009, Said et al. (2009), Gallego-Alvarez and Quina-custodio (2016), 
Hussainey et al. (2011) found an insignificant correlation between ROA and the level of CSED 
in Saudi Arabia. Habbash (2015) and Alsaeed (2006) found that firm profitability is an 
insignificant factor in explaining the variation in the level of disclosure.   
Leverage 
The results in Table 6.13 show there is a significant positive correlation between firm leverage 
and the level of CSED at a significant level of 5% (β4=0.13, t-statistics=2.10). This indicates 
that Saudi-listed companies with higher leverage or debt tend to disclose more social and 
environmental information than firms with lower leverage. This positive correlation could be 
due to companies with a higher level of leverage that are more concerned about satisfying 
stakeholders, including creditors, investors and shareholders, and so provide the information 
they require (Alsaeed, 2006). This argument has been supported by both the stakeholder and 
legitimacy theories as companies aim to prove to stakeholders and especially creditors they are 
legitimate by providing more social and environmental information. As explained by 
stakeholder theory, creditors require a higher level of disclosure from firms with high leverage 
to protect their funds (Jensen, 1986). Based on agency theory, agency costs increase with a the 
increase of the level of leverage (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012). As a result, managers of 
companies with high level of leverage disclose more information including social and 
environmental information to lower agency cost (Alsaeed, 2006; Gallego-A lvarez and 
Quina-Custodio, 2016). When the debt level increases, a conflict of interest between 
shareholder and creditors results, so and to prevent this from happening creditors seek more 
information to reduce information asymmetry and to make sure that the company will be able 
to pay the debt in the future (Gallego-A lvarez and Quina-Custodio, 2016) 
This result, which shows a positive association between firm leverage and CSED, is in line 
with Esa and Ghazali (2012), Malone et al.(1993), Branco and Rodrigues (2008), Said et al. 
(2009), Naser et al. (2002), Naser et al. (2006) and Esa and Malone et al. (1993), who found 
that a firm’s leverage positively affects the level of disclosure. In addition, Habbash (2015) 
found the same results in the Saudi Arabian context, while Alsaeed (2006) stated that there is 
no correlation between leverage and the level of disclosure in Saudi Arabia. Similarly, 
Giannarakis and Konteos (2014), Reverte (2009), Siregar and Bachtair (2012), Gallego-
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Alvarez and Quina-Custodio (2016), Muttakin and Khan (2014) and Hussainey et al. (2011) 
found that leverage is an insignificant factor when it comes to explaining the variation of the 
level of CSED.  
Corporate governance 
The next set of hypotheses test the effect of corporate governance on the level of corporate 
social and environmental disclosure by testing the following variables:  
Ownership structure 
Managerial ownership 
The results of the regression, as shown in Table 6.13, show that managerial ownership is an 
insignificant factor in explaining the variation in the level of CSED. This led to a rejection of 
the hypothesis proposed in Chapter Three, that there is a negative association between 
managerial ownership and the level of CSED. Previous studies had inconclusive results with 
some finding a negative association between managerial ownership and CSED, as a result of 
managers paying less attention to public accountability and other voluntary activities, such as 
corporate social and environmental disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 
2006; Chau and Gray, 2010; Kuo and Hung, 2012). In contrast, other studies argue that the 
external pressure that companies face nowadays from stakeholders to maintain their legitimacy 
should not be ignored (Belal and Owen, 2007; Islam and Deegan, 2008). This argument has 
been explained by the stakeholder, legitimacy and institutional theories, as managers need to 
respond to stakeholder demand and report social and environmental information, as well as 
meet governmental and global standards and pay attention to accounting and reporting 
regulations. Although the results of the regression indicate that managerial ownership is 
insignificant, the coefficient is positive (β5=0.06, t-statistics=1.05). The result of this study is 
not consistent with previous studies, such as Li et al. (2013), Ruland, Tung, and George (1990), 
Ghazali and Weetman, (2006), Eng and Mak, (2003) , Samaha and Dahawy (2011), which 
found that managerial ownership is a significant determinant of CSED. This could be because 
reporting social and environmental information in Saudi Arabia a new issue, therefore, 
managers might pay more attention to the required priorities that help to maximise shareholders 
value, than they do to social and environmental activities. 
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Government ownership 
The sixth hypothesis tests the effect of governmental ownership on the level of CSED. The 
results of the regression analysis, as shown in Table 6.13 (β6=0.15, t-statists=2.47), indicate 
there is a significant and positive association between governmental ownership and the level 
of CSED at the level of 5%, which led to the hypothesis being accepted. The results illustrate 
the significance of the governmental ownership mechanism in explaining the variation in the 
level of CSED and improving the disclosure level (Conyon and He, 2011). Based on 
institutional theory, corporate social and environmental disclosure is affected by governmental 
laws, rules and regulations (Li and Zhang, 2010). Therefore, government ownership will 
demand more accountability and transparency, which means more reporting, including social 
and environmental reporting. This result confirms the argument that companies with 
government ownership are socially responsible, as governments promote transparency and 
disclosure practices, including reproducing CSED (Said et al., 2009: Ntim et al., 2013; Al-
Janadi et al, 2013; Habbash, 2015). 
Agency theory suggests that, in the case of governmental ownership, a balance will be reached 
between the goals of principals (governmental owners) and agents (managers). The company 
will generate profits whilst continuing to be socially responsible.  The fact that the government 
establishes regulations to ensure companies remain socially responsible is another reason for 
the positive association between governmental ownership and CSED level. Companies that are 
owned by the government have a responsibility to set an example to other companies by being 
socially responsible and this will be evidenced in reporting (Habbash, 2015). Governmental 
ownership encourages good governance, accountability, transparency, corporate social 
responsibility and disclosure (Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Eng and Mak, 2003; Habbash, 2015; Ntim 
et al., 2013; Said et al., 2009). This result has been supported by existing empirical studies by 
Said et al. (2009), Khan (2010) and Das et al. (2015), Eng and Mak (2003), Haniffa and Cooke 
(2005), and Conyon and He (2011). 
Foreign ownership  
The results of the regression analysis showed the association between foreign ownership and 
the level of CSED is insignificant. However, the correlation coefficient indicated there is a 
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positive association (β7=0.04, t-statists=0.59). As discussed in Chapter Three, companies with 
foreign ownership are expected to disclose more social and environmental information (Khan 
et al., 2012). This argument is supported by legitimacy theory as companies give more attention 
to proving their legitimacy to foreign investors to sustain investment, as well as disclosing more 
social and environmental information to prove their legitimacy. Another reason is that 
companies with foreign ownership are inspired by investors who enhance more CSED 
(Schipper, 1981). However, in this study, foreign ownership failed to explain the variation in 
the level of CSED by Saudi-listed companies, as disclosing social and environmental 
information is still a voluntary activity. Therefore, the seventh hypothesis, which states that 
there is a positive association between foreign ownership and the level of CSED, is rejected.     
Size of the Board of Directors  
The size of the board of directors has also been tested in this regression analysis and the results 
in Table 6.13 show there is a positive but insignificant association between the board’s size 
and the extent of CSED in Saudi-listed companies (β8=0.09, t-statists=1.43). In Saudi Arabia, 
corporate governance is a contemporary issue, as the application of the corporate governance 
mechanism is still new. The Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC)35 does, however, 
recommend a size of between three and eleven directors, according to the needs and size of the 
company (Albassam 2014). In addition, CSED is a voluntary activity that the board of directors 
might not give much attention or priority to. Since there is no evidence of a significant 
association between the size of the board of directors and the extent of CSED in the results of 
the multiple regressions, the eighth hypothesis, which tests the impact of board of director’s 
size on the extent of CSED, is rejected.  
The proportion of independent members of the board of directors 
The ninth hypothesis is to test if the proportion of independent members of the board of 
directors has a positive association with the extent of CSED in the Saudi context. The results 
of the regression analysis, as shown in Table 6.13, indicate that there is an insignificant 
                                                 
35 The Saudi corporate governance code (SCGC) was issued by the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in 2006 (AL-Abbas, 
2009). 
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association between the proportion of independent members of the board and the extent of 
CSED (β9=0.06, t-statists=1.03). This finding led to a rejection of the hypothesis. As 
mentioned in the previous section, the practice of disclosing social and environmental 
information is considered to be voluntary and is similar to the size of the board of directors, as 
the introduction of independent board members was one of the corporate governance 
mechanisms introduced in developing countries in general (Mahadeo et al., 2012) and Saudi 
Arabia in particular36. Jiraporn et al. (2009) argue that independent directors may not have 
enough time to participate actively on the board and this could influence CSED. Another reason 
is that the Saudi corporate environment is still influenced by political connections and informal 
social relations to an extent, and this could affect the selection of the directors, which has led 
to boards in Saudi-listed companies having questionable independence (Al-Twaijry et al., 
2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Alshehri and Solomon, 2012, 
Albassam 2014). These previous aspects could be the reasons why no evidence has been found 
of a positive association between the proportion of independent members of the board and the 
extent of CSED in Saudi-listed companies. The finding is not consistent with the legitimacy 
and stakeholders theories, as they suggest a positive association between the proportion of 
independent members of the board and the extent of CSED, as independent directors are better 
at representing stakeholders’ interests (Clarke, 1998) and pay more attention to the legitimacy 
of their company. This finding is in line with previous studies that have found board 
independence insignificant, such as Ho and Wong (2001) Ghazali and Weetman (2006) 
Hussainey et al. (2011) and Habbash (2015) in the Saudi context. However, this result is not 
consistent with Eng and Mak (2003), Barako et al. (2006), Said et al. (2009), Khan (2010), 
Hannifa and Cooke (2002) Harjoto and Jo (2011) Khan et al. (2012), who found the proportion 
of independent members of the board of directors significant. 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) role duality  
The association between the CEO duality and the extent of CSED has been tested through the 
regression analysis, as shown in Table 6.13. The finding indicates there is a negative 
                                                 
36 Article 12c in the SCGC proposed that the number of independent members of the Board of Directors should not be less 
than two or one-third of all the members, whichever is greater.  
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insignificant association with the t-statistics of -0.04, which means that separating the CEO and 
Chairman could not explain the variation in the level of disclosure. Thus, the tenth hypothesis, 
which proposes a negative association between CEO duality and the level of CSED, is rejected. 
The CMA issued Article 12d37 in the SCGC in Saudi Arabia to enhance the role of the board 
in monitoring the company’s performance. This result is consistent with Giannarakis et al. 
(2014) and Bukair and Abdul-Rahman (2015), Ho and Wong (2001), Elzahar and Hussainey 
(2012), Said et al. (2009) Michelon and Parbonetti (2012), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), and 
Khan et al. (2012), who also found that CEO duality is an insignificant factor when 
investigating the determinant of the level of CSED. Habbash (2015) has found the same result 
in Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Roberts et al (2005), Gul and Leung (2014), Huafang and 
Jianguo (2007), Lakhal, (2005), Laksmana, (2008), Forker, (1992), Haniffa and Cooke, 
(2002), Eng and Mak, (2003) and Hussainey et al. (2011) found that CEO duality is a 
significant factor in investigating the determinants of CSED.  
Audit firm size 
The results of the regression analysis, as shown in Table 6:13, indicate that the size of the audit 
firm has a significant positive effect on the level of CSED at 5% level (β11= 0.13, t-statistics 
= 2.26). This result has led to acceptance of this model’s eleventh and last hypothesis, which 
examines the positive association between audit firm size and the level of CSED. Although audit 
firm has a significant role in improving the level of CSED in the SCGC, this code does not address 
the role of audit firms with regards to disclosure. This result is consistent with agency theory which 
is concerned with audit quality since providing more reliable and credible information in the 
reports reduces agency costs and big audit firms enhance disclosure quality (Al-Janadi et al., 
2013; Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As a result, 
small audit firms are expected to require less information to be disclosed. Previous studies also 
suggest that large audit firms (big four firms)38 seem to be more independent than small ones and 
                                                 
37 Article 12d in the SCGC states that conjoining the position of the Chairman of the Board of Directors with any other 
executive position in the company, such as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) managing director or general manager, is 
prohibited.  
 
38 The big four audit firms are PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte and Touche, Ernst and Young and KPMG.   
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are more able to limit the opportunistic behaviour of managers due to their experience (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003). In addition, the big four firms may require the disclosure of 
more information to protect and maintain their legitimacy and reputation, this argument is 
consistent with the concept of legitimacy theory. On the other hand, smaller audit firms are 
more concerned about losing their clients and as a result they give serious consideration to the 
customers’ needs (Alsaeed, 2006; Malone et al., 1993). 
Previous studies DeAngelo (1981), Depoers (2000), Raffournier (1995), Ntim et al. (2012a) and 
Schiehll et al. (2013) are inconsistent with the findings of this study, that there is a significant 
positive association between audit firm size and the CSED. In contrast, Wallace et al. (1994), 
Hossain et al. (1995) and Macarulla and Talalweh (2012) found there was no significant 
relationship between audit firm size and disclosure. In Saudi Arabia, Alsaeed (2006) found that 
audit firm size was an insignificant factor in the investigation of voluntary corporate disclosure. 
Table 6.14: A summary of all the hypotheses and findings for the determinants of corporate social 
and the environmental disclosure model 
Explanatory variable Hypothesis No. Expected sign 
Finding 
sign 
Finding 
significance 
Hypothesis 
status 
Firm Characteristics      
Firm Size  
1 + + 
Significant 
(5%) 
Accepted 
Firm Age  
2 + + 
Significant 
(1%) 
Accepted 
Profitability (ROA)  
3 + + 
Significant 
(1%) 
Accepted 
Leverage  
4 + + 
Significant 
(5%) 
Accepted 
Corporate Governance 
Factors 
     
Managers Ownership  5 -  Insignificant Rejected 
Government Ownership  
6 + + 
Significant 
(5%) 
Accepted 
Foreign Ownership 7 +  Insignificant Rejected 
Board Size 8 +  Insignificant Rejected 
Independent members of 
the board of directors 
9 +  Insignificant Rejected 
CEO Duality  10 -  Insignificant Rejected 
Audit firm Size 
11 + + 
Significant 
(5%) 
Accepted 
Note: In the hypothesis of the corporate social and environmental disclosure model, the dependent variable is corporate social 
and environmental disclosure (CSED). It is presented in Chapter Three.  
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After analysing the results of the regression model and discussing the findings, the table below 
summarises the outcomes of the hypothesis for the determinant of the level of CSED. Six 
hypotheses were found to be consistent with the hypotheses expressed in Chapter Three – firm 
size, firm age, ROA, leverage, government ownership and audit firm size. However, managers’ 
ownership, foreign investors’ ownership, the size of the board of directors and the percentage 
of independent members of the board of directors were rejected.  
6.6 Chapter summary and conclusion  
This chapter presents the descriptive statistics of corporate social and environmental disclosure 
(CSED) and of the CSED determinants. The model aims to investigate the determinants of 
CSED in Saudi Arabia by using a sample of 157 Saudi-listed companies. The objectives of this 
chapter are: firstly, to present a descriptive analysis of CSED and the determinants, which are 
the firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanism. Secondly, the chapter focused 
on investigating the determinants of the level of CSED. These are divided into two sets of 
determinants (firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanism using) and involve 
multiple regression analysis. The first part of this chapter presents the descriptive statistical 
analysis by using different statistical techniques that use ANOVA, Spearman’s correlation 
coefficient and by comparing the means of the variables. The results indicate that more that 
70% of Saudi-listed companies are reporting social and environmental information with a mean 
that is (7.61) lower than the average. This result shows that the Saudi-listed companies have 
the intention of disclosing social and environmental information, although this is considered to 
be of a basic level. Regarding the preliminary tests that were conducted to investigate the 
association between CSED and the determinants (firm characteristics and corporate 
governance mechanism), the results show there is a positive and significant association 
between all of the variables (FS, FA, ROA, Lev, ManOwn, Govown, ForOwn, BS, Ind, 
CEODual, AuditFS)39 and CSED, except for CEO duality, which is negative insignificant. In 
the second part of the chapter, the assumptions of the OLS regression have been checked in 
                                                 
39 FS: firm size, FA: firm age, ROA: return on assets, Lev: leverage, ManOwn: managerial ownership, Govown: 
governmental ownership, ForOwn: foreign ownership, BS: board size, Ind: the proportion of independent 
members on the board of directors, CEODual: CEO role duality, AuditFS: audit firm size.  
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order to guarantee that OLS is a suitable test to run the study model. After ensuring that OLS 
is the appropriate test, a multiple regression analysis has been run to address the second 
research question, which investigates the factors affecting the level of CSED in Saudi Arabia. 
The results are in line with previous studies, indicating that larger firms are more likely to 
disclose more social and environmental information. This result is supported by the legitimacy, 
stakeholder and institutional theories. In addition, older firms have a higher level of CSED than 
newly established ones, as suggested by both the legitimacy and institutional theories. 
Profitability and leverage are also significant factors that affect the level of CSED, in line with 
stakeholder and legitimacy theories, which argue that variables, ROA and leverage affect the 
level of CSED.  
Corporate governance mechanisms as variables are also included in the model that investigates 
their effect on the level of CSED. The regression analysis showed that only two variables – 
governmental ownership and audit firm size – are significant in explaining the variation that 
exists in the extent of CSED. Institutional theory suggests there is a positive association 
between governmental ownership and the extent of CSED, while there is an argument that 
companies audited by one of the big four companies disclose more social and environmental 
information. On the other hand, managerial and foreign ownership, the size of the board of 
directors, the proportion of independent members of the board and CEO duality are 
insignificant variables when determinants of the CSED are examined. Six hypotheses (firm 
size, firm age, ROA, leverage, governmental ownership and audit firm size) are accepted from 
the results of the regression analysis. However, five hypotheses have been rejected (managerial 
and foreign ownership, board size, the proportion of independent directors on the board and 
CEO duality). The model in this chapter was to investigate the effect of the firm characteristics 
and corporate governance mechanism on CSED in general by using a total of six categories. 
In the next chapter, each category of the corporate social and environmental disclosure index 
will be investigated separately, as well as how they relate to the determinants (firm 
characteristics and corporate governance mechanism). Negative binomial regression is used to 
investigate whether firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanism affect each 
CSED category separately.  
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Chapter 7: Empirical analysis of the determinants 
of the CSED categories   
7.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter, the results obtained from the examination of 157 Saudi listed 
companies showed that all firm characteristics in this study (firm size, firm age, ROA and 
leverage), in addition to some corporate governance mechanisms (governmental ownership and 
firm size), have significant effects on the level of social and environmental disclosure.  
This chapter will go further and examine whether firm characteristics and corporate governance 
factors have a potential influence on the level of corporate social and environmental disclosure 
categories. As shown in Chapters Five and Six, the sampled companies differed in the types of 
categories (included in the corporate social and environmental disclosure index) that they 
report.  For example, the companies reported more in categories such as human resources, 
community and economics than they did in the environment and product and consumers 
categories. 
The aim of this chapter is to identify the rationale for this variation in the levels of reporting 
by Saudi listed companies by examining the determinants of individual CSED categories. This 
chapter will address the third research question which is RQ3: What are the determinants of 
the level of CSED in terms of categories that are reported by Saudi listed companies? This 
research question will be addressed through two sub questions; RQ3.a: Do corporate 
characteristics of the Saudi listed companies have an impact on the level of each category of 
the CSED? and RQ3.b: Do corporate governance mechanisms of the Saudi listed companies 
have an impact on the level of each category of the CSED?  
The chapter will be organised as follows. Section 7.2 presents the descriptive statistical analysis 
of the CSED categories as dependent variables40. Section 7.3 presents the statistical method 
                                                 
40 The descriptive statistical analyses of the independent variables, firm characteristics and corporate governance 
mechanisms, are discussed in Chapter Six.   
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applied (negative binomial regression) followed by 7.4 which specifies the determinants of 
environmental disclosure. Section 7.5 deals with the determinants of human resources and 
section 7.6 with the determinants of the products and consumers disclosure. Section 7.7 covers 
the determinants of community involvement disclosure while 7.8 looks at the determinants of 
economic disclosure followed by the determinants of general disclosure in 7.9.  Finally, 7.10 
presents the chapter summary and conclusion.          
7.2 Descriptive statistics of CSED categories 
This section presents a descriptive analysis of the CSED categories used in the regression 
analysis.  The dependent variables are environmental disclosure, human resources disclosure, 
products and consumers disclosure, community involvement disclosure, economics disclosure 
and general disclosure. As discussed in Chapter Four, the CSED index consists of these six 
main categories by which to measure the quantity of the social and environmental information 
disclosed by Saudi listed companies in their annual reports. The disclosure in each category is 
measured by allocating 1 for each disclosed item in the annual report and 0 otherwise.  The 
amount of disclosure per company and per category is measured by the total number of items 
disclosed.  
Table 7.1 below presents the descriptive statistical analysis of the categories forming the CSED 
index.  It can be seen from the means of the categories in Table 7.1 that the human resources 
category has the highest mean (3.2) with a minimum of 0 items disclosed and a maximum of 
35 items. The human resource category represents any information regarding employee 
training and development, the pay and benefits system, employee morale, health and safety, 
employment policies, equal opportunities and social life balance. As discussed in Chapter Five, 
human resources information is the category most disclosed by the Saudi listed companies 
(41% of the total disclosure) as 87% of those that report social and environmental activities 
report human resource items (Table 7.2). Community involvement disclosure is the second 
highest category.  This category contains information about supporting education and training, 
art, culture, public health and safety and the sponsorship of sporting or recreational activities. 
24% of the total social and environmental disclosure in the index refers to community 
involvement disclosure with around 44% of the sample companies disclosing community 
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involvement information in their reports (Table 5.2). The mean of this category, community 
involvement, is 1.88 with a minimum of 0 items and 13 items as the maximum disclosed (Table 
7.1).  This result is as expected in a traditional Islamic country where public interest is 
prioritised over individual interests. 
Table 7.1: Statistical discriptive analysis of CSED categories 
 CSED 
catego
ries 
Mean Min Max Variance Std. Deviation Skewness 
Std. 
Error of 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Std. 
Error of 
Kurtosis 
ED 0.55 0 16 3.16 1.78 5.64 0.19 40.29 0.39 
HRD 3.2 0 35 21.24 4.61 3.00 0.19 14.60 0.39 
PCD 0.24 0 6 0.60 0.77 4.73 0.19 26.70 0.39 
CID 1.88 0 13 7.79 2.79 1.74 0.19 2.71 0.39 
ECD 1.59 0 9 3.89 1.97 1.45 0.19 1.96 0.39 
GD 0.19 0 3 0.27 0.52 3.25 0.19 11.87 0.39 
Corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSED) categories in this table are Environmental Disclosure (ED), 
Human Resources Disclosure (HRD), Products and Consumers Disclosure (PCD), Community Involvements 
disclosure (CID), Economic Disclosure (ECD) and General Disclosure.  
The third category, economic information, includes information about a company’s economic 
performance, market presence and job nationalisation (Saudisation).  Accounting for 20% of 
the CSED index represents economic information as being disclosed by 53% of the listed 
companies (Table 5.2) with a 1.59 mean, 0 minimum items and a maximum of 9 maximum 
(Table 7.1). The remaining three categories discussed below are environmental disclosure, 
products and consumer disclosure and, finally, general disclosure. 
Environmental disclosure represents any information related to the reduction of pollution, the 
conservation of natural resources and energy, aesthetics or any other information about the 
company’s environmental activities or plans. The results in Chapter Five indicate that the 
disclosed environmental information is relatively low (7% of the total CSED by the sample, as 
shown in (Table 5.2). The results also show that only 18% of the sampled companies disclosed 
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information concerning environmental activities. As shown in (Table 7.1), the mean of the 
environmental disclosure is 0.55, with 0 items as a minimum and 16 items as a maximum.  
Products and consumer disclosure includes any information related to product development, 
product safety, product quality and consumer relations. The results from Chapter Five indicate 
that product and consumer disclosure represents only 3% of the CSED index disclosure with 
13.5 % from the sampled companies (figure 5.1 the percentage of CSED categories disclosed 
in the CSED index). The mean of this category as shown in table 7.1 is 0.24 with 0 minimum 
items and 6 maximum items.  
Finally, general disclosure includes any other social disclosure such as human rights, 
sustainability and transparency. General disclosure is the least reported category. It accounts 
for only 4% of the total CSED disclosure by the sampled companies as discussed in Chapter 
Five (figure 5.1 the percentage of CSED categories disclosed by the Saudi listed companies) 
with a 0.19 mean and 0 items minimum, 3 items maximum (table 7.1).  
7.3 Descriptive statistics of CSED categories based on firm 
characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms 
independent variables  
This section, together with the regression analysis in this chapter, seeks to answer the 
supporting RQ3.a: Do corporate characteristics of Saudi-listed companies influence the level 
of CSED categories? and supporting RQ3.b: Do corporate governance mechanisms of Saudi-
listed companies have an effect on the level of CSED categories? These supporting research 
questions will be addressed in this section by analysing the correlation between CSED 
categories and the firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms and by the 
regression analysis discussed later in this chapter. 
Based on previous studies and the results from Chapter Six, firm characteristics (Alsaeed, 2006; 
Esa and Ghazali, 2012; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Jennifer Ho and Taylor, 2007; Reverte, 
2009) and corporate governance mechanisms (Esa and Ghazali, 2012; Giannarakis et al., 2014; 
Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012) have been the centre of a significant numbers of studies in 
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relation to the levels of CSED. It has been argued that larger companies (Alsaeed, 2006; 
Bayoud et al., 2012; Gray et al., 2001; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Huang and Kung, 2010; 
Menassa, 2010; Wallace and Naser, 1996), older firms (Habbash, 2015; Muttakin and Khan, 
2014; Rettab et al., 2009), more profitable firms (measured by ROA) (Habbash, 2015; Muttakin 
and Khan, 2014; Rettab et al., 2009) and companies with higher leverage (Esa and Ghazali, 
2012; Malone et al., 1993; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Said et al., 2009; Habbash, 2015) 
report more social and environmental information in general. Moreover, it has also been argued 
that ownership structure (Belal and Owen, 2007; Islam and Deegan, 2008; Khan et al., 2012), 
the size and independency of the board of directors and the size of the audit firm have positive 
associations with the level of CSED while CEO duality has a negative association.     
In this section the descriptive analysis of the level of each CSED category, specifically in 
relation to firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms, is presented based on 
stakeholder, legitimacy and institutional theories to investigate the potential factors correlated 
with each category of CSED among the sampled firms. Each of the CSED categories is 
addressed in a subsection below. 
Environmental disclosure is the first category in the CSED index.  In order to investigate the 
determinants of the level of environmental disclosure, correlation coefficients are studied and 
the following table (Table 7.2) demonstrates the correlation between CSED categories and firm 
characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms. Two main hypotheses as follows are 
tested in this section: 
H12: There is a positive association between firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, ROA and 
leverage) and environmental disclosure.  
H13: There is a positive association between corporate governance mechanisms (managerial 
ownership, government ownership, foreign ownership, board size, board independence, CEO 
duality and audit firm size) and environmental disclosure. 
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Table 7.2: Correlations between firm characteristics, corporate governance mechanism and CSED categories. 
 ED HRF PCD CID ED GD 
 Correlation coefficient P-value 
Correlation 
coefficient P-value 
Correlation 
coefficient P-value 
Correlation 
coefficient P-value 
Correlation 
coefficient P-value 
Correlation 
coefficient P-value 
LgFS .296*** <0.001 .515*** <0.001 .329*** <0.001 .566*** <0.001 .415*** <0.001 .205*** 0.010 
LgFA .285*** <0.001 .530*** <0.001 .370*** <0.001 .566*** <0.001 .462*** <0.001 .165** 0.039 
ROA .304*** 0.006 .533*** 0.006 .359*** <0.001 .596*** <0.001 .463*** <0.001 .137* 0.088 
Lev .068 0.397 .265*** 0.001 .117 0.144 .231*** 0.004 .285*** <0.001 .107 0.182 
ManOwn .076 0.341 .259*** 0.001 .207*** 0.009 .252*** <0.001 .239*** 0.003 .151* 0.060 
GovOwn .201** 0.012 .433*** <0.001 .261*** 0.001 .303*** <0.001 .376*** <0.001 .157** 0.049 
ForOwn .128 0.109 .314*** <0.001 .178** 0.026 .264*** <0.001 .314*** <0.001 -.012 0.886 
LgBS .219*** 0.006 .384*** <0.001 .208*** 0.009 .351*** <0.001 .338*** <0.001 .065 0.416 
Bind .240*** 0.002 .330*** <0.001 .205*** 0.010 .377*** <0.001 .343*** <0.001 .060 0.456 
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Dummy41 
variable f-stcsatisti Sig.  f-stcsatisti Sig. f-stcsatisti Sig. f-stcsatisti Sig. f-stcsatisti Sig. f-stcsatisti Sig. 
CEODual .029 .865 1.525 .219 .453 .502 2.249 .136 .150 .699 .004 .951 
AuditFS .370 .544 4.086** .045 1.028 .312 1.201 .275 3.735* .055 .654 .420 
Notes:  The dependent variables are (ED) environmental disclosure, (HRD) human resource disclosure, (PCD) product and consumer disclosure, (CID) community involvement disclosure, 
(ECD) economic disclosure and (GD) general disclosure. The independent variables are as follows (LogFS): the natural logarithm of firm size, (LogFA) the natural logarithm of 
firm age, (ROA) return on assets, (Lev) leverage, government ownership (GovOwn), (ManOwn) managerial ownership, (ForOwn) foreign investment ownership, (LogBS) the 
natural logarithm of the board of directors’ size, (Bind) the percentage of independent members on the board of directors, (CEODual) SEO role duality, (AuditFS) audit firm 
size. Chapter Four presents the detailed definitions of variables employed. 
***denotes significant correlation P < 0.01, **denotes significant correlation P < 0.5 and *denotes significant correlation P < 0.1 (Spearman’s correlation) 
 
                                                 
41 CEO duality and audit firm size are dummy variables (0,1), f-statistic is the appropriate statistical test.   
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The above table (Table 7.2) shows that there is a statistically significant correlation 
(Spearman’s correlation coefficients) at 1% level between firm size (0.30) and environmental 
disclosure. Moreover, firm age is significantly positively correlated with environmental 
disclosure proved by Spearman’s correlation coefficient (0.285) at 1% level of significance 
(Table 7.2). Spearman’s correlation coefficient in Table 7.2 also shows that ROA (0.304) is 
positively correlated with environmental disclosure at 1% level. However, leverage is the only 
firm characteristic that has insignificant correlation with environmental disclosure based on the 
results from Spearman’s correlation coefficients technique (Table 7.2).  
Table 7.2 also shows that there is a statistically significant correlation (Spearman’s correlation 
coefficients) between the size of the board of directors (0.22) and the proportion of independent 
members on that board (0.24) at the 1% level of significance. In addition, governmental 
ownership is statistically correlated with environmental disclosure based on correlation 
coefficient (0.20) at 5% level of significance while managerial ownership, foreign investment 
ownership, CEO duality and audit firm size are insignificant factors in relation to 
environmental disclosure (Table 7.1).  
Human resources disclosure is the second category in the index table 7.2 represents 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient test to examine the relation between firm characteristics and 
corporate governance mechanisms and human resources disclosure. The following hypotheses 
are to be tested in this section:    
H14: There is a positive association between firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, ROA and 
leverage) and human resources disclosure.  
H15: There is a positive association between corporate governance mechanisms (managerial 
ownership, government ownership, foreign ownership, board size, board independence, CEO 
duality and audit firm size) and human resources disclosure.  
Human resources disclosure is the most reported category by the Saudi listed companies and 
all firm characteristics are significantly positively correlated (Spearman’s correlation 
coefficients) with this category as shown in Table 7.2 at 1 % level of significance except for 
ROA at 5% level of significance. The second firm characteristic, as shown in Table 7.2, firm 
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age (0.53) followed by profitability represented by ROA (0.53) are positively correlated with 
human resources. Leverage (0.27) is also positively correlated to human resources disclosure 
according to Spearman’s correlation coefficient as shown in Table 7.1.  
Corporate governance mechanisms are all significantly positively correlated at the level of 
human resources disclosure apart from CEO duality which is insignificant. As shown in Table 
7.2, the factors are all statistically significant at 1% level of significance, according to 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient, specifically managerial ownership (0.26), governmental 
ownership (0.43) and foreign investment (0.31). Furthermore, the table shows the coefficients 
of the board of directors’ size (0.38) and the proportion of independent members on the board 
of directors (0.33). Audit firm size holds a 5% level of significance according to the f-test (4.09) 
(Table 7.2).  
Products and consumers disclosure is the third category in the index.  It is one of the 
categories least disclosed by the Saudi listed companies, as shown in Table 7.1. To investigate 
the correlation between firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms regarding 
products and consumers disclosure, Spearman’s correlation coefficient test has been conducted 
Table 7.2 and the following hypotheses are to be tested in this section:    
H16: There is a positive association between firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, ROA and 
leverage) and products and consumers disclosure. 
H17: There is a positive association between corporate governance mechanisms (managerial 
ownership, government ownership, foreign ownership, board size, board independence, CEO 
duality and audit firm size) and products and consumers disclosure.  
The results of Spearman’s correlation coefficients in Table 7.2 demonstrate the significant 
positive correlation between three of the firm characteristics, namely firm size (0.33), firm age 
(0.37) and ROA (0.36). Leverage is the only insignificant firm characteristic in relation to 
products and consumers disclosure. Regarding corporate governance mechanisms, five 
corporate governance mechanisms are positively significantly correlated with products and 
consumer disclosure based on the Spearman’s correlation coefficients (Table 7.2).  On the other 
hand, CEO duality and audit firm size are statistically insignificant. The first corporate 
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governance mechanism that is positively correlated with products and consumer disclosure at 
1% level of significance is managerial ownership (0.23) followed by governmental ownership 
(0.26) and foreign ownership (0.18). The board of directors’ size (0.21) and the proportion of 
independent members on the board of directors (0.21) are also correlated with products and 
consumer disclosure at 1% level of significance.    
Community involvement disclosure is the fourth category in the index and the second most 
reported category by the Saudi listed companies as shown in Table 7.1. Using Spearman’s 
correlation coefficient as the technique by which to investigate the correlation between firm 
characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms with community involvement disclosure 
as shown in Table 7.2 the following main hypotheses will be tested:     
H18: There is a positive association between firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, ROA and 
leverage) and community involvement disclosure. 
 H19: There is a positive association between corporate governance mechanisms (managerial 
ownership, government ownership, foreign ownership, board size, board independence, CEO 
duality and audit firm size) and community involvement disclosure. 
Table 7.2 shows the results of Spearman’s correlation coefficients which demonstrates the 
significant positive correlation between all firm characteristics, firm size (0.57), firm age 
(0.57), ROA (0.60) and leverage (0.23), with community involvement disclosure at 1% level 
of significance. Moreover, of the corporate governance mechanisms, five mechanisms are 
positively significantly correlated with community involvement disclosure based on 
Spearman’s correlation coefficients at 1% level of significance (Table 7.2). CEO duality and 
audit firm size are statistically insignificant. Managerial ownership (0.25), governmental 
ownership (0.30), foreign ownership (0.264), board of directors’ size (0.35) and the proportion 
of independent members on the board of directors (0.36) represent the governance mechanisms 
that are correlated with community involvement disclosure.     
Economic disclosure is the fifth category in the study CSED index.  It includes one of the 
enforceable governmental regulations, that of job nationalisation (Saudisation).  This category 
has therefore been reported in more than half of the sample (Table 5.2). Two hypotheses will 
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be tested in the next section using Spearman’s correlation coefficients in to examine the 
association between firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms with economic 
disclosure:  
H20: There is a positive association between firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, ROA and 
leverage) and economic disclosure. 
 H21: There is a positive association between corporate governance mechanisms (managerial 
ownership, government ownership, foreign ownership, board size, board independence, CEO 
duality and audit firm size) and economic disclosure. 
Beginning with firm characteristics, firm size (0.42), firm age (0.46), ROA (0.46) and leverage 
(0.29) (as in Table 7.2) show positive significant association with economic disclosure at 1% 
level of significance. Regarding corporate governance mechanisms, managerial ownership 
(0.24), governmental ownership (0.38), foreign ownership (0.31), board of directors’ size 
(0.34) and the proportion of independent members on the board of directors (0.34) show a 1% 
level of significance (Table 7.2). Audit firm size is statistically significant with economic 
disclosure at 10 % level of significance. In contrast, CEO duality is statistically insignificant.     
General disclosure is the sixth and final disclosure.  This category concerns any general social 
disclosure that is not specified in any of the previous categories and it is the least disclosed 
category. Using the same technique, Spearman’s correlation coefficients, the association 
between firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms with general disclosure 
will be investigated to test the following main hypotheses:      
H22: There is a positive association between firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, ROA and 
leverage) and general disclosure. 
H23: There is a positive association between corporate governance mechanisms (managerial 
ownership, government ownership, foreign ownership, board size, board independence, CEO 
duality and audit firm size) and general disclosure. 
By examining the association between firm characteristics and general disclosure using 
Spearman’s correlation coefficients as shown in Table 7.2, there is a significant positive 
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association between general disclosure and three firm characteristics - firm size (0.21) at 1% 
level of significance, firm age (0.17) at 5% level and ROA (0.14) at 10% level of significance. 
Leverage is, however, an insignificant factor related to general disclosure. Spearman’s 
correlation coefficients as shown in Table 7.2 indicate a significant positive association at 5% 
level of significance between governmental ownership (0.16) and managerial disclosure (0.15) 
and at 10% level of significance. Meanwhile, the other five mechanisms of foreign ownership, 
board of directors’ size, the proportion of independent members on the board of directors, CEO 
duality and audit firm size are insignificant. 
7.4 Statistical method: negative binomial regression  
This chapter investigates the determinants of the level of each category of the CSED index, the 
six dependent variables being environmental disclosure, human resources disclosure, products 
and consumer disclosure, community involvement disclosure, economic disclosure and general 
disclosure.  The dependent variables in this chapter are limited dependent count variables 
where the large majority of observations are zeros.  A simple, ordinary least-squares regression 
analysis would yield biased results given that the distribution of the observations for each 
category is not normal. As a result, a negative binomial regression model has been adopted in 
this chapter which is an appropriate model for use with count data (Hausman et al., 1984; 
Crepon and Duguet, 1997; Greene, 1997).  
Negative binomial regression is an extension to Poisson regression which is widely used in 
analysing count data (e.g. Frome, Kutner, and Beauchamp 1973; Frome 1983; Haberman 1974; 
Holford 1983). Poisson regression conditions state that the mean is equal to the variance.  
However, if they are not equal then substantial extra-Poisson variation or over-dispersion will 
be the case.  Accordingly, if Poisson regression is used in this study, extra-Poisson variation or 
over-dispersion will cause misleading results and thus the analysis will be similarly 
misrepresentative (Paul and Plackett 1978; Cox 1983). Over-dispersion, as is the case in this 
chapter, is where the variance is larger than mean (as shown in Table 7.1). Moreover, after 
testing the normality of the dependent variables, i.e. the CSED categories, it can be shown from 
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the descriptive analysis (Table 7.1) that these are not normally distributed42.  Therefore, as a 
result of these considerations, negative-binomial regression is the more appropriate method by 
which to analyse the data in this chapter and this technique has also been applied in previous 
studies such as Engel (1984), Lawless (1987), Manton et al. (1981).  
Six negative binomial models will be developed to investigate the determinants of the level of 
CSED categories in to answer the third research question which is RQ3: What are the 
determinants of the level of CSED in terms of the categories that are reported by the Saudi 
listed companies? To address this research question (RQ3), two sub questions will be 
addressed. The first question is, do corporate characteristics of the Saudi listed companies 
influence the level of each category of the CSED? The second sub question is, do corporate 
governance mechanisms of the Saudi listed companies have an effect on the level of each 
category of the CSED? 
7.5 The determinants of the level of CSED categories 
This section consists of six sub sections each investigating the determinants of one of the CSED 
categories in order to explore and better understand the reasons and incentives behind the 
variations in the level of disclosure of each category and the variations in the type of each 
category disclosure by Saudi listed companies. As previously discussed, negative-binomial 
regression is the technique followed in to test the hypotheses relating to each category.  
7.5.1 The determinants of the level of environmental disclosure 
The first model is an examination of the relationship between environmental disclosure as the 
dependent variable and firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, ROA and leverage) and 
corporate governance mechanisms (managerial ownership, governmental ownership, foreign 
ownership, board of directors’ size, the proportion of independent members in the board of 
                                                 
42  According to skewness and kurtosis of the dependent variables as statistical tests to assess normality 
assumption, the results shown in Table 7.1indicate the variables follow negative-binomial distribution which 
is not normal distribution.  
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directors, CEO duality and audit firm size) as the independent variables. This model aims to 
test H12 and H13.  
The table below (Table 7.3) shows a good fit with the model of Pearson Chi-Square (1.42) 
which is greater than 0.05 (Gray and Kinnear 2012; Rice, 2007). The negative binomial 
regression model with the independent variables was significant with the likelihood ratio chi-
square equal to 74.92, df =11, p < 0.01. After running the model, which includes the variables 
of the firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms as shown in table (Table 7.3), 
the results will be divided into two subsections. The first contains the firm characteristics 
variables and the second contains the corporate governance mechanisms.  
Starting with firm characteristics, it can be shown (Table 7.3) that there is a significant 
association between firm size and environmental disclosure (Wald Chi-Square = 7.90) at 1% 
level of significance. The value of Exp. (B= 0.71) implies that for a one-unit increase in the 
firm size, the difference in the logs of expected counts of environmental disclosure is expected 
to increase by 0.71, given the other predictor variables in the model are held constant. This 
result supports the sub hypothesis H12.a: Larger firms are more likely to disclose more 
environmental information than smaller firms. 
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Table 7.3: Negative binomial regression of CSED categories 
  ED HRD PCD CID EcD GD 
Firm Characteristics       
FS 
Wald chi-square 
Sig. 
0.71*** 
7.90 
(0.005) 
0.36** 
5.23 
(0.022) 
0.25 
0.54 
(0.463) 
0.42** 
4.97 
(.026) 
-0.08 
0.16 
(0.687) 
0.39 
1.50 
(0.220) 
FA 
Wald chi-square 
Sig. 
1.96*** 
8.67 
(0.003) 
0.88*** 
7.60 
(0.006) 
2.43** 
5.60 
(0.018) 
1.41*** 
12.39 
(<0.001) 
0.55* 
2.83 
(0.093) 
0.60 
0.72 
(0.395) 
ROA 
Wald chi-square 
Sig. 
-.03 
2.08 
(0.15) 
0.02 
2.00 
(0.158) 
0.03 
0.80 
(0.372) 
.024 
1.75 
(.186) 
0.04** 
4.72 
(0.030) 
0.00 
0.02 
(0.884) 
LEV 
Wald chi-square 
Sig.  
-.91 
1.25 
(0.265) 
0.56 
1.85 
(0.174) 
0.16 
0.03 
(0.864) 
-.034 
0.01 
(0.945) 
1.02** 
4.78 
(0.029) 
0.49 
0.28 
(0.600) 
Corporate Governance       
Man Own 
Wald chi-square 
Sig. 
-0.00 
0.05 
(0.832) 
-0.01 
0.34 
(0.557) 
0.00 
0.03 
(0.843) 
0.00 
0. .02 
(0.88) 
-0.00 
0.06 
(0.811) 
0.02 
1.12 
(0.291) 
Gov Own 
Wald chi-square 
Sig.  
0.01* 
3.60 
(0.058) 
0.01* 
3.63 
(0.057) 
0.01 
1.00 
(0.319) 
0.01 
0.72 
(0.397) 
0.01 
1.92 
(0.166) 
0.02* 
3.00 
(0.08) 
For In Own 
Wald chi-square 
Sig.  
0.00 
0.04 
(0.839) 
-0.00 
0.25 
(0.614) 
-.01 
0.32 
(0.574) 
0.01 
0.32 
(0.569) 
0.01 
0.313 
(0.576) 
-0.03 
1.58 
(0.209) 
BS 
Wald chi-square 
Sig.  
2.02 
0.75 
(0.387) 
2.48* 
3.50 
(0.061) 
3.61 
1.48. 
(0.224) 
2.04 
1.770 
(0.183) 
1.46 
1.02 
(0.313) 
1.28 
0.22 
(0.640) 
Bind 
Wald chi-square 
Sig.  
0.02 
4.00 
(0.919) 
0.01 
1.20 
(0.274) 
0.02 
2.25 
(0.134) 
.01* 
2.86 
(0.091) 
0.01** 
4.56 
(0.033) 
-0.00 
0.15 
(0.701) 
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CEO Dual 
Wald chi-square 
Sig.  
0.62 
1.17 
(0.279) 
-0.78* 
2.90 
(0.089) 
-0.79 
0.45 
(0.502) 
0.54 
1.684 
(0.194) 
-0.43 
0.78 
(0.377) 
0.29 
0.11 
(0.736) 
Audit FS 
Wald chi-square 
Sig.  
-0,01 
0.00 
(0.978) 
0.44* 
3.03 
(0.082) 
0.50 
0.59 
(0.442) 
-0.135 
0.24 
(0.627) 
0.36 
1.62 
(0.203) 
0.20 
0.12 
(0.73) 
Intercept 
Wald chi-square 
Sig.  
-12.12*** 
16.13 
(<0.001) 
-7.23*** 
15.89 
(<0.001) 
-12.70*** 
10.51 
(<0.001) 
-7.706*** 
13.024 
(<0.001) 
-2.76 
2.11 
(0.146) 
-4.98 
1.88 
(0.170) 
Likelihood Ratio   
Chi-Square, Sig.  
74.92*** 
(0.001) 
101.60*** 
(0.001) 
50.39*** 
(0.001) 
113.87*** 
(<0.001) 
60.50*** 
(<0.001) 
18.19* 
(0.077) 
Df 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Pearson    
Chi-Square 
1.42 0.79 0.79 0.94 0.71 0.96 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Chapter Four provides a detailed definition of the measurement method of all the independent variables used for 
the estimation.  
Firm age has also been found to be a significant factor that affects the level of environmental 
disclosure (Wald Chi-Square = 8.67) at 1% level of significance. The value of Exp. (B= 1.96) 
implies that for a one-unit increase in the firm age, the difference in the logs of expected counts 
of environmental disclosure is expected to increase by 1.96, given the other predictor variables 
in the model are held constant (Table 7.3). This result provides evidence supporting sub 
hypothesis H12.b: Older firms are more likely to disclose more environmental information 
than newly established firms. 
Firm size and firm age are the two significant firm characteristics that affect the level of 
environmental disclosure whereas ROA and leverage are insignificant characteristics related 
to the level of environmental disclosure (Table 7.3). These results lead to a rejection of sub-
hypotheses H12.c and H12.d. Therefore, the main hypothesis H12 is partially supported in that 
the part related to firm size and age is accepted while in the part related to ROA and leverage 
it is rejected (see Table 7.4).    
The corporate governance mechanisms of Saudi listed companies have been also tested by this 
model in relation to environmental disclosure.  The result of the negative binomial regression 
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indicates that only governmental ownership has a positive significant effect on the level of 
environmental disclosure (Wald Chi-Square = 3.60) at 10% level of significance. The value of 
Exp. (B= 0.01) implies that for a one-unit increase in the governmental ownership, the 
difference in the logs of expected counts of environmental disclosure is expected to increase 
by 0.01, given the other predictor variables in the model are held constant (Table 7.3). This 
result supports sub hypothesis H13.b: There is a positive association between governmental 
ownership and environmental disclosure. All the other corporate governance mechanisms are 
insignificant in relation to environmental disclosure leading to the rejection of sub hypotheses 
H13.a, H13.c, H13.d, H13.e, H13.f and H13.g.  Thus, the main hypothesis H13 is partially 
supported in that the part related to governmental disclosure is accepted whilst the parts related 
to managerial and foreign ownership, board size, board independence, CEO duality and audit 
firm size are rejected (see Table 7.4).  
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Table 7.4: Summary of all the hypotheses and findings for the determinants of environmental 
disclosure model 
Explanatory 
variable 
Hypothesis 
No. 
Expected 
sign Finding sign 
Finding 
significance 
Hypothesis 
status 
Firm 
characteristics 12 +  
Partly 
significant 
Partly 
accepted 
Firm size 12.a + + Significant (1%) accepted 
Firm age 12.b + + Significant (1%) Accepted 
ROA 12.c +  Insignificant Rejected 
Leverage 12.d +  Insignificant Rejected 
Corporate 
governance 13 +  
Partly 
significant 
Partly 
accepted 
Managerial 
ownership 13.a +  Insignificant Rejected 
Governmental 
ownership 13.b + + 
Significant 
(10%) Accepted 
Foreign ownership 13.c +  Insignificant Rejected 
Board size 13.d +  Insignificant Rejected 
Board 
independence 13.e +  Insignificant Rejected 
CEO duality 13.f +  Insignificant Rejected 
Audit firm size 13.g +  Insignificant Rejected 
Notes: H12: There is a positive association between firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, return on assets and leverage) 
and the level of environmental disclosure. H12.a: larger firms are more likely to disclose more environmental information 
than smaller firms. H12.b: older firms are more likely to disclose more environmental information than newly established 
firms. H12.c: more profitable firms are more likely to disclose more environmental disclosure than less profitable firm.  H12.d: 
firms with higher level of leverage are more likely to disclose more environmental disclosure. H13: there is a positive 
association between corporate governance mechanisms (managerial ownership, governmental ownership, foreign ownership, 
board size, the proportion of independent in the board of directors, CEO duality and audit firm size) and the level of 
environmental disclosure.  H13.a there is a positive association between managerial ownership and environmental disclosure. 
H13.b: there is a positive association between governmental ownership and environmental disclosure. H13.c there is a positive 
association between foreign investment ownership and environmental disclosure. H13.d there is a positive association between 
board of directors size and environmental disclosure. H13.e there is a positive association between the proportion of the 
independent members in the board of directors and environmental disclosure. H13.f there is a positive association between 
the CEO duality and environmental disclosure. H13.gthere is a positive association between audit firm size and environmental 
disclosure.  
7.5.2 The determinants of the level of human resources disclosure 
The second model examines the effect of firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, ROA and 
leverage) and corporate governance mechanisms (managerial ownership, governmental 
ownership, foreign ownership, board of directors’ size, the proportion of independent members 
on the board of directors, CEO duality and audit firm size) as the independent variables with 
human resources disclosure as the dependent variable by testing hypotheses H14 and H15.  
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The Pearson Chi-Square as shown in Table 7.3. indicates a good fit of the model (0.79) which 
is greater than 0.05 (Gray and Kinnear 2012; Rice 2007). The negative binomial regression 
model with the independent variables was significant with likelihood ratio chi-square equal to 
101.60, df =11, p < 0.01. In running the second model, the results will be discussed in two 
subsections.  Firm characteristics variables are the first subsection to be dealt with while 
corporate governance mechanisms variables are the second.  
As shown in Table 7.3, there is a significant association between firm size and human resources 
disclosure (Wald Chi-Square = 5.23) at 5% level of significance. The coefficient value of firm 
size is equal to 0.36 which indicates that for a one-unit increase in firm size, the difference in 
the logs of expected counts of human resources disclosure items is expected to increase by 
0.63, given the other predictor variables in the model are held constant. This result supports the 
sub hypothesis H14.a: Larger firms are more likely to disclose more human resources 
information than smaller firms.     
Firm age also has a significant effect on human resource disclosure as Table 7.3 indicates a 
positive significant association between firm age and human resources disclosure (Wald Chi-
Square = 7.60) at 1% level of significance. The coefficient value of firm age is 0.88 implying 
that for a one-unit increase in firm age, the difference in the logs of expected counts of 
environmental disclosure is expected to increase by 0.88, given the other predictor variables in 
the model are held constant (Table 7.3). This result provides evidence supporting sub 
hypothesis H14.b: Older firms are more likely to disclose more human resources information 
than newly established firms. 
As in the first model, the environmental disclosure model, firm size and firm age are the only 
two significant firm characteristics that affect the level of human resources disclosure while 
ROA and leverage are insignificant factors (Table 7.3). Based on the results above, sub-
hypotheses H14.c and H14.d are to be rejected. As a result, the main hypothesis H14 is partially 
accepted in the part related to firm size and age while it is rejected in the part related to ROA 
and leverage (see Table 7.4).    
The second area tested in this model refers to the corporate governance mechanisms of Saudi 
listed companies in relation to human resources disclosure. The result of the negative binomial 
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regression implies that four of the corporate governance mechanisms are significant. 
Governmental ownership has a positive significant effect on the level of human resources 
disclosure (Wald Chi-Square = 3.63) at 10% level of significance. The value of Exp. (B= 0.01) 
implies that for a one-unit increase in the governmental ownership, the difference in the logs 
of expected counts of human resources disclosure is expected to increase by 0.01, given the 
other predictor variables in the model are held constant (Table 7.3). This result provides 
evidence supporting sub hypothesis H15.b: There is a positive association between 
governmental ownership and human resources disclosure.  
The second corporate governance mechanism to be tested is the board of directors’ size. The 
results (as shown in Table 7.3) indicate a positive significant correlation between board size 
and human resources disclosure (Wald Chi-Square = 3.50) at 10% level of significance. The 
table (Table 7.3) also shows that for a one-unit increase in the board of director size, the 
difference in the logs of expected counts of human resources disclosure is expected to increase 
by 2.48, given the other predictor variables in the model are held constant based on the 
Exp.(B=2.48).  
CEO duality is also a significant factor that positively affects the level of human resources 
disclosure (Wald Chi-Square = 2.90) at 10% level of significance (Table 7.3). The Exp. 
(B=0.78) indicates that the difference in the logs of expected counts of human resources 
disclosure is expected to increase by 2.90 for a one-unit increase in the board of director size 
given the other predictor variables in the model are held constant (Table 7.3).  
The final corporate governance mechanism that affects the level of human resources disclosure 
is audit firm size.  However, it has a negative effect (Wald Chai-Square = 3.03) at 10% level 
of significance (Table 7.3). As shown in Table 7.3, the Exp. (B = 0.44) indicates that being 
audited by one of the big-four audit companies increases the probability that the firm will 
voluntarily disclose human resource items, where the logarithms of expected counts of human 
resources disclosure is expected to increase by 0.44, given the other predictor variables in the 
model are held constant. 
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Table 7.5: Summary of all the hypotheses and findings for the determinants of human resourced 
disclosure. 
Explanatory 
variable 
Hypothesis 
No. 
Expected 
sign 
Finding 
sign 
Finding significance Hypothesis status 
Firm 
characteristics 14 +  Partly significant Partly accepted 
Firm size 14.a + + Insignificant (5%) Accepted 
Firm age 14.b + + Significant (1%) Accepted 
ROA 14.c +  Insignificant Rejected 
Leverage 14.d +  Insignificant Rejected 
Corporate 
governance 
mechanism 
15 +  Partly significant Partly accepted 
Managerial 
ownership 15.a +  Insignificant Rejected 
Governmental 
ownership 15.b + + 
Significant 
(10%) Accepted 
Foreign 
ownership 15.c +  insignificant Rejected 
Board size 15.d + + Significant (10%) Accepted 
Board 
independence 15.e +  insignificant Rejected 
CEO duality 15.f + + Significant (10%) Accepted 
Audit firm 
size 15.g + + 
Significant 
(10%) Accepted 
Notes: H12: There is a positive association between firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, return on assets and leverage) 
and the level of environmental disclosure. H12.a: larger firms are more likely to disclose more environmental information 
than smaller firms. H12.b: older firms are more likely to disclose more environmental information than newly established 
firms. H12.c: more profitable firms are more likely to disclose more environmental disclosure than less profitable firm.  
H12.d: firms with higher level of leverage are more likely to disclose more environmental disclosure. H13: there is a 
positive association between corporate governance mechanisms (managerial ownership, governmental ownership, foreign 
ownership, board size, the proportion of independent in the board of directors, CEO duality and audit firm size) and the 
level of environmental disclosure.  H13.a there is a positive association between managerial ownership and environmental 
disclosure. H13.b: there is a positive association between governmental ownership and environmental disclosure. H13.c 
there is a positive association between foreign investment ownership and environmental disclosure. H13.d there is a 
positive association between board of directors size and environmental disclosure. H13.e there is a positive association 
between the proportion of the independent members in the board of directors and environmental disclosure. H13.f there 
is a positive association between the CEO duality and environmental disclosure. H13.gthere is a positive association 
between audit firm size and environmental disclosure.  
The other three corporate governance mechanisms, managerial and foreign investment 
ownership and the proportion of independent members on the board of directors, are 
insignificant in relation to human resources disclosure leading to the rejection of sub 
hypotheses H15.a, H15.c, and H15.e. Thus, the main hypothesis H15 is partly accepted in the 
part related to governmental disclosure, board of directors’ size, CEO duality and audit firm 
size while it is rejected in the part related to the other mechanisms (see Table 7.4).  
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7.5.3 The determinants of product and consumer disclosure  
The third model examines the relationship between products and consumer disclosure as the 
dependent variable and firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, ROA and leverage) and 
corporate governance mechanisms (managerial ownership, governmental ownership, foreign 
ownership, board of directors’ size, the proportion of independent members in the board of 
directors, CEO duality and audit firm size) as the independent variables. This model tests the 
following two main hypotheses:  
H16: There is a positive association between firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, return 
on assets and leverage) and the level of products and consumer disclosure. 
H17: There is a positive association between corporate governance mechanisms (managerial 
ownership, governmental ownership, foreign ownership, board of directors’ size, the 
proportion of independent in the board of directors, CEO duality and audit firm size) and the 
level of products and consumer disclosure.  
The good fit of the model with Pearson Chi-Square (0.79) which is greater than 0.05 (Gray and 
Kinnear 2012; Rice 2007) is shown in Table 7.3. The negative binomial regression model with 
the independent variables was significant with likelihood ratio chi-square equal to 50.39, df 
=11, p < 0.01. Table 7.3 shows the results of running the third model which includes the 
variables of the Saudi firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms (as shown in 
the table below) and products and consumer disclosure.  
The results indicate that only one factor out of all the factors is significant (firm characteristics 
and corporate governance mechanisms) and that is firm age. It can be shown (Table 7.3) that 
there is a significant positive association between firm age and products and consumer 
disclosure (Wald Chi-Square = 5.60) at 5% level of significance. The value of Exp. (B= 2.43) 
indicates that for a one-unit increase in the firm age, the difference in the logs of expected 
counts of products and consumers disclosure is expected to increase by 2.43, given the other 
predictor variables in the model are held constant. This result supports the sub hypothesis 
H16.b: Older firms are more likely to disclose more products and consumer information than 
newly established firms. Thus, the main hypothesis H16 is partly accepted in the part related to 
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firm age. However, all the other sub-hypotheses relating to firm size, ROA, leverage, 
managerial ownership, governmental ownership, foreign ownership, board size, board 
independence, CEO duality and audit firm size are rejected (Table 7.6). Moreover, the main 
hypothesis H17 which tests the association between corporate governance mechanisms and the 
level of products and consumer disclosure is rejected based on the results in Table 7.3.  
Table 7.6: Summary of all the hypotheses and findings for the determinants of products and consumer 
disclosure 
Explanatory 
variable 
Hypothesis 
No. 
Expected sign Finding sign Finding 
significance  
Hypothesis 
status  
Firm 
characteristics 
16 +  Partly 
significant 
Partly 
accepted 
Firm size 16.a +  Insignificant Rejected 
Firm age 16.b + + Significant 
(5%) 
Accepted 
ROA 16.c +  Insignificant Rejected 
Leverage 16.d +  Insignificant Rejected 
Corporate 
governance 
mechanism 
17 +  Insignificant Rejected 
Managerial 
ownership 
17.a +  Insignificant Rejected 
Governmental 
ownership 
17.b +  Insignificant Rejected 
Foreign 
ownership 
17.c +  Insignificant Rejected 
Board size 17.d +  Insignificant Rejected 
Board 
independence 
17.e +  insignificant Rejected 
CEO duality 17.f +  Insignificant Rejected 
Audit firm size 17.g +  Insignificant Rejected 
H12: There is a positive association between firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, return on assets and leverage) 
and the level of environmental disclosure. H12.a: larger firms are more likely to disclose more environmental 
information than smaller firms. H12.b: older firms are more likely to disclose more environmental information 
than newly established firms. H12.c: more profitable firms are more likely to disclose more environmental 
disclosure than less profitable firm.  H12.d: firms with higher level of leverage are more likely to disclose more 
environmental disclosure. H13: there is a positive association between corporate governance mechanisms 
(managerial ownership, governmental ownership, foreign ownership, board size, the proportion of independent 
in the board of directors, CEO duality and audit firm size) and the level of environmental disclosure.  H13.a 
there is a positive association between managerial ownership and environmental disclosure. H13.b: there is a 
positive association between governmental ownership and environmental disclosure. H13.c there is a positive 
association between foreign investment ownership and environmental disclosure. H13.d there is a positive 
association between board of directors size and environmental disclosure. H13.e there is a positive association 
between the proportion of the independent members in the board of directors and environmental disclosure. 
H13.f there is a positive association between the CEO duality and environmental disclosure. H13.gthere is a 
positive association between audit firm size and environmental disclosure.  
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7.5.4 The determinants of community involvement disclosure 
The fourth model focuses on community involvement which investigates the relationship 
between firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, ROA and leverage) and corporate governance 
mechanisms (managerial ownership, governmental ownership, foreign ownership, board of 
directors’ size, the proportion of independent members in the board of directors, CEO duality 
and audit firm size) as the independent variables and community involvement disclosure as the 
dependent variable. The aim of this model is to test hypotheses H18 and H19.   
To test the good fit of the model, Pearson Chi-Square has been checked (0.94) and it is greater 
than 0.05 (Gray and Kinnear 2012; Rice 2007) as shown in Table 7.3. The results of the 
negative binomial regression model with the independent variables was significant with 
likelihood ratio chi-square equal to 113.87, df =11, p < 0.01. The results from running the 
model which include the variables of the Saudi firm characteristics and corporate governance 
mechanisms as shown in Table 7.3, indicate two firm characteristics and one corporate 
governance mechanism are significant.  
Starting with firm characteristics, it can be shown (Table 7.3) that there is a significant positive 
association between firm size and community involvement disclosure (Wald Chi-Square = 
4.97) at 5% level of significance. The value of Exp. (B= 0.42) indicates that for a one-unit 
increase in the firm size, the difference in the logs of expected counts of products and 
consumers disclosure is expected to increase by 0.42, given the other predictor variables in the 
model are held constant. This result supports the sub hypothesis H18.a: Larger firms are more 
likely to disclose more community involvement information than smaller firms.  
Firm age has also been found to be a significant factor that affects the level of environmental 
disclosure (Wald Chi-Square = 12.39) at 1% level of significance. The value of Exp. (B= 1.41) 
implies that for a one-unit increase in the firm age, the difference in the logs of expected counts 
of community involvement disclosure is expected to increase by 1.41, given the other predictor 
variables in the model are held constant (Table 7.3). This result supports sub hypothesis H18.b: 
Older firms are more likely to disclose more community involvement information than newly 
established firms. Firm size and firm age are the only firm characteristics that influence the 
level of community involvement so, in this case, the main hypothesis H18 is partly accepted in 
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the part related to firm size and age and rejected with relation to ROA and leverage (see Table 
7.4).    
Table 7.7: Summary of all the hypotheses and findings for the determinants of community involvement 
disclosure 
Explanatory variable Hypothesis No. 
Expected 
sign 
Finding 
sign 
Finding 
significance 
Hypothesis 
status 
Firm characteristics 18 +  Partly significant Partly accepted 
Firm size 18.a + + Significant (5%) Accepted 
Firm age 18.b + + Significant (1%) Accepted 
ROA 18.c +  Insignificant Rejected 
Leverage 18.d +  Insignificant Rejected 
Corporate governance 
mechanism 19 +  
Partly 
significant Partly accepted 
Managerial ownership 19.a +  Insignificant Rejected 
Governmental ownership 19.b +  Insignificant Rejected 
Foreign ownership 19.c +  Insignificant Rejected 
Board size 19.d +  Insignificant Rejected 
Board independence 19.e + + Significant (10%) Accepted 
CEO duality 19.f +  Insignificant Rejected 
Audit firm size 19.g +  Insignificant Rejected 
H12: There is a positive association between firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, return on assets and leverage) and the 
level of environmental disclosure. H12.a: larger firms are more likely to disclose more environmental information than 
smaller firms. H12.b: older firms are more likely to disclose more environmental information than newly established 
firms. H12.c: more profitable firms are more likely to disclose more environmental disclosure than less profitable firm.  
H12.d: firms with higher level of leverage are more likely to disclose more environmental disclosure. H13: there is a 
positive association between corporate governance mechanisms (managerial ownership, governmental ownership, 
foreign ownership, board size, the proportion of independent in the board of directors, CEO duality and audit firm size) 
and the level of environmental disclosure.  H13.a there is a positive association between managerial ownership and 
environmental disclosure. H13.b: there is a positive association between governmental ownership and environmental 
disclosure. H13.c there is a positive association between foreign investment ownership and environmental disclosure. 
H13.d there is a positive association between board of directors size and environmental disclosure. H13.e there is a 
positive association between the proportion of the independent members in the board of directors and environmental 
disclosure. H13.f there is a positive association between the CEO duality and environmental disclosure. H13.gthere is 
a positive association between audit firm size and environmental disclosure.  
Regarding the corporate governance mechanisms of Saudi listed companies, only one 
mechanism has been found significant when running the model in relation to community 
involvement disclosure. The proportion of independent members on the board of directors has 
a positive significant effect on the level of environmental disclosure (Wald Chi-Square = 2.86) 
at 10% level of significance. The value of Exp. (B= 0.01) implies that for a one-unit increase 
in the governmental ownership, the difference in the logs of expected counts of environmental 
disclosure is expected to increase by 0.01, given the other predictor variables in the model are 
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held constant (Table 7.3). This result leads to the acceptance of sub hypothesis H19.e: There 
is a positive association between the proportion of independent members on the board of 
directors and community involvement disclosure. All the other corporate governance 
mechanisms are insignificant in relation to community involvement disclosure leading to a 
rejection of sub hypotheses H18.a, H18.b, H18.c, H18.d, H13.f and H13.g. Thus, the main 
hypothesis H13 is partly accepted in the part related to the proportion of independent members 
on the board of directors and rejected in relation to all other mechanisms (see Table 7.4).  
7.5.5 The determinants of the level of economic disclosure 
Economic disclosure in the fifth category in the CSED index and Table 7.3 shows the results 
of the model which examines the association between economic disclosure  as the dependent 
variable and firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, ROA and leverage) and corporate 
governance mechanisms (managerial ownership, governmental ownership, foreign ownership, 
board of directors’ size, the proportion of independent members in the board of directors, CEO 
duality and audit firm size) as the independent variables. This model tests two main hypotheses 
H20 and H21.  
Table 7.3 shows a good fit of the model with Pearson Chi-Square (0.71) which is greater than 
0.05 (Gray and Kinnear 2012; Rice 2007). The negative binomial regression model with the 
independent variables was significant with likelihood ratio chi-square equal to 60.50, df =11, 
p < 0.01. The results from the negative binomial regression (as shown in Table 7.3) which 
includes the variables of the Saudi firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms 
indicate that only firm characteristics have an effect on environmental disclosure. It can be 
shown (Table 7.3) that there is a significant positive association between firm age and 
economic disclosure (Wald Chi-Square = 2.83) at 10% level of significance. The value of Exp. 
(B= 0.55) implies that for a one-unit increase in the firm age, the difference in the logs of 
expected counts of economic disclosure is expected to increase by 0.55, given the other 
predictor variables in the model are held constant. This result leads to the acceptance of sub 
hypothesis H20.b: Older firms are more likely to disclose more economic information than 
newly established firms.  
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Moreover, profitability (ROA) is also positively significant with economic disclosure (Wald 
Chi-Square = 4.72) at 5% level of significance. The value of Exp. (B= 0.04) indicates that for 
a one-unit increase in the ROA, the difference in the logs of expected counts of economic 
disclosure is expected to increase by 0.04, given the other predictor variables in the model are 
held constant. This result provides evidence to accept sub-hypothesis H20.c: More profitable 
firms are more likely to disclose more economic information than less profitable firms.  
Leverage also has a positive significant effect on economic disclosure (Wald Chi-Square = 
4.78) at 5% level of significance. The value of Exp. (B= 1.02) implies that for a one-unit 
increase in the level of leverage, the difference in the logs of expected counts of economic 
disclosure is expected to increase by 1.02, given the other predictor variables in the model are 
held constant. This result supports sub-hypothesis H20.d: Firms with higher levels of 
disclosure are more likely to disclose more economic information than firms with lower levels 
of disclosure. The above discussion partly supports the main hypothesis H20. Related to firm 
age, ROA and leverage but not firm size while rejecting H21 as there is no evidence found for 
any association between corporate governance mechanisms and economic disclosure (see, 
Table 7.3 and Table 7.4).    
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Table 7.8: Summary of all the hypotheses and findings for the determinants of economic disclosure 
Explanatory 
variable 
Hypothesis 
No. 
Expected 
sign 
Finding sign Finding 
significance  
Hypothesis 
status  
Firm 
characteristics 
20 +  Partly 
significant 
Partly 
Accepted 
Firm size 20.a +  Insignificant Rejected 
Firm age 20.b + + Significant Accepted 
ROA 20.c + + Significant Accepted 
Leverage 20.d + + Significant Accepted 
Corporate 
governance 
mechanism 
21 +  Insignificant Rejected 
Managerial 
ownership 
21:a +  Insignificant Rejected 
Governmental 
ownership 
21.b +  Insignificant Rejected 
Foreign 
ownership 
21.c +  Insignificant Rejected 
Board size 21.d +  Insignificant Rejected 
Board 
independence 
21.e +  Insignificant Rejected 
CEO duality 21.f +  Insignificant Rejected 
Audit firm size 21.g +  Insignificant Rejected 
H12: There is a positive association between firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, return on assets and leverage) and the 
level of environmental disclosure. H12.a: larger firms are more likely to disclose more environmental information than smaller 
firms. H12.b: older firms are more likely to disclose more environmental information than newly established firms. H12.c: 
more profitable firms are more likely to disclose more environmental disclosure than less profitable firm.  H12.d: firms with 
higher level of leverage are more likely to disclose more environmental disclosure. H13: there is a positive association between 
corporate governance mechanisms (managerial ownership, governmental ownership, foreign ownership, board size, the 
proportion of independent in the board of directors, CEO duality and audit firm size) and the level of environmental disclosure.  
H13.a there is a positive association between managerial ownership and environmental disclosure. H13.b: there is a positive 
association between governmental ownership and environmental disclosure. H13.c there is a positive association between 
foreign investment ownership and environmental disclosure. H13.d there is a positive association between board of directors 
size and environmental disclosure. H13.e there is a positive association between the proportion of the independent members 
in the board of directors and environmental disclosure. H13.f there is a positive association between the CEO duality and 
environmental disclosure. H13.gthere is a positive association between audit firm size and environmental disclosure.  
7.5.6 The determinants of the level of general disclosure 
The last category in the CSED index is general disclosure. The general disclosure model 
examines the relationship between general disclosure and firm characteristics and corporate 
governance mechanisms as shown in Table 7.3 to test the two hypotheses H22 and H23.   
This model has a good fit with Pearson Chi-Square (0.96) which is greater than 0.05 (Gray and 
Kinnear 2012; Rice 2007). The negative binomial regression model with the independent 
variables was significant with likelihood ratio chi-square equal to 18.19, df =11, p (0, 07). The 
results of the model, which includes variables of the Saudi firm characteristics and corporate 
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governance mechanisms as shown in the table below (Table 7.3), indicate that there is no 
association between any of the firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, ROA and leverage) and 
general disclosure. These results lead to a rejection of both the main and the sub-hypothesis 
related to firm characteristics and general disclosure (H22, H22.a, H22.b, H22.c and H22d).  
On the other hand, two of the corporate governance mechanisms are positively correlated to 
general disclosure - governmental ownership and the proportion of independent members on 
the board of directors. Governmental ownership is the first mechanism that has a significant 
positive effect on general disclosure (Wald Chi-Square = 3.00) at 10% level of significance. 
The value of Exp. (B= 0.02) indicates that for a one-unit increase in the governmental 
ownership, the difference in the logs of expected counts of general disclosure is expected to 
increase by 0.02, given the other predictor variables in the model are held constant. This result 
provides evidence to accept sub-hypothesis H23.b: There is a positive association between 
governmental ownership and general disclosure.  
The proportion of independent members on the board of directors also has a significant positive 
association with general disclosure (Wald Chi-Square = 4.56) at 5% level of significance. The 
value of Exp. (B= 0.01) implies that for a one-unit increase in the proportion of independent 
members on the board of directors, the difference in the logs of expected counts of general 
disclosure is expected to increase by 0.01, given the other predictor variables in the model are 
held constant. This result supports the sub hypothesis H23.e: There is a positive association 
between the proportion of independent members on the board of directors and general 
disclosure. These results partly support the main hypothesis H23 which tests the effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms on general disclosure (see Table 7.9). 
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Table 7.9: Summary of all of the hypotheses and findings for the determinants of environmental disclosure 
model 
Explanatory variable Hypothesis 
No. 
Expected 
sign 
Finding sign Finding 
significance  
Hypothesis 
status  
Firm characteristics 22 +  Insignificant Rejected 
Firm size 22.a + + Insignificant Rejected 
Firm age 22.b + + Insignificant Accepted 
ROA 22.c +  Insignificant  Accepted 
Leverage 22.d +  Insignificant Accepted 
Corporate 
governance 
23 +  Partly 
significant 
Partly   
accepted 
Managerial 
ownership 
23.a +  Insignificant Rejected 
Governmental 
ownership 
23.b + + Significant 
(10%) 
Accepted 
Foreign ownership 23.c +  Insignificant Rejected 
Board size 23.d +  Insignificant Rejected 
Board independence 23.e +  Significant  
(5%) 
Rejected 
CEO duality 23.f +  Insignificant Rejected 
Audit firm size 23.g +  Insignificant Rejected 
H12: There is a positive association between firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, return on assets and leverage) and the 
level of environmental disclosure. H12.a: larger firms are more likely to disclose more environmental information than smaller 
firms. H12.b: older firms are more likely to disclose more environmental information than newly established firms. H12.c: 
more profitable firms are more likely to disclose more environmental disclosure than less profitable firm.  H12.d: firms with 
higher level of leverage are more likely to disclose more environmental disclosure. H13: there is a positive association between 
corporate governance mechanisms (managerial ownership, governmental ownership, foreign ownership, board size, the 
proportion of independent in the board of directors, CEO duality and audit firm size) and the level of environmental disclosure.  
H13.a there is a positive association between managerial ownership and environmental disclosure. H13.b: there is a positive 
association between governmental ownership and environmental disclosure. H13.c there is a positive association between 
foreign investment ownership and environmental disclosure. H13.d there is a positive association between board of directors 
size and environmental disclosure. H13.e there is a positive association between the proportion of the independent members 
in the board of directors and environmental disclosure. H13.f there is a positive association between the CEO duality and 
environmental disclosure. H13.gthere is a positive association between audit firm size and environmental disclosure.  
 
7.6 Discussion of the results 
From the discussions above, it can be shown that firm age, firm size, profitability (ROA) and 
leverage are effective firm characteristics that affect, at different levels, the CSED categories 
as shown in Table 7.10: summary of the determinants of CSED categories as well as 
governmental ownership board of directors’ size, the proportion of independent members on 
the board of directors, CEO duality and audit firm size.  
Firm age is the most significant determinant as it positively affects five of the CSED 
categories across Saudi listed companies, these being environmental disclosure, human 
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resource disclosure and community involvement disclosure at 1% level of significance and 
products and consumer disclosure at 5% level and economic disclosure at the 10% level. Firm 
age is the only factor that influences products and consumer disclosure. The positive correlation 
between firm age and the five categories (Table 7.10: summary of the determinants of CSED 
categories) as part of CSED, has been suggested by stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory and 
institutional theory, as discussed in Chapter Three. Stakeholder groups of older firms have 
higher expectations than newly established firms and this is what the stakeholder theory 
suggests. Stakeholders expect older firms to be environmentally responsible and to pay more 
attention to employees, consumers, product quality and community involvement and, finally, 
to contribute to the economy. Moreover, older companies are keen to maintain the legitimacy 
that they have gained.  By reporting information about CSED categories, firms can gain, 
maintain or repair legitimacy and this is what the legitimacy theory suggests (Alsaeed, 2006).  
The institutional theory supports the idea that older firms usually influence newly established 
companies and therefore they pay more attention to the environment, community, employees, 
consumers and economic involvement in to gain a competitive advantage. In addition, there is 
the notion that older companies are constantly under governmental and media pressure (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1986). Looking at the three theories discussed, across Saudi listed companies, 
older companies report more information regarding the environmental, human resource, 
products and consumer, community involvement and economic categories than newly 
established companies.  
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Table 7.10: summary of the determinants of CSED categories 
Firm characteristics Corporate governance mechanisms 
 FS FA ROA Lev Man Own 
Gov 
Own 
Forin 
Own BS Bind CEO 
Aud 
FS 
ED 0.71*** 1.96*** - - - 0.01* - - - - - 
HRD 0.36** 0.88*** - - - 0.01* - 2.48* - -0.78* 0.44* 
PCD - 2.43** - - - - - - - - - 
CID 0.42** 1.41*** - - - - - - .0.01* - - 
EcD - 0.55* 0.04** 1.02** - - - - 0.01** - - 
GD - - - - - 0.02* - - - - - 
Total 3 5 1 1 0 3 0 1 2 1 1 
Notes: the dependent variables are; environmental disclosure (ED), human resource disclosure (HRD), product and consumer 
disclosure (PCD), community involvement disclosure (CID), economic disclosure (ECD) and other general disclosure 
(GD). The independent variables are defined as follows: the natural logarithm of the corporate social and environmental 
disclosure(lgCSED), the natural logarithm of firm size (lgFS), the natural logarithm of firm age (lgFA)  return on asset 
(ROA), leverage, managers ownership (ManOwn),, foreign investment ownership(ForInOwn), government ownership 
(GovOwn), the natural logarithm of the Board of directors size (lgBS), the percentage of independence members in the 
board of directors (Ind), CEO duality (CEODual), Audit firm size (AuditFS), chapter four presents the detailed 
definitions of variables employed.  
***denotes significant correlation P < 0.01, **denotes significant correlation P < 0.5 and *denotes significant correlation P 
< .1 (spearman’s correlation) 
Firm size is the second most affective characteristic, influencing three categories, 
environmental disclosure at 1% level of significance, human resources disclosure and 
community involvement disclosure at 5% level (Table 7.10). The result of firm size in relation 
to theories is very similar to firm age and supports the argument that larger firms disclose more 
social and environmental disclosure as explained by stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory and 
institutional theory (Kamal Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003). Larger firms report more 
environmental, human resources and community involvement information than smaller firms 
because they need to satisfy their stakeholder groups who, being large companies, expect more 
disclosure from them. Additionally, larger firms are expected to provide their employees with 
more benefits than smaller firms so they therefore report more comprehensively to confirm that 
they are acting as expected.  
Moreover, the  legitimacy theory suggests that larger companies care more about their 
legitimacy than smaller firms (Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Reverte, 2009) in  addition to well 
larger firms leading smaller firms, an argument put forward by the institutional theory (mimetic 
isomorphism). Larger Saudi listed companies report more environmental, human resource and 
community involvement information than smaller firms.  This is because being 
environmentally responsible, being involving in community activities and paying more 
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attention to employees are time and resource consuming activities that smaller firms may find 
some difficulty dealing with.  
Furthermore, the Saudi government puts greater pressure on larger firms to be more socially 
responsible than smaller firms (coercive isomorphism). For example, as regards job 
nationalisation (Saudisation), the percentage of Saudisation depends on the size of a company 
and the number of employees. As a result, larger companies disclose more social and 
environmental information in order to be entitled to receive government benefits and rewards.  
Profitability (ROA) and leverage have the same level of effect as both of them determine 
one category that being economic disclosure at 5% level of significance (Table 7.10). Both 
characteristics have been found to be positively correlated with economic disclosure. This 
might be because contributing to the economy and reporting that contribution show how strong 
the company is.  
In the case of more profitable companies, management decide to disclose more social and 
environmental information in order to prove their ability to maximise shareholder value and 
thus increase managerial compensation (Alsaeed, 2006). Additionally, and based on the 
stakeholder theory, companies with high profitability disclose more voluntary information, 
including social and environmental disclosure, to show stakeholders and the public their 
achievements and to promote a positive impression of their performance (Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2008; Reverte, 2009).  
In the context of economic disclosure, government pressure on companies with higher 
profitability might be greater than that placed on less profitable companies. Therefore, more 
profitable companies report more on economic issues such as job nationalization (Saudisation). 
This argument is supported by the institutional theory (coercive isomorphism). Furthermore, 
more profitable companies tend to report more social and environmental disclosure, 
particularly economic disclosure (Saudisation), to prove to society that they are capable of 
meeting  societal expectations and needs and that they  legitimately operate in society (Roszaini 
M. Haniffa and Cooke, 2005) as proposed by the legitimacy theory. According to the agency 
theory, managers of firms with high profitability tend to show their achievements in detail 
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because this reflects on their reputation, image and salary. (Gallego-A lvarez and Quina-
Custodio, 2016).      
In the context of leverage, companies with a higher level of leverage tend to report more social 
and environmental information to appeal to creditors, stakeholders and investment trusts. This 
argument is supported by the stakeholder theory as well as the legitimacy theory and agency 
theory. They also disclose more social and environmental information, particularly regarding 
economics, to show that they are legitimate to operate, although they may be high in debt.  This 
is what the legitimacy theory proposes.   
Moreover, as suggested by the agency theory, agency costs grow with an increase of the level 
of leverage (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012). Therefore, managers of companies with high levels 
of leverage disclose more information including social and environmental information in order  
to lower agency cost (Alsaeed, 2006; Gallego-A lvarez and Quina-Custodio, 2016). When the 
debt level increases, a conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors results so, and to 
prevent this from happening, creditors seek more information in order to reduce information 
asymmetry and to make sure that the company will be able to meet its debts in the future 
(Gallego-A lvarez and Quina-Custodio, 2016).   
Governmental ownership is the most dominant factor that influences the level of disclosure 
of three categories, these being environmental disclosure, human resources disclosure and 
general disclosure, all at 1% level of significance (Table 7.10).  This result is expected in a 
developing country such as Saudi Arabia where the government has a significant influence on 
a company’s plans and actions. Companies with higher governmental ownership are more 
likely to disclose environmental, human resources and general disclosure. Based on the 
stakeholder theory, Saudi listed companies pay attention to governmental laws and regulations 
especially if the company is owned by the government itself.  In addition, there is a greater 
demand for accountability and transparency for companies under government ownership. 
Governmental ownership is the only factor that affects general disclosure as it includes 
disclosure and transparency standards.  
The proportion of independent members on the board of directors is the second 
significant factor affecting two categories, economic disclosure at 5% level of significance and 
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community involvement disclosure at 10% level (Table 7.10). Saudi listed companies with a 
higher number of independent members on the board of directors tend to disclose more 
economic and community involvement information. Based on the agency theory, the existence 
of independent members on the board of directors places pressure on management to ensure 
that they operate successfully as well as satisfying stakeholders’ requirements. They control 
managers’ opportunism to protect shareholders and reduce agency costs and information 
asymmetry (Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
because they can control the actions of managers about companies’ strategies and plans (Said 
et al., 2009). It is argued that the existence of independent board members enhances 
accountability, transparency and CSED. They encourage managers to act in alignment with the 
norms and values of society to ensure their legitimacy, as implied by the legitimacy theory. 
Therefore, an association is found between the existence of independent members on the board 
of directors and community involvement and economic disclosure. In Saudi Arabia, the 
phenomenon of independent board members is considered new (Mandourah 2012).  According 
to the Saudi Corporate Governance Code, independent board members shall not be less than 
two members or one-third of the members, whichever is greater (article 12: e). 
Board size, CEO duality and audit firm size affect one category, human resource 
disclosure at 10% level of significance (Table 7.10).  However, CEO duality has a negative 
effect which explains the argument that CEO role duality negatively affects the control system, 
presents a conflict of interest and reduces the level of accountability (Michelon and Parbonetti, 
2014). According to Roberts et al. (2005) it is more effective for the company to separate the 
CEO and Chairman roles, as each individual will be able to do each job with minimum conflict 
(Albassam, 2014). Moreover, companies which separate the two roles achieve greater quality 
in decision making concerning stakeholders than companies which prefer CEO role duality (J. 
Li et al., 2008). The agency theory supports the separation of the roles of CEO and Chairman 
suggesting that the separation  increases the efficiency of the control system which, in turn, 
protects stakeholders’ rights and results in better disclosure quality (Yaseen Al-Janadi et al., 
2013). Therefore, companies who separate the roles of CEO and Chairman disclose more 
human resource information than companies with the CEO occupying dual roles.  
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In the context of large audit firms, there is a positive association between audit firm size and 
human resource disclosure. Large audit companies are very concerned about their reputation 
and therefore are more willing to associate with firms that disclose more information in their 
published financial reports (Alsaeed, 2006; Depoers, 2000). The agency theory is concerned 
with audit quality since providing more reliable and credible information in reports reduces 
agency costs and using big audit firms enhances the quality of disclosure (Al-Janadi et al., 
2013; Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This 
argument is consistent with the concept of the legitimacy theory in that the large audit firms 
consider their legitimacy and therefore request a higher level of information reporting including 
CSED.  
7.7 Chapter summary  
In conclusion, this chapter examines the determinants of CSED categories that are in the CSED 
index. Having examined the social and environmental information reported by 157 Saudi listed 
companies, the results show that all firm characteristics in this study (firm size, firm age, ROA 
and leverage), in addition to some corporate governance mechanisms (governmental 
ownership, board of directors size, board independence, CEO duality and audit firm) affect the 
level of social and environmental disclosure categories.  
The negative binomial results indicate that firm age is the most influential factor that 
determines the level of five categories, environmental, human resources, products and 
consumers, community involvement and economic disclosure. Firm age is, in fact, the only 
factor that affects products and consumer disclosure.  
In second place, firm size and governmental ownership both have an effect on environmental 
disclosure and human resources disclosure. While firm size affects the level of community 
disclosure, governmental ownership affects economic disclosure. The proportion of 
independents on the board of directors affects two categories, community involvement and 
economy disclosure. Finally, CEO duality and audit firm size affect only one area, which is 
human resources disclosure.  
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In other words, our results show that human resources, the most reported category, is affected 
by the largest number of determinants (firm size, firm age, governmental ownership, board of 
directors’ size, CEO duality and audit firm size), followed by economic disclosure which is 
influenced by four determinants (firm age, ROA, leverage and board independence). 
Environmental disclosure and community involvement disclosure are influenced by the same 
number of factors, three factors (firm size and firm age for both categories, governmental 
ownership for environmental disclosure and board independence for community involvement). 
Products and consumer disclosure is affected by firm age as well as general disclosure which 
is affected by governmental ownership.  
The results of this chapter indicate that, in Saudi Arabia, social and environmental disclosure 
across all the categories is still to be considered at a basic level. Although it is a voluntary 
activity, most of the information reported as social and environmental activities, such as human 
resources and economic disclosure, is on an enforced basis or is based on a cultural or religious 
foundation such as community involvement. There are no rules or guidelines that companies 
may follow when performing or reporting social and environmental activities.             
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Chapter 8: Research conclusion  
8.1 Introduction  
This study investigates corporate social and environmental disclosure and its categories in the 
Saudi business context, in addition to the determinants of the level of disclosure. As discussed 
in Chapter One and Four, this study has employed a quantitative method to: (i) investigate the 
extent and nature of CSED in Saudi-listed companies; (ii) examine the determinants of CSED, 
which are the firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms; (iii) examine the 
determinants of each category of CSED (environmental, human resource, product and 
consumer, community involvement, economic and general social disclosures), which are the 
firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms. The study employed content 
analysis technique by using the annual reports of the Saudi-listed companies.  
This chapter seeks to achieve two main objectives. Firstly, to present a summary of the 
empirical findings of the thesis regarding both the extent and nature of the CSED and shed light 
on the determinants of CSED and its categories. Secondly, to highlight the contribution and 
implications of the research findings, as well as the research’s limitations and suggestions for 
future research. This chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 reiterates the research 
questions and the methodology employed to answer the research questions. Section 8.3 
presents a summary of the research empirical findings of Chapter 5, 6 and 7 with relation to 
the four theories. Section 8.4 highlights the research’s contribution and the results’ practical 
implications. Section 8.5 discusses the limitations of the research. The last section 8.6 presents 
suggestions for future research. 
8.2 Overview of the thesis   
The distinctiveness of the Saudi business context and the significance of its economy both 
provide a motivation for investigating CSED practice. As discussed in Chapter Two, Saudi 
Arabia is a developing country which has institutional, regulatory and contextual 
characteristics that are similar to Islamic and Arab countries (Al-Matari et al., 2012; Hussainey 
and Al-Nodel, 2008). Therefore, Islamic perspectives and values affect life activities in Saudi 
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Arabia, such as the economic system, laws and regulations, and business (Abdul Rahman, 
1998; Kamla, 2009; Sarkar, 2008). Saudi Arabia is one of the most competitive economies and 
the world’s fastest reforming business environment. It has achieved an important economic 
position at international level as a member of the G20 (Al-Matari et al., 2012) and is the largest 
economy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (Al-Filali and Gallarotti, 2012; Al-
Matari et al., 2012, Piesse et al., 2012). Additionally, it is the largest free market in (MENA) 
region (SAGIA, 2013). As a result of the previous factors that give Saudi a unique position, 
some of the Saudi regulations have been changed, such as, the accounting profession (Al-
Rehaily, 1992), corporate governance code (Albassam, 2014), investment policies and stock 
market regimes (Tadawul, 2015). Some of these regulations and codes require companies to 
pay more attention to accountability, transparency and voluntary disclosure. Corporate social 
and environmental disclosure (CSED) is one of the voluntary disclosures that is expected to 
increase due to the recent development and growth that have taken place in Saudi Arabia. Thus, 
the main aim of this study is to investigate CSED practice in Saudi Arabia. 
This thesis has been organised into eight chapters. Chapter One is the research introduction, 
which provides a brief background of the research, as well as the motivations for conducting 
this research. Chapter One also presents the research aim, objectives and research questions. 
Chapter Two presents the context of Saudi Arabia, highlighting the political and economic 
systems, in addition to the Saudi culture. It sheds light on the accounting and finance system, 
corporate social disclosure and corporate governance framework. Chapter Three identifies the 
key concepts of corporate social responsibility and corporate social and environmental 
disclosure in general and in Saudi Arabia. Chapter Three also discussed the relevant CSED 
theories, which are stakeholder, legitimacy, institutional and agency theories. It also discusses 
a review of the related literature, which includes developing and developed countries, and 
empirical literature on the determinants of CSED in general and CSED categories in particular.  
The research questions are posed in Chapter Three and the related hypotheses are presented. 
Chapter Four discusses the research methodology, which includes the research paradigm 
(positivism) and the philosophical assumptions. The chapter also discusses the research 
quantitative method and explains the data collection process and the used statistical analysis 
methods. Chapter Five presents from the descriptive statistics the results of the extent of CSED, 
as well as the nature of CSED, which includes the categories and the information reported by 
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Saudi-listed companies. Chapter Six examines the determinants of CSED, which are the firm 
characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms, by presenting the descriptive analysis 
of the determinants of CSED, in addition to the empirical findings and results of the 
multivariate regression analysis. Chapter Seven examines the determinants of each category of 
CSED, which are the firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms. It also 
presents the empirical findings and the results of the negative binomial regression analysis. 
Chapter Eight is the final chapter and presents a summary of the findings of the research, as 
well as the contribution and the practical implications. It also discusses the limitations of the 
study and offers suggestions for future research. 
8.3 Findings and their Theoretical Justifications  
This study has adopted multi-theoretical perspectives, based on the view that there is no one 
single theory that can be employed to justify and explain the social and environmental 
disclosure findings on its own. It uses four theories to explain CSED phenomena in Saudi 
Arabia: stakeholder, legitimacy, institutional and agency theory. These theories are the most 
common theories in addressing CSED (Deegan and Unerman, 2006) (for more details see 
Chapter Three). The next sub-sections will discuss the findings of this research under each 
research question, which are justified with the assistance of the previously mentioned theories.   
8.3.1 Research Question 1: What is the extent and nature of the social and 
environmental information that is reported by the Saudi-listed 
companies?    
Research question 1 aims to address parts of the two research objectives. The first objective is 
to examine the extent of the CSED by using content analysis to analyse the annual reports of 
the Saudi-listed companies. The second objective is to analyse the nature of the CSED in terms 
of the type of categories that have been reported by Saudi Arabian-listed companies. In order 
to address these objectives, an index has been constructed to investigate the CSED practice in 
Saudi Arabia. This index includes six main categories, which are environment, human 
resources, product and consumer, community involvement, economic and other social 
disclosure. To examine the extent and nature of CSED, descriptive statistical analysis has been 
258 
 
 
done and the results indicate that the majority of Saudi-listed companies disclose at least one item 
about their social and environmental activities (70% of the companies). This result indicates there 
is an increase in Saudi-listed companies’ awareness of CSED and they are cognizant of the 
importance of its contribution to the society and community in which they are operating, and 
their obligation to report their contributions43.  
The three categories reported the most by Saudi-listed companies, and so have the greatest 
emphasis is placed on them, are human resources issues (e.g. training and development, employee 
pay and benefit etc.), which is reported by 41% of the companies, followed by community 
involvement (e.g. education and training contribution, donation, public health and safety 
contribution etc.), reported by 24%, and economic disclosure (e.g. economic performance, job 
nationalisation etc.), by 20%. (For details, see Chapter 6). These three categories are related to 
government regulations that could place pressure on companies. Additionally, since community 
involvement comes in second place, it is clear that when it comes to reporting, Saudi Arabia’s 
status as a traditional Islamic country affects the nature of CSED.  
In the context of human resource disclosure, employees are considered as powerful stakeholders 
that companies pay attention to when performing and reporting, and this is consistent with 
stakeholder theory. Aspects that companies consider include achieving employee loyalty, 
lowering employee turnover rates, retaining and attracting good employees. Legitimacy theory 
suggests that companies are confirming their legitimacy by reporting on human resource 
information. This category is the most frequently reported by Saudi-listed companies and the 
result is consistent with previous studies that have been conducted in developing countries 
(Alsaeed, 2006; Belal, 2001; Gray et al., 2001; Guthrie and Parker, 1990; Ratanajongkol et al., 
2006). Additionally, a significant number of government enforcement regulations fall under the 
human resource category that includes aspects, such as the minimum wage, working hours and 
the retirement system. According to institutional theory (coercive isomorphism), companies 
report human resource information in order to prove their regulatory compliance to the 
                                                 
43 This study depends on one source of data which is the annual reports. By looking at stand-alone report of one 
of the socially responsible companies, it can be shown that more reporting on social and environmental activities. 
This could increase the level of CSED in the Saudi context.     
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government. Peer pressure might also be responsible for the high percentage of Saudi-listed 
companies that report human resource information. Furthermore, another institution 
isomorphism (mimetic isomorphism) places pressure on companies to report human resource 
information so that they can successfully gain a competitive advantage. Consequently, they can 
both attract and retain good employees.       
As mentioned previously, community involvement disclosure was the second most reported 
category by Saudi listed companies. This finding is expected in a developing Islamic country 
and traditional culture where group rights are prioritised over those of individuals and 
generosity is one of the common behaviours.  According to legitimacy theory, companies use 
this type of information and activities to prove that they are capable of meeting both relative 
stakeholders and societal expectations and have the legitimacy to operate. By reporting their 
community involvement information, companies are also demonstrating to the government that 
their activities are aligned with government plans and strategies. This argument is supported by 
institutional theory (coercive isomorphism). Regarding donations to authorised charities, the 
amount that is donated to charities by companies is deducted from the amount of zakat and 
income tax that the company pay to the Authority of Zakat and Taxation from their profits. The 
disclosure of community contributions has a positive effect on both a company’s reputation and 
image and leads to a competitive advantage. This argument is supported by institutional theory 
(mimetic isomorphism).     
Economic disclosure is the third category reported by Saudi-listed companies. This category 
includes job nationalisation (Saudisation), which is the most frequently reported issue and has 
been reported by 87 Saudi-listed companies (56% of the reporting companies). The Ministry of 
Labour has encouraged the nationalisation of jobs by hiring new employees or replacing foreign 
employees to decrease unemployment rates. Furthermore, they impose fines on companies that 
do not comply with the regulations, while rewarding companies that are complying. According 
to institutional theory (coercive isomorphism), companies choose to disclose this category 
because of pressure being placed on them by the government. Legitimacy theory also suggests 
that companies disclosed this category to prove they are contributing to the economy and 
playing their part in solving national and international issues, and therefore have the legitimacy 
to operate.  
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On the other hand, the environmental disclosure category is not popular in the annual reports 
of the Saudi-listed companies’ (7% of the total disclosure). The majority of companies that 
reported this category were industrial companies that have a direct or indirect effect on the 
environment. The implementation of this category is considered to be uneconomical, since 
applying environmentally friendly operating systems, including equipment, is said to incur 
significant expenses. Companies that exhibit a greater awareness of environmental issues when 
operating are considered to be a new but growing phenomenon. Generally, products and 
consumer disclosure are reported the least (at 4% and 3%). 
Together with the institutional pressure that is posed by regulations, competitors, international 
standards and the status of Saudi Arabia as a traditional Islamic country, these results indicate 
there has been a significant increase in the level of CSED in Saudi Arabia. International pressure 
comes from the international standards and regulations that companies are required to comply 
with in some cases, which could explain the low mean of the level of CSED (7 information 
items). Although companies are aware of the importance of CSED, they choose to disclose a 
low number of items. This could be due to the absence of regulations and codes that help to 
shape CSED practice in Saudi Arabia. While this research question investigates the extent and 
nature of CSED in Saudi Arabia, the second question empirically examines the determinants of 
CSED by Saudi-listed companies, which will be discussed in the next sub-section.    
8.3.2 Research Question 2: What are the determinants of the level of CSED 
reported by Saudi-listed companies? 
The second research question aims to address the other parts of the study objective, which are 
related to investigating what are the determinants of the level of CSED in general. Under this 
research question, there are two sub-questions. The first one is related to firm characteristics, 
which aims to examine the effect of specific such characteristics (e.g., firm size, firm age, 
profitability (ROA) and leverage) on the level of CSED in Saudi Arabia. RQ2.a: Do the 
corporate characteristics of Saudi Arabian-listed companies affect the level of CSED? The 
second sub-question is related to corporate governance and aims to examine the effect of 
specific corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., ownership, board size, board independence, 
CEO duality and audit firm size) on the level of CSED in Saudi Arabia. RQ2.b: Do corporate 
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governance mechanisms of Saudi Arabian listed companies affect the level of the CSED? Based 
on previous studies and the determinants of CSED and related theories, 11 hypotheses were 
developed (for details, see Chapter 3). These variables were predicted to have an influence on 
the level of CSED when the hypothesis and the model were being developed. The model aims 
to investigate the determinants of CSED in Saudi Arabia uses a sample of 157 Saudi-listed 
companies.  
A descriptive statistical analysis and multiple regression analysis were carried out to investigate 
the predicted influence. The findings of the regression analysis were presented in Chapter 6 
and are summarised in Table 6.14. The results are in line with previous studies, indicating that 
all four of the firm characteristics (H1, H2, H3 and H4) are significant; firm size (for example, 
see: Branco and Rodrigues 2008; Muttakin and Khan, 2014; Hussainey et al., 2011; Habbash, 
2015), firm age (for example, see: Muttakin and Khan, 2014; Skouloudis et al, 2013; Habbash, 
2015), profitability (ROA) (for example, see: Kansal et al., 2014; Muttakin and Khan, 2014; 
Skouloudis et al., 2013) and leverage (for example, see: Habbash, 2015; Esa and Ghazali, 2012; 
Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Said et al., 2009). These findings are justified by the legitimacy, 
stakeholder, institutional and agency theories.  
According to stakeholder theory, firm size, firm age, profitability and leverage are expected to 
have a positive correlation with the level of CSED. Stakeholder groups of larger firms have 
greater expectations that need to be satisfied and place greater pressure than the stakeholders 
of smaller firms do (Roberts 1992, Meek et al., 1995). Additionally, older firms have more 
experience than newly established firms do in dealing with stakeholders’ needs, the media and 
government rules and regulations. Furthermore, the stakeholders of old firms have higher 
expectations and so older firms disclose more social and environmental information to satisfy 
their stakeholders’ needs. Moreover, managers of firms with large profits tend to disclose more 
social and environmental information to persuade stakeholders of their ability to maximise 
shareholder value and the companies’ achievements, which leads to an increase in 
compensation (Alsaeed, 2006). Furthermore, companies with a higher level of leverage are 
more concerned about satisfying stakeholders, including creditors, investors and shareholders, 
and so provide the information they require (Alsaeed, 2006). Creditors require a higher level 
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of disclosure from firms with high leverage to protect their funds (Jensen, 1986), as explained 
by stakeholder theory. 
Based on legitimacy theory, larger firms are expected to disclose more social and 
environmental information in order to maintain their legitimacy and good reputation (Alsaeed, 
2006). Larger firms, like older ones, are expected to disclose more social and environmental 
information as they have built their legitimacy throughout the years they have been in operation 
and are keen to maintain this legitimacy and not lose it. Moreover, managers of high-profit 
companies promote a positive image by disclosing social and environmental information to 
maintain both their legitimacy and good image (Branco and Roderigues, 2008; Reverte, 2009). 
Additionally, companies with a higher level of leverage aim to prove to stakeholders, and 
especially creditors, they are legitimate by providing more social and environmental 
information.  
The government, the media and public groups give more attention to disclosure carried out by 
larger firms than they do to disclosure by smaller firms (coercive and normative isomorphism), 
as shown by institutional theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Another explanation for the 
positive correlation between firm size and CSED might be their wish to gain a competitive 
advantage over smaller firms (mimetic isomorphism). Moreover, old firms usually take the 
lead in business and, as a result, disclose more social and environmental information to gain a 
competitive advantage over newly established companies. 
From an agency theory’s perspective, managers of highly profitable firms tend to show their 
achievements in detail, since it reflects well on their reputation, image and hence their 
pecuniary benefits. In contrast, when  profits are low, managers tend to hide some information 
and disclose less to avoid any negative effects on their companies’ market values (Gallego-
A lvarez and Quina-Custodio, 2016). Regarding a company’s leverage, agency costs increase 
with an increase in the level of leverage (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012). As a result, managers 
of companies with a high level of leverage disclose more information, including social and 
environmental information to lower agency cost (Alsaeed, 2006; Gallego-A lvarez and 
Quina-Custodio, 2016). When the debt level increases, a conflict of interest between the 
shareholders and creditors results. To prevent this from happening, creditors seek more 
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information to both reduce information asymmetry and make sure that the company will be 
able to pay the debt in future (Gallego-A lvarez and Quina-Custodio, 2016).   
In Saudi Arabia, Saudi labour law and regulations state that companies are required to 
participate in the Saudisation programme the government implemented in 2011 (Department 
of Labour and Employment, Ministry of Labour). As a result, larger, older and more profitable 
companies are expected to participate more in this programme, as they have more employees, 
experience and financial ability, and so can recruit more Saudi employees or replace foreign 
employees in occupied jobs. Moreover, those companies are more likely to apply for 
governmental tenders to do this than smaller companies are, as well as apply for government 
projects, as they are requested to submit a Saudisation certificate44 to show their legibility. 
Therefore, the level of CSED is found to be higher in large companies, older companies and 
more profitable companies than it is in smaller companies, newly established companies and 
less profitable ones.  
In the context of corporate governance mechanisms, the regression analysis, which was carried 
out in line with previous studies, shows that only two mechanisms (H5 and H8)– governmental 
ownership (for example, see: Said et al., 2009; Khan, 2010; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Conyon 
and He, 2011) and audit firm size (for example, see: Raffournier, 1995; Ntim et al., 2012a; 
Schiehll et al., 2013) – are significant in explaining the variations that exist in the extent of 
CSED. The level of CSED is affected by governmental laws, rules and regulations (Li and 
Zhang, 2010). Based on institutional theory (coercive isomorphism), government ownership 
demands more accountability and transparency, which means more reporting, including social 
and environmental reporting. This result confirms the argument that government owned 
companies are socially responsible, as governments promote transparency and disclosure 
practices, including reproducing CSED (Said et al., 2009: Ntim et al., 2013; Al-Janadi et al, 
2013; Habbash, 2015). 
                                                 
44 A Saudisation certificate is given by the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Labour to firms that achieve the Saudisation 
target.  
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Agency theory suggests that governmental ownership will lead to a balance being reached 
between the goals of the principals (governmental owners) and agents (managers), and the 
company will generate profits whilst continuing to be socially responsible. Another reason for 
the positive association between governmental ownership and CSED level is the fact that the 
government establishes regulations to ensure that companies remain socially responsible. 
Companies owned by the government have a responsibility to set an example to other 
companies by being socially responsible and this is evidenced in reporting (Habbash, 2015). 
Therefore, government ownership encourages good governance, accountability, transparency, 
corporate social responsibility and disclosure (Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Eng and Mak, 2003; 
Habbash, 2015; Ntim et al., 2013; Said et al., 2009). Stakeholder theory can also explain the 
association between government ownership and the level of CSED, as it shows that companies 
disclose CSED to satisfy the needs and expectations of powerful stakeholders, such as 
government shareholders (Gray et al., 1996; Robert, 1992).  
The size of an audit firm is found to positively affect the level of CSED in this research, as 
large audit firms (the big four firms)45 seem to be more independent and more able to limit the 
opportunistic behaviour of managers due to their experience (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Eng and 
Mak, 2003) than small ones. In addition, the big four firms may require the disclosure of more 
information in order to protect their reputation. Agency theory is concerned with audit quality, 
since providing more reliable and credible information in the reports will reduce agency costs 
and big audit firms enhance the quality of disclosure (Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Eng and Mak, 
2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This argument is consistent with 
the concept of legitimacy theory, which argues that large audit firms take their legitimacy into 
account and, therefore, request more information reporting, including CSED. In contrast, 
smaller audit firms are more concerned about losing clients and, as a result, give serious 
consideration to the customers’ needs (Alsaeed, 2006; Malone et al., 1993). As a result, small 
audit firms are expected to require less information to be disclosed. 
On the other hand, managerial and foreign ownership, board size, the proportion of independent 
members on the board of directors and CEO duality are all insignificant variables when 
                                                 
45 The big four audit firms are PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte and Touche, Ernst and Young and KPMG.   
265 
 
 
examining the determinants of CSED. It can be concluded from the regression analysis results 
that six hypotheses were accepted (firm size, firm age, ROA, leverage, governmental 
ownership and audit firm size). However, five hypotheses were rejected (managerial and 
foreign ownership, board size, the proportion of independent directors on the board of directors 
and CEO duality) (Table 6.14).  
This research question examined the determinants of the level of CSED in general. The next 
research question investigates each category of the corporate social and environmental 
disclosure index separately, as well as how they relate to the determinants (firm characteristics 
and corporate governance mechanism). Negative binomial regression is used to investigate 
whether the firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanism affect each CSED 
category separately.  
8.3.3 Research Question 3: What are the determinants of the level of CSED 
in terms of the categories that are reported by Saudi Arabian-listed 
companies?  
From the previous research question, it has been found that all the firm characteristics that have 
been included in this study have a significant influence on the level of CSED. Additionally, 
two corporate governance mechanisms have a significant influence on CSED, which are 
government ownership and the size of the audit firms. To investigate this more, this research 
question aims to address the fourth objective, which examines the determinants of the level of 
each CSED category reported by Saudi Arabian-listed companies. There are two sub-questions 
under the third research question; one aims to examine the effect of the specific firm 
characteristics (e.g., firm size, firm age, profitability (ROA) and leverage) on the level of CSED 
categories in Saudi Arabia. RQ3.a: Do the corporate characteristics of Saudi Arabian-listed 
companies affect the level of each category of CSED? The other sub-question is related to the 
aim of corporate governance, which is to examine the effect of specific corporate governance 
mechanisms (e.g., ownership, board size, board independence, CEO duality and audit firm size) 
on the level of CSED categories in Saudi Arabia. RQ3.b: Do the corporate governance 
characteristics of Saudi Arabian-listed companies affect the level of each category of the 
CSED?  
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In order to address this research question, 6 models have been developed and each model 
examines the determinant of each category. 12 hypotheses are to be tested, with 2 for each 
category; one is related to the firm characteristics (H12, H14, H16, H18, H20, H22) and one to 
corporate governance mechanisms (H13, H15, H17, H19, H21, H23). The findings of the 
negative binomial regression analyses, which have been done to test the hypothesis, indicate 
that the firm characteristics (firm age, firm size, profitability (ROA) and leverage) are effective 
and they affect, at different levels, the CSED categories, as shown in table 7.10 as well as the 
corporate governance mechanisms (governmental ownership, board size, the proportion of 
independent board members, CEO duality and audit firm size). (For details, see Table 7.4.)  
The findings indicate that firm age is the most influential factor that determines the level of the 
five categories (environmental, human resources, products and consumers, community 
involvement and economic disclosure). Firm age is, in fact, the only factor that affects both 
products and consumer disclosure. The positive correlation between firm age and the five 
CSED categories has been suggested by stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory and institutional 
theory. Stakeholder theory suggests that stakeholder groups of older firms have higher 
expectations than newly established ones, as stakeholders expect older firms to be 
environmentally responsible and pay more attention to employees, consumers, product quality 
and community involvement, as well as contribute to the economy. Moreover, older companies 
are keen to maintain the legitimacy they have gained over time. Legitimacy theory suggests 
that firms can gain, maintain or repair their legitimacy by reporting information about the 
CSED categories (Alsaeed, 2006).  
Firm size and governmental ownership are in second place, as they both influence 
environmental disclosure and human resources disclosure. While firm size affects the level of 
community disclosure, governmental ownership affects economic disclosure. Based on 
stakeholder theory, larger firms report more environmental, human resources and community 
involvement information than smaller firms do because they need to satisfy their stakeholder 
groups who expect more disclosure from large companies. Additionally, larger firms are 
expected to provide their employees with more benefits than smaller firms, so they report more 
comprehensively to confirm they are acting as expected. Moreover, the legitimacy theory 
suggests that larger companies care more about their legitimacy than smaller firms do (Branco 
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and Rodrigues, 2008; Reverte, 2009). In addition, larger firms wish to lead smaller firms, an 
argument that is put forward by the institutional theory (mimetic isomorphism). Larger Saudi-
listed companies report more about their environmental, human resource and community 
involvement information than smaller firms do. This is because smaller firms can find it more 
difficult to be environmentally responsible, to become involved in community activities and to 
pay more attention to employees, as these are both time and resource consuming activities. The 
Saudi government puts greater pressure on larger firms to be more socially responsible than 
smaller firms (coercive isomorphism). For example, the percentage of Saudisation depends on 
the size of a company and the number of employees. As a result, larger companies disclose 
more social and environmental information in to be entitled to receive government benefits and 
rewards.  
The proportion of independent directors on the board of directors affects two categories – 
‘community involvement’ and ‘economy disclosure’. According to the agency theory, the 
existence of independent members on the board places pressure on the management to ensure 
that they operate successfully and satisfy stakeholders’ requirements. Independent members 
also protect shareholders and reduce agency costs and information asymmetry by controlling 
the opportunism of managers (Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), as they can control the managers’ actions regarding the companies’ strategies 
and plans (Said et al., 2009) by encouraging managers to act in alignment with the norms and 
values of society. This is done to ensure their legitimacy, as implied by the legitimacy theory. 
In Saudi Arabia, the phenomenon of independent board members is considered to be new 
(Mandourah 2012). According to the Saudi Corporate Governance Code, there should be at 
least two independent members on the board or one-third of the members, whichever is the 
greater (article 12: e). 
Profitability (ROA) and leverage have the same level of effect, as they both determine 
economic disclosure. This might be because contributing to the economy and reporting shows 
how strong the company is.  
When it comes to profits, managers disclose more social and environmental information in 
order to prove their ability to maximise shareholder value and, thus, increase managerial 
compensation (Alsaeed, 2006). According to the stakeholder theory, companies with high 
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profitability disclose more voluntary information, including social and environmental 
disclosure, in order to show stakeholders and the public their achievements and promote a 
positive impression of their performance (Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Reverte, 2009). 
Furthermore, government pressure on companies with higher profits might be greater than the 
pressure it is on less profitable companies. Therefore, more profitable companies report more 
on economic issues, such as job nationalisation (Saudisation). This argument is supported by 
the institutional theory (coercive isomorphism).  
Moreover, more profitable companies tend to report more social and environmental disclosure, 
particularly economic disclosure (Saudisation), to prove they are capable of meeting societal 
expectations and needs and so can legitimately operate in society (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005), 
as proposed by the legitimacy theory. According to the agency theory, managers of highly 
profitable firms tend to show their achievements in detail because it reflects on their reputation, 
image and salary (Gallego-A lvarez and Quina-Custodio, 2016).      
In the context of leverage, companies with a higher level of leverage tend to report more social 
and environmental information to appeal to creditors, stakeholders and investment trusts. This 
argument is supported by the stakeholder theory, as well as the legitimacy theory and agency 
theory. They also disclose more social and environmental information, particularly regarding 
economics, to show that they have a legitimacy to operate, even though they may be highly in 
debt. This is what the legitimacy theory proposes. Moreover, agency costs grow when there is 
an increase in the level of leverage (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012), as suggested by the agency 
theory. Therefore, managers of companies with a high level of leverage disclose more 
information, including social and environmental information, in order to lower agency costs 
(Alsaeed, 2006; Gallego-A lvarez and Quina-Custodio, 2016). A conflict of interest between 
shareholders and creditors results when debt levels increase, and to prevent this from 
happening, creditors seek more information to reduce information asymmetry and make sure 
the company is able to meet its debts in future (Gallego-A lvarez and Quina-Custodio, 2016).   
Finally, the size of the board, CEO duality and audit firm size all affect only one area, which 
is human resources disclosure. CEO duality has a negative effect by presenting a conflict of 
interest and reducing the level of accountability (Michelon and Parbonetti, 2014). Moreover, 
companies that separate the two roles make better quality decisions concerning stakeholders 
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than companies that prefer CEO role duality (Li et al., 2008). The agency theory, which 
supports the separation of the roles of CEO and Chairman, suggests that this separation 
increases the efficiency of the control system and so protects stakeholders’ rights, which results 
in better quality disclosure (Al-Janadi et al., 2013). Therefore, companies who separate the 
roles of the CEO and Chairman disclose more human resource information than those that have 
the CEO occupying dual roles.  
Regarding board size, it is argued that a larger board increases the level of knowledge, making 
them more capable of managing the company (Pfeffer, 1972). Additionally, it helps to reduce 
the uncontrolled power of the managers (Al-Janadi et al., 2013). To overcome this problem and 
limit the size of the board, the Saudi Corporate Governance Code has specified that all boards 
should have a minimum of 3 members and a maximum of 11. Each company has the right to 
choose an appropriate number of board directors that best suits the company’s needs. 
According to agency theory, the board of directors is a corporate governance mechanism that 
aims to reduce the managers’ opportunistic behaviour by controlling their decisions. It also 
reduces the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers, which only increases 
agency costs. Moreover, the board seeks to improve the company’s accountability, 
transparency and social responsibility.  
Large audit companies are very concerned about their reputation and, therefore, more willing 
to associate with firms that disclose more information in their published financial reports 
(Alsaeed, 2006; Depoers, 2000). The agency theory is concerned with audit quality, since 
providing more reliable and credible information in reports reduces agency costs, and using 
big audit firms will enhance the quality of disclosure (Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Eng and Mak, 
2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This argument is consistent with 
the concept of the legitimacy theory, which states that large audit firms consider their 
legitimacy and, therefore, request a higher level of information reporting, including CSED.  
In another way of presenting the results, it can be seen that human resources – the most reported 
category – is affected by the largest number of determinants (firm size, firm age, governmental 
ownership, board size, CEO duality and audit firm size), followed by economic disclosure, 
which is influenced by a total of four determinants (firm age, ROA, leverage and board 
independence). Environmental disclosure and community involvement disclosure are both 
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influenced by three factors (firm size and firm age for both categories, governmental ownership 
for environmental disclosure and board independence for community involvement), while 
products and consumer disclosure are affected by firm age, as well as general disclosure, which 
is affected by governmental ownership.  
The results of this chapter indicate that social and environmental disclosure across all the 
categories is still at a basic level in Saudi Arabia. Although it is a voluntary activity, most of 
the information reported about social and environmental activities, such as human resources 
and economic disclosure, is either enforced or based on a cultural or religious foundation, such 
as community involvement. There are no rules or guidelines that companies can follow when 
performing or reporting social and environmental activities.             
8.4 Research contribution and practical implications of the results 
After presenting the finding of this research, it can be shown that this research contributes to 
CSED literature in the following ways (as discussed in Chapter One).  
Firstly, this study contributes to CSED literature about developing countries in general and 
Saudi Arabia in particular by examining the extent and nature of CSED and its categories, as 
well as the determinants of Saudi-listed companies. Although there have been a significant 
number of studies that have addressed the issues of corporate social and environmental 
disclosure (CSED) in the past, few of them have been carried out in developing countries in 
general and Saudi Arabia in particular (Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Alsaeed, 2006; Habbash, 2015). 
Furthermore, this study contributes to the literature by explaining the results with the help of 
four theories: the stakeholder, legitimacy, institutional and agency theory. This considers the 
scarcity of CSED literature about Saudi Arabia and that disclosure studies conducted in Saudi 
Arabia have either not used a specific theory to explain the results or have depended on a single 
theory. Additionally, the research findings provide scope for future research. 
Secondly, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first study in Saudi Arabia to 
analyse in detail CSED information reported by listed companies, including the categories, 
sub-categories and items. This insight analysis contributes to Saudi literature by providing an 
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overview of what Saudi-listed companies both perform and report on about their corporate 
social and environmental activities and information.  
Thirdly, this study contributes to the extent of the literature there is about the determinants of 
CSED by providing empirical evidence on the factors that determine the level of CSED. This 
study’s results about the effect of some of the firm characteristics and corporate governance 
mechanisms on the level of CSED will add to the literature by providing multiple theoretical 
justifications in particular, as well as by relating the results to the Saudi context. The factors 
investigated in this study include the firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, profitability, 
leverage) and corporate governance (firm ownership structure, board size and independence, 
CEO duality and audit firm size). 
Fourthly, the study contributes to CSED literature because of the scarcity of existing literature 
that examines the determinants of CSED categories, particularly economic disclosure which 
includes Saudisation. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first study that 
investigates the factors that affect the choice and level of CSED categories in Saudi Arabia. 
The types of CSED (categories) differ between the Saudi-listed companies. 
The index of this study is constructed of six different categories that contribute to the literature 
by providing empirical evidence about the determinants of the level of each of the CSED 
categories. Adding economic disclosure to the index considers a significant contribution as it 
includes Saudisation which has been found from the results of this study a significant category 
that Saudi companies disclose. This will contribute to the literature as it is considered the first 
study to add this category. The results were justified by using a multi-theoretical perspective 
and have been put in the Saudi context framework. The factors used to investigate the 
determinants of the choice and the level of the CSED categories are firm characteristics (firm 
size, firm age, profitability, leverage) and corporate governance (firm ownership structure, 
board size and independence, CEO duality and audit firm size). 
This study has several implications that are of particular relevance to Saudi Arabia (the context 
of the study), but the implications may equally be applicable to other Islamic, developing and 
Arab countries (e.g. the GCC, MENA countries etc.) in a situation similar to Saudi Arabia. 
This research has practical implications that are particularly important to policy-makers and 
regulatory bodies (e.g. the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Ministry of Labour, the Capital 
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Market Authority (CMA), the Saudi Stock Exchange etc.), organisations and researchers. The 
findings of this study will assist in a greater understanding of whether the empirical evidence 
supports and justifies the need for a change in the decisions of organisations and policy-makers 
or the rules and regulations of regulatory authorities to enhance the ability of companies to 
engage in social and environmental activities by reporting these activities and information in 
Saudi Arabia. That will be discussed below. 
The findings suggest a series of recommendations to policy-makers on the assessment of CSED 
practice. These aim to improve coordination between the regulatory bodies that implement 
CSR and CSED through the regulations. Another implication of the findings is that 
stakeholders need greater protection through the better enforcement of regulations. More 
awareness and regulation of corporate environmental responsibilities are both needed, as the 
research findings indicate there is a low level of environmental disclosure. Product and 
consumer category should also be given more attention in terms of the quality of products, 
safety and consumer rights and relations. The CMA should improve the standards of CSED 
disclosure by increasing awareness of corporate social responsibility and disclosure, which 
would enhance the accountability and transparency of companies. These standards or 
requirements should be decided by a committee of people with expertise in social and 
environment related issues. This committee could consist of members from different ministries 
or departments, such as the Ministry of Labour, and these representatives would enable the 
committee to ensure that the reporting requirements (e.g. minimum wage, health and safety 
measures, and emission level, etc.) were consistent with the legislation. 
The results that showed the determinants of CSED and its categories could have a number of 
implications for Saudi-listed companies. By knowing what are the determinants that influence 
CSED the policy maker and related authority could improve the standards of CSED disclosure 
which lead to better quality of CSED. For example, companies that are large, old and profitable 
should focus on all types of disclosure to face the pressures and expectations that can arise 
from different groups within society due to a company’s status. The findings will help 
companies to understand what society considers to be legitimate and has to be reported. The 
finding of the determinants of the CSED categories will assist in forming the government rules 
and regulation such as applying fines on larger companies that are not paying attention to 
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Saudisation than smaller companies (Firm size). The results indicate that the mean of the CSED 
by Saudi-listed companies is lower than the average highlights the need to improve the quality 
of CSR disclosure in the annual reports. Previous studies in environmental disclosure have 
found that the quality of environmental disclosure is positively correlated with a company’s 
environmental reputation (see: Hasseldine, Salama, and Toms, 2005; van Staden and Hooks, 
2007). This is consistent with previous findings and it is suggested that companies should 
improve the quality of CSR disclosure that could improve their CSR reputation. 
The next section will present the limitations and suggestions for future studies.  
8.5 Limitations and future research suggestions 
This section highlights the limitations of the research and suggests areas of future research. 
This study focuses on CSED in Saudi-listed companies and, as a result, the findings cannot be 
generalised to include non-listed companies. Some of these non-listed companies significantly 
contribute to the Saudi economy and are worthy of being studied, such as family firms. A 
suggestion is that future research should include or focus on non-listed companies to aid 
understanding of CSED. This would provide another overview, as well as help policy-makers 
to implement disclosure policies for both listed and non-listed companies in Saudi Arabia.  
A limitation of this study could be that it relies on only one source of information, the annual 
reports, to examine CSR information disclosed by Saudi Arabia-listed companies. To depend 
on one source when examining CSED could mean that the study fails to represent the actual 
level of disclosure. Previous studies have found that companies are increasingly publishing 
stand-alone CSR or sustainability reports (see GRI 2010). Van Staden and Hooks (2007) 
argued that the internet has become a common tool to disclose CSR information that is also 
less costly (Wanderley, Lucian, Farache, and de Sousa Filho, 2008). Although this study has 
used a single source to collect CSED information – the annual reports – this source is more 
reliable than the others (Omar and Simon, 2011). According to Knutson (1992, cited in 
Albassam, 2014, p.334), “the annual report is the major reporting document and every other 
report is in some respect subsidiary or supplementary to it”. As mentioned in Chapter 4, listed 
firms are obliged to publish their reports on the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) website. 
Therefore, future research should consider other information sources for examining CSED, 
such as the stand-alone sustainability reports and the internet. This would provide an 
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opportunity to discover the differences between the annual reports, stand-alone CSR reports 
and website CSR disclosure.  
This study is a cross-sectional research that has been carried out across listed firms in Saudi 
Arabia and did not consider the differences that time might have on CSED. However, it was 
found from investigating a sample of annual reports published in 2010, 2011 and 2012 that 
disclosure in the three years was very similar. As a result, the study focused on 2012, the most 
recent year at the time of collecting the data. For future study, it might be beneficial to use a 
panel data that includes both cross-sectional and time-series data.     
Another limitation relates to the single method that was used to conduct the research, which 
was quantitative research using secondary data. Quantitative data has been criticised for not 
providing sufficient interpretation of the results because of the extreme dependence on 
statistical data (Boyd et al., 2012). Therefore, future research should collect primary in order 
to explore the results of the research, as well provide insight analysis. A mixed-methods 
approach is suggested for future studies as this data can be helpful in explaining and 
interpreting the results (Boyd et al., 2012), 2012). 
The binary scoring system of the CSED index used in this study is considered to be a limitation. 
Although binary coding is highly common in most corporate disclosure studies (Gompers et 
al., 2003; Ammann et al., 2013), the technique has some limitations (Beattie et al., 2004) as it 
ignores the importance of the disclosed information, unlike weighted scoring (Hassan and 
Marston, 2010). However, the justifications for using binary coding have been discussed in 
Chapter 4. Weighted scoring could be used to overcome this problem in future studies.   
Although the study considers the most influential determinants, some variables are not included 
for several reasons, such as the unavailability of data (i.e., R and D expenditure). Future 
research could include more determinants, such as media exposure, remuneration committee 
size and committee meetings.   
Another interesting issue that could be investigated is the significant number of large 
companies that own charities with separate financial accounting systems. A few years ago, the 
government restricted donations to unknown charities (that are not registered with the 
government). By doing so, the government aimed to control unknown charities and 
consequently prevent terrorism financing. This could explain the missing CSR information 
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from listed companies’ annual reports, as they might consider charities’ annual reports as CSR 
disclosure.  
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Appendices: 
Appendix 1: literature table 
  factors Methodology Finding 
1 Giannarakis  
and Konteos (2014) 
Environmental and Governance 
CEO duality, Women in board, 
greenhouse gas emission, 
leverage, Industry  
Bloomberg, least square Dummy variable model, 
100 companies 2009 -2012  
Leverage is not statistically significant, 
CEO duality insignificant 
2 Esa and Ghazali 2012 Leverage  
Board size 
Independent directors 
Company size 
Profitability 
 27 companies for two years (2005 and 2007) 
 Content analysis annual reports. 
  Multiple regression analysis was performed to 
identify factors influencing CSR disclosure  
Leverage, board size, Independent 
directors 
 Significant 
 
3 Branco and Rodrigues 
2008 
Company size 
Industry affiliation 
Consumer proximity 
Environmental sensitivity 
Media exposure 
Control variables (Profitability, 
Leverage,  
 Multiple linear regression models to analyse the 
relationship between total SRD and each one of 
its categories, both in annual reports and on the 
Internet, and the influencing factors referred to 
in the previous section.  
 Ten models are examined 
 57 listed companies in 2003 
Leverage, size, media exposure significant  
4 Al Saeed 2006 
Saudi Arabia  
Firm size. 
Debt ratio 
Ownership dispersion 
Firm age 
Profit margin 
industry type 
Audit firm size  
 One year because disclosure policies usually 
tend to remain constant over time (Botosan, 
1997). 
 The annual reports of year 2003 were chosen 
because they are relatively more recent and 
easier to obtain. 
 56 firms spanning six industries 
  Unranked OLS approach 
Only firm size significant  
5 Reverte 2009 Spanish 
companies 
Leverage, Industry, media, 
exposure, Firm size  
 Legitimacy, stakeholder, agency theories.   
 Non-financial firms 2005 and 2006. 
 46 Observations 
 Leverage and profitability insignificant 
 Firm size, media and Industries 
sensitivity Significant  
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 Linear regression model 
6 Siregar and Bachtair 
(2008) 
board size, foreign ownership, firm 
size, profitability, and leverage 
 Annual reports were analysed by content 
analysis method  
 multiple regression 
 board size has a positive and non-linear 
(quadratic and concave) relationship 
with CSR reporting 
 Firm size has a positive effect on CSR 
reporting. 
7 Jennifer Ho and Taylor 
2007 
Firm size 
Profitability 
Liquidity 
Leverage 
Industry 
country 
 50 of the largest US and Japanese companies 
 Annual reports, stand-alone reports, and special 
website reports. 
 Regression analysis 
Firm size positive 
Profitability, liquidity negative 
firms with membership in the 
manufacturing industry positive 
higher for Japanese firms 
8 Said et al 2009 Malaysia  CEO duality, Board size, 
Independent directors, Firm size, 
Profitability, leverage and CSRD 
27 companies 2005 – 2007 content analysis, 
multiple regression analysis (Bloomberg database) 
CEO duality insignificant, Board size 
positively significant. 
Leverage and Independence are 
significant. 
Firm size and Profitability are not 
significant 
9 Michelon  and Parbonetti 
2012 
 independent directors 
CEO duality 
Control variables (Corporate size, 
profitability, leverage, risk, age, 
listing status, reputation, country 
and industry) 
 57 Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) 
companies and of a control group of companies 
matched on country, industry and size belonging 
to the Dow Jones Global Index (World1) for 
year 2003 
 OLS 
 Multivariate analysis 
 Robustness analysis 
CEO  Dual insignificant 
 Independent  directors insignificant 
10  Cheng and Courtenary 
2006 
CEO Duality  CEO duality insignificant 
11 Roberts et al 2005 CEO Duality  CEO Duality significant  
12  Gul and Leung 2004  CEO Duality 
Board independent 
 CEO Duality significant negative 
Board independent insignificant  
13 Huafang and Jianguo 2007 CEO Duality  CEO Duality significant 
14 Eng and Mak 2003 Independent   Independent significant 
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CEO duality  
Directors ownership 
CEO duality negative association  
Directors ownership significant negative  
15 Barako et al 2006 Independent   Independent significant 
16 Naser et al 2002 Leverage  Leverage Significant 
17 Abdul Hamid 2004 Firm size   Firm size not significant 
18 Khan et al 2012 
Bangladesh 
Corporate governance and CSRD  
Main ownership, Public 
ownership, Foreign ownership, 
Board Independence, CEO duality, 
Audit committee 
 Annual reports 
 Legitimacy theory 
 Regression analysis  
 Main ownership negatively 
significant 
 Public, foreign ownership, 
Independence, audit committee 
positively significant. 
 CEO not significant 
19  Ghazali 2007 Main ownership 
Firm size 
Directors ownership 
Government ownership  
Profitability  
industry 
 87 listed companies in 2001 
 Checklist containing 22  
directors ownership negative significant 
firm size positive significant 
20 Haniffa and Cook 2002 CEO duality and Firmsize  
Board independent 
Government ownership  
 Board independent insignificant 
CEO duality negative association 
Firm size positive significant 
Government ownership positive 
significant 
21 Nawaiseh et al 2015    
22 Belal and own 2007 
bangladesh 
   
23 Chau and Gray 2010 Main ownership  Main ownership negatively significant 
24 Islam and Deegan 2008    
25 Saudi Arabia Macarulla 
and Talalweh 2012 
   
26 Al Janadi et al (2012) Saudi 
Arabia 
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27  Habbash 2015 Saudi 
Arabia  
Governance, Family ownership, 
Firm size, Firm age, Leverage, 
Audit committee, Independence, 
duality, profitability, industry, 
institutional ownership 
 267 annual non-financial reports 2007-2011 
 17 CSR checklist based on ISO 26000 
 Agency Theory – OLS 
 Governance, Family ownership, 
Firm size, Firm age  positively 
significant 
 Leverage negatively significant 
 Audit committee, Independence, 
duality, institutional ownership, 
profitability and Industry (no 
relation) 
28 Hussainey et al (2011) 
Egypt 
CEO duality  
Board Independent 
Directors ownership 
Board size 
Control variables (leverage, firm 
size, profitability and industry 
types)   
 100 Egyptian listed companies companies in 
2009 
 content analysis technique 
 OLS transformed multiple regression model 
 Another 3 models :corporate governance 
voluntary disclosure subcategories and 
corporate governance mechanisms.  
 binary logistic regression 
Independent, firm size positive significant  
Board size insignificant  
CEO duality negative significant  
Leverage, industry, ROA insignificant 
 
29 Khasharmeh and Desoky 
(2013) Gulf corporation 
   
30 Gallego-alvarez and 
Quina-custodio (2016) 
FS, leverage, Profitability  110 companies in 2014 (the latest year 
available) 
 79 indicators (economic, environment, social) 
 GRI G3.1 (2011) 
 Multivariate analysis 
 FS, leverage significant 
 ROA insignificant 
31 Li et al (2013) Firm performance, State 
ownership 
 Chinese listed companies (2008) 
 1574 non-financial listed firms 
 Probit and Tobit regression 
State ownership positive significance. 
32 Kansal et al (2014) Firm size, industry, profitability, 
Risk, Firm age, Corporate 
reputation 
 India, top 100 companies in the Bombay stock 
exchange 
 Content analysis  
 Simple regression model (6 models) multiple 
regression 
 Industry, reputation and profitability 
significant  
33 Muttakin and Khan (2014) Firm size, industry type, family 
ownership, export oriented 
industry, ROA, leverage, firm age 
 135 manufacturing companies listed with the 
Dhaka stock exchange (DSE) Bangladesh 
from 2005 to 2009 
 Family ownership negative significant 
 Firm size positive significant 
 ROA positive significant 
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 Multiple regression  Leverage insignificant 
 Firm age positive significant 
 Industry type significant 
34 Skouloudis et al (2013)  Firm size, industry (sensitivity), 
profitability, ROE, ROA, level of 
internationalisation, government 
ownership, foreign ownership,  
 100 largest companies based on annual 
revenues 
 Generic mathematical equation 
 Internationalisation, ownership 
identity, firm size, industry, 
profitability significant.  
35 Fifka (2013) Board independent    
36  Chau and Leung (2006)    Board independent   Board independent positive relation 
37 Weir and Laing (2003) Board independent   Board independent positive relation 
38 Williams, 2002 Board independent   Board independent positive relation 
39 Ghazali and Weetman 
(2006),  
Board independent 
CEO duality  
Directors ownership  
  Board independent insignificant 
 CEO duality insignificant 
 Directors ownership negative 
association  
40 Ho and Wong (2001) Board independent 
CEO duality 
  Board independent insignificant 
 CEO duality insignificant 
41 Lakhal, 2005,   CEO duality    CEO duality negative association  
42 Laksmana, 2008 CEO duality   CEO duality negative association 
43 Forker, 1992 CEO duality   CEO duality negative association 
44 Arcay and Vazquez, 2005 CEO duality    CEO duality insignificant 
45 Ruland, Tung, and George 
(1990) 
Directors ownership    Director ownership negative 
association  
46  Samaha and Dahawy 
(2011 
Directors ownership   Director ownership negative 
association  
47 Newson and Deegan 
(2002) 
Industry    Industry significant 
48  Adams et al. (1998) Company size 
Industry  
  Company size and industry 
significant  
49 Patten, 1991  Firm size   Firm size positive significant 
50 Hackston and Milne, 1996 Firm size   Firm size positive significant 
51 Richardson and Welker, 
2001 
Firm size  Firm size positive significant 
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52 Naser et al 2006 Firm size 
Leverage 
Government ownership 
 Corporate size, leverage positive 
significant 
government ownership insignificant 
53 Delaney and Huselid 
(1996) 
Firm age  Firm age positive significant 
54 Gao, Heravi, and Xiao, 
2005 
Firm size  Firm size positive significant 
55 Gray and Bebbington, 
2001 
Firm size  Firm size positive significant 
56 Rettab et al. (2009) Firm age  Firm age negative significant 
57 Cowen Linda and Scott, 
1987 
Industry   Industry positive significant 
58 Gray, 2002 Industry  Industry positive significant 
59 Parsa and Deng, 2008 Industry  Industry positive significant 
60 Wanderley, Lucian, 
Farache, and de Sousa 
Filho, 2008 
Industry  Industry positive significant 
61 Bayoud et al 2012 Firm size 
Firm age 
industry 
 Mixed method (quan and qual) 
 135 Libyan organisations across four sectors 
(40 final sample for the quantitative study) 
 three-year period from 2007 to 2009 
 content analysis 
 multivariate regression 
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 Significant Insignificant 
FS 
Habbash 2015, Muttakin and Khan (2014), Hussainey et al (2011),  Adams et 
al. (1998),  Patten, 1991;  Richardson and Welker, 2001; Abdul Hamid, 2004; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2005), Naser et al 2006, (Alsaeed, 2006; Bayoud et al., 2012; Rob Gray et al., 2001; 
Hackston and Milne, 1996; Huang and Kung, 2010; Menassa, 2010; Wallace and Naser, 
1996), Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Gao, Heravi, and Xiao, 2005; Gray and Bebbington, 
2001 
Said et al 2009, Abdul Hamid 2004, Gallego-alvarez and Quina-
custodio (2016) 
FA 
Habbash 2015, Muttakin and Khan (2014), Skouloudis et al (2013), Delaney and Huselid 
(1996), Rettab et al. (2009)  
Al Saeed 2006, Menassa (2010) 
 
ROA 
Kansal et al (2014), Muttakin and Khan (2014), Skouloudis et al (2013), Gray et al., 2001; 
Hackston and Milne, 1996; Patten, 1991 and; Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989 
Reverte 2009, Said et al 2009, Habbash 2015, Gallego-alvarez and 
Quina-custodio (2016), Hussainey et al (2011) 
Leverage 
Esa and Ghazali 2012, Branco and Rodrigues 2008, Said et al 2009, Naser et al 2002, 
Habbash 2015, Naser et al 2006, Esa and Malone et al.(1993) 
Giannarakis  
and Konteos (2014), Al Saeed 2006, Reverte 2009, Siregar and 
Bachtair (2012), Gallego-alvarez and Quina-custodio (2016), Muttakin 
and Khan (2014), Hussainey et al (2011), Al Saeed 2006 
 
 
Industry 
Reverte 2009(sensitivity), Kansal et al (2014), Muttakin and Khan (2014), Skouloudis et al 
(2013),  Adams et al. (1998),  Newson and Deegan (2002), Bayoud et al., 2012; Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2008; Patten, 1992; Waddock and Graves, 1997), Cowen Linda and Scott, 1987; 
Gray, 2002; Parsa and Deng, 2008; Wanderley, Lucian, Farache, and de Sousa Filho, 2008) 
 
Habbash 2015, Al Saeed 2006 
 
Man 
own 
Li et al (2013), Ruland, Tung, and George (1990), Ghazali and Weetman, 2006, Eng and 
Mak, 2003 ,  Samaha and Dahawy (2011) 
 
Gov. 
own 
Haniffa and Cooke (2005) Naser et al 2006 
For. own Khan et al 2012  
Pub. own Khan et al 2012  
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BS Said et al 2009 Hussainey et al (2011) 
IND. 
Said et al 2009, Eng and Mak 2003, 
Barako et al 2006, Khan et al 2012,  Chau and Leung (2006), Weir and Laing (2003), 
Williams, 2002,  Eng and Mak (2003), Barako, Hancock, and Izan (2006),Gul and Leung 
(2004), Hussainey et al (2011) 
Habbash 2015, Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002), and Ho and Wong (2001), Hussainey et al (2011) 
CEO 
Roberts et al 2005, Gul and Leung 2014,  
Huafang and Jianguo 2007, Lakhal, 2005, Laksmana, 2008, Forker, 1992, Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002, Eng and Mak, 2003 , Hussainey et al (2011) 
Giannarakis  
and Konteos (2014), Said et al 2009, Michelon and Parbon etti 2012, 
Cheng and Courtenary 2006, Khan et al 2012, Habbash 2015, (Arcay 
and Vazquez, 2005, Ghazali and Weetman, 2006, Ho and Wong, 
2001) 
Aaudit 
FS 
 Al Saeed 2006  
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Appendix 2: Saudi listed companies in Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) 2012 
NO.  Company Industry  
1 Advanced Petrochemical Company  Petrochemical  
2 Alujain Corporation  Petrochemical 
3 Methanol Chemicals co.  Petrochemical 
4 Nama Chemicals co.  Petrochemical 
5 National industrialization co. Petrochemical 
6 National Petrochemical company Petrochemical 
7 Rabigh Refining and Petrochemical co Petrochemical 
8 Sahara Petrochemical Co. Petrochemical 
9 Saudi Arabia Fertilizers co.  Petrochemical 
10 Saudi Basic Industries Corp Petrochemical 
11 Saudi Industrials Investment Group Petrochemical 
12 Saudi International Petrochemical Co.  Petrochemical 
13 Saudi Kayan Petrochemical Company  Petrochemical 
14 Yanbu National Petrochemical Company Petrochemical 
15 AlJouf Cement Company Cement 
16 Arabian Cement Co Cement 
17 City Cement Co Cement 
18 Eastern Province Cement Co Cement 
19 Hail Cement Company Cement 
20 Najran Cement Company Cement 
21 Saudi Cement Company Cement 
22 Southern Province Cement Co Cement 
23 Tabuk Cement Co Cement 
24 The Qassim Cement Co.  Cement 
25 Yamamah Saudi Cement Cement 
26 Yanbu Cement Co.  Cement 
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27 Abdullah Al Othaim Markets Company Retail 
28 Aldrees Petroleum and Transport Service Co.  Retail 
29 AlKhaleej Training and Education Company  Retail 
30 Dallah Healthcare Holding Company Retail 
31 FawazAbdulazizAlHokair Company Retail 
32 Fitaihi Holding Group Retail  
33 Jarir Marketing Co.  Retail 
34 Mouwasat Media Services Company Retail 
35 Dallah Healthcare Holding Company Retail 
36 National Agriculture Marketing Co.  Retail 
37 National Medical Care Company Retail 
38 Saudi Automotive Services Co Retail 
39 Saudi Marketing Company Retail 
40 United Electronics Company Retail 
41 National Gas and Industrialization Co.  Energy and Utilities 
42 Saudi Electricity Company Energy and Utilities 
43 Al-Jouf Agriculture Development Co Agriculture and food Industries 
44 Almarai Company Agriculture and food Industries 
45 Anaam International Holding Group Co Agriculture and food Industries 
46 Ash-Sharqiyah Development Company Agriculture and food Industries 
47 BishahAqriculture Development Co Agriculture and food Industries 
48 Food Products Co Agriculture and food Industries 
49 HalawaniBross Agriculture and food Industries 
50 Herfy Food Services Co Agriculture and food Industries 
51 Jazan Development Co Agriculture and food Industries 
52 National Agriculture Development Co. Agriculture and food Industries 
53 Qassim Agriculture Co Agriculture and food Industries 
54 Saudi Airlines Catering Copany Agriculture and food Industries 
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55 Saudi Fisheries Co. Agriculture and food Industries 
56 Saudi Dairy and Foodstuff Co. Agriculture and food Industries 
57 Savola Group Agriculture and food Industries 
58 Tabuk Agriculture Development Co Agriculture and food Industries 
59 Wafrah for industry and development Agriculture and food Industries 
60 Etihad AtheebTelecomunication Company Telecommunication Company 
61 Etihad Etisalat Co Telecommunication Company 
62 Mobile Telcommunications Company Saudi Arabia Telecommunication Company 
63 Saudi Integrated Telecom Company Telecommunication Company 
64 Saudi Telecom Telecommunication Company 
65 Al-Ahsa Development Co.  Multi-Investment 
66 Al-Baha Investment and Development Co. Multi-Investment 
67 Aseer Trading, Tourism and Manufacturing Co. Multi-Investment 
68 Kingdom Holding Company Multi-Investment 
69 Saudi Arabian Refineries Co. Multi-Investment 
70 Saudi Industrial Services Co. Multi-Investment 
71 Saudi Advanced Industries Co.  Multi-Investment 
72 Al Hassan Ghazi Ibrahim Shaker Industrial Investment 
73 Al Sorayai Trading And Industrial Group Company Industrial Investment 
74 AlAbdullatif Industrial Investment Co Industrial Investment 
75 Astra Industrial Group  Industrial Investment 
76 Basic Chemical Industries Industrial Investment 
77 Filling and Packing Materials Manufacturing Co Industrial Investment 
78 National Metal Manufacturing and Casting  Co.  Industrial Investment 
79 Saudi Arabian Mining Company Industrial Investment 
80 Saudi Chemical Company Industrial Investment 
81 Saudi Industrial Export Co. Industrial Investment 
82 Saudi Paper Manufacturing  Co. Industrial Investment 
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83 Saudi Pharmaceutical Indust. and Med. Appliances Corp Industrial Investment 
84 Takween Advanced Industries  Industrial Investment 
85 The National Co. for Glass Industries  Industrial Investment 
86 Abdullah A. M. Al-Khodari Sons Copany Building and Construction  
87 Al-Babtain Power and Telecommunication Co.  Building and Construction 
88 Arabian Pipes Company Building and Construction 
89 Middle East Specialized Cables Co Building and Construction 
90 Mohammed Al Mojil Group Company Building and Construction 
91 National Gypsum Company Building and Construction 
92 Red Sea Housing Services Company Building and Construction 
92 Saudi Arabian Amiantit Co  Building and Construction 
93 Saudi Cable Company Building and Construction 
94 Saudi Ceramic Co.  Building and Construction 
95 Saudi Industrial Development Co. Building and Construction 
96 Saudi Steel Pipe Company Building and Construction 
97 Saudi Vitrified Clay Pipes Co Building and Construction 
98 United  Wire Factories Company Building and Construction 
99 Zamil Industrial Investment co Building and Construction 
100 Arriyadh Development Co.  Real Estate Development  
101 Dar Alarkan Real Estate Development Company Real Estate Development 
102 Emmar The Economic City Real Estate Development 
103 Jabal Omar Development Company Real Estate Development 
104 Knowledge Economic City Real Estate Development 
105 Makkah Construction and Development Real Estate Development 
106 Saudi Real Estate Co. Real Estate Development 
107 Taiba Holding Co Real Estate Development 
108 Saudi Public Transport Co Transport 
109 Saudi Transport and Investment Company Transport 
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110 The National Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia Transport 
111 United International Transportation Company Ltd.  Transport 
112 Saudi Printing and Packaging Company Media and Publishing 
113 Saudi Research and Marketing Group Media and Publishing 
114 Tihama Advertising and Marketing Group  Media and Publishing 
115 Altayyar Travel Group Hotel and Tourism 
116 Saudi Hotels and resort Areas Co.  Hotel and Tourism 
117 Tourism Enterprise Co.  Hotel and Tourism 
118 Riyad Bank  Banking 
119 Bank Aljazira Bank 
120 Saudi Hollandi Bank 
121 Banque Saudi Fransi Bank 
122 Saudi British bank  Bank  
123 National Arab Bank Bank  
124 Samba Financial Group Bank 
125 Alrajhi Bank Bank 
126 Bank Albilad Bank 
127 Alinma Bank Bank 
128 Saudi Investment Bank Bank 
129 Ace Arabia Cooperative Insurance  Insurance  
130 Al Alamiya for Cooperative Insurance Insurance 
132 Al-Ahlia Insurance Company Insurance 
133 Al-Rajhi Company for Cooperative Insurance Insurance 
134 Al Ahli Takaful Insurance 
135 AlinmaTokio Marine Co Insurance 
136 AlJazira Takaful Insurance 
137 Allianz Saudi Fransi Cooperative Insurance Insurance 
138 Allied Cooperative Insurance Group Insurance 
  
 
311
139 Amana Cooperative Insurance Co Insurance 
141 Arabian Shield Cooperative Insurance Insurance 
142 AXA Cooperative Insurance Company Insurance 
143 Bupa Arabia for Cooperative Insurance Insurance 
144 Buruj cooperative insurance company Insurance 
146 Gulf Union Cooperative Insurance Company Insurance 
147 Malath Cooperative Insurance and Insurance 
148 MetLife AIG ANB Cooperative Insurance Insurance 
149 SABB Takaful Insurance 
150 Salama Cooperative Insurance Co Insurance 
151 Sanad Insurance and Reinsurance Insurance 
152 Saudi Arabian Cooperative Insurance Insurance 
153 Saudi Enaya Cooperative Insurance Company  Insurance 
154 Saudi Indian Company for Co- operative Insurance 
155 Saudi Re for Cooperative Reinsurance Insurance 
156 Saudi United Cooperative Insurance Insurance 
157 Solidarity Saudi Takaful Co Insurance 
158 The Company for Cooperative Insurance Insurance 
159 The Mediterranean and Gulf Insurance  Insurance 
161 United Cooperative Assurance Co Insurance 
162 Wataniya Insurance Company Insurance 
163 Weqaya Takaful insurance and reinsurance Insurance 
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Appendix 3: Saudi listed companies in Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) 2016 
No. Company Name Industry 
1 Riad Bank 
Banks and Financial 
Services (12) 
2 Bank Al Jazira 
3 The Saudi Investement Bank 
4 Saudi Hollandi Bank  
5 Banque Saudi Fransi 
6 SABB 
7 Arab National Bank 
8 Samba Financial Group 
9 Al Rajhi Bank  
10 Bank Al Bilad 
11 Alinma Bank 
12 The National Commercial Bank 
13 Methanol Chemicals Company Ltd 
Petrochemical 
Industries (14) 
14 National Petrochemical Co. 
15 Saudi Basic Industries Corp.  
16 Saudi Arabian Fertilizers Co.  
17 National Industrialization Co.  
18 Alujain Corporation 
19 Nama Chemicals Co.  
20 Saudi Industrial Investment Group 
21 Sahara Petrochemical Co.  
22 Yanbu National Petrochemicals Co.  
23 Saudi International Petrochemical Co.  
24 Advanced Petrochemical co.  
25 Saudi Kayan Petrochemical Co.  
26 Rabigh Refining and Petrochemical Co. 
27 Hail Cement Co.  
Cement (14) 
28 Najran Cement Co.  
29 City Cement Co.  
30 Northern Region Cement Co.  
31 Um Al Qura Cement Co.  
32 Arabian Cement Co. Ltd  
33 Yamamah Saudi Cement Co. Ltd 
34 Saudi Cement Co.  
35 The Qassim Cement Co.  
36 Southern Province Cement Co.  
37 Yanbu Cement Co.  
38 Eastern Province Cement Co.  
39 Tabouk Cement Co.  
40 Al Jouf Cement Co.  
41 Al Othaim Holding Co.  Retail (17) 42 Al Mouwasat Medical Services Co.  
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43 United Electronics Co.  
44 Dallah Healthcare Co.  
45 National Medical Care Co.  
46 Saudi Marketing Co.  
47 Al Hammadi Development and Investment Co.  
48 Saudi Co. for Tools and Hardware 
49 Middle East Healthcare Co.  
50 L’azurde for Jewelry 
51 Saudi Automotive Services Co. SASCO 
52 National Agr. Marketing Co.  
53 Fitaihi Holding Group  
54 Jarir Marketing Co.  
55 Aldrees Petroleum and Transport Services Co.  
56 Fawaz Abdulaziz Al Hokair and Partners Co.  
57 Al Khaleej Training and Education Co.  
58 National Gas and Industrialization Co. Gasco Energy and Utilities 
(2) 59 Saudi Electricity Co.  
60 Savola Group  
Agriculture and Food 
Industries (16)  
61 Wafrah for Industry and Development Co.  
62 The Saudia Diary and Foodstuff Co.  
63 Almarai Co.  
64 Anaam International Holding Group Co.  
65 Halwani Brothers Co.  
66 Herfy Food Services  
67 Saudi Airlines Catering Co.  
68 National Agricultural Development Co.  
69 Gassim Agricultural Co.   GACO 
70 Tabouk Agricultural Development Co. Tadco 
71 Saudi Fisheries Co. 
72 Ash Sharqiyah Development Co. SHADCO 
73 AL Jouf Agricultural Development Co.  
74 Bishah Agricultural Development Co.  
75 Jazan Development Co. JAZADCO 
76 Saudi Telecom Co.  
Telecommunication 
and Information 
Technology (4) 
77 Etihad Etisalat Co. Mobily  
78 Saudi Mobile Telecommunications Co.  
79 Etihad Atheedb Telecom 
80 The Company for Cooperative Insurance  
Insurance (36) 
81 Metlife AIG ANB Cooperative Insurance Co.  
82 Al Jazira Takaful Co.  
83 Malath Cooperative Insurance and Reinsurance Co.  
84 Mediterranean and Gulf Insurance and Reinsurance Co.  
85 Allianz Saudi Fransi Cooperative Insurance Co.  
86 Saudi United Cooperative Insurance Co.  
87 Saudi Cooperative Insurance Co.  
88 Arabian Shield Cooperative Insurance Co.  
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89 SABB Takaful Co.  
90 Sanad Cooperative Insurance Co.  
91 Saudi Arabian Cooperative Insurance Co.  
92 Saudi Indian Co. for Cooperative Insurance  
93 Gulf Union Cooperative Insurance Co.  
94 AlAhli Takaful Co.  
95 Al Ahlia Insurance Co.  
96 Allied Cooperative Insurance Group 
97 Arabia Insurance Cooperative Co.  
98 Arabia Insurance Cooperative Co.  
99 Trade Union Cooperative Insurance Co.  
100 Al Sagr Company for Cooperative Insurance  
101 United Cooperative Assurance Co.  
102 Saudi Reinsurance Co.  
103 Bupa Arabia For Cooperative Insurance Co.  
104 Weqaya Takaful Insurance and Reinsurance Co.  
105 Al Rajhi Co. for Cooperative Insurance  
106 ACE Arabia Cooperative Insurance Co.  
107 AXA Cooperative Insurance Co.  
108 Gulf General Insurance Co.  
109 Buruj Cooperative Insurance Co.  
110 ALalamiya Cooperative Insurance Co.  
111 Solidarity Saudi Takaful Co.  
112 Wataniya Insurance Co.  
113 Amanah Cooperative Insurance Co.  
114 Saudi Enaya Cooperative Insurance Co.  
115 Alinma Tokio Marine Co.  
116 Saudi Arabian Refineries Co.  
Multi Investment (7) 
117 Saudi Advanced Industries Co.  
118 Al Ahsa Development Co.  
119 Saudi Industrial Services Co.  
120 Aseer Trading, Tourism, Mfg., Agri., Real Estate, and Contracting 
121 Al Baha for Development and Investment Co. ABDICO 
122 Kingdom Holding Co.  
123 Takween Advanced Industries Co.  
Industrial Investment 
(15) 
124 Basic Chemical Industries Co.  
125 Middle East Paper Co.  
126 Saudi Arabian Mining Co.  
127 Astra Industrial Group 
128 Al Sorayai Trading and Industrial Group 
129 Al Hassan Ghazi Ibrahim Shaker Co.  
130 Saudi Pharmaceutical Indus. and Medical Appliances Corp.  
131 The National Co. for Glass Industries  
132 Filing and Packing  Material Mfg. Co.  
133 National Metal Manufacturing and Casting Co.  
134 Saudi Chemical Co.  
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135 Saudi Paper Manufacturing Co.  
136 Al-Abdullatif Industrial Investment Co.  
137 Saudi Industrial Export Co.  
138 United Wire Factories Company 
Building and 
Construction (18) 
139 Bawan Co.  
140 Electrical Industries Co.  
141 Al Yamamah Steel Co.  
142 Mohammed Al Mojil Group Co.  
143 Saudi Steel Pipes Co.  
144 Abdullah A. M. Al Khodari Sons Co.  
145 Saudi Ceramics Co.  
146 National gypsum Co.  
147 Saudi Cable Co.  
148 Saudi Industrial Development Co.  
149 Saudi Arabian Aminantit Co.  
150 Arabian Pipes Co.  
151 Zamil Industrial Investment Co.  
152 Al Babtain Power and Telecommunication Co.  
153 Saudi Vitrified Clay Pipe Co.  
154 Middle East Specialized Cables Co.  
155 Red Sea Housing Services Co.  
156 Saudi Real Estate Co.  
Real Estate 
Development  (9) 
157 Taiba Holding Co.  
158 Makkah Constr. and Development  
159 Arriyadh Development Co.  
160 Emaar The Economic City 
161 Jabal Omar Development Co.  
162 Dar Alarkan Real Estate Development Co.  
163 Knowledge Economic City  
164 Al Andalus Property Co.  
165 The National Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia  
Transport (5) 
166 Saudi Ground Services Co.  
167 Saudi Public Transport Co.  
168 Saudi Land Transport Co. MUBSRRAD 
169 United International Transportation Co. Ltd 
170 Tihama Advt. and Public Relations Co.  Media and Publishing 
(3) 171 The Saudi Research and Marketing Group 172 Saudi Printing and Packaging Co.  
173 Al Tayyar Travel Group  
Hotel and Tourism (4) 174 Abdulmohsen Al Hokair Group for Tourism and Development Co.  175 Dur Hospitality Co.   
176 Tourism Enterprises Co. SHAMS 
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Appendix 4: CSED Index and rules of analysing the reports 
Rules of  analysing the reports from (Hackston and Milne, 1996; O'Dwyer, 2005a) 
1. Discussion of directors’ activities is not to be included as a discussion on employees. 
2. All sponsorship activity is to be included no matter how much it is advertising. 
3. All disclosures must be specifically stated, they cannot be implied. 
"4. If any sentence has more than one possible classification, the sentence should be classified 
CSED Index main categories:  
1. Environmental disclosure 
1.1. Environmental Pollution 
1.2.  Conservation of natural resources 
1.3.  Energy 
1.4.  Aesthetic 
1.5. Biodiversity  
1.6. Environmental (other) 
2. Human resource disclosure 
2.1. Training and staff development 
2.2.  Pay and benefits 
2.3. Participation and staff involvement 
2.4. Health and safety and individual well-being  
2.5. Measures of human resources policies 
2.6. Employment policies 
2.7. Equal opportunities 
2.8.  Work-life balance 
2.9.  Human resource (other) 
3. Products and consumer disclosure  
3.1.  Product development 
3.2.  Product safety 
3.3.  Product quality  
3.4.  Consumers’ relations 
3.5.  Product and consumer (other) 
4. Community involvement disclosure 
4.1.  Support for education or training 
4.2. Support for art and culture 
4.3.  Support for public health and safety 
4.4. Sponsoring sporting or recreational projects 
4.5.  Community involvement (other) 
5. Economic 
5.1. Economic performance 
5.2.  Market Presence  
5.3.  Indirect economic impacts  
5.4. Saudisation 
5.5. Economic (other) 
6. Social and general disclosure 
6.1. Sustainability and Transparency 
6.2. Anti-Corruption 
6.3. General disclosures 
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as to the activity most emphasized in the sentence." 
5. Innovations in products or services should not be included unless they are beyond what is 
necessary to compete in the marketplace or attract business." 
6. Any disclosure which is repeated shall be recorded as a CSD sentence each time it is 
discussed." 
7. Discussions relating to the quality of goods and services will not be a CSD unless it contains 
notice of a verifiable change in quality, Organisation ISO 9000 quality series standard." 
e.g. accreditation to the International Standards 
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Appendix 5: Saudi listed companies by sectors in 2014 
Sector No. of Companies  
Banks and financial services 12 
Petrochemical industry 14 
Building and Construction 16 
Real Estate Development 8 
Cement 14 
Transport 4 
Media and Publishing 3 
Hotel and Tourism  4 
Retail 14 
Energy and Utilities 2 
Agriculture and Food Industry 16 
Telecommunication and information technology 5 
Insurance 35 
Multi investment 7 
Industrial Investment 14 
Total 168 
Reference: Saudi Stock exchange official website November 2014 
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Appendix 6: The sample of the index pilot study 
No.  Industry  Company name  
1 Retail Fawaz Al-Hokair Group  
2 Multi investment Saudi Refining Inc. 
3 Industrial investment  Saudi Chemical Company 
4 Bulding and construction Zamil Group 
5 Transport The National Shipping of Saudi Arabia  
6 Media and publishing Tihama Holding 
7 Cement Saudi Cement company 
8 Petrochemicals  Petro Rabigh   
9 Food and agriculture Savola Group 
10 Telecommunications Saudi Telecommunications Company  
11 Energy and utilities Saudi Electricity Company 
12 Real State Jabal Omar Developmwnt Co.  
13 Tourism  Al-Tayyar Group 
14 Banking Saudi British Bank 
15 Insurance Puba Arabia  
 
